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Preface
I set up the TalkingHeads experimentwith a group of brilliant students and collaborators
at the end of the nineteen nineties. It was intended to be the first large-scale, open-ended
experiment in the emergence of a shared set of grounded concepts and a vocabulary for
expressing these concepts by a population of autonomous agents. Inspired by Ludwig
Wittgenstein, the experiment took the form of a series of language games, more con-
cretely games of reference about a “world” made up of geometric figures pasted on a
white board and observable by the agents through pan-tilt cameras. I wanted to demon-
strate with this experiment earlier breakthroughs in the study of language origins and
test whether they would hold for large-scale populations and open-ended environments.
I also wanted to find out how humans would interact with these agents. So we made it
such that human users, after logging in through the Internet, could teach new words to
agents or use the words they learned from the agents to play their own language games.
In 1999, the experiment went live in the context of an exhibition called Laboratorium
organised in Antwerp (Belgium) by Hans-Ulrich Obrist and Barbara Vanderlinden. After
a first experimental run from 27 June 1999 to 3October 1999, the experimentwas repeated
as part of a new exhibition called N01SE organised in Cambridge and London (UK) by
Adam Lowe and Simon Schaffer from 22 January to 26 March 2000, with additional
installations at the Palais de la Découverte in Paris and several other places.
At the occasion of the 1999 Laboratorium exhibition, the draft of a book was pub-
lished that described the experiment and the underlying theoretical assumptions in con-
siderable detail. For many reasons, not at least that work continued at great speed on
other exciting experiments, the original “pre-edition” of the book never made it to a
fully finished officially published work, and circulated only as an “underground” edition.
This was disappointing because the Talking Heads experiment was an important break-
through. Moreover the experiment contained the first inklings of mechanisms that since
then have been worked out, enhanced and tested in many experiments which replicated
the original results and further enhanced them. The present volume is intended to fill
this gap.
Part I of this book contains the original Talking Heads volume which has been only
slightly edited to correct for minor mistakes. It is a miracle that the original source files
survived and that the figures could be reconstructed. Part II of this book contains addi-
tional unpublished background material, reports on different aspects of the experiment,
including its scientific results, and a brief overview of further developments in language
evolution research that took place on the basis of the experiment.
Dozens of people worked on the Talking Heads. The initial research started in 1997 at
the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Free University of Brussels (VUB) funded by
a “Geconcentreerde onderzoeks actie” (GOA) of the Belgian government. Joris Van Loov-
eren worked closely with me on a first prototype that was demonstrated in 1997, using
an active vision system custom-built by Tony Belpaeme and segmentation algorithms
implemented by Danny van Tieghem. Edwin de Jong did the first theoretical investiga-
tions of the underlying semiotic dynamics. Once the initiative for a public installation
was taken, the main hub became the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris, where
I worked together intensely with Frédéric Kaplan and Angus McIntyre, with additional
contributions for the teleportation infrastructure by Silvère Tajan and Alexis Agahi. The
AI Laboratory of the VUB remained a second hub where important contributions were
made most notably by Joris Van Looveren, Tony Belpaeme, Holger Kenn andMario Cam-
panella. To all of them I am grateful that we were able to create such an extremely excit-
ing experiment that stimulated many thousands of people to think about language and
its origins in new ways.
I also thank the curators of the Laboratorium Exhibition in Antwerp (Hans-Ulrich
Obrist and Barbara Vanderlinden) and the members of its curating board (Bruno Latour
and Carsten Höller), the curators of the N01SE exhibition in London (Adam Lowe and Si-
mon Schaffer), artist Olafur Eliasson, with whom I collaborated on the Look into the Box
piece at the Musé d’art Moderne in Paris, artist Anne-Mie Van Kerckhoven for collabora-
tions for the Chromosophy laboratory in Aachen and the many organisers and helping
hands who made the other installations possible. Sylvia Spruck Wrigley has helped to
improve the 1999 pre-edition (now Part I of the book) under considerable time pressure
and Marleen Wynants was crucial in the last phases of this publication with comments,
professional advice, photographs, and support.
Part II of the book discusses what happened after the Talking Heads experiment. Our
research went through various boom and bust cycles. In the good years there was money
to hire new people and push the research forwards, but then bad years would come and
the team disintegrated again due to lack of resources. This made progress less substantial
than it could have been but had the advantages that waves of new young people were
given a chance to contribute. The first wave started working after the Talking Heads
experiments were finished. At Sony CSL there was first exciting work by Pierre-Yves
Oudeyer and Frederic Kaplan pursuing the origins of turn taking and symbol usage with
the aibo robots, thus exploring even earlier stages in the origins of language.
Thanks to the FP6 ECAgents project and the FP7 ALEAR projects of the European
Commission, a new team could be formed around 2004, which included Joris Bleys,
Joachim De Beule, Bart de Vylder, and Jelle Zuidema at the VUB in Brussels. Mean-
while, we got access through the Sony Computer Science Laboratory to the QRIO hu-
manoid robots thanks to Masahiro Fujita and Hideki Shimomura. A new team formed
in Paris which included Nancy Chang, Katya Gerasimova, Martin Loetzsch, Vanessa Mi-
celli, Michael Spranger, Simon Pauw and Remi Van Trijp. I thank them all for major
contributions to the experiments reported in the second part of the book. I also thank
Stefano Nolfi for coordinating the ECAgents project with a firm hand and Manfred Hild
and his team for creating the new humanoid myon robot that we used in later experi-
ments.
vi
In 2008/2009 I was a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, which was an ideal
environment to reflect on our research program and how we could proceed. Many new
ideas came out of that year, in particular, a realisation that for several of the key puzzles
we were trying to solve, inspiration could be found in evolutionary biology, and this led
to a new path which only now is beginning to be explored. It is good to know that after a
major collapse in funding around 2009, there is again a team of young people assembling
to push research on language games further. They include Emilia Garcia Casademont in
Barcelona, Miquel Cornudella and Paul Van Eecke in Paris, and Yana Knight in Brussels.
Financing remains precarious but the future is in their hands!
The present new edition is not only special because of the historical significance of
the Talking Heads experiment but also because it is the first one in a new series “Compu-
tational Models of Language Evolution” published by the Language Science Press. The
intention of this series is to make available through Open Access in-depth models of lan-
guage evolution that have been validated using agent-based computational simulations.
I am grateful to Martin Haspelmath and Stefan Müller (the editors of the Language Sci-
ence Press) for making it possible to publish in Open Access research results which do
not quite fit in the standard mode. I thank Maria Ferrer Bonnet for help in the final stage
of adapting bibliographies. And I am grateful to ICREA for time to create a revised and
extended version of the Talking Heads Book and to the Institut de Biologia Evolutiva
in Barcelona for providing such an excellent working environment. I thank in addition
Remi van Trijp for his help in making this series a reality and Annemie Maes for her
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Part I
The 1999 Talking Heads book

Original cover of the Talking Heads book published in 1999 on the occasion of the




Inquiring about the origins of a phenomenon, as opposed tomerely describing its present
state, often leads to profound new discoveries. Biology provides a wealth of examples.
Darwin asked the question of the origins of species diversity and thus discovered evolu-
tion by natural selection. Pasteur wondered about the origins of life and thus discovered
the role of bacteria in human diseases. My approach in this book is going to be similar. In
order to advance our understanding of human language and cognition, I propose to ad-
dress the fundamental question how language and meaning might ever have originated.
I will not do this by a historical reconstruction, nor by an empirical investigation of child
language acquisition or by examining data from the birth of new languages.1 Rather, I
will pose the question in a completely general way: how can a physically embodied au-
tonomous agent arrive at a repertoire of categories for conceptualising his world and
how can a group of such agents ever develop a shared communication system with the
same complexity as human natural languages?
1.1 The Talking Heads experiment
For centuries, philosophers, linguists, psychologists and neuroscientists have been grop-
ing with the amazing capacities of the mind. By necessity, they have been doing this
through thought experiments or by observing human behaviour and brain anatomy. Al-
though this has generated a wealth of insights,2 everyone involved in this research must
surely agree that we are still lacking adequate models, particularly for higher order cog-
nitive functions like language processing, and definitely for understanding how such
functions may have arisen. To discover or test such models, it therefore remains useful
to do experiments with artificial systems. We can build robots that receive sensory in-
puts through a camera or other sensors, give them computational power and memory,
and empower them for action in the world by adding actuators. Given such a set-up, we
1 There has been a renewed interest the last five years in the question of the origins of language from these
various perspectives. Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy & Knight (1998) contains a representative sample of the
most recent work. Other samples of recent research can be found in Hawkins (1992) and Velichkovsky &
Rumbaugh (1996).
2 Attempts are made to bring together the insights from various disciplines to establish a true “cognitive
science”. Osherton (1995) contains an introduction into some of the main research trends in this very
diverse scientific field. See also Luger (1994). The work reported in the present book can be classified
as theoretical cognitive science because I try to formulate and test the operational adequacy of possible
models for the origins of language and meaning but do not claim nor give any evidence that these models
are also valid for human cognition, just as the study of aerodynamics and aircraft design may help to
understand how birds can fly but is more generic than its biological implementations.
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can precisely examine the operational adequacy of a hypothesis. For example, if some-
one proposes a process for segmenting images, we can test this process by capturing
streams of images through a camera and see whether the process is indeed capable of
performing segmentation. When someone proposes a process for parsing sentences, we
can implement this process and confront it with a series of example sentences to mea-
sure success and failure. How else can we test the operational adequacy of a proposed
cognitive model, given the enormous complexity involved? Of course, building an artifi-
cial system in no way proves that the principles that were used to construct it are valid
for natural systems. But it is an enormously valuable source of insight for approaching
the extraordinarily complex phenomena observed in human cognition.
Figure 1.1: Two Talking Heads are shown a1 and a2 each seeing the scene on the white
board from a slightly different viewpoint.
The Talking Heads experiment follows this research strategy. It features an enor-
mously challenging experimental infrastructure to explore how a cognitive system, like
the one underlying human language, might be able to bootstrap itself into interaction
with other cognitive systems and driven by increasing challenges from the environment.
The experiment involves a set of robotic “Talking Heads” engaged in language games,
with each other or with human interlocutors, about real world scenes they perceive
through their sensors (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The robots use vision as major sensory
source. They are located in different places in the world and connected through the Inter-
net. Two robotic agents can only engage in an interaction when they are instantiated in
robot bodies in a shared physical environment. After an exchange, an agent can teleport
himself to another body in another location and engage in interactions there.
The agents’ categorisations of the world and their language is not programmed but
emerges. It is constructed and learned by the agents themselves. The more interactions
they have with other humans the more they adopt our concepts and language. Interact-
ing with the Talking Heads is a bit like interacting with two year old twins; they play
6
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Figure 1.2: A single “Talking Head”. There is a camera oriented towards a white board.
The bottom screen shows what the camera observes. The top right screen
shows the result of processing. A loudspeaker reproduces the utterances of
the agent.
most of the time with each other and develop their own language in the process, but the
more humans engage in interaction with them, themore the language resembles existing
human languages.3
Although the agents invent their own language and conceptualisations of the world,
we had to program a basic cognitive architecture into the agents. This architecture is
based on a set of relatively simple, biologically plausible mechanisms, which neverthe-
less gives rise to enormous complexity. The goal of the experiment is to examine the
explanatory power of these mechanisms: What phenomena do they cause and hence
explain?
1.2 The main hypotheses
The Talking Heads experiment is first and foremost a scientific experiment. It subjects
four radical ideas to experimental scrutiny. The first idea is that language emerges
through self-organisation out of local interactions of language users. It spontaneously
becomes more complex to increase reliability and optimise transmission across genera-
tions of users, without a central designer. I call this the selfish language hypothesis:
3 Often twins develop a private language, particularly if they do not interact much with adults. Compared to
other children, twins are usually 6 months behind in their language development but that delay and also
the private languages that go with it disappear by the age of 8.
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Language colonises brains and recruits available cognitive capacities to satisfy its ap-
petite for expressing ever more complex meaning with minimal effort and maximum
effectiveness.4 Language is not a uniform abstract system of rules (and definitely not an
innate system of rules) but a creative open-ended complex adaptive system, like a natural
ecology, in which certain solutions to relate forms with meanings become temporarily
conventionalised in the community, even though new creative solutions emerge almost
any time someone speaks. Language is in constant flux because new meanings contin-
uously arise and existing forms undergo change beyond the control of any individual
language user.
The second radical idea is that meaning is built up slowly by each individual in a
cumulative growth process. Meaning is not innate, as rationalists in the footprints of
Plato have been arguing for centuries, nor learned through stepwise induction from
examples and counterexamples, as empiricists have been saying. Meaning is at first
very concrete and strongly situated in the environment and bodily experiences. I will
take the suggestions made by Wittgenstein one step further, namely that meaning (and
language) is constructed and practised as part of language games.5 I will introduce a
selectionist approach to the acquisition of meaning, introducing models to show that
conceptual distinctions can “grow” in the brain like the leaves and branches on a tree and
be pruned to fit the demands and characteristics of the environment in which an agent
finds itself. Even though non-verbal activities, like predicting the future based on amodel
or deciding what to do in specific circumstances, stimulates the growth of distinctions,
language use is probably one of the greatest stimulators of conceptual growth. It provides
feedback about which distinctions were successful in linguistic communication and thus
whether or not they should be preserved. Thus language and cognition co-evolve. Each
one pushes the other up towards more complexity and they become tightly co-ordinated
with neither a central co-ordinator nor prior innate design.
A third idea concerns the characteristics of cognitive architectures. For centuries, the
human cognitive system has been likened to a machine, most recently to the computer
as an information processing machine.6 Although there is a lot to say for adopting such
a viewpoint, I will instead emphasise biological metaphors. Specifically, I will defend
the idea that a living ecology is a better metaphor for a realistic cognitive system. In an
ecology, there is constant change as the individual organisms adapt themselves to the
physical environment and to other organisms sharing the same environment. There is
evolution by selection so that successful adaptations survive and others disappear. There
are failures but also repair processes happening at all levels of the ecological hierarchy.
These various characteristics inspired the artificial architectures used in the experiments.
A fourth radical idea concerns the nature and origins of grammar. Rather than invok-
ing the need of a highly specialised genetically determined language organ,7 I believe
4 See Deacon (1997) for a discussion of co-evolution between cognitive and linguistic capacities and brain
structures.
5 Wittgenstein (1953) emphasises the relativity of concepts and the role of language and hence meaning in
social interactions.
6 See Newell & Simon (1976).
7 As strongly argued by Chomsky in various writings, for example Chomsky (1986). Even though Chomsky
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that grammar spontaneously arises when generic capabilities to categorise reality, store
past events in terms of abstract schemas, remember associations between events, etc.,
reach a critical level and are applied to language itself. These capabilities are relevant
across many different cognitive domains. In order to store linguistic experiences, human
memories spontaneously structure them, thus introducing abstract schemas, internal
categories, and roles that substructures can play in schemas. These organisational ele-
ments then become externalised. Categories are marked by enriching the form of words,
schema boundaries are marked by imposing patterns on the expression of a schema,
roles are marked by assigning them to specific positions in a pattern. This externalisation
increases the reliability in communication because it reduces ambiguities and supplies
additional context. It also aids the stable transmission of the language from one genera-
tion to the next because the language learner gets additional hints to guess the meaning
and function of unknown words and constructions. Once such structuring devices are
in place, they help to increase the expressive power of the language. The complexity
of possible language interactions can increase, and words or word groups which had
multiple usages can become specialised for particular semantic functions.
The various language construction processes gradually shaping a full-blown language
are not under the conscious control of individuals but instead constitute a collective
enterprise. Language users structure and restructure their language and thus increase
its systematicity, but there are also forces causing a breakdown of systematicity, such
as erosion of a form through sloppiness of pronunciation, in turn causing a grammati-
cal regularity to break down. The interplay between these constructive and destructive
forces helps to explain the constant evolution of language and the growing diversity
among languages emanating from the same source, such as French, Italian, and Spanish
from Latin.
1.3 A bottom-up approach to artificial intelligence
My daughter Lenie grew up surrounded by computers and robots which her obsessed
father was trying to infuse with artificial intelligence. When she was twelve, I asked her
whether she thought any of the machines or programs she had seen were intelligent. She
said no, someone had programmed them, so they were not intelligent themselves. The
programmer was intelligent, not the machine. Indeed, this is true.
In 1996, a computer program called Deep Blue defeated the reigning world champion
Kasparov in a game of chess (Newborn 1996). Kasparov was astonished and depressed,
and claimed this was a defeat of humans in the race against machines. But was he ac-
tually beaten by artificial intelligence? Not really. A team of engineers and scientists
from Carnegie Mellon University and from the IBM Watson Research Center had been
working for ten years to program vast amounts of chess knowledge, invented by human
experts, into Deep Blue. They had built extremely sophisticated dedicated computing
argues for an innate language acquisition device he has expressed scepticism about evolution by natural
selection as an explanation for the origin of this device (and therefore of language). A genetic theory of
language evolution has been suggested by Pinker (1994).
9
1 Introduction
hardware to apply this knowledge at a blinding speed. So, in beating Kasparov, other
humans were the clever ones, not machines.
Recently, the whole world looked on in fascination for several weeks as a small robot,
the Rover Sojourner, ventured out on Mars, navigating through the rocky landscape,
collecting samples, taking pictures and performing experiments.8 Was this a first sign of
artificial life? Even though the behaviour of the robot has some apparent characteristics
of living systems, people more familiar with the project would say no. The robot was
hardly autonomous; it continuously had to rely on signals coming fromhuman engineers
in order to set its next targets, or to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The robot’s
behaviours were all human designed and carefully programmed. The robot itself was
in no way adaptive. It did not learn new behaviours nor new interaction modes, as a
living system would do. It was critically dependent on human engineers whenever its
functionality needed to be extended or modified.
This in no way diminishes the achievement in building these artificial devices, on the
contrary, it does show we have to be careful in ascribing mental or biological qualities
to machines. Despite the hype generated by the media and the occasional researcher
taking his dreams for reality, intelligence and life remain very much the property of nat-
ural rather than artificial systems. In a way, our powerful engineering methodologies
make it too easy to succumb to a strategy of programming directly the human or animal
behaviours we observe and interpret as being intelligent. But doing this, we keep simulat-
ing the end products of intelligence rather than getting at the heart of intelligence itself.
We put our own human concepts explicitly in the machine instead of implementing the
mechanisms that enable an artificial agent to acquire new categories itself, implement-
ing by hand a fixed set of predetermined behaviours which we believe the agent should
have, rather than supplying mechanisms that allow the agent to acquire new behaviours
when faced with unforeseen circumstances, and so on. Things are done this way because
we simply do not know how to do them otherwise.
The goal of the fundamental research reported in this book is not only to raise some
profound fascinating questions about language, but also to lay the groundwork for an
alternative bottom-up approach towards artificial intelligence. In this approach, the hu-
man designer does not put his or her language and concepts into the computer, but tries
to set up systems that autonomously generate their own. Indeed, if we have scientific
models which explain how language originates, both in a language community and in
new individuals born into a community, we should be able to operationalise these mod-
els and show that they work on autonomous robotic agents. This is exactly what the
Talking Heads experiment tries to accomplish.
1.4 History of the project
The Talking Heads experiment is the culmination of one of the most exciting scientific
and engineering projects I have ever been involved in. It has required the creative efforts
8 See Wunsch (1998) (a book for children!).
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of a dozen excellent researchers over many years. The story started in 1985. Instead of
continuing to design and program intelligence explicitly based on formalising human
cognitive capacities, as most of my colleagues in artificial intelligence research labs were
doing,9 I started to focus on the question of how intelligence might originate and evolve
in physical agents as they interact autonomously with their environment or with other
humans, and I encouraged my students at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the
University of Brussels (VUB) to experiment in the same direction. We initially developed
a bottom-up, behaviour-oriented approach to sensori-motor intelligence, which was also
being explored around the same time by Rodney Brooks at theMIT Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory. The behaviour-oriented, bottom-up approach was a counter reaction to the
symbolic, top-down approach of earlier AI research. See Steels &Brooks (1995) andArkin
(1998). We built robots of various sizes and shapes, using simple electronic circuits, Lego
bricks, small motors, rechargeable batteries, self-made sensors, single board computers,
and everything else that appeared useful (Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: Example of a Lego vehicle built by Tim Smithers based on Lego bricks,
a sensori-motor processing board, and a variety of sensors and actuators.
We developed these robots in the early nineties for exploring a behaviour-
oriented approach to robotics.
Most robots drove around on wheels, but we also used balloons and propellers to build
flying robots and experimented with a fish-shaped robot which swam in the university
swimming pool by wagging its tail (see Figure 1.4).
To investigate the role of the environment in shaping the evolving sensori-motor
capacities of these robots, we built various robotic ecosystems in which robots could
recharge themselves but also had to work for their living by dimming lights that took
away energy from the total energy flowing in their ecosystem (see Figure 1.5). Visitors
9 Some recent overviews of this “classical” approach to artificial intelligence can be found in: Nilsson (1998)
and Russell & Norvig (2003).
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Figure 1.4: “Artificial fish” built by Miles Pebody to explore influence of robot bodies on
behaviour. The fish could swim around by wagging its tail and avoid obstacles
based on infrared sensing.
to our lab could see robots helping each other or engaging in fierce competition for the
resources available for survival. In all of this research, we tried to see how far behaviours
would autonomously evolve, in other words we tried to find mechanisms by which the
robots would bootstrap themselves towards greater sensori-motor complexity. One of
the main lessons from these experiments was that explanations for cognition lie partly
outside the brain of the individual agent: The environment, the body, the sensori-motor
apparatus and the behaviour of the other agents all partly shaped their capacities and
further development.10
Many fascinating tales can be told about this research but the intelligence being exhib-
ited by these autonomous robots hardly seemed worthy of the name. Yes, they learned
by themselves how to avoid obstacles, how to recharge themselves in a charging station,
or how to co-ordinate efforts to exploit the resources in the ecosystems we had built for
them. But critical observers did not see much more than rat intelligence and they were
right. The original goal of reaching human cognitive levels, as observable for instance in
expert problem solving or conversations in natural language, remained elusive. The tra-
ditional artificial intelligence approach of explicitly programming symbolic intelligence
still gave far superior performance in tasks requiring cognition. Clearly, essential theo-
retical concepts were missing for a truly bottom-up approach to succeed.
In the summer of 1995, a clear breakthrough occurred. I was working as a visiting
researcher in the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Tokyo, invited by its director
Mario Tokoro. Reflecting on our experiments from a distance, two new ideas occurred
to me. First of all, language may have been the missing key in the initial experiments.
Language may be a necessary route by which the human cognitive system bootstraps
itself autonomously, in tight interactionwith the environment and aided by a community
of other language speakers. This suggested that if we wanted to have emergent forms
of cognitive intelligence, we needed to go the same route. Second, the principles and
mechanisms that had been pouring out of the study of complexity had to be relevant
to understanding the origins and evolution of language, because they provided generic
10 This approach is also known as situated cognition. Clancey (1997), see also: Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991).
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Figure 1.5: This ecosystem was designed together with David McFarland (Oxford Univer-
sity) to explore emergent cooperation and competition. The robots in the form
of lego vehicles could recharge themselves in the charging station (shown in
the right top corner). But they had to ensure that there was enough energy in
the charging station by dimming a light in black cylinders by pushing against
them.
explanations for how complexitymay emerge. These principles include self-organisation,
structural coupling, selectionism, level formation, and many others (Nicolis & Prigogine
1989). The field of artificial life brings together researchers exploring the insights of
complex systems with computational and robotic experiments (see: Langton 1995).
Together with other researchers interested in the then-arising field of “artificial life”,
I had already been simulating path formation in ant societies and other biological phe-
nomena exhibiting an emergence of complexity. It dawned on me that the importance of
these mechanisms for bootstrapping intelligence and language might be much greater
than thought so far.11
11 The following reference provides a general survey of similar work in the area of lexicon formation: Steels
(1997b). A representative sample of work on syntax is Briscoe (1999).
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Back in Brussels, an extremely exciting but very intense period of research started as
I tried to apply these principles to language and subject them to experimental scrutiny.12
We very quickly built a first prototype of a Talking Head with our own hardware and
low-level software (see Figure 1.6) and experimented with language games on mobile
robotic agents.13 New fundamental insights and discoveries emerged almost daily. The
first experiments, particularly in grounding language on real robots, were extremely
difficult but we were clearly making steady progress.
Figure 1.6: First prototype of a Talking Head camera with associated electronics built by
Tony Belpaeme. The camera is capable to track moving images.
As my research programme grew more radical, it became more and more difficult
to get funding. European research and development programmes were increasingly
demanding short-term projects that targeted information technology products already
available on the American or Japanese market. Increasingly, my research proposals were
being rejected and running projects were cut off, as reviewers could not see direct short-
term commercial benefits. All this was endangering the further existence of my Brussels
laboratory, whereas I, paradoxically, thought that our research had never been more
promising. Fortunately at this critical moment Mario Tokoro helped me again in a cru-
cial way. He understood what I was hoping to achieve and ensured secure and stable
resources from the Sony Corporation. At the end of 1996, I consequently set up a new
research structure in Paris, a spin-off from the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in
12 The earliest papers on these mechanisms are in: Steels (1995) and Steels (1997a).
13 The electronics and tracking software for this active camera were built by Tony Belpaeme. The mobile
robot experiments were conducted with Paul Vogt. Other early work on the grounding and autonomous
acquisition of language-like communication systems by robotic systems is described in Steels & Vogt (1997).
See also: Billard & Dautenhahn (1999).
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Tokyo, where the bulk of the research reported in this book could be done in almost
ideal circumstances. The Paris research was complemented with many important contri-
butions from my graduate students at the VUB AI Laboratory in Brussels.
1.5 Beyond Turing
A scientific experiment creates, in a controlled and repeatable way, phenomena which
shed light on similar phenomena observed in the natural world. Initially there is always
some discussion about the relation between the artificially created phenomena and the
natural phenomena. Galileo dropped cannon balls from the tower of Pisa and claimed
that these experiments validated a general theory of falling bodies; but his contempo-
raries objected that birds graceously landing on a roof can also be seen as falling bodies,
so how general was his theory really?
When dealing with cognitive phenomena such as language and meaning, the same
problem arises. To what extent do the languages constructed by the Talking Heads count
as languages? Does it make any sense to say that these robotic agents categorise their
world? Do the Talking Heads learn? Do they genuinely understand each other? Do they
understand us? To what extent is there a real increase in syntactic complexity? Intense
discussions about whether cognitive phenomena can be recreated in artificial systems
have raged since researchers have been exploring this route, and they have been shown
extremely difficult to resolve to everyone’s satisfaction.
It seems unavoidable that there is disagreement because judgements about cognitive
capabilities are to some extent subjective. Most people ascribe more intelligence to their
pets than a casual observer is willing to admit. In any case, judgements should clearly
rest with humans, and definitely not with the designers who are all too keen to call their
systems intelligent. This was clearly recognised by Turing when he devised his famous
Turing test.14 Turing started from a popular societal game of his time, where an observer
had to tell through a dialog whether he was talking to a man or a woman. He proposed
to call a computer program intelligent when it was capable of playing the role of a man
or woman so well that the observer could no longer tell whether a person or a computer
program was playing the game. The Turing test has rightfully been criticised as being
on the one hand too difficult, because it is completely open-ended, and on the other
hand too narrow, because it does not incorporate important aspects of intelligence such
as learning or sensori-motor intelligence. The only way to have a decent showing in
the Turing test is to cheat, i. e. to let the computer mimic intelligence by manipulating
symbolic patterns without any notion of what they mean. It is therefore desirable to
have an alternative set up which still preserves some of Turing’s original ideas.
The goal of the Talking Heads experiment is not to demonstrate an artificial intelli-
gence with the same capacities as human intelligence, but to perform scientific experi-
ments so as to examine aspects of a theory of the origins of language and meaning. How-
ever, as in Turing’s proposal, the public should be the ultimate judge whether cognitive
14 The Turing test is originally described in Turing (1950).
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phenomena are taking place, and the artificial agents should be able to play their role in
interaction with humans. Sound scientific methodology requires that the experimental
apparatus is a white box which can be fully probed by anyone who wants, that the ex-
periments are repeatable, and that the phenomena that are generated (for example, the
complexity of the lexicons or grammars) can be compared by anyone to human cognitive
phenomena in order to gage their similarity and thus their relevance for understanding
human cognition.
In 1999, a golden opportunity presented itself to expose our theories and systems to
public scrutiny and thus solicit judgements from a wide range of human observers. Bar-
bara Vanderlinden and Hans-Ulrich Obrist, two internationally renowned young cura-
tors, had been put in charge of an important art event in the city of Antwerp (Belgium)
and made the brilliant decision to organise a confrontation/co-operation between art
and science.15 They invited artists and scientists to set up a public laboratory in the city
and conduct experiments from the viewpoint of their discipline. This is how the Talking
Heads experiment came to be installed in a public space in Antwerp and how thousands
of people, some more bewildered than others, took part in the first ever large-scale pub-
lic experiment in artificial intelligence. Everybody was encouraged to interact with the
robots and to try and understand what was going on. This was not an obvious thing
to do because the Talking Heads construct their own language and their own conceptu-
alisation of the world. Understanding what they are talking about resembles the work
of an anthropologist who is studying the language and conceptualisations of a newly
discovered tribe living secluded in the rainforest.
The Laboratory for cognitive robots and teleportation that housed the Talking Heads
experiment also contained a documentation room in which the audience could get ad-
ditional background information and provide feedback and commentary on the exper-
iment. We created a website that was accessible worldwide through the Internet. This
allowed viewers from anywhere in the world to follow the dialogs, inspect the lexicons
and ontologies (sets of perceptually grounded concepts) of the robots, and even interact
remotely with the physical robots, playing language games and doing their own experi-
ments. We also added other physical sites in Tokyo, Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam, San Jose
(US) and other places, to increase the environmental complexity that the agents could
experience.
Themassive response and thoughtful judgements of the public were crucial to validate
many aspects of the theories put forward in this book. But the interactions with a broad
public and the intense discussions that it generated also added new dimensions to the re-
search. First of all, a whole new type of interface between man and machine was taking
shape under our very eyes. In contrast to pre-programmed computer interfaces, which
more often than not make it difficult to do what one wants, the Talking Heads demon-
strated for the first time the concept of negotiated user interfaces. The interaction
was based on mutual respect and adaptation of man and machine. Communicative fail-
ure was not fatal but an opportunity to fine-tune and negotiate the way communication
would take place in the future.
15 The catalogue of this event (Obrist & Vanderlinden 1999) gives an idea of the other laboratories and the
coming together of art and science.
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Secondly, the Talking Heads experiment turned out to be an ideal learning environ-
ment for raising philosophical issues. Children and adults alike started to ask questions
about the nature of meaning, the relation between language and reality, the mind-body
problem, the origins and evolution of language, consciousness, social identity, and so on.
They started to play language games among themselves and some of them reported pro-
found changes in the way they think about language. If these reflections create greater
tolerance towards other languages and the conceptualisations of the world they implic-
itly embody, then I consider the Talking Heads experiment of great societal value, irre-
spective of the scientific and engineering breakthroughs the project has generated.
1.6 The book
This book describes in detail the rationale behind the Talking Heads experiment, the
mechanisms that make it all work, the ontologies and languages the agents develop,
and what happened when the Talking Heads were exposed to public scrutiny. It studies
processes which must already be active in the very first stages of language use in the
child, and must also have been present in the early phases of human language genesis.
Themain text contains the principled line of the argument in a formwhich is intended
to be generally accessible without compromising exactness. The notes after each chapter
contain references to other work, as well as details or additional material of relevance
to the specialist. Each chapter also contains a set of references to literature on the same
topic.
This book starts with a preview of the experiment and a brief illustration of the core
ideas (Chapter 2). I then cover the different tasks step-by-step that speakers and hearers
must carry out: perception (Chapter 3), conceptualisation (Chapter 4), and lexicalisation
(Chapter 5). Each chapter discusses the architectural components withwhich the Talking
Heads have been endowed and the kinds of cognitive structures that the agents generate
in interaction with the environment and the other agents. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 then
bring all these results together and tests the rich complex semiotic dynamics that arise
when the Talking Heads effectively interact with real world environments.
The research discussed in this book is far from finished. It is still science in the making.
Many cognitive structures and capabilities, even very elementary ones arising during the
first years of human life, are still unveiled. Many language issues have not been covered
yet. The current set-up shows only inklings of what future forms of man-machine inter-
action might be like. Nevertheless, I believe that the hypotheses proposed in this book,
and the methodology of experimentation that has been used to explore these hypotheses,
open new venues for a scientific understanding of the human mind. Building artificial
systems that exhibit cognitive capabilities does not de-humanise the mind, in the same
way as the telescope does not demystify the cosmos. We see much more and what we




When people see the Talking Heads for the first time, they are stunned. It takes a while
before one gets used to the self-generated movements of each robot, the strange dia-
logues in an incomprehensible language, the graphs plotting the evolution of their inter-
nal states, and the colourful environment which is the subject of their language games.
But after some time, almost everyone gets involved in the game and attempts to figure
out the language the robots have developed or to teach them his own. Some people come
back day after day to follow the progression of the language and conceptualisations that
the Talking Heads build in collaboration with interacting observers. Children are the
first ones to start playing with neither fear nor preconception.
This chapter explains the general setup of the experiment and gives a rough idea of
what is going on. The various principles and mechanisms at work will be discussed in
more detail later and I will also give many more examples taken from concrete interac-
tions.
2.1 The main components
Clearly in the development of language and meaning, the group and the environment
matter. A child who grows up without a caring community or without sufficient envi-
ronmental stimuli never develops the rich cognitive capacities normal adults have. From
attempts to educate wolf children who grow up in isolation from a human community,
or impaired children for whom the intensity of early interactions are limited, we know
that there are critical periods where a community and a challenging environment must
be present otherwise the child’s capacities for language are damaged for the rest of his
or her life.1
But how can we sufficiently recreate these social conditions in experiments with ar-
tificial systems? Building colonies of physical autonomous robots roaming the world in
search of stimulating environments and rich interactions with other robots is not feasi-
ble today. So how can we ever test seriously situated and socially embedded approaches
to cognition?
2.1.1 Teleporting
Let me make a distinction between the physical aspects of a cognitive agent and the
mental aspects. The physical aspects include the agent’s body, the sensors and articula-
tors, the physical location, the objects in this location, and the other agents physically
1 See Tager-Flusberg (1994).
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present in the environment. The mental aspects include the agent’s repertoire of be-
haviours, the brain structures and processes performing categorisations of reality, his
memory, lexicon, grammar, and so on. In the case of humans, these two aspects are
intimately connected and indivisible. We cannot teleport our mental faculties into an-
other body, or into another copy of our body, even though there have been speculations
that we could in the future record human brain states,2 I believe that this will still not
enable teleportation because in human brains there is no distinction between hardware
and software. The architecture of a human brain, the physical connections between cells,
and the biochemical processes in each cell determine the brain’s behaviour. There is no
separation between a brain program and an interpreter that reads brain programs and
executes them. The brain is a special-purpose hardware device which is unique to each
individual. To copy such a device we would have to rebuild it physically, atom by atom,
and integrate it in an exact copy of the same body.
Figure 2.1: The Talking Heads agents are implemented as software entities that can travel
over the internet. To play a game, they get downloaded in a local server that
drives the cameras and orchestrates a game. After a game, the software state
is uploaded again to travel towards another location.
However, in the case of computer-based artificial agents, we can make the distinction.
It is possible to capture the mental state of an agent in software, load this into a physical
body, and then operate the agent. Afterwards the agent can extract himself again from
the body, teleport himself to another physical location through a data transmission net-
work like the Internet, get instantiated there in another body, and experience another
reality and physically meet other agents. This is exactly how we have implemented the
Talking Heads experiment.3 There are on the one hand the physical structures, which I
2 Such visions of the future have been put forward by Moravec (1995). Neither current artificial intelligence
technology nor the state of the art in brain state recording are anywhere near to realising these visions.
3 The agent teleportation infrastructure is in itself a fascinating non-trivial engineering project. Contribu-
tions from Angus McIntyre, Alexis Agahi, Sylvere Tajan and Frederic Kaplan are gratefully acknowledged
(McIntyre, Steels & Kaplan 1999). The fact that agents can teleport proves that we are dealing with a
truly distributed multi-agent system. It also introduces physical parallelism in the agent-agent and agent-
environment interactions. For a general introduction into multi-agent system technologies and design
methodologies, see Ferber (1998).
20
2.1 The main components
will refer to as the robot bodies. They are installed in different physical locations some-
where in the world and connected with each other through the Internet. Then there
is a population of software structures that are occasionally loaded and instantiated in
specific robots. I will call these software structures virtual agents. A real agent (a
Talking Head) only exists when the virtual agent is loaded in a physical robot body.
Virtual agents cannot interact and an interaction between two “real” agents can only
take place when they are both physically present in the same location. Thus an agent
can travel from Paris to Tokyo at the blink of an eye, rather than having to take a plane,
but two agents can only interact when they are instantiated in the same physical envi-
ronment. It is in principle possible that agents in different physical locations describe to
each other the environment that they see (but which the other one does not see), just
as we would do in a telephone conversation. This is only possible, however, after the
agents have had sufficient interactions with each other in a shared physical world to
have developed and learned a grounded shared language.
The teleporting setup enables fascinating experiments, engulfing the whole globe. The
same agent can look at a scene from different points of view or at scenes in different
physical locations in the world by teleporting himself in different bodies. He can de-
velop categories in one location and enrich his learning experience by moving to a new
location which has different objects and thus poses new categorial challenges. There can
be populations of varying sizes with new agents being born and older agents dying, just
like in natural human populations, so that we can study the transmission of language
from one generation to the next or the resilience of a language against an influx and
outflux of agents. We can also let agents develop in different parts of the world and have
them migrate to study intercultural exchange and language contact.
2.1.2 The robots
A blind person who receives sight after the critical period for acquiring visual categori-
sation undergoes a traumatic experience, see Zeki (1993). We could in principle build
robot bodies through which agents can experience their world with tactile sensing and
other robot bodies which support visual sensing, or both. But then an agent which had
only access to tactile sensing might suddenly find himself in a body equipped with vi-
sion. This pathological complication will be avoided by using the same robotic infras-
tructure in every location, even though it would be fascinating and technically possible
to study multi-modality in its own right. We also decided to make the robots vision-
based, because visual sensing is one of the major sources of meaning in human natural
languages.
Concretely, each robot consists of five building blocks (see Figure 1.2):
• A camera mounted on pan/tilt motors so that it can move up or down and left or
right.
• A loudspeaker (for voice output) and a microphone (for voice input). Each agent
has a particular quality of voice output with male and female voices, so that it is
possible to keep them apart in the dialogue.
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• A computer that can house an agent’s cognitive architecture as well as peripheral
control software to steer the movements of the camera, receive and preprocess im-
ages, or synthesise and analyse sound. This computer is connected to the Internet
to allow virtual agents to be loaded and instantiated.
• A television screen that shows us what the agent instantiated in a body currently
sees through the camera.
• A computer screen that shows us what is going on inside the brain of the agent
currently installed in the robot (Figure 2.2)
Figure 2.2: Interface through which the internal states of agents can be inspected. Two
agents are shown. The top windows show the state of an agent, the middle
windows the camera inputs that the agent sees and the bottomwindows show
their discrimination trees.
In constructing the robot bodies, we have used as much as possible off-the-shelf stan-
dard components so that we could focus almost completely on issues directly relevant
to language and meaning. Each robot’s low-level vision system (integrated in the cam-
era) is already very sophisticated.4 It can focus automatically to get a sharper image
and autonomously track a moving object. The speech signal is produced with a stan-
dard text-to-speech system so that we did not have to worry about building complex
audio modules ourselves. The computer hardware is powerful, but not specialised nor
in the supercomputer range. All programs have been written in the standard symbolic
4 The camera is a Sony EVI-D31. Themain computer is a PowerMacintosh fromApple, Inc. The agent servers
run under the Linux operating system.
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programming language of artificial intelligence research, namely lisp.5 What makes the
Talking Heads experiment special is not the hardware or software tools but what we
have done with it.
2.1.3 The agents
Agents can only engage in interactions with other agents when they are physically in-
stantiated in a robot. Each agent has a basic brain architecture with different layers
performing the cognitive functions relevant for playing language games:
• A perceptual layer which performs low-level signal processing to segment the
image and collect data about each segment such as the colour, size, position or
shape of a segment.
• A conceptual layer which categorises and conceptualises the segmented and pro-
cessed image. It is based on a self-generated and evolving repertoire of categorial
distinctions, such as red versus green, or small versus large. Such a repertoire is
referred to as the agent’s ontology in this book.
• A lexical layer which maintains an evolving repertoire of associations between
meanings and words, which I will refer to as the lexicon, and performs lexical
lookup while parsing or producing utterances.
• A syntactic layer which uses grammatical schemata for organising words in larger
structures or for recognising these structures and reconstructing complex mean-
ings.
• A pragmatic layer which carries out the scripts for playing language games and
maintains themachinery for engaging in interactionswith other agents in a shared
environment.
Each of these layers is described in more detail later. The internals of the layers are not
static but constantly evolving and adapting. They are not strictly modular but coupled
in various ways to each other. Each verbal interaction in effect changes the agent’s
internal state and thus influences future behaviour. A new, virgin agent starts without
any built-in ontology, lexicon, or grammar. This is one of the crucial points of the whole
experiment, because we want to test possible theories on how language and meaning
can evolve and be acquired ab initio.
Agents are part of populations which determine the probability with which they en-
counter each other. This generates a dynamic process at two levels: There is the dynam-
ics of the evolving cognitive competence of each agent (the ontologies, the lexicon, the
5 Theconstruction of the programs underlying the TalkingHeads experiment has required advanced artificial
intelligence programming techniques, such as discussed by Norvig (1992). A general toolkit for the system-
atic execution of simulation and physical experiments, called babel, has been designed and implemented
by Angus McIntyre. The toolkit allows the definition and modular composition of cognitive architectures,
the design of experiments, and the monitoring and displaying of results, see McIntyre (1998).
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grammar), and there are the evolving macroscopic structures which arise in a popula-
tion of agents, such as the common lexicons or shared grammars. We will see that the
mental characteristics of agents, even in a single population, are never identical because
each agent has his own history of interactions with the environment and with other
agents. This is another crucial aspect of the experiment. We want to investigate in how
far communication is possible without complete ontological or linguistic coherence.
2.1.4 Interactivity
To qualify as a sound scientific experiment, anybody who wishes to challenge the claims
should be given the tools “to see for him- or herself”. There are three ways in which we
have empowered observers to do so.
First, each physical Talking Heads site has a complex infrastructure to organise the
interactions between agents operating in that location, and to support the arrival and
teleporting of agents. This infrastructure also houses a commentator, a computer pro-
gram that monitors the dialogues, inspects the internal states of each agent, and displays
useful statistics such as the degree of sharing of the lexicon, the competition between
different words to express a particular meaning, the stability of certain syntactic con-
structions, etc. The commentator produces spoken or written comments and displays
measurement results on an additional computer screen.
Second, the teleporting infrastructure makes it possible to implement interactions be-
tween humans and artificial agents, either directly in the shared physical environment
or through the Internet. At any time, a human experimenter can pretend to be one of the
agents: seize a robot, partly control the camera to set the context of an interaction, and
type in expressions playing the role of speaker or hearer in a language game. The human
experimenter can create a new, virgin agent, track in detail how this agent acquires the
categories and language in an existing group, or try to influence the currently dominat-
ing language by introducing new words or constructs and following their propagation
(see Figure 2.3).
Finally, the environment has been restricted to increase the transparency of experi-
mental results. It consists in all locations of a magnetic white board mounted on the wall
in front of the robots (see Figure 2.4). On this board, the human experimenter can paste
various figures, typically stylised geometric figures like rectangles, circles, and squares,
in various sizes, shapes and colours. By changing the environment, the experimenter
can try to find out what visual categories the agents employ and force the expansion of
categorial repertoires, for example by pasting new types of figures on the board. He can
probe the adaptivity of the agents by setting up situations that destabilise an existing
lexicon and see how long it takes before a new, perhaps more abstract lexicon emerges.
All these tools generate unprecedented opportunities to apply the most rigid scientific
evaluation criteria to the theories of language and cognition that I will propose in this
book.
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Figure 2.3: Internet interface through which users can access the state of games on re-
mote sites and follow the experiment.
Figure 2.4: The physical environment of the Talking Heads consists of a white board on
which various geometric figures can be pasted. The light conditions were not
under the control of the experimenters in most locations.
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2.2 The Guessing Game
Given this rich computational and robotic infrastructure, many specific experiments are
possible. Each experiment could explore a particular interaction between the robots, the
environment, and human observers. In this book, I explore only one type of interac-
tion, which I call the Guessing Game.6 The Talking Heads play this game either among
themselves or with a human experimenter.
2.2.1 Rules of the game
The Guessing Game is played between two physically instantiated agents. Agents in
a virtual state must queue up to have access to one of the robot bodies installed in a
particular site before they can play the game. One agent plays the role of speaker and
the other then plays the role of hearer. Agents take turn playing games so that all of
them develop the capacity to be speaker or hearer. A human experimenter can pick one
of these roles and play the game instead of an artificial agent.
The speaker first looks at one area of the white board and directs the attention of the
hearer to the same area.7 The objects located in this area constitute the context. The
speaker then chooses one object from the context, which I will call the topic, and gives a
verbal hint to the hearer. The verbal hint is an expression that identifies the topic with
respect to the other objects in the context. For example, if the context contains a red
square, a blue triangle, and a green circle, then the speaker may say something like the
red one to identify the red square as the topic. If the context contains also a red triangle,
he has to be more precise and say something like the red square to delineate the topic
from the red triangle as well as from the blue square. Of course, the Talking Heads do
not say the red square but use their own language and concepts which are not necessarily
the same as those used in English. For example, they may say malewina to mean [upper
extreme-left low-redness].
Based on the verbal hint, the hearer tries to guess what topic the speaker has chosen,
and communicates his choice to the speaker by pointing to the object. Given that the
robots do not have arms, pointing is realised by focusing on an object. One robot can
“see” in which direction another one is looking, and thus know where he is “pointing”.
The game succeeds if the topic guessed by the hearer is equal to the topic chosen by the
speaker. The game fails if the guess was wrong or if the speaker or the hearer failed at
some earlier point in the game.
In case of a failure, the speaker gives an extra non-verbal hint to the hearer by himself
pointing to the topic, and both agents try to repair their internal structures to be more
successful in future games: The speaker weakens his hypothesis that the words and con-
6 A very similar game has been called the original language game by Brown (1973) in the context of research
on child language acquisition. See also the thoughtful analysis in Halliday (1987). Research on child lan-
guage has inspired the agent architectures and behaviours but they should not be seen as a realistic model
of child language acquisition.
7 I will explain later how exactly agents decide on a particular scene and how they are able to draw each
other’s attention to specific areas of the white board.
26
2.2 The Guessing Game
structions he used were correct, in the sense of shared by other agents. The hearer tries
to guess what meanings the speaker might have used and deduce what form-meaning
relations or syntactic constructions he is missing. Pointing by gesturing is always vague,
and the repair actions are far from guaranteed to succeed. Nevertheless, they gradually
lead (as we will see) to a sufficiently shared communication system meaning that suc-
cess in guessing the topic purely based on language communication increases to reach
almost 100%.
2.2.2 Nature of the game
The Guessing Game is one of the common things we do with language. For example, I
play a similar game when I sit with a friend at the dining table and say could you give
me the salt. If she guesses correctly what I mean and hands me the salt, the game has
succeeded. If she looks at me with a puzzled face (maybe she does not speak English)
or hands me the salmon instead of the salt, the game has failed. In that case, I can
gesture in the direction of the salt and say no, no, the salt please, and then she hopefully
realises and gives the salt to me. Failure is common in natural language dialogues and
may be caused by many factors. For example, the salmon could indeed be close to the
salt and my pronunciation of the word salt may have sounded a bit like salmon, perhaps
because there was loud music playing in the background or perhaps my friend does not
understand English. A failure is often an opportunity to negotiate how something will be
expressed in the future. For example, the hearer may pick up a new word or the speaker
may realise that a certain word is not appropriate in this particular context.
The Guessing Game is not a game of winners and losers because both agents win or
both agents lose at the same time. But it is a game nevertheless, because it is played
with clear rules, with a clear outcome and strict limitations on how success can be
achieved. An agent can not look inside another agent’s brain state. Agents can only
interact through the external environment. There is no global control center that is mon-
itoring the behaviour and internal states of all agents and setting the way they should
speak or perceive their world. The artificial agents are autonomous and fully distributed,
just like human beings.
The game is different from a closed world game like chess, because the environment
is open. The human experimenter may introduce new objects at any time, any one agent
can extend the language (for example invent a new word), possibly requiring the other
agents to adopt it as well, or the human experimenter may inject new language forms
in the dialogues. Agents try to maximise their communicative success by cooperating to
the fullest and update or change their internal structures and processes to improve their
chances in the game.8
8 The Guessing Game is a cooperative game, because both the agents win or loose at the same time and
have the highest gain if they develop co-ordinated behaviour. The agent who manages to have the most
success in the game is the global winner. Because the commentator requires to know from the speaker
which topic he wants to communicate before he is allowed to speak, no cheating is possible. Game theory,
originally founded by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, can be applied to study the language
game mathematically. We are dealing with an evolutionary game in which the players optimise their
internal states to become better in the game, see Maynard Smith (1982).
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In the Talking Heads experiment, it is assumed that agents want to cooperate and that
they use communication as part of their cooperation. The evolution of cooperative games
has been studied extensively by artificial life researchers often in the context of Robert
Axelrod’s prisoners dilemma game, see for example Ikegami (1994). For a general intro-
duction how communication can evolve in the context of cooperation, see Hauser (1996).
Computer simulations showing the evolution of cooperation and communication have
been reported in the artificial life literature. See for example MacLennan & Burghardt
(1993). Most of these computer simulations are closer to animal signaling systems than
to human lexicons both in size and in terms of the complexity of meaning.
The Guessing Game is clearly not the only thing we do with language. Humans are
capable of playing a whole range of language games and inventing new ones when the
circumstances require it; however, to do controlled experiments we need to limit our-
selves. The objective of the Talking Heads experiment is not to cover the full range and
complexity of human natural language interaction but to examine with objective preci-
sion a limited number of issues concerning the nature of language and meaning.
2.2.3 The semiotic square
Theenvironment of the TalkingHeads is not fixed. The human experimentermay change
the position of objects, add new kinds of objects, or eliminate others. Consequently a
strategy of naming individual objects will not work. It would lead to a proliferation of
proper names and it would require the Talking Heads to recognise objects, which is very
difficult to do.9 Indeed, humans don’t exclusively use proper names in natural language
conversations either. We say could you give me the red small square as opposed to could
you givemeO_143. Natural languagewords like red or small name perceptually grounded
categories and syntactic structures indicate how they should be combined and used to
find the topic. The relation between a language expression and its referent is therefore
always indirect. This is summarised in the semiotic square (Figure 2.5), which I will use
throughout this book to help understand and analyse the nature of language communi-
cation. The semiotic square relates the four entities involved in a verbal interaction:
• An utterance, such as small red square, which is transmitted as a physical signal
from one agent to another one through the external environment. It is written
between double quotes.
• A meaning, which consists of categories like [red], [small], or combinations of
categories, like {[red] [small]}. Labels of categories are written in capital letters
between square brackets.
9 For a thorough exposition of the difficulties of object recognition, see Ullman (1996). Object constancy
comes fairly late in the acquisition of a child’s ontology, as Piaget’s conservation experiments have shown.
Language probably plays an important role in forming the notion of an object.
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• An image segment, denoted as S143, which is a segment of the image perceived
through the camera.





Figure 2.5: Any verbal interaction involves four entities here grouped in the semiotic
square. The relation between utterance and referent always needs to be estab-
lished indirectly by passing through perception and meaning.
The systematic relation between meaning and referent is usually studied under the
heading of semantics, and the systematic relation between meaning and utterance as
grammar (including syntax, morphology and lexicon).10
Many tricky philosophical issues are raised in the unavoidable distinction between the
sensed image of an object (which is local to the agent) and the object itself (which is exter-
nal to the agent). Some philosophers even doubt that objects have an existence outside
our perception of them! We need to make the distinction because agents always have
different internal images even if they look at the same object seen from our viewpoint
as an external observer. However, for simplifying the explanations, I will sometimes as-
sume that perceived image and external object are the same, so that the semiotic square
becomes a semiotic triangle.11
10 For a general introduction to the contemporary linguistic viewpoint on the processes involved, see Van
Valin jr & LaPolla (1997). In a logical approach to language, as exemplified by Montague grammar (Mon-
tague 1974), meanings are represented using a logical formalism, i.e. a variant of intensional logic. Natural
language expressions are systematically related to expressions in this logic, and a formal semantics sys-
tem defines how expressions in the logic are mapped onto their denotations. Because this is a formal
framework, the denotations consist of formal models. To make the Talking Heads experiment work, we
needed to develop a grounded semantics system, which details how an agent may go from physical reality
to meaning using a perceptual apparatus, and from meaning to physical reality. The logical structure of
the meanings we will investigate are very simple (unary predicates and conjunctions). But once we know
how to set up a grounded semantics for simple meaning structures we can scale it up to the more complex
meaning structures typically studied in logic.




When we put together the semiotic squares of two agents (Figure 2.6), we see more
clearly that agents are trying to agree about a common object in the external word, but
they never have any direct access and hence confirmation whether they are really refer-
ring to the same object. Only through pointing or other cooperative actions can speaker
and hearer co-ordinate whether they indeed refer to the same object in the external re-
ality.
The utterance is not the same for both agents, because it needs to be articulated, trans-
mitted, and perceived through a physical medium. Errors in transmission or perception
may and do occur and have an important impact on the evolution of language. To remain
focused, I will not treat this issue in depth in this book but will instead assume that there
is direct, error-free transmission of the utterance.
2.2.4 Processes involved in language communication
I will use the following terms for denoting the processes speakers and hearers go through
while traversing the relations in the semiotic square as they play a language game (Fig-
ure 2.6). A similar framework, but emphasising the language production side, has been
described in great detail by Levelt (1989). This book also provides a wealth of psycho-
logical evidence that these processes must be going on and expands the phonetic and
phonological side. An example of a detailed architecture inspired by generative gram-
mar is discussed in: Jackendoff (1997). Generative approaches to language attempt to
define a language by generating its set of possible utterances. Interpretations are con-
structed from the syntactic structure derived by the generative grammar. In this book,
we are interested in the mapping from communicative intent in a perceived reality to an
utterance and back. The knowledge and skill needed to solve this problem is different
from that need to systematically generate the set of sentences in a language and their
possible interpretations.
1. The speaker as well as the hearer perceive reality by capturing an image through
the camera, segmenting the image into coherent units, and deriving various sen-
sory characteristics about each image segment, such as the colour, size, movement.
2. The speaker must then conceptualise the scene on the basis of this perception.
He must find a set of categories or a conjunctive combination of categories that
distinguishes the referent from the other objects in the context, and which will act
as the meaning of his communication. For example, he might choose [blue] if the
topic has a blue colour and all the other objects in the context are not blue.
3. The speakermust then verbalise this conceptualisation. Hemust use his language
system to find words and syntactic constructions expressing this meaning. For
example, he might choose blauw (if he speaks Dutch), or bleu (if he speaks French),
to convey the category [blue].
4. The hearer must engage in similar tasks but now going in the reverse direction.
He must interpret the utterance to find out which conceptualisation constitutes
the meaning.
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Figure 2.6: Left: processes carried out by the speaker. Right: processes carried out by
the hearer. There are also feedback processes moving in alternate directions
until the agents settle on coherent choices for all the items in their semiotic
squares.
5. Then the hearer must apply this meaning to see what referent was intended. The
hearer has also perceived the scene in terms of a set of segments and now uses
the meaning to identify the segment that could have been the one intended by the
speaker.
6. Finally the hearer acts upon the outcome of meaning application. He points to
the topic he has identified. This is the step where both agents co-ordinate their
behaviour through the external world.
2.2.5 Knowledge sources and competences
Each of these activities requires knowledge and/or skill (summarised in the table below).
Perceiving requires visual processes capable of segmenting images and deriving image
segments. Conceptualisation requires an ontology, a repertoire of perceptually grounded
distinctions that can be applied to a segmented image to yield distinctive categories or
category combinations that may constitute the meaning of the utterance. Verbalising
a conceptualisation requires a lexicon that maps parts of the meaning to words and a
syntax that specifies how to organise individual words into a larger complex. The hearer
must use similar knowledge sources in the other direction. He must use his lexicon
and syntax to reconstruct the meanings expressed by the utterance, and then use the
ontology again to apply the meaning to the present context to find the referent (see
Table 2.1).
There is no simple linear flow from perception to utterance or from utterance to per-
ception. Instead, we must imagine a dynamic process involving forward and backward
propagation of information until coherent choices for all the nodes in the two semiotic
squares have been established by the speaker and the hearer. Many different choices
are initially possible (many segmentations, conceptualisations, verbalisations, interpre-
tations), but the dynamic process gradually settles into a single coherent attractor, so
that speaker and hearer agree upon a common referent. The co-ordination between cho-
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Table 2.1: Activities and knowledge soruces
Activity From To Knowledge source
Perceive Object Image segments Visual processes
Conceptualise Topic Meaning Ontology
Verbalise Meaning Utterance Lexicon + syntax
Interpret Utterance Meaning Lexicon + syntax
Apply Meaning Topic Ontology
Act Topic Object Behavioural process
sen topic and identified referent is done through the real world (pointing, handing an
object, performing an action).
I deliberately left an important aspect of language out. In the case of physical agents,
the form cannot be transmitted directly but needs to be articulated in speech sounds,
written signs, or gestures, to create a true utterance. This additional complexity will
not be discussed further in this book – even though it is a fascinating topic in its own
right.12 To make a verbal interaction nevertheless complete, agents are given a reper-
toire of consonants and vowels with which they can make random syllables and syllable
combinations, like wabido, bimaku, etc. The articulation and recognition of these sylla-
bles is assumed to be acquired already and transmission is engineered to be error-free.
This way, our attention can be focused on how ontologies, lexicons, and grammars may
emerge.
2.3 Perception and categorisation
I will now discuss in some more detail each of the processes the Talking Heads go
through when they play a complete language game, leaving a more detailed discussion
to subsequent chapters.
2.3.1 Scene and topic selection
Every physical TalkingHeads set-up features awaiting room inwhich agents are stored,
ready to be loaded into the robotic infrastructure or to be teleported to another physical
site. A game starts when two agents are chosen at random from this waiting room and
loaded into the two physical robots. The internal architecture of each agent is connected
with the sensori-motor apparatus of the robot so that they can receive the sensory data
12 See for a state of the art review: Clark & Yallop (1995). We have already been conducting quite extensive
research in our group on the origin of sound systems using similar principles as the ones discussed in
this book for the origins of word semantics. See de Boer (2000). The complex adaptive systems approach
underlying this phonetics work was already foreshadowed in work of phoneticians like Liljencrants &
Lindblom (1972).
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streams recorded by the camera and control the movements of the robots. Then the
general control system assigns randomly the role of speaker and hearer to each of the
agents and the game can begin.
Next the speaker randomly moves around its camera, halts at a particular location,
and captures the image. The speaker then attempts to segment this image. If the scene
is interesting, which means that there are at least two clear segments, it is chosen for
playing a language game. Otherwise the agent makes another random movement and
repeats the process. An example of an interesting scene with its subsequent segmenta-
tion by the speaker is shown in Figure 2.7 (top image on the right). The scene has two
circles as main objects. Segments which are too small are ignored.
Figure 2.7: Three examples of segmented images (from top to bottom). Left and right im-
ages show the perceived and segmented images for two agents respectively.
These images are always different because they are dependent on the position
of the agent. The topic is indicated by a dashed bounding box in the image
of the speaker (on the right for the first case and on the left for the others).
Segments which are too small are ignored. The topics have all been concep-
tualised as being to the right and so the same word gofubo has been used to
successfully refer to them.
Segmentation can happen according to several criteria. For example, patches with sim-
ilar colour can be grouped into a single patch, edges can be identified and then linked
with each other to form line segments circumscribing the contours of an object, or con-
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secutive images can be compared to extract the parts that changed and hence moved
as a single object. There is now a solid body of techniques from decades of machine
vision research to efficiently segment scenes according to these and other methods. The
Talking Heads use several methods in parallel and combine their output to get a clearly
segmented picture.13
Thehearer must be able to sense in which direction the speaker is looking. This facility
is at the moment implemented by having the speaker indicate to the hearer the point on
the white board at which its camera is focused. The hearer then moves the camera to this
point and records an image as well. The hearer segments this image (see Figure 2.7, top
image on the left) so that now both the speaker and the hearer have a set of segments and
can start playing a language game. Note that the speaker and hearer never get exactly the
same image because they are standing about one metre apart from each other before the
white board. Also the calibration is never entirely accurate so that perceptual differences
are unavoidable.
2.3.2 Sensory channels
Next low-level visual processes gather information about each segment, such as its av-
erage colour, size, shape, the position with respect to horizontal or vertical axes. Each
process outputs its information on a sensory channel scaled between 0.0 and 1.0. The
mechanisms from the conceptualisation layer that subsequently use this information can
operate on any kind of sensory channel. I will assume for the rest of this chapter that the
low-level routines produce each only three types of information, sent on the following
sensory channels:
• The first channel is called hpos (horizontal position). It contains the x-midposition
of a segmented object within the field of view of the robot.
• The second channel is called vpos (vertical position). It specifies the y-midposition
of the segmented object.
• The third channel is called gray and contains the average gray-scale of the object.
Later on additional channels will be introduced.
Consider the two objects in Figure 2.8. The triangular object has the (scaled) values
hpos=0.35, vpos=0.40, gray=0.33, and the rectangular object has the values hpos=0.70,
vpos=0.85, gray=0.33. The agents can already visually distinguish millions of possible
scenes with these three sensory channels. The number of scenes quickly grows when
the set of sensory channels increases.
The low-level visual processes outputting values on the various sensory channels are
already quite complicated in themselves. I will discuss them further in Chapter 3. I will
then argue that the agent’s repertoire of visual processes does not have to be static and
programmed in advance but evolves and adapts through a selectionist process. New pro-
cesses may “grow” by the random combination of primitive operations and are pruned
13 For general introductions to these areas, see Ballard & Brown (1982) and Fischler & Firchein (1987).
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when they fail to yield useful information or information which is irrelevant in the en-
vironment in which the agent finds himself.
2.3.3 Making distinctions
The data on sensory channels are values from a continuous domain (between 0.0 and 1.0).
To be the basis of natural language communication, these values must be transformed
into a discrete domain. This is precisely the task of the conceptual layer. It performs
massive data reduction to make infinitely rich environments manageable. One means
of categorisation is to divide up each domain of values on a particular sensory channel
into regions and simply assign a category to each region, thus creating a discrimination
tree. For example, the hpos-channel can be cut in two halves leading to a distinction
between [left] (0.0≤qhpos < 0.5) and [right] (0.5≤qhpos≤q1.0). The triangular object
in Figure 2.8 has the value hpos=0.35 and would therefore be categorised as [left]. Sim-
ilarly, the vpos-channel can be divided in two halves yielding the categories [lower]
and [upper], and likewise the gray-channel yielding the categories [light] and [dark].
Given these categories, the rectangular object in the scene of Figure 2.8 would be cate-
gorised as [right upper light]. Of course, light, dark, left, lower, etc. are labels that
I have given to these categories. The Talking Heads create categories by partitioning
sensory channels but do not use these labels internally.
It is always possible to refine a distinction by further subdividing its region. Thus an
agent could further divide the bottom region of the hpos-channel (categorised as [left])
into two subregions [totally-left] (0.0≤hpos < 0.25), and [mid-left] (0.25≤hpos <
0.5). The triangular object can now be categorised as [mid-left], if simply categorising
it as [left] is not distinctive enough. Each of these categories can still be further refined.
The categorisation networks resulting from these consecutive binary subdivisions form
discrimination trees (Figure 2.9). It is not at all assumed that all agents have the same
trees; due to different developmental histories, divergence is inevitable.
Figure 2.8: The scene contains two objects: a triangular object and a rectangular object
with the same gray levels. Each one is characterised by values on three sen-
sory channels: hpos, vpos, and gray.
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Figure 2.9: A discrimination tree displays the divisions of the total range of values on a
sensory channel into finer and finer subregions. Categories are assigned to
each region at different levels of the tree.
There are obviously other ways to move from the continuous domain of sensory chan-
nels to the discrete domain of categories.14 For example, it is not really necessary to have
a binary division, we could just as well split each region into three or more subregions.
Or we could introduce focal (prototypical) values and associate a category with each of
them. In the latter case, the categorisation process consists in identifying the prototype
that is closest to an object’s value. For the current experiment, I will stick however to a
binary categorisation strategy because that is the simplest to understand and formally
investigate.
We will see that agents build hundreds, even thousands, of categories as they play
their language games, and in addition they make combinations of categories. To bring
some order in this profusion of categories, I will label them using the sensory channel
from which a category operates, followed by the upper and lower bound of the region
they carve out. Thus [totally-left] is labeled as [hpos 0.0–0.25], because it carves out
a region between 0.0 and 0.25 on the hpos-channel. When it must be emphasised that a
category belongs to a particular agent, for example a1, we write [hpos 0.0–0.25]a1. The
same category in agent a2 is labeled as [hpos 0.0–0.25]a2. If I want to talk about this
category in the abstract, I will not mention any agent and simply write [hpos 0.0–0.25].
We will also allow conjunctive combinations of categories which will be written as a set,
as in {[hpos 0.0–0.25], [vpos 0.0–0.25]}, which could be paraphrased as totally-left and
totally-down.
Where do an agent’s discrimination trees, and hence categories, come from? This is
one of the main puzzles to be addressed in this book and it will occupy most of Chapter 4.
Very briefly, I propose again a selectionist approach, as for the formation of low-level
visual routines. I hypothesise that the nodes and branches of the discrimination trees
grow more or less randomly in all directions. The use and success of categories is moni-
tored and categories which are not sufficiently useful or successful in the environments
encountered by the agent are pruned. I will argue in Chapter 4 that this mechanism
indeed leads to a repertoire of distinctions that is adequate for playing language games,
and that categories therefore need not be innate nor learned by induction from a large
series of examples.




Verbalisation (mapping meaning to form) involves two distinguishable activities. The
first one relies on a lexicon to map components of meaning to individual words. The
second one relies on syntactic rules to provide supra-word structuring and additional
syntactic marking to express additional aspects of meaning, particularly how component
meanings are combined into a complex whole. Both types of activities also take place
in interpretation (mapping form to meaning): the individual words are mapped back to
their meanings and the meaning of the whole is reconstructed from the meaning of the
parts.
In the early origins of language, there must have been an initial phase in which no
complex syntax was in place yet. Utterances then must have consisted of single words
or multiple words without further syntax. Such syntax-less languages have been called
proto-languages.15
Children acquire their first words around the first year of life.16 Most people believe
that they do this as a result of hearing a particular word repeated several times in a
certain context and gradually abstracting an association between a word and a meaning.
But how is it that they know which meaning to associate with a particular word? How
is it that word acquisition goes so rapid? We will follow a different approach, which
leaves an open question whether this applies to human word acquisition as well. The
approach will be selectionist. The agents construct hypotheses, either on the basis of
one specific case where they guess through a non-verbal strategy what the meaning of
an unknown word might be, or they have simply invented a new word because they
do not have one yet. The hypotheses are then tried out in subsequent games and either
receive confirmation or are falsified. As a side effect of this local behaviour, a global
self-organising dynamic process arises leading gradually to coherence.
Here are a few example games to give a general flavor of this selectionist approach to
word acquisition. Let us assume that there are only two agents, a1 and a2, and they use
only the three sensory channels introduced earlier: vpos for vertical position, hpos for
horizontal position, and gray for grayscale.
2.4.1 Same meaning, same referent
Here is the simplest possible instance of a language game, based on the scene in Fig-
ure 2.8. The speaker, a1, has picked the triangle as the topic. To give a verbal hint, he
needs to conceptualise this topic, which means in this specific case, to find a category
15 See Bickerton (1999) as well as Thomason & Kaufman (1988). Children similarly go through a single word
phase (even though a single word for them might be multiple words for us), and then slowly start to boot-
strap their grammar. See Tomasello (1992) and Bates, Bretherton & Snyder (1988). They are still observed
in the very first phases of child language acquisition or in pidgins that spontaneously form when two
communities with widely diverging languages need to interact. Out of proto-languages, languages with a
fully-fledged syntax must have emerged at some point. How this occurred is still a heavily debated mystery.
In this volume I only treat the origins of proto-languages.
16 Representative work in the study of child language learning focuses mostly on the acquisition of specific
meanings. See Gleitman & Landau (1994), Clark (1993), Bowerman (1996).
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(or set of categories) which distinguishes the topic from the other objects in the context.
Here the context contains only one additional object, namely the rectangle. The category
[vpos 0.0–0.5]a1 (lower) fits the criteria. [vpos 0.0–0.5] is valid when vpos< 0.5 which
is the case for the triangle but not for the rectangle. a1 has an association in his lexicon
relating [vpos 0.0–0.5]a1 with the word lu, a1 retrieves this word and transmits it to the
hearer, which is agent a2.
a2 has stored in his lexicon an association between lu and [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2, and so
hypothesises that [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2 must be the meaning of lu. When this category is
applied to the present scene, in other words, when a2 filters out the objects whose value
for vpos do not fall in the region [0.0–0.5], only one remaining object is obtained, the
triangle. Hence a2 concludes that this must be the topic and points to it.
The speaker recognises that the hearer has pointed to the right object and so the game
succeeds. The complete dialogue is reported by the commentator as follows:
Game 125.
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 2 objects
a1 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a1 says: ”lu”
a2 interprets ”lu” as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a2 points to the topic
a1 says: ”OK”
This game illustrates a situation where the speaker and the hearer associate the same
meaningwith the same form andwhere themeaning picks out the same referent for both
agents. No wonder the game succeeds. Unfortunately things are seldom that simple.
2.4.2 A new word
There are (at least) two ways in which a game similar to game 125, but played earlier
might have failed. First of all it can be that the speaker does not have a word yet for the
meaning he wants to convey. The speaker then invokes a strategy to repair this failure.
The simplest strategy is to create a new word for the present meaning. This is how a1
might have created the word lu, and associated it with [vpos 0.0–0.5] in his lexicon. Such
simple constructive steps cause new words to enter the lexicon.
Second, it can be that the hearer does not know the word. The game then fails and
the speaker points to the topic so that the hearer can make an educated guess what
the meaning might have been: If the hearer is able to recover a possible topic from the
non-verbal hint given by the speaker, he himself can seek a distinctive category or set
of categories that delineates this topic from the other objects in the context just as the
speaker has done. It is possible (although not necessary as we will see) that the hearer
a2 arrives at his own version of the same category, namely [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2. The hearer
now stores in his lexicon a new association between the form heard, lu, and the guessed
meaning [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2. Based on this extended lexicon, he will succeed in the same
38
2.4 Lexicalisation
game in the future and he can use lu himself to verbalise [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2 when talking
to other agents. This is the way new words spread in the population.
A game where these two repair activities have taken place is reported by the commen-
tator as follows:
Game 25.
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 2 objects
a1 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a1 creates a new word: ”lu”
a2 does not know ”lu”
a2 says: ”lu?”
a1 points to the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a2 stores ”lu” as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
2.4.3 Competition between words
The observant reader will have noticed immediately that I have swept some important
difficulties under the carpet. First, it could very well be that unknown to the speaker
another agent had already used the word lu for another meaning, so that there are now
two alternative meanings for lu in the lexicon. lu has become ambiguous. Second, it may
be the hearer a2 already had a word for [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2, for example bomida, so that
there are now two synonyms for [vpos 0.0–0.5] in the lexicon. Synonymy and ambiguity
are very common in natural languages and unavoidable when a group of distributed
autonomous agents creates a language without a central co-ordinator. This implies that
the agents’ lexicon must be sophisticated enough to support multiple associations. An
agent must be able to store the different meanings being used for the same word, and
the different words being used for the same meaning.
Will this process not lead to a proliferation of words and massive, inefficient lexicons,
particularly in large populations? No. As I will discuss extensively in Chapter 5, a pos-
itive feedback loop between use and success can be set up causing progressive conver-
gence towards an efficient lexicon. The agents keep track of the use and success of each
form-meaning pair and prefer the forms that have had the most success in past use. The
more success a form has, the more it will be chosen and consequently the more success
it will have in the future. This positive feedback loop creates a winner-take-all situa-
tion because as soon as one form is slightly preferred, its success grows and overtakes
its competitors to eventually dominate (Figure 2.10). Particularly in open environments,
the dominance may only be temporary after which a new struggle develops and another





























Figure 2.10: The graph shows the competition between different forms for expressing
one meaning in a population of 20 agents. The graph plots the frequency of
each form in the population, more precisely the percentage of agents that
prefer a particular word. A complex dynamic process unfolds with periods
where one word (first xu and then fepi) dominates.
2.4.4 Disambiguation
Another difficulty which I did not deal with when discussing Game 25 above, is that
the hearer may conceptualise the scene differently from the speaker. For example, the
triangular object is not only located at the lower half of the scene and the rectangle at
the upper half, but it is also to the left, i.e. with hpos < 0.5, whereas the rectangle is to
the right. It follows that the hearer could just as well have hypothesised that lu means
[hpos 0.0–0.5] (left) and not [vpos 0.0–0.5] (lower).
Is this bad? It depends on the situations being encountered in the future. When the
game is played again for the same scene with a1 saying lu to mean [vpos 0.0–0.5], and
a2 interpreting lu as [hpos 0.0–0.5], the game would succeed! Communicative success
is achieved whenever the hearer recovers the referent chosen by the speaker; it is not
required that they use exactly the same meaning. In fact, the hearer can never know
for sure what meaning was initially conceptualised by the speaker and neither can the
speaker know which meaning was understood by the hearer because they cannot look
inside each other’s head. The meaning can be quite different, as we have just seen, as
long as it is compatible.
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Even more remarkably, if a topic which is at the lower portion of the scene, is al-
ways on the left side and vice-versa, there would always be success despite the different
meanings of lu, and the players would never discover that each means something else
by lu.
Similar situations arise in human natural language communication as well, particu-
larly for words which are not stabilised yet or whose interpretation depends strongly on
the non-verbal information provided by the context. They also arise when the speaker
or hearer have different sensory modalities or sensibilities. For example, a colour-blind
person (unable to make the distinction between red and green) will recognise the red
traffic light by its position. For that person, stop for the red light does not mean stop for
the light that has the colour red but stop when the upper-most light is lit.
These examples show clearly that shared language and meaning arise from the efforts
of agents to co-ordinate their conceptualisations and lexicalisations with respect to the
environments they encounter and the games they play, but that these co-ordinations
cannot be perfect nor totally uniform because the agents have limited rationality. In
general, we can not assume that different agents have exactly the same conceptualisa-
tion of reality and that they mean the same thing by the same words. As we will see
in later experiments, the Talking Heads hardly agree on the meaning of a word, par-
ticularly in the early phases of language development, but they nevertheless manage
to have a surprisingly high communicative success rate. There is no guarantee that a
particular form maps onto the same meaning, even in the same language community.
Despite these shaky foundations, communication is generally successful because there
is sufficient coherence among the members of a community and sufficient constraints
from the context.
Figure 2.11: A second scene which can be used to disambiguate lu.
Consider now another scene (Figure 2.11). The speaker is again a1 and categorises the
bottom triangle as [vpos 0.0–0.5]a1, meaning the object at the lower half of the scene.
Assuming that the hearer a2 has associated lu with [hpos 0.0–0.5]a2, he would interpret
lu as [hpos 0.0–0.5]a2 (to the left). But this does not yield a single referent and therefore
the game fails. This failure is an opportunity for the hearer to repair his hypotheses
about the possible meanings of lu. When he conceptualises the scene himself, he finds
that [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2 distinguishes the triangle from the circle. A new association be-
tween lu and [vpos 0.0–0.5]a2 is stored. The old association is not removed but enters
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in competition with the new one, and gradually one meaning will come to dominate by
the winner-take-all mechanism discussed earlier on.
The commentator reports this kind of interaction as follows:
Game 137.
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 4 objects
a1 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a1 says: ”lu”
a2 interprets ”lu” as [HPOS 0.0–0.5]
There is more than one such object
a2 says: ”lu?”
a1 points to the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
a2 stores ”lu” as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
Through such disambiguating situations, meanings of words get clarified and the lex-
icons of the agents become more similar. Note that the dominating meaning of lu can
still go in two directions. For example, a2 could have used lu with a1 in a situation where
its only possible meaning is [hpos 0.0–0.5] (left). Then a1, now playing the role of hearer,
would have stored the association between lu and [hpos 0.0–0.5]. If this happened often
enough [hpos 0.0–0.5] (left) might have become the dominant meaning of lu, instead of
[vpos 0.0–0.5] (lower). This shows clearly that the evolution of language will never be
predictable. At a critical bifurcation, small preferential differences between the agents
or the chance occurrence of certain situations may tilt the competition in one direction
or the other.17 There is no right or wrong solution in the language game and no one has
any more rights than anyone else.
2.4.5 Same meaning, different referent
When agents have the same meaning for the same form, it is likely that they pick out
the same referent from the context. When agents have a different meaning for the same
form, it is less likely although it may still happen that they pick out the same referent,
as we have seen. But there is an even more problematic situation: When agents have the
same meaning for the same form but nevertheless pick out different referents!
For example, suppose that two Talking Heads have developed the concept of [left]
and [right] with respect to their own position in front of the scene. In terms of the
sensory channels we have been using, anything to the left of their field of vision (0.0 ≤
hpos < 0.5) is categorised as left, i.e. [hpos 0.0 0.5], and everything right (0.5 < hpos ≤
1.0) is categorised as right, i.e. [hpos 0.0 0.5]. But because the agents stand next to each
other and have therefore slightly different positions with respect to the scene in front
17 This high sensitivity to initial conditions is one of the characteristics of a chaotic dynamic system, see
Lorenz (1993). Indeed, as I will explore in more detail later, evolving languages have all the characteristics
of complex adaptive systems, including the potential for punctuated equilibria.
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of them, there is an area which will be categorised as right for one head and left for the
other (Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.12: Two TalkingHeads are shown a1 and a2 each seeing the scene from a slightly
different viewpoint.
When this occurs in real dialogues, the form-meaning pairs lexicalising the distinc-
tions left and right destabilise, because sometimes it gets positive feedback as it succeeds
in the game, and at other times it gets negative feedback. This is one of the reasons why
human categories are often relative and scaled with respect to a context. For example,
we say the triangle to the left of the square, in other words left with respect to the square,
to avoid the uncertainty inherent in the absolute use of left. Humans scale the size of
objects with respect to the scene, so that small objects are small compared to the others
in the scene and not small in an absolute sense.
2.4.6 Situated grounded semantics
These various examples, and I am clearly only scratching the surface, already illustrate
the major thrust of the approach explored in the remainder of this book. There are
dynamic processes at two levels. (1) There is the evolution of a lexicon in a single agent:
new words are invented or adopted from another agent and the scores of form-meaning
pairs in the lexicon go up and down depending on success or failure in the game. At
any point in time, an agent will have a preferred form to express a particular meaning,
but he has also stored the alternative words floating around in the population, and his
preference will change depending on feedback in further language games. (2) There
is also lexicon evolution at the level of the group. A coherent global lexicon emerges
because the lexicons of the individual agents become more and more similar. This is due
to the positive feedback loop between the outcome of using a certain form-meaning pair
and the probability that this pair will be used again in the future. The group lexicon
will however seldom be exactly uniform because new meanings constantly pop up and
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agents may arrive from other language communities, bringing in newwords. I will study
this two level dynamic process in much more detail in Chapter 7. It explains many of
the mysteries of language, for example why there is ambiguity.
The semantic theory required to make the Talking Heads experiment work is very
different from the classical textbook approaches to the subject, which tend to assume that
categories can be defined in the abstract, independent of their context of use. Grounded
processes of conceptualisation and interpretation are necessarily strongly situated and
context-dependent. Whether ‘blue triangle’ is going to be effective in picking out the
intended topic depends on what else is in the scene. If all other objects in the context
are also blue triangles, the game will fail. If there is only one triangle, it was not really
necessary to say that it is blue. This situatedness and context-dependence, together with
the non-verbal hints given by the speaker, are crucial keys for restricting the possible
meanings of a form and they therefore help the hearer disambiguate utterances or figure
out the meaning of an unknown form. But situatedness and context-dependence are also
major sources of difficulty, because the same categories may refer to different things for
different agents in different contexts. Even if both agents agree that a particular form
names a certain category, they may still fail in the game if the category picks out a
different referent, for example because they see the context from a slightly different
vantage point.
Another major difference with classical theories of meaning and reference is that the
repertoire of meanings and form-meaning pairs is open-ended and subject to change at
any time. Logicians would say that the truth conditions of the forms are non-monotonic.
Non-monotonicity is unavoidable in the case of grounded situated agents with limited
rationality.18 Agents should always be allowed to introduce new forms or recruit existing
forms to express new meanings, simply because the set of meanings must expand to
cope with novel contexts and new communicative situations. After enough interactions
among the members of the same group in a relatively stable environment, we expect
there to be a stable set of conventionalised form-meaning relations, but it cannot be
expected that everything anyone ever wants to say is already conventionalised, and so
there will always be turbulence at the fringes. The idea that the lexicon and the syntax
of a language are static entities is completely false. Both are in constant flux. Non-
monotonicity is consequently one of the big topics in logic-based approaches to artificial
intelligence.
A theory of languagemust try to capture the strategies by which language users shape
and reshape their language and by which some solutions may become conventionalised
and spread in the rest of the population, rather than focus on describing the end results
of this process. This open-ended adaptive character of language systems is explored
extensively in Chapter 7.
This section probably raised many questions in the mind of the critical reader: Will
the agents really reach a sufficiently similar lexicon to have successful communication,
18 Examples of these processes are described in: Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994), Traugott & Heine (1991).
For attempts to explain these “grammaticalisation” processes in terms of general cognitive operations, see
Heine (1997).
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despite the fact that no one has a complete overview nor controls globally what the
others can say? Are the unclear situations, i.e. those where more than one possible
meaning is possible, not going to destabilise existing lexicons? Will all this scale up
both for the size of the agent set and for the size of the meaning set? Is a new, virgin
agent going to be able to catch up with a lexicon already existing in a population? What
happens when two populations each with their own entrenched lexicon meet? These are
exactly the kinds of questions that I will address later. They can all be posed in a precise
way within the context of the Talking Heads experiment.
2.5 The origins of grammar
The self-organisation of a shared lexicon in a population of agents already represents
a formidable challenge. We need to find models that work in principle and we have to
make them operational on physically instantiated autonomous robots. But many lin-
guists would claim that this does not yet represent true language, they would want to
see the emergence of a genuine syntax. How that might happen is one of the ultimate
remaining scientific mysteries of our time but let me sketch a possible approach.
Basically, I hypothesise that the agents must first of all have the capability to generate
much more complex semantic and pragmatic strategies for conceptualising reality or
applying a conceptualisation to retrieve a referent.
For example, a phrase like ‘the two red triangles to the left of the smallest green square’
requires the following strategy:
1. The agent filters the set of possible objects in the scene to retain only the squares.
2. He further filters the resulting set to retain only the green ones.
3. He orders the remaining green squares based on size and then picks out the small-
est one.
4. Then he orders the objects in the scene based on their horizontal position (hpos)
and retains only those whose position is to the left of the smallest green square.
5. From the remaining set he filters out the triangles, and from this set those with a
red colour.
6. This final set should contain only two members and they constitute the referents
of the original phrase.
Our research has already led to mechanisms whereby agents can autonomously generate
such semantic strategies using processes that compose primitive strategies into complex
ones. The strategies compete for use in language games. New strategies form when
needed by the environment or the agent’s interactions and those that do not work or
are irrelevant get pruned. The mechanisms for generating and selecting such semantic
strategies are not unique to language. The invention and use of tools or the planning
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of a series of actions and the retrieval and use of ready-made plans requires exactly the
same sorts of capabilities.
The spontaneous generation of repertoires of complex semantic strategies already ex-
plains some characteristics that are reflected in full-fledged languages: There is hierarchi-
cal structure, because one strategy may call upon another strategy to achieve a subgoal,
and a strategy may potentially call upon itself thus introducing recursivity. There is also
a functional specialisation of categories. They are now sometimes used for filtering the
members of a set, sometimes for ordering them, sometimes for modifying another cate-
gory before it is used for filtering, and so on. Hierarchical structuring, recursivity and
functional specialisation therefore do not have to originate in language. The fact that we
see them in language structure is a reflection of the generic hierarchical and functional
nature of semantic strategies.19
Second, my hypothesis is that the need for communicating more and more complex
semantic strategies and the conceptual structures they use, has pushed language users
to start using more and more complex form characteristics, starting with word order
but also intonation, stress patterns, function words, morphological variations of words,
etc. Here another aspect comes into play: the ability to recognise forms and structures,
which we also need to recognise structured objects in scenes for example, and the ability
to assemble a structure satisfying a set of constraints. The collective dynamics which
are responsible for the propagation and the spontaneous self-organisation of coherence
in lexicons should also apply here. Grammars can be seen as ecologies, where form-
meaning pairs compete in the population. New syntactic and semantic categories, new
constructions and new uses of grammatical conventions are continuously created, and
existing ones may destabilise and become in disuse.20
Each language user employs his own ideolect which is as well as possible co-ordinated
with that of other language users but there is never complete similarity and never abso-
lute stability. This explains perhaps why linguists have such a hard time to pin down
“the” language of a community. As soon as someone speaks, language changes.
According to this theory, natural language structure is not the consequence of an au-
tonomous innate language device which evolved by a genetic mutation or series of mu-
tations. Instead cognitive mechanisms and structures already in place have been mar-
shalled to get a language system off the ground, even though once language became
essential for the rapid incorporation of new individuals and the general organisation of
activities in human populations, it must have started to recruit vast amounts of brain ca-
pacity and stimulated other cognitive faculties, such as categorisation, episodic memory
or problem solving, to become in turn much more complex and versatile.21
19 The fact that languages change is, of course, well-known in linguistics even though it is less a focal research
topic than used to be in the 19th century. See McMahon (1994) for a brief introduction into the subject.
Language change has many of the characteristics of biological change but it takes place in cultural as
opposed to biological time. See Labov (2000).
20 The semantic strategies are similar to the cognitive processes that have been studied extensively in cogni-
tive grammar (Langacker 1987). Formal versions of some of these processes have been formulated as part
of Montague grammar (Montague 1974). In computational linguistics research, various attempts have been
made to formalise conceptualisation and meaning application strategies (Gazdar & Mellish 1989).
21 There has been an ongoing nature versus nurture debate with respect to the origins and acquisition of
language. The different issues in this debate are already well illustrated in Piattelli-Palmarini (1980).
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Before the problem of syntax can be tackled seriously, wemust have a solid foundation
showing how agents are capable of autonomously acquiring individual words or com-
binations of words without syntax. This is the subject of the remainder of the present
volume.
2.6 Conclusions
The Talking Heads experiment examines with what kinds of mechanisms physically em-
bodied autonomous agents might be capable of bootstrapping an ontology, a lexicon,
and a syntax. The Talking Heads are situated embodied agents. This allows them to
build up and co-ordinate language and meaning in tight interaction with a shared physi-
cal environment as perceived through their cameras. TheTalkingHeads are social agents,
members of a language community. The collective dynamics of the community is a cru-
cial ingredient to understanding how successful communications of a similar complexity
as human natural language communications might have originated and how the under-
lying system can be maintained from one generation to the next.
This chapter has described the main hardware and software components of the agents
and briefly sketched their internal architecture. The operation and effect of this architec-
ture have been illustrated with some example games. The remaining chapters explore
the various aspects of the agent’s capacities in much more detail. First I will break the
global task down into different subtasks, as suggested by the semiotic square. We will
start by looking how agents may establish the relation between a real world object and
a segmented image (Chapter 3). Then we study how they relate a segmented image to its
conceptualisation (Chapter 4). Third, we study how a conceptualisation can be related
to an utterance (Chapter 5). In Chapters 6 and 7 we couple these various components




Our minds deceive us. Intuitively we feel we see very clearly and unambiguously the
objects in our environment and are able to categorise objects or actions unequivocally in
terms of perceptually grounded distinctions. For example, when I look out of the office
window at the inner courtyard garden, I can clearly see the plants, trees and birds, as
well as the walls, windows, and doors of the surrounding buildings. I can categorise their
colours, sizes, and shapes and determine whether the leaves of the trees are moving with
the wind. Because of this categorisation I can describe to another person what I see.
A categorisation and conceptualisation of reality is fundamentally based on sensors
which output signals that directly reflect, in an analog and partially unreliable way, phys-
ical properties of the environment. For visual perception, human beings have photosen-
sors in the eye which correlate with the amount of light, i.e. the amount of photons,
falling on the sensor. The more photons, the stronger the sensor signal. But, a photo-
sensor, or a matrix of such sensors as in the human retina, does not tell anything more
than what the light intensity is at a tiny spot of the image captured by the eye. There
is no obvious straightforward procedure that groups the spots into coherent patches.
When you implement and try out different segmentation procedures on real world im-
ages, you quickly find that each procedure generates a multitude of possibilities instead
of a clear segmentation. Even if coherent segments are detected, there is the problem
of what features of the scene are going to be used for further conceptualisation. A very
large, open-ended set of possible feature detectors can be imagined. The quality and reli-
ability of their output depends on the scene being processed, and is in any case strongly
context-dependent.
So we find that the world does not present itself neatly segmented, processed, and
categorised. There is an enormous gap between the symbolic world of objects and cat-
egories and the subsymbolic world of analog sensing. The brain somehow performs a
vast amount of processing to fill this gap, without us being in the least aware of it. This
processing takes place in parallel. Many different segmentation procedures and feature
detectors operate concurrently on streams of consecutive images, generating hypothe-
ses that become stronger if they are confirmed by additional evidence, or weaker if they
do not fit into a larger picture. We are only aware of the final result and therefore have
no intuition of what is really going on, except in rare and pathological circumstances.
Rather than viewing perception as a straight-forward step-by-step transformation of the
raw sensory data into a segmented picture, it is better to think of the whole process as a
boiling soup with thousands of hypotheses taking shape, some of them floating like bub-
bles up to the surface. Constraints and expectations flow down from the top so that the
maximum amount of available information is used to construct the coherent segmented
picture of reality we consciously experience.
3 Perception
The objective of this chapter is to examine this process in sufficient detail to move
forward with the main topic of our investigations, namely language and meaning. My
aim is not to delve into the full complexity of the visual system, because this would lead
us too far astray of the main topic, but to have a sufficiently rich source of features so
that conceptualisation and language communication can be studied.
3.1 What sensors sense
Sensors and actuators are the interfaces between the physical world and the internal
world. They are dedicated hard-wired components which grow in biological systems
strongly influenced by genetics and environmental inputs.1
A sensor transduces external physical states into internal states. For example, a touch
sensor, of which there are hundreds of thousands all over the human body, transduces
mechanical energy into neural signals. Other sensors respond to the intensity of certain
sectors of the wave spectrum. Ears respond to audible waves. Photoreceptors in the eye
respond to visible light waves. The body also has a large number of biochemical sensors
responsive to internal chemical states so that we can feel the hunger in our stomach
for example. In addition to sensors, bodies carry actuators, which transduce internal
states into mechanical energy and thus make it possible to perform actions in the world.
Actuators receive continuous signal streams and modulate their activity based on these
signals.
3.1.1 Artificial sensors and actuators
Analogs of biological sensors can be artificially recreated to give robots sensory capa-
bilities. Something similar to a touch sensor can be created using a contact switch that
passes current when closed. A microphone has a functionality similar to the ear. A
digital camera can be used to recreate the functionality of an eye; it records the light in-
tensity of millions of small rectangles of the image, known as pixels, just like the retina.
The set of all pixels is usually called an image map. Digital colour cameras provide three
information elements for every pixel: the amount of red, green and blue of each pixel
(RGB). We can build sonar sensors responding to low frequency waves, just like the ones
bats use for navigation, or infrared sensors which are useful for obstacle avoidance be-
cause the amount of infrared light emitted and captured back by the sensor correlates
with distance to objects.
A sensor should never be seen as measuring accurately an abstract property of real-
ity. For example, an infrared sensor does not measure the distance to an obstacle. The
infrared reflection depends not only on distance but also on the reflection properties of
the object and on the amount of background infrared in the environment, thus distance
must be inferred and projected onto reality. Similarly, the colour receptors do not really
1 Possible biological implementations of the various sensors and sensory processes discussed in this chapter
can be found in Churchland & Sejnowski (1992). The nature and neurophysiological implementation of
visual processes are discussed in detail in Zeki (1993).
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measure colour. They respond to reflections within segments of the wavelength spec-
trum but this reflection is again determined by many factors: how much and what kind
of light falls on the object, and how the object reflects the light depending which varies
with the position of the object. So colour is again a more abstract notion that needs to
be reconstructed and projected on the image based on complex processing.
The Talking Heads use vision as the main source of sensory information because most
of the perceptually grounded concepts used in language derive from visual sensing. The
only actuator (apart from the speech synthesiser which I will not discuss in detail) is a
pan/tilt motor for turning the head up and down or left and right.
3.1.2 Natural sensing
It is technically possible to build all sorts of sensors and actuators that have little to
do with human capabilities. But clearly, human-like categories and languages that are
similar to human categories and languages will only emerge if the sensors and actuators
are at least to some degree similar to those of humans. This is not always technologically
possible and when it is, it often requires non-trivial transformations of artificial sensor
data. The Talking Heads use digital cameras as their main sensory source. These cameras
give output in RGB (red, green, blue intensities) because this is the standard in current
computer technology. But human vision operates on four quite different channels: the
two chromatic opponent channels which provide a value on the yellow-blue and red-
green dimensions, an achromatic channel which holds the brightness or light intensity,
and a saturation channel which reflects the degree of saturation or purity of a colour.
These channels can be reconstructed from RGB by a complex transformation.2
3.1.3 Behaviours
Although language requires that the image is segmented and categorised, a lot can al-
ready be done with raw or lightly processed sensory data by dynamically coupling them
to signals controlling the actuators. The neural abilities of many simple animals proba-
bly do not get much further than this and it already has turned out to be a good way to
construct the basic behavioural layers of robots that have to operate autonomously in a
real-world environment in real time.
For example, suppose you want a robot of the sort seen in Figure 1.3 to move towards
a light source. As originally suggested by the cybernetician Braitenberg (1984), we can
do this by mounting two simple light sensors to the left and right of the body and by
implementing a direct dynamical coupling between the output of the light sensors and
the motors. The coupling is such that when the sensed left light is stronger than the
sensed right light, the motor attached to the left wheel is slightly decreased and the
2 There is a vast literature on colour perception from different points of view (physics, psychology, neuro-
physiology, linguistics). A representative sample is contained in Byrne & Hilbert (1997). In some of the
experiments described later, the RGB values are converted to the CIE XYZ colour coding and from that




right motor slightly increased, so that the robot veers to the left. When the right light
is stronger, the right motor is increased and the left motor decreased, so that the robot
veers to the right. When these two dynamical couplings are put in place together with
a forward movement, a zig-zag behaviour emerges which brings the robot to the light
source.
Basic behaviours can be put together to form more complex behaviours.3 Figure 3.1
shows a recording of the internal states of the robot in Figure 1.3 as it is performing pho-
totaxis towards a light source, using two simple light sensors, and touch-based obstacle
avoidance behaviour. When the robot strikes the box housing the light, it moves back in
a kind of reflex behaviour triggered by the touch sensors mounted at the front. The Left-
Light and RightLight sensory channels and the LeftMotorSpeed and RightMotorSpeed
are shown in Figure 3.1. When the robot strikes the obstacle housing the light, its left
and right motor is pulled down to a negative value so that it moves backwards. Then the

























Figure 3.1: Internal states of a robot’s sensory and actuator channels on the y-axis and
time in periods of 1/40 seconds on the x-axis. The robot pushes against a box
holding a light source.
These channel recordings illustrate clearly that sensor or actuator data is continuous
in time and rapidly fluctuates in response to changes in the environment or the behaviour




of the agents. Coupling sensory data to actuators is effective for quick reaction without
the need for higher level processing. If an obstacle is rapidly approaching, it is important
to get out of the way rather than trying to figure out what kind of obstacle it is. The
observed behaviour is very complex, even though the underlying dynamical systems
are relatively simple; the complexity is due to the complexity of the real world with
which the robot is interacting.
Similar behaviour systems and networks have been experimented with for more com-
plex tasks and it is actually the way that the Mars rover discussed in Chapter 1 works.4
However, the gap between the continuous dynamics of sensori-motor intelligence and
cognition remains unbridged. It is possible for us to see structure in the data but this
structure is not perceived nor used for control by the robot itself. The robot does not seg-
ment nor categorise reality. It does not “know” that it is moving left or right and there-
fore cannot communicate this information to another robot. All processing remains at
the analog continuous level. However because it remains at this subsymbolic level, it is
doubtful whether we can ever hope to bootstrap cognitive intelligence simply by adding
more of these dynamical systems.5 The difference between behavioural intelligence and
cognitive intelligence resides in an additional layer of processing which is no longer con-
tinuous and analog but discrete and symbolic. How this second symbolic layer could be
formed but at the same time remain grounded in the analog sensori-motor layer is one
of the main research topics addressed in this book.
3.2 Segmentation
The first step that bridges the gap between sensory layers and cognitive processing is
segmentation. Segmentationmeans that a sensory data stream is divided into units either
in space or in time. In the Talking Heads experiment, the environment is restricted
to static images only, so that segmentation amounts to aggregating pixels into spatial
patches.
A patch may have an irregular shape which makes it hard to apply some classifica-
tions without complex processing. Bounding boxes are much easier to compute and are
already very useful. The bounding box of a segment is a rectangle around the contours
of a segment (Figure 3.2).
It is generally not necessary for segmentation to always yield parts of the images that
correspond to what we would call objects. This is an impossible demand. What counts
as an object is to some extent task-dependent. Segmentation yields information that can
4 At the risk of simplifying, we can say that the early work in cybernetics (such as that of Braitenberg (1984))
has focused on this subsymbolic layer and thatArtificial Intelligence, as a research field emerging in the late
1950’s, has focused on the symbolic layer. Some researchers involved in a bottom up approach to Artificial
Intelligence strongly refocused on the subsymbolic layer. One of the most vocal advocates of this position
is Brooks (1991). Obviously we need the two, but bridging the gap is a non-trivial problem, sometimes
known as the grounding problem. See: Harnad (1990).
5 Marr (1982) remains a classical reference outlining the features that can be extracted, the principled algo-
rithms for doing it, and possible neurophysiological models. These are the main research topics that still
dominate research in vision. See Ullman (1996) for an overview.
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Figure 3.2: Example of a scene captured by the camera in Figure 1.6, containing a puppet,
a wooden house, and a horse. Segmentation is based on aggregating grayscale
patches, i.e. areas in the image that are lighter or darker than the general
background. Bounding boxes have been drawn around the segments. Note
that there can be bounding boxes within bounding boxes if an object forms
part of a larger object.
be used for object identification but should not be equated with it. This is well illustrated
in Figure 3.2. Segmentation has been done here by filtering out segments with lower
or higher average grayscale values compared to the average in the scene. The segments
that have been obtained are not necessarily those that we humans identify, because we
use knowledge of the objects involved. This shows clearly that higher level constraints
play a role even at the very first basic visual processing layers.
3.2.1 Feature extraction
Many methods for segmentation have been reported in the computer vision literature
and all of them are useful even though they give slightly different results. Most methods
assume that additional low level processing is first performed on the imagemap to detect
small-scale structures, such as:
• Edges, which are possible boundaries between two surfaces. Edges can be aggre-
gated in line segments.
• Junctions, which are regions where lines come together.
• Patches, which are regions where the colour or the grayscale values are relatively
constant.
• Textures, which are small-scale regular surface markings, for example blobs.




• Distance from the observer, computed by matching two image maps from binocu-
lar vision.
• Shadings, recovered from continuous variations in brightness.
The recovery of such features is in itself a non-trivial topic of research and a huge liter-
ature as well as many software libraries now exist.
The visual layer of the Talking Heads only extracts patches and edges which each
leads to one way of segmenting the scene. Segmenting based on patches attempts to
aggregate those parts of the image into patches (a process called region growing) that
have more or less the same colour. More or less the same is of course a relative notion
and larger or smaller segments will be found depending on the thresholds that are used
for deciding whether a colour is similar or not. Segments that are too small are not
considered further. Region growing starts by comparing for each pixel how similar it
is to neighbouring pixels. Similar pixels are grouped as a patch. In the next step, each
patch is examined to see whether it can be merged with a neighbouring patch, and so on
recursively until patches cannot be combined further. Small patches or individual pixels
that stand on their own are included as part of a larger patch so that we get sufficiently
broad patches.
Segmentation based on edges starts by first detecting the edges themselves, which are
colour discontinuities suggesting a boundary between two surfaces. The edges are then
aggregated into lines, and these lines are connected to find the contours of an object. This
method works well for the simple objects used in the Talking Heads experiment. Things
are no longer so simple when contours are less clear, for example because they fuse with
the background. Further complications arise when one object partly obstructs another
object or when a set of lines can ambiguously be organised in different configurations (as
in visual illusions like the Necker cube). This illustrates that one segmentation method
must be balanced with others to offset unclear areas or local ambiguities.
Figure 3.3: Left view shows an image as captured by a Talking Heads camera. Middle
view shows the result of segmentation based on edge detection. Right view
shows the integration of segmentation by color and by edge detection.
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The results of applying these two segmentation methods can be seen in Figure 3.3. The
top picture shows the image map itself as it is captured by a Talking Head camera. The
middle image shows the result of segmenting based on edge detection. The contours of
two objects have been found. Note that these contours are not straight lines as onemight
expect. They are obtained by connecting together line segments which are themselves
based on connected edges. The bottom image shows the combination of edge detection
and segmentation based on patches. Because the green objects stand out clearly against
the white background they are easily recognised by the combination of these segmenta-
tion methods. Given the simplicity of the Talking Heads environment (geometric shapes
on a white board), segmentation based on colour and on edge detection generally yields
a segmentation that corresponds to the individual objects humans perceive in a scene.
3.2.2 Divergent perception
There is no guarantee that two Talking Heads looking towards the same area of the
white board perceive exactly the same image. In fact, the contrary is true. Because the
robots are physically grounded and situated in a particular context, standing roughly
one meter apart from each other (as shown in Figure 1.1), they cannot see the same
scene from exactly the same vantage point, and so images diverge. On the edges of the
field of view, the differences might become so significant that different objects are seen
and consequently different categories used.
Compare for example the recorded images for a speaker (top) and a hearer (bottom)
as shown in Figure 3.4 (to the left). The same figure shows the segmentation performed
by both agents in a separate window (to the right). The images are clearly different
because they have been taken from slightly different camera positions and the hearer
only approximately perceives in which direction the speaker is pointing. Agent a1 (top
of 3.4) has recovered the two circles, but not the rectangle which was deemed to small
to be relevant. Agent a2 (bottom of 3.4) has recovered the rectangle in the left top corner
but only one circle. The yellow circle was not recognised by a2 due to slightly different
reflections perceived from a2’s angle of view, so that the yellow surface was no longer
distinguishable from the white background.
Usually the situation is not so divergent, and even if there is divergent perception, the
categorisation used by the speaker may still be compatible with the same topic for the
hearer. Nevertheless, we must take into account that divergent perception of the scene
might considerably confuse language communication and the feedback the speaker gives
to the hearer. This is one example where it is useful to do grounded experiments because
it shows clearly a major issue (namely perceptual and hence categorical divergence)
which is usually swept under the carpet.
3.2.3 The sieve architecture
Segmentation exemplifies a dual kind of processing that we will encounter again and
again as we focus on the different layers of the cognitive architecture (Figure 3.5). Var-
ious possible solutions are generated, expanded and combined in parallel. The possible
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Figure 3.4: Top (left), image captured by the hearer. Bottom (left), image captured by the
speaker. Because both have a different view on the scene, the images diverge
and consequently the segmentation (bottom and top right) diverges as well,
in particular the yellow circle is not perceived by the speaker. In contrast the
speaker perceives a rectangle (bottom left corner) and has chosen this as the
topic. The rectangle is not perceived by the hearer, so the game has no chance
to be successful.
solutions enter into competition until globally coherent solutions emerge, which are
ranked and handed to the next layer of processing. Often a solution does not emerge or
multiple solutions are equally valid in which case constraints from expectations or from
the further processing of partial solutions must flow down to influence earlier process-
ing, which can be implemented as a re-entry of some solutions back into the previous
layer. For example, hearing a word may stimulate the expectation that a certain category
is relevant, which in turn may stimulate the computation of certain features and influ-
ence how the image is segmented. A speaker may have to choose between alternative
segmentations and categorisations depending on whether the conceptualisation can be
succinctly and accurately lexicalised and possible lexicalisations will only be acceptable
when they can be integrated in a complete sentence.
The two way flow of constraints (from perception to high level cognitive processing
and from high level cognitive processing to perception) suggests that the brain is best
thought of as a massively parallel, densely connected processing system, in which mul-
tiple partial solution structures float up or down, gathering strength or weakening with
new information entering the system. This contrasts with the view that information is
processed in a serial step-by-step fashion through tightly compartmentalised modules.6
6 See Fodor (1983). This book discusses a modular, sequential information processing architecture for cog-
nition. A non-modular, parallel view is sketched in: Minsky (1986). A more realistic neurophysiological
model similar to the one underlying the sieve architecture we have used is discussed by Edelman (1987).
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Figure 3.5: The different layers of cognitive processing act like a sieve. Inputs flow into
the layer, where they are processed to generate hypotheses of which the best
ones are transmitted to the next layer. Every layer can operate in both direc-
tions, so that constraints can flow from top to bottom and from bottom to top.
It is true that we have the illusion that there is some homunculus, a little man, which
sees a single coherent picture of reality and finds quickly the right way to verbalise or
interpret this picture, but closer examination of the actual informational requirements of
each subprocess shows that this can never work. Constraints must flow in all directions,
because the sensory data has not enough information to allow a unique segmentation,
and categorisation and language is too full of ambiguities to allow a straightforward
linear interpretation.
3.3 Sensory channels
Once segments have been found, further characteristics must be extracted. The values
of these various characteristics will be communicated on sensory channels to later cate-
gorisation processes. A characteristic property of a segment, such as average gray-scale,
is still in the analog continuous domain and should not be confused with a category (like
dark or light) which is in the discrete symbolic domain. An open-ended set of possible
sensory channels can be imagined, ranging from very general channels sensitive to often
recurring properties relevant in common tasks and thus shared by most people, to very
specific channels which only experts in specific domains possess.
3.3.1 Example channels
The segment characteristics which will be used later in various experiments are defined
below. Their values are all derived by straightforward computations from the raw image
maps captured by the cameras.
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• area: The surface area of a segment is calculated by simply counting the number
of pixels that are part of the segment.
• hpos, vpos: The x and y values of the central-position of a segment. The central
position is calculated by taking the mid-point of the sides of the bounding box.
• height: The height of the bounding box.
• width: The width of the bounding box.
• bb-area: The area of the bounding box, calculated by multiplying height by width.
• gray: The average gray-scale value of the pixels in a segment.
• r, g, b: The average r (redness), g (greenness), and b (blueness) values in a segment.
To obtain more human-like colour channels, they are transformed in terms of yb
(yellow-blue), rg (red-green), bw (black-white), sat (saturation) and brightness
channels.
• edge-count: The number of edges in a segment, for example 3 in the case of a
triangle.
• angle-count: The number of angles, determined on the basis of the junctions.
• ratio: The ratio between the area of the segment and the area of its bounding box,
which gives an idea how close a figure is to a rectangular shape.
Each of these segment characteristics or combinations of characteristics enables cer-
tain types of categorisations. For example, the gray channel makes it possible to dis-
tinguish between light and dark, height between short and tall, hpos between left and
right, vpos between top and bottom, area between big and small, etc. In the next chap-
ter, we will study how such categorisations may form on the basis of their respective
channels.
3.3.2 Conceptual spaces
The sensory channels used in the experiments have deliberately been kept to a minimum
so that we can follow in detail the ontological and lexical dynamics, which is a non-trivial
matter as I will demonstrate in Chapters 6 and 7. Obviously to get a richer lexicon, more
channels need to bemade available to the agents. These channels can often be grouped to
form a conceptual space.7 One of the best known examples is the colour space formed
by the yellow-blue, red-green, black-white, saturation, and brightness channels.




Here are some other examples:
1. A set of sensory channels that are sensitive to characteristics of moving segments
can easily be imagined. They include the speed of movement, the direction of
movement (along the horizontal position (hpos) and vertical position (vpos) di-
mensions), or the change in area (getting bigger if the object approaches or smaller
if it moves away). This is the foundation for categories about spatial change: mov-
ing left versus moving right, approaching versus retracting, speeding up versus
slowing down.8
2. Various spatial relations between segments can be computed: inclusion and over-
lap between segments, distance between midpoints, hierarchical structure, etc.
This leads to another batch of categories which are the basis for spatial distinc-
tions like inside versus outside.
3. More properties of the shape of segments can be computed. I have already intro-
duced the ratio channel, which is the area of the segment divided by the area of
the bounding box, giving an indication how rectangular a segment is. This can be
generalised by using an ellipse around a shape so that we can calculate convex-
ity. We can then also calculate elongation (by calculating the principal axes of the
ellipse).
It is not at all necessary that the channels operate on visual input, they can also use
actuator sensors or internal states like the level of the battery. It is moreover possible
to consider channels for dynamic states, for example by transforming the sensor and
actuator data into state-space representations and analysing them in terms of attractors.9
The ontological and lexical apparatus of the Talking Heads is generic with respect to
the nature of the sensory channels that are used, they could just as easily be about other
sensory domains like sound, tactile sensation or internal states of the robots.
3.3.3 Perceptual constancy
Real world sensory data is remarkably volatile due to the high variation and constant
change of our physical environment, nevertheless human beings have the illusion of
constancy. For example, the colour of an object is determined by the wavelength of
the light reflected by its surface. For a long time, it was thought that colour was an
intrinsic property of a surface, and that we therefore experience the colour of an object
as constant, but psycho-experimental evidence has shown that this is not true. When
we look at a surface in isolation which reflects light between 430 and 470 nanometres,
8 Experiments using segmentation based on movement using the dedicated hardware shown in Figure 1.5
were carried out by Tony Belpaeme. More details can be found in: Belpaeme, Steels & van Looveren
(1998) These channels have been used in language experiments where the agents were perceiving and
communicating about moving images: Steels (1998) The segmentation used in this book based on output
from the Sony EVI-D31 camera was implemented by Danny Van Tieghem. Angus McIntyre integrated the
interfaces to this camera within the babel environment.
9 Several examples of this type of approach are found in Port & van Gelder (1995).
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we experience the colour blue. As a result, one might assume that blue can be equated
with the experience of light in this particular wavelength region. However, if the same
surface is perceived in a broader context and the light conditions are changed (so that
objectively they now reflect light in a different spectral region), they still appear as blue!
What should objectively appear green according to the measured wavelength values is
still experienced as blue. This explains why we see colours as relatively constant even
if the light conditions are changing (for example from broad daylight to evening light)
which is obviously extremely useful for dealing with rich environments. But it implies
that colour is not an intrinsic property that can be measured objectively with a light
meter. It is actively mapped onto reality as a result of complex processing which takes
the context into account.10
The same sort of context-sensitivity is important for the other sensory dimensions that
the Talking Heads use, as well as for segmentation. An object will appear large or small
depending on the other objects in the scene. It will appear light or dark depending on
the average brightness. A scene may be segmented in one way or another depending on
the objects it contains. Visual illusions arise when more than one context is consistent
with an image and interpretations sometimes switch back and forth between different
possibilities.
3.3.4 Transformations
Cognitive agents can stabilise the sensory data to achieve more perceptual constancy
by transforming them so that the data become less context-sensitive. This implies that
additional processing first recovers more information about the context. One of the best
known examples of this concerns colour constancy. As mentioned earlier, wavelength
reflection is strongly influenced by the background light in the environment. However,
when the average surface reflectance is known, it is possible to transform the colour data
to recover the colour that is experienced by humans as constant for a surface.11
3.3.5 Scaling
The second way in which the erratic nature of real world signals can be diminished is by
scaling. Scaling means that the values actually recorded by sensors or feature extractors
are calibrated with respect to a frame of reference.
A first frame of reference is based on the absolute minima and maxima of the values
on a sensory channel. This can be used to do sensor-oriented scaling. For example,
the image map captured by the camera contains 320 × 240 pixels, which means that the
horizontal position (hpos) has a value between 0 and 320 and the vertical position (vpos)
has a value between 0 and 240. Both values can be scaled to fall between 0.0 and 1.0 so
that they become uniform with respect to other sensory channels. Given a value x and a
10 See the discussion about colour in: Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991)
11 See the discussion in: Zeki (1993), particularly Chapter 23.
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min and max value, then the scaled value is x′ = (x−min)/(max−min). Thus the
sensed value of hpos=200 becomes hpos=0.62 after scaling .
In the experiments discussed later, sensor-scaling is always performed so that all sen-
sory data is between 0.0 and 1.0, allowing values on different channels to be compared
with each other. In addition, context-oriented scaling is performed. Context-oriented
scaling uses the minima and maxima of the values that effectively appear in the context.
For example, if the values for the height of segments observed in the scene is between
500 and 700, then these can be the minimum and maximum of the height scale, so that
500 maps onto 0.0 and 700 to 1.0. Context-oriented scaling acts like a lens magnifying
the perceived values so that distinctions stand out more clearly. This scaling could be
made more sophisticated by introducing an additional scaling factor so that differences
are amplified but not necessarily blown up to their extremes.
Context-oriented scaling has two advantages. The context is now strongly taken into
account, in a way similar to human perception: A segment looks dark when surrounded
by light segments but light when surrounded by darker ones. The second advantage is
that differences within the relevant subrange that actually occur in the scene are ampli-
fied, so that they stand out even if the range of possible values is much wider. Often both
relative (context-oriented) and absolute (sensor-oriented) scaling are pertinent. Thus left
can be the left-most of all the objects in the scene (context-oriented scaling) or left in
absolute terms (sensor-oriented scaling). Some channels, such as the colour channels,
should never be scaled for context, because the categorisation works best on the basis of
the sensor-scaled values.
Context-oriented scaling is not necessarily based on the frame of reference imposed
by the image map which is recorded by perceiving the scene from the viewpoint of
the camera. Many contexts and hence other frames of reference are possible and are
exploited in natural language conversations. Often a particular context is communicated
through language. Scaling is then performed within the frame of reference suggested by
that context, for example, if I will tell someone ‘the chair is to your left’, whereas it may
perhaps be to the right of the hearer from my point of view.
A final form of scaling uses the typical values of the object being perceived. I will call
this object-oriented scaling. For example, a small elephant is always very large next
to a large mouse. We clearly have expectations about the typical size of an elephant at a
certain distance and use it to scale perceptual data prior to size categorisation. Context-
oriented and object-oriented scaling are examples how constraints must flow from non-
visual cognitive processes to visual processing. These non-modular interactions are a
strong indication that cognitive subsystems must be highly interconnected.
3.3.6 Saliency
The perceptual layer generates in parallel a wealth of sensory characteristics about each
of the segments in an image and their relationships. But not all sensory characteristics
are equally distinctive. For example, two segments in a scene may have almost the same
area but one might be very thin and thus tall, and the other very wide and thus short. In
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our own human perception, those channels that reflect significant differences stand out
and are preferred in referring to an object. Therefore, it is unlikely that area would be
used in Figure 3.6 to distinguish object 1 from the others.
Figure 3.6: A scene with three objects. The sensory values on the grayscale channel are
the most salient and will therefore be chosen preferentially for categorisation
and verbalisation.
The saliency of a channel is the smallest distance (after sensor-scaling) between the
perceived values of the topic and one of the corresponding perceived values of the other
segments in the context. Thus the different perceived values (after sensor-scaling) for the
segments in Figure 3.6 are shown in Table 3.1. The last line shows the saliency, assuming
that the topic is segment 1. Clearly the gray-channel is the most salient one in this case,
followed by the width-channel. Other sensory channels such as hpos, vpos or height
(which have almost the same values for object 0 and 1) are not salient at all.
Determining saliency has to be done before context scaling, because context-scaling
stretches the values to their extremes and so saliency information is lost. Table 3.2 shows
for the scene shown in Figure 3.6 the area channel with its raw data, the value after
sensor-scaling (with minimum 1,000 and maximum 10,000), and the value after context-
scaling.
Another example based on the segmented image is shown in Figure 3.7 (top images).
Two circular segments have been identified, the others are ignored because they are
too small. The different sensory values (after sensor-scaling) for the segments in the
speaker’s image are shown in Table 3.3.
The table shows clearly that hpos is the most salient channel. The horizontal position
also strikes us immediately as being the most salient when looking at Figure 3.7. For
many of the other channels, the differences are almost insignificant. The use of saliency
facilitates enormously communication and the acquisition of new categories. The case
shown in Figure 3.7 (top images) is an excellent opportunity for the agents to learn about
left versus right. If more channels are salient, it is no longer so easy for the hearer to
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Figure 3.7: Three examples of segmented images. The topic is indicated by a dashed
bounding box in the image of the speaker. Segments which are too small
are ignored. The topics have all been conceptualised as being to the right and









Figure 3.8: Processing converts data on a sensory channel into more usable data for later
categorisation processes.
guess what meaning might have been used by the speaker and so incoherence would
slip into the group’s lexical system.
The various steps that the agents go through in preparing data on sensory channels
are summarised in Figure 3.8. It is presented here as flowing in one direction, but in fact
constraints coming from higher level cognitive processing may influence these steps.
For example, if we say ‘the largest square left of the triangle’, we expect the hearer to
scale the squares with respect to all the objects left of the triangle, not with respect to
all the objects in the scene. The backward flow of constraints will be studied after I have
covered the different layers separately.
3.4 Methodology
I hope the reader now has a much better idea of the enormous challenge that the Talking
Heads face when trying to play a language game about a real world scene, particularly
because they try to develop a lexicon and ontology as well. The images contain a multi-
tude of ways to make distinctions and they differ slightly for both agents. It is enough
fo a cloud to pass by causing the light conditions to change slightly, and different values
are immediately seen on the colour channels possibly leading to different segmentations.
So how can the agents ever get a repertoire of abstract categories and associated words
when the real world shows such a perplexing variation? Very different scenes (for ex-
ample the ones contained in Figure 3.7) can intuitively be distinguished with the same
Table 3.1: Perceived values for each segment in Figure 3.6.
obj hpos vpos height width gray area
0 0.66 0.95 0.01 0.71 0.19 0.27
1 0.69 0.83 0.07 0.33 0.97 0.21
2 0.99 0.87 0.54 0.72 0.22 0.57
sal 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.39 0.75 0.06
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Table 3.2: Data for the area channel for the scene in Figure 3.6.
Object Raw data Sensor-scaled Context-scaled
0 24530 0.27 0.18
1 18924 0.21 0.0
2 50960 0.57 1.00
Table 3.3: Perceived values for each segment in Figure 3.7
channel obj-0 obj-1 saliency
hpos 0.27 0.16 0.11
vpos 0.20 0.20 0.0
height 0.15 0.15 0.0
width 0.10 0.11 0.01
area 0.10 0.10 0.0
R 0.23 0.25 0.02
G 0.32 0.34 0.02
B 0.63 0.65 0.02
categories (namely [left] versus [right]). But how can such inductive leaps be made?
Scaling and sensor transformation introduce some perceptual constancy, and saliency
helps to restrict the attention to those channels that are potentially effective in commu-
nication, but there is clearly an enormous gap between sensory data and language.
In this book, I will not only report on the outcome of an experiment and what we
learned about the nature of cognitive architectures, but I will also try to illustrate how
we tackle such tremendously complicated problems. I will take a moment to explain this
methodology because it runs like a red thread through the remaining chapters of this
book and differs from the way other subdisciplines of cognitive science go about their
investigations.
3.4.1 Putting up scaffolds
The standard means of attacking a difficult problem is to break it up in subproblems. In
this case, the most obvious subdivision is along the different sides of the semiotic square
I introduced in the previous chapter (Figure 3.9). This leads to three natural subproblems:
perception, conceptualisation, and verbalisation. When breaking up a problem, we can
initially assume that the other subproblems will be solved somehow and that they give
perfect output to the others or provide the right feedback. We can then try to invent
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a mechanism that can do the job for the subtask we are investigating in these ideal
circumstances, and test its strength and limitations. This is like putting up scaffolds to






Figure 3.9: The general problem of production is broken up into three subproblems: per-
ception, conceptualisation and verbalisation.
I will extensively make use of this methodology. This chapter has focused on percep-
tion, the next chapter focuses exclusively on conceptualisation, assuming that there is
good segmentation and a decent set of sensory channels. Chapter 5 turns to the prob-
lem of lexicalisation, assuming that the agents have a shared repertoire of meanings and
agree on what meaning to use in a particular game. Chapter 6 then puts the solutions for
conceptualisation and lexicalisation together by coupling their inputs and outputs and
establishing the appropriate feedback connections. Chapter 7 then couples this system
to the perceptual processes discussed in this chapter, so that we get back to our original
goal: understand how perceptually grounded language communication is possible.
Themethodology of breaking a problem into its subproblems goes quite a distance, but
is not without danger. The processes relating perception to language cannot be modular
for reasons already mentioned. Each layer receives inputs which are not completely
reliable and generates a set of possible suggestions rather than a single “correct” solution.
Constraints have to flow from top to bottom because there is simply not enough reliable
information to solve the problem with a straightforward sequential decision process. In
addition, every layer is constantly adapting itself to the surrounding information context.
New categories may develop, new words need to be learned, new sensory channels may
even emerge. So, constructing a global system is going to be more than simply putting
together its parts. There are complex behaviours that will only become visible when the
appropriate non-modular couplings are put in place, and this is notoriously difficult to
do and study.
3.4.2 Idealisation and realism
To make this problem more manageable I will adopt a second complementary method,
widely used in engineering. We can keep the various aspects of the global process intact,
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but simplify the challenge. We start with extremely idealised operational circumstances
and then gradually add more and more realism, until the system is ready to face the real
world. At every step we first establish whether the mechanisms still work, which means
in the guessing game that communicative success moves up. If this does not happen, we
must investigate what needs to be added or changed and perhaps reduce the complexity
again to find a new solid ground. If a language system does get established, we can
examine the limits of the process before increasing the challenge once more. During
the original research, we extensively used this stepwise approach, often sliding down
the mountain when too much complexity was introduced too quickly so that we were
forced to take a few steps back and tackler simpler challenges until we got our feet on
the ground again.
We can simplify or scale down in four dimensions. The first dimension is that of the
agents. I will often start by investigating a group of only two agents, then scale up to
larger and larger groups, and then tackle the problem of an open-ended population in
which new members enter and others leave. Each of these steps introduces additional
difficulties. For example, when there are only two agents, the risk of synonyms forming
is low – aswewill see later – because the agents only interact with each other and so they
can rapidly see whether the other one has a word for the same meaning. But when the
population is scaled up it is highly likely that different subgroups invent different words
or develop newmeanings. These variations take time to propagate until the group settles
into a coherent state. When there is an open-ended set of agents, the new agents in the
population must acquire a language which already exists, which implies that we must
have demonstrated that language acquisition goes sufficiently fast to explain cultural
transmission. When agents leave the community, they take some of the knowledge of
the language conventions, and so we have to show that the whole community might
destabilise.
Second there is the dimension of the real world and how it relates to perception and
action. For this book, I will in any case only use worlds restricted to coloured shapes
on a two-dimensional surface, thus drastically reducing the perceptual challenges, and
constrain the perceptual task still further by supplying the agents only with a limited set
of sensory channels. We also performed initially many simulations with artificial worlds
(to be explained shortly) where we could carefully control various parameters, such as
the number of objects in a scene, their complexity, or their variation.
But restricting the environment is not enough. Other aspects of perception can se-
riously disrupt language communication in a variety of ways and each of them can be
neutralised. We have already seen that in normal circumstances, the agents do not share
the same image of reality, which introduces a whole array of problems. They might
consequently segment the scene differently, the pointing might not be accurate enough
(even if they both were referring to the same object), the segments might have very
different sensory characteristics (as already discussed for Figure 3.7). We have reduced
these sources of difficulty by initially using only one camera, then scaling up to two
cameras in the same room, and only then scaling up to many different cameras located
all over the world.
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Increasing or decreasing the importance of saliency also helps. When only the most
salient sensory channel is used, agents have a higher chance to guess the right meaning
(at least if their perception converges reasonably well), and so they can better guess
the meaning of an unknown word or go less astray with words for which they have
already a shared meaning. So by varying the saliency, we can control the degree of
semantic ambiguity in the agents’ communications. Divergent perception and confusing
regularities in the environment are sources of polysemy in language, which the agents
need to dampen if they want their communications to be efficient and reliable.
Another real world aspect that we can make more or less complex is related to the
movements of the head and the pointing. A hearer must be able to look in the same
direction as the speaker, so that there is a minimum shared context. The hearer must be
able to point to the topic guessed, so that the speaker can seewhether the communication
succeeded. If it did not, the speaker must be able to point to the topic. These physical
interactions are well within the state of the art in robotics, and there exist even various
learning systems capable of bootstrapping this capacity from scratch.12
But these processes will never be completely reliable either. So we can increase or
decrease the challenge to the agents by making the non-verbal communication and co-
ordination more or less challenging. In the experiments reported in this book, speaker
and hearer can communicate to each other the direction in which they are looking.13 Be-
cause they still see a different image due to their physical position, the interaction is still
partly unreliable but it is sufficiently stable to enable the agents to bootstrap a shared
communication system, which then in turn can help to establish physical coordination.
Third, there is the cognitive apparatus of the agents implicated in language. Here we
can start with a simple associative memory for the lexicon that can only handle single
words associated with single meanings, and then scale up to conjunctions of meanings
covered by single or multiple words, and then still further to open-ended complex mean-
ings and syntax. Each step requires additional machinery in the agents, which will au-
tomatically lead to more complex linguistic forms, but it is our experience that there is
great value in trying to understand the basic process of word meaning acquisition before
attempting to install more cognitive complexity in the agents’ architecture. Even for the
acquisition and propagation of single word utterances there are still many open-ended
problems.
A final dimension concerns the transmission and perception of the utterance. Here
again we can scale up or down the challenge to the agents, from full-blown uncon-
strained speech in noisy environments down to perfect direct transmission of the lan-
guage form by the speaker and perfect recognition by the hearer. Complexity along this
dimension has been reduced to the minimum in the Talking Heads experiment. Agents
transmit utterances directly although a speech sound is generated so that human listen-
ers can hear which utterance is produced as part of a game.
12 This is the problem of hand-eye coordination performed in living systems by the vestibulo-oculomotor
systems. See: Anastacio & Robinson (1989).
13 This real world interaction has been developed by Kaplan (1999).
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Figure 3.10: An example of the computer-generated scenes from the geom world. Each
shape is labeled for further reference.
3.5 The geom world
One way to perform controlled experiments quickly and on a large scale consists of arti-
ficially generating the perceptual input to the agents. This has the additional advantage
that we can simplify the situations the agents have to work in (for example have fewer
types of shapes) and let them start initially with a shared perception. A simulation world
that we have used extensively for many simulations reported later is the geom world.
The geomworld generates geometric shapes similar to the physical figureswe paste on
the white board. Possible geometric shapes are circles, triangles, squares, rectangles, etc.
We can control the complexity of the scenes that are generated through a few parameters,
for example the number of minimum or maximum figures, or the possible repertoire of
shapes. We ignore colour and use only different grayscale values. To construct a scene
the computer simulation program chooses first a random number of figures. Then for
each figure, a shape is chosen, and random values for the main characteristics (position,
height, width, grayscale) are set.
An example of a computer-generated scene containing only rectangles is shown in
Figure 3.10 (another one was shown earlier in Figure 3.6). Given such a scene, each
agent calculates the bounding box and the segment-characteristics for every computer-
generated figure. For the scene in Figure 4.3, which contains three squares and a rect-
angle, the values of the channels are summarised in Table 3.4. After sensory-scaling we
get Table 3.5.
The output of the simulation is exactly the same as the one from real vision so that
we can easily switch between simulation and physical experimentation.
Working with simulations has obvious advantages for speeding up development and
systematic testing, but it does not replace experimentation with physical robots. It is true
that building an experimental apparatus such as we built for the Talking Heads exper-
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Table 3.4: Sensory data for the scene shown in Figure 3.10.
hpos vpos height width gray ratio area
0 116 166 293 293 0.777 1.0 85849
1 692 317 148 224 0.449 1.0 33152
2 192 64 137 137 0.408 1.0 18769
3 167 770 277 277 0.201 1.0 76729
Table 3.5: Sensory data after scaling for the scene shown in Figure 3.10.
hpos vpos height width gray ratio area
0 0.09 0.13 0.64 0.64 0.78 1.0 0.95
1 0.55 0.25 0.16 0.41 0.45 1.0 0.37
2 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.41 1.0 0.21
3 0.13 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.20 1.0 0.85
iment is a very non-trivial engineering project, particularly because of the teleporting
infrastructure that enables the agents to travel to multiple sites and thus experience dif-
ferent physical environments or the same environment from different points of view.
One might therefore wonder why we have persisted to go to such great length in con-
structing a real-world physical infrastructure. Why are experiments with robotic agents
necessary or desirable? Is it not enough to conduct simulation experiments given that
they can be done so much more easily?
Computer simulations calculate the consequences of a theoretical model. For example,
we can implement Newton’s model of the solar system and simulate the movements of
the planets around the sun by calculating for small time steps the position of each planet
and hence the trajectories they follow. All the aspects of a calculation are under the
scientist’s control and it is therefore possible to use this method to examine whether a
theory can be operationalised, whether it is coherent, and whether it is complete, i.e.
whether it covers all aspects of the phenomena one tries to understand. Simulations can
be inspected, re-executed or reprogrammed by anyone who cares to challenge them and
other researchers can try to achieve the same performance with alternative approaches,
so that different theories can be compared in an objective way.
Computer simulations can be set up for any theory which is formalisable, and hence
for theories of cognition and language as well. We need to implement the cognitive
architecture of the agent and then examine what happens when the agent engages in
interactions, i.e. when data is supplied from real or simulated scenes. Computer simula-
tions of cognitive mechanisms provide proof that they can be instantiated on physical
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systems, even though it may still be a mystery how the brain, itself a physical system,
implements similar mechanisms. Computational simulation is of course not restricted
to the theories I put forward in this book. Any theory claiming to explain the origins
of language and meaning should be testable by computer simulation, so that it is clear
what form the architecture takes and whether it does the job. All this is a big step com-
pared to the early days of cognitive modelling when one was supposed to believe on
faith whether a certain cognitive architecture could be instantiated by a physical system
and whether it was indeed able to exhibit the functionality that was ascribed to it.
But computer simulations have two major shortcomings, which makes them only one
of the tools in the toolkit of the cognitive scientist. First of all, computer simulations
by themselves do not empirically validate a theory. When a computer screen shows
pictures of planets moving around the sun, there is nothing that says that this is also the
way the planets move. To validate the theory, large amounts of data need to be collected
of the natural phenomena, and the simulation results have to be compared with the
real world data to determine a sufficient fit. In this book, we are primarily concerned
with formulating new plausible models for cognition and particularly for the origins of
cognition, not yet with their empirical validation; this exciting work is left for the future.
However, there is a second shortcoming. Cognitive systems must deal with the real
physical world in its infinite variety and complexity. If we perform only computer sim-
ulations, we not only model the cognitive mechanisms of the agents but also the en-
vironments which they are confronted with. We validate the model only with respect
to stylised worlds. Of course we can make such worlds much more sophisticated, but
there is never a guarantee that they are going to be representative of the real world that
embodied cognitive agents have to deal with. The more realistic computer simulations
become, that is the more aspects of reality they reliably take into account, the more
the simulation starts to approach reality and the more a simulation may tell us whether
the proposed mechanisms live up to realistic circumstances. But there will always be a
huge difference between computer-simulated worlds and real worlds, as any roboticist
knows all too well. And this is why we need to do experiments with physical robots and
real-world environments.
Of course, it is useful and efficient to conduct simulations as part of the discovery
process but true validation of a cognitive architecture can only come when the system is
confronted with a real physical environment. It forces us to attack the final known or hid-
den assumptions in the theory’s operational validation. It forces us to address the issue
of sensing, using real world physical sensors. Therefore, an experiment like the Talking
Heads experiment has a much greater force in convincing the sceptic. It is like testing
the design for an airplane by building and flying one, as opposed to demonstrating the
idea only in simulation.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter focused on the perceptual layer which is responsible for interfacing the ex-
ternal physical world with the internal world of the agents. The interface is based on
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sensors to transduce external states into internal states and actuators to transduce inter-
nal states into external states. Four sorts of operations take place on raw sensory data
making them more amenable to categorisation, conceptualisation and consequently lan-
guage communication: Features in the form of micro-structures are extracted, the image
is segmented in coherent units using region growing or countour finding, segment char-
acteristics such as average colour or size are derived, and characteristics are transformed
or scaled to bring out salient features and aid to achieve categorial constancy.
The Talking Heads use standard techniques from computer vision research. Research
in this field is indeed so advanced that a large number of algorithms for segmenting
images and extracting information about image segments could be taken off the shelf
and re-programmed to get a vision system that is adequate for the task setting of the
Talking Heads experiment. This will, of course, no longer be the case if the environment
ismademore challenging andmore open to novel situations. Very quicklywewould then
reach the limits of what can currently be done using standard techniques. Nevertheless
for our purpose of exploring language and meaning, the Talking Heads vision system
gives a sufficiently rich and reliable segmentation and characterisation of the scene so




4 The Discrimination Game
Theprevious chapter laid the perceptual groundwork for investigating conceptualisation
and language communication. It proposed a set of mechanisms for segmenting a scene
and extracting characteristics about each segment. The next task of the agent is to use
these results from the perceptual layer to categorise and hence conceptualise the scene.
For the time being, I will ignore the full complexity of natural language meaning and
focus only on the most simple type of conceptualisation one can imagine, namely cate-
gories, which logicians refer to as unary predicates, as well as conjunctive combinations
of categories. Words like blue, light or square name such categories. We not only need
a way that the Talking Heads can use such categories to conceptualise a scene based on
visual perception, but we also need mechanisms that can explain how such categories
might develop or be acquired by each agent autonomously and without supervised train-
ing. This is clearly an enormous challenge and no known universally accepted solution
exists to this problem.
Categorisation has fascinated philosophers and scientists since the onset of thought,
not only because it is one of the most fundamental capabilities of the human mind, but
also because the subject matter immediately raises some intriguing paradoxes and puz-
zles. First of all, we have already seen that there is an enormous gap between the sym-
bolic world of objects and categories and the subsymbolic world of analog sensori-motor
signal streams. A particular sensory signal is highly context-dependent and inherently
noisy due to the partial unreliability of sensors and their limited accuracy. Sensory pro-
cessing, transformation, and scaling go some way to achieve perceptual constancy but
cognitive processes must clearly make up for the fleeting erratic nature of reality. Here
we are immediately confronted with a first paradox. Univocal categorisation seems only
possible when an interpretation of reality is within reach, for example when there are
strong expectations, possibly coming from language utterances. But this interpretation
depends itself on categorisation. How can this apparent causal circularity be broken?
Furthermore, if it is already so difficult to map categories on real world sensory data
streams, how on earth can categories form and become stable? Young children appear
to acquire perceptually grounded categories effortlessly and without systematic training.
Psychologists have often observed the acquisition of distinctions with very few clear ex-
ample cases and no overt feedback. On the other hand, categories appear to some extent
culture-specific and different individuals make more refined distinctions depending on
the sort of tasks they engage in. This is the case even in such a basic domain as colour
categorisation. Painters or textile designers make distinctions ordinary humans do not
see and have developed a very extensive repertoire of terms to talk about these distinc-
tions. These observations highlight a second paradox: The effortless early acquisition
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of perceptual distinctions suggests that categories are innate. But the dependence on
culture, individual variation and specialisation suggest that categories are learned. How
can these two observations be reconciled?
Then there is a third paradox, first suggested by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In order to
communicate, the speaker and the hearer need to share the building blocks of the con-
ceptualisations underlying their communication. If I say the wine glass on the table, I
expect the hearer to be able to recognise what objects are tables, when something is
on the table or not on the table, and when something is a wine glass versus another
kind of glass. But if every individual learns categories independently and autonomously,
how can they ever become shared? It is assumed that language helps in establishing a
shared ontology within a language community but language itself depends on shared
categories, so how can the whole system ever get off the ground; how can this chicken
and egg situation be broken?
I will begin this chapter by outlining the empiricist and rationalist positions, which
have dominated much of the philosophical discussion on categorisation and have in-
directly influenced attempts to build artificial systems able to perform some form of
categorisation. I will then propose an alternative selectionist approach and study a
categorisation system based on it. It is shown that agents endowed with this system are
able to develop an adequate repertoire of categories for distinguishing objects in their
environment and that this repertoire remains adaptive when important changes occur in
the environment. This goes some way to resolve the paradoxes of meaning, but the story
remains incomplete. To explain how agents can share the same categories even if they
develop their ontologies independently of each other, I will later argue for a co-evolution
of language and meaning. I will show that when ontological development is coupled to
lexical development, the two become co-ordinated with neither a central co-ordinator
nor prior design.
4.1 The paradoxes of meaning
There are basically two philosophical doctrines that have tried to address the paradoxes
of meaning. One doctrine is known as empiricism, the other one as rationalism. Many
philosophical texts are available introducing these philosophical doctrines and their his-
torical roots. The problem of the origins of language and meaning was for example
already a highly debated topic among philosophers in the 18th century, see for example
Rousseau (1781).
The debate between rationalism and empiricism is still very much alive today and now
based on much more knowledge about what it means for something to be innate or what
the limits are of induction. See Elman et al. (1996) for the most recent arguments and
counterarguments. Compared to the full richness of human experience, I necessarily
have had to adopt a very narrow view, focusing only on basic perceptually grounded
categories. More complex categories related to human relationships, emotions, social or-
ganisation, or beliefs will not be considered and it would be very difficult to do so with
the methodology used here. See Varela,Thomson & Rosch (1991) for a broader discussion.
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4.1.1 The empiricist’s stance
The empiricist tradition has a long and reputable history. The first clear formulations
emerged as a counterreaction to 17th century rationalism, with the work of Hume, Locke,
and others. Empiricists were inspired by the early success of the natural sciences, which
had insisted on observing reality as it is, through sensory experience and stepwise in-
duction. The empiricist attitude has continued to dominate epistemology in the 19th
and 20th century. It was formulated by Bertrand Russell in a doctrine called logical
empiricism, and elaborated by generations of philosophers from Carnap to Quine into
rich logical frameworks and precise inductive methods. Empiricist explanations about
categorisation today very much dominate the neurosciences.
Empiricists argue that categories capture what is common or invariant between cases
and that neural networks in the brain can detect this invariance. They also argue that
these commonalities can be learned by progressively abstracting away from the details of
specific cases, even if there is a poor stimulus. A child sees many examples of red objects
and progressively grasps the abstract concept [red] by retaining what is common to all
of them. If categories are the result of a general inductive learning procedure, the areas of
the brain responsible for categorisation do not have to be specialised or pre-programmed
for recognising specific categories. Empiricists therefore believe that they can take the
form of general purpose networks that learn any kind of category by making abstraction
from the examples supplied by the environment. Categories are therefore not innate but
learned.
In recent decades, various designs for neural network models have been proposed
that reflect this empiricist stance.1 The input nodes of these networks receive data from
sensory channels of the sort discussed in the previous chapter. They are connected to
higher level nodes which use the data to decide whether a category applies. The connec-
tions are weighted and a positive output signal is produced when the weighted sum of
the inputs exceeds a certain threshold. Thus the networks exhibit some of the flexibil-
ity, tolerance to variation, and context-dependence seen in human categorisation. The
weights and thresholds are learned by propagating back errors in categorisation. If a
node makes a positive identification when it should not have done so, the weights of the
incoming connections are lowered and the threshold is increased, so that it is less likely
that the threshold will be exceeded again for the same situation the next time around.
Conversely, if the network makes a negative identification where it should have made a
positive one, the weights of the incoming connections are increased and the threshold
lowered. It is known through mathematical proofs that such networks indeed stabilise
on reliable categorisations, if the environment remains sufficiently constant.2 These in-
1 The first neural network models emerged in the fifties from the work of neurologists and computer sci-
entists like Donald Hebb, McCullogh and Pitts, Rosenblatt, and others. There was a strong first wave of
enthusiasm in the sixties, as illustrated for example in: Minsky & Papert (1969). A second wave developed
in the mid-eighties when new more powerful network architectures were discovered that could handle in-
termediary representations and later on temporal structures (see the overview in Churchland & Sejnowski
(1992).
2 This type of neural networks and some of its main variants are discussed at length in the classical textbook
by Rumelhart & McClelland (1986).
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ductive neural networks therefore constitute their first serious proposal for bridging the
gap between sensory signals and categories and for explaining the origins and acquisi-
tion of categories.
4.1.2 The rationalist’s stance
A radically different approach to categorisation has been proposed by rationalists. The
rationalist point of view had its first clear formulation in Plato’s philosophy. A resur-
gence of rationalist ideas took place in the 17th and beginning of the 18th century, par-
ticularly through the work of Descartes and Leibniz. More recently, in the second half
of the 20th century, a strong rationalist movement emerged again, mainly under the in-
fluence of Noam Chomsky. Today rationalist attitudes very much dominate linguistics
and cognitive psychology.
Early rationalists, like Descartes, were dualists, which saw the mind and the body in
totally different realms. In such a view, it becomes very difficult to scientifically inves-
tigate perceptually grounded categorisation, and an explanation how the brain works
seems more remote than ever. However, most contemporary rationalists (like empiri-
cists) now believe that categorisation is done by physical structures in the brain. Indeed,
if certain parts of the brain are damaged, the capability to categorise disappears or is
severely restricted and distorted (Deacon 1997).
Rationalists claim that categories exist a priori and therefore categorisation comes
from within. They argue that humans have a repertoire of ideal universal forms, which
they project onto reality. Reality itself is a weak, imperfect reflection of these forms, like
the shadows of objects on thewall of a cave. Because of this poverty of stimuli, categories
(particularly the perceptually grounded categories that are the focus of our attention in
this book) are claimed to be unlearnable by induction and must therefore be innate.3
This innateness hypothesis suggests that the brain comes with categorisation or-
gans, small neuronal circuits capable of performing the mapping of some idealised uni-
versal form onto reality. Consequently the human genomemust include a set of concept
genes which regulate how each of these categorisation organs should grow during de-
velopment. Rationalists claim that it is absurd to think of categories as being learned
from example cases supplied by the environment, just as it is absurd to say that the
hand learns to grow five fingers.
4.1.3 Arguments for and against rationalism
There is something to say both for a rationalist and for an empiricist approach, indeed
otherwise so many serious thinkers could not have believed fervently in one position
3 Strong forms of innateness have been defended by Fodor (1983) and many philosophers and linguists as-
sociated with the generative grammar paradigm. See the discussion in Wierzbicka (1992), particularly the
introductory chapter. In artificial intelligence research, particularly the logic-oriented tradition, there is
often an implicit acceptance that basic categories are innate, but that derived categories, formulatable in
terms of more primitive concepts, can be learned (see McCarthy 2008). There are also large-scale efforts
going on to build an ontology as rich as human ontologies, see the discussions around Doug Lenat’s CYC
project in Steels & McDermott (1994).
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or the other. Rationalists point to the fact that children acquire concepts surprisingly
quickly and apparently with very little stimuli and that anthropological observations
have shown that there are strong universal tendencies for basic perceptually grounded
categories, such as colour or space. However, more detailed observations show that the
acquisition of categories in children goes in fact very slowly. For example, concepts like
cause-effect and the correct use of the word because, the proper use of tenses, etc. all
take years to develop. Adults keep acquiring new categories through out their lifetime,
whichmakes it difficult tomaintain that they are part of the human genome. For example,
airline pilots and sailors categorise the direction and strength of winds and the shapes
and colours of clouds, so as to predict turbulences, future weather, or advantageous
trajectories. There are occasionally profound differences in how cultures conceptualise
reality. These differences do not seem to be innate because everybody who has had
sufficient exposure to the culture, preferably at an early age and therefore without too
much preconception, can normally acquire them.4
Further objections against the innateness hypothesis have come from the camp of
neurobiology. In lower animals, neural circuits have been identified which perform very
specific categorisations of reality. For example, the frog is sensitive to objects of a par-
ticular size moving in front of it at a particular speed, specifically the kind of objects
that constitute a potential source of food for the frog. The dedicated neuronal circuits
performing this categorisation have been shown to be innate and shared by all frogs.
But higher animals and humans exhibit an enormous plasticity, both in terms of the
repertoire of categories they recognise and in terms of the actual brain structure.5
The difference between an animal reacting to a limited set of environmental stimuli
with a rigid neural apparatus and a cognitively endowed human being is precisely the
high degree of flexibility and adaptivity of the latter. It is therefore not surprising that
clear-cut categorisation organs which have the same structure in all humans and are
located at the same position in the brain have not been found. The microstructure of the
brain does not consist of neatly separated organs and it therefore does not make sense
to look for genes that regulate their maturation. Neurobiologists tell us that the brain
appears more like an organically grown tissue rather than a delicately tuned machine
laid out by genetic programs. In contrast to insect brains or brains of lower animals,
the mammalian brain is capable of regenerating itself to some extent after damage, and
brain tissue from one higher order animal can be implanted in another one, causing
a resurgence of lost function, even if the source location of the transplant is different.
For example, if tissue from the visual cortex is implanted in the auditory cortex, it will
regenerate and function as part of the auditory cortex. Pathways to the visual cortex
can be redirected to the auditory cortex, which will cause the auditory cortex to take on
functions of visual processing.
4 Rationalists often argue that there is no other way to explain the child’s rapid acquisition of concepts but
detailed psycholinguistic observations have shown that child language understanding (which is the clearest
sign whether certain concepts have been acquired) is often deceptive because non-verbal strategies may
lead to appropriate answers to adult questions and thus the appearance of understanding.
5 Evidence for the remarkable plasticity of the human brain is reviewed in Edelman (1987) and Elman et al.
(1996).
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Even supposing that there is a strong genetic determination of micro-level brain struc-
ture, there is still the question how the hundreds of thousands of concepts employed by
adult human beings might have become included in the human genome. Saying that a
perceptually grounded category is innate does not explain anything. One has to show
a plausible evolutionary history for the categories hypothesised to be innate and prove
that the hypothesised concept genes can propagate sufficiently fast in the human popu-
lation.6
4.1.4 Arguments for and against empiricism
Empiricists have had considerable success in coming up with inductive learning mech-
anisms. They have even been demonstrated on autonomous robots in direct interaction
with the environment. At the same time, the learning mechanisms proposed so far turn
out to be very fragile.7 The human experimenter has to carefully set up the architecture
of the network (the number of nodes, the number of layers of nodes, and how they are
connected), tune the learning parameters, and supply just the right set of test cases. Per-
formance may degrade when too many cases are seen. Even worse, when new cases
are supplied that require a revision of categories already learned, a substantial portion
of the earlier cases must be resubmitted to retrain the network. All this contradicts the
robustness and open-ended extensibility of human categorisation. In addition, the learn-
ing mechanisms proposed have been slow to consistently acquire categories. A large
number of cases are required and often cases must go through multiple iterations. More-
over any inductive method is a slave of the data. A category will only become reliably
recognised when it is statistically significant.
So there are questions both for a rationalist and an empiricist approach. If categories
are innate how can new categories, which are required when the environment or the task
settings change, form so quickly? How can the genetic code store the vast repertoire of
categories humans routinely employ, and how can we explain the diversity with which
different cultures approach reality? On the other hand, if every child independently
acquires categories by learning, we must question how can they do so, given the poor
quality of the examples they see. How is it that learning is so rapid? How can different in-
dependent learners arrive at a repertoire of categories that is sufficiently shared to make
language communication possible? How do we reconcile the apparent innate origins
of perceptually grounded categories with their remarkable adaptedness to the changing
needs and open-ended environments that the individual effectively encounters?
6 SeeWorden (1995). This article argues, based on the genetic difference between humans and other primates,
that there are limits to genetic transmission of cognitive content, like categories or grammars. For discus-
sions on the speed of gene spreading compared to cultural evolution, see Cavalli-Sforza, Cavalli-Sforza &
Thorne (1996).
7 The weakness of traditional connectionist networks with respect to speed and resilience are discussed at




The difficulties encountered with the empiricist and rationalist points of view make it
worthwhile to explore alternative solutions. The one I propose and further explore in this
book has been inspired by two key principles from biology. The first principle is that of
selectionism. It requires a growth process in the agents that generates possible structures,
even in the absence of examples, and a pruning process that removes those that are irrel-
evant. The growth and pruning process is assumed to be biologically given but not the
categories that result from it. The second principle that I will adopt is interactionism, put
forward by biologists to understand how genetic influences and environmental impact
cooperate to shape an organism. Interactionism was first suggested by Piaget (originally
a biologist) to explain the growth of mental capacity in the child. His numerous exper-
iments show a gradual progressive construction of increasingly more complex ways of
categorising and conceptualising reality. The child encounters situations that can be
assimilated, and thus cause entrenchment of existing structures, as well as situations
that cannot be handled and require the child to accommodate with new constructions
or reorganisations.8
4.2.1 Principles of selectionism
Selectionism is a general means of explaining the origins of complexity. It requires: (1)
a process that can generate a repertoire of possible solutions in a basically random fash-
ion, (2) a process for preserving solutions so that there can be a gradual build up of
more complex solutions, and (3) a selectionist force, which uses feedback from the envi-
ronment and influences preservation so that adequate solutions are retained and others
discarded.9
In the case of the Darwinian explanation for the evolution of species, a solution is
an organism capable of surviving in a given environment. Types of organisms are pre-
served in the genetic material as it is copied from one generation to the next. Variations
are produced due to errors in gene copying, mutations, gene insertion, etc. The feedback
comes from the natural environment. Organisms that do not flourish are less success-
ful in reproduction so that their genetic material and hence the organisms this material
generates are less likely to be preserved. Selectionism contrasts with Lamarckian in-
structionism, which claims that the organism transmits its adaptations and what it has
learned during its life time to its offspring.
8 The work of Waddington is typical for the interactionist approach to development, see Waddington (1975).
Such a view does not necessarily imply that there is a pre-determined course of development. Piaget em-
phasised a progressive, dynamical view on development Piaget (1985). His work arose prior to the detailed
computational modeling that is now common place in cognitive science and there is still an enormous
work left to demonstrate operationalisations of these insights. See for a more recent discussion of the
issues: Thelen & Smith (1994).
9 There are many excellent introductory accounts of selectionism. One of the best known is: Dawkins (1976).
The recent application of selectionism to the automatic derivation of computer programs clearly demon-
strates how general the principle is. See Goldberg (1989) and Koza, Goldberg & Fogel (1996). The principle
has now even been applied to the development of computational hardware. See Sipper, Mange & Andres
(1998).
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From the viewpoint of instructionism, the neck of a giraffe is so long because at some
point giraffes with shorter necks often stretched their necks. This was transmitted to
the offspring which got born with slightly longer necks. They also stretched their necks
further, and so on. In a selectionist framework, it is assumed that the natural variation in
the population is exploited. Some giraffes have longer necks than others, and if this gives
an advantage their genes proliferate. Within the population born with the new gene dis-
tribution there are still variations and once again those with a longer neck proliferate,
and so on. Instructionist processes build further upon acquired characteristics. There
is progressive learning from one generation to the next. Selectionism assumes natural
variation and progressive dominance of fitter variants, with neither learning nor trans-
mission of acquired characteristics. Selectionism can make sudden jumps and therefore
has the potential to go much faster than the transmission of acquired characteristics.
In the case of the immune system, a solution is an antibody capable of combatting in-
truders foreign to the organism. Here again an instructionist approach can be envisioned
and was believed for a long time to be the case. For this belief to be true would mean
that the immune system somehow learns the appropriate response and then preserves
that response. The selectionist viewpoint of the immune system argues instead that it
generates autonomously a very large repertoire of possible antibody responses. When a
foreign body invades, the response is already there, it is simply amplified (Varela et al.
1988).
4.2.2 Selectionist cognitive systems
TheTalking Heads experiment explores the same line of thinking, both to the acquisition
of categories, and later experiments (discussed in part II) to the acquisition of more com-
plex meaning and even grammar. It implies that there is no learning taking place in the
empiricist sense of induction from a series of examples, but that instead three processes
are active:
1. a process whereby structures capable to categorise reality are generated in a basi-
cally random fashion,
2. a process to preserve these structures and build further upon them to enable a
steady increase in complexity, and
3. a selectionist force which prunes away those structures that were irrelevant and
retains the ones that are successful and needed.
As I will expand upon in more detail in this chapter, categorisation can be carried out
by discrimination trees where the nodes in the tree filter objects depending on whether
they fall within a sensory region or not. I will show that the discrimination trees grow in
a more or less random fashion and those parts of the tree that are irrelevant get pruned.
The selectionist feedback comes from the games in which the agent participates. Distinc-
tions that are effective in discriminating the topic from the other objects in the context
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and have been successfully lexicalised, are maintained in the lexicon of the community,
others are discarded.
When there is a high failure rate, the discrimination trees should expand, in the same
way that the immune system gets stimulated (but does not strictly speaking learn) when
the organism is invaded or genetic variation increases in periods of stress on a species.
When there is a high success rate, some pruning might be possible. The growth and
pruning dynamics creates an ecology of distinctions which is constantly adapting itself
to the situations and tasks the agent encounters, without any innate a priori categories
and without any inductive learning.
4.2.3 The tree metaphor
The growth of a tree or plant is a good metaphor to visualise this selectionist approach.
The shape of a tree appears well adapted to its environment. Typically there are more
branches and leaves where there is more sunlight. The height of the tree reflects the
competition of neighbouring trees or the height of surrounding buildings. The overall
shape reflects the shape of surrounding walls or other trees. It is obvious that a tree does
not come with “shape genes” that determine exactly which shape the tree will have in a
particular setting. Nor does it come with sophisticated sensors and a brain inductively
learning about the environment so as to decide on which branch the next leaf should
grow. Instead the tree grows in all directions following a steady, usually quite regular
growth pattern. A tree standing alone in a landscape exhibits a beautiful balanced shape,
expanding in all directions, but when the growth is constrained, the tree reflects these
constraints. The branches and leaves that catch more sunlight receive more resources to
flourish and develop further, whereas those pointing towards an area with no sunlight
are stifled in their growth and may die altogether.
Given that the brain is a living tissue, it is possible to imagine a similar growth process
in the brain.10 Neural networks implementing discrimination trees could be expanding
in all directions, just as other tissue forms. The overall growth dynamics is genetically
determined but neutral with respect to the repertoire needed in a certain environment.
The shape of the discrimination trees in a particular individual is due to the kinds of
sensory data that have been produced in his interactions with the environment and their
use and success in other cognitive processes such as language communication. The users
of the discrimination trees and the environment act as selectionist forces molding the
spontaneously forming repertoires.
Note that selectionism is not applied at the level of a species as in biological evolution
but at the level of the cognitive structures in each individual as he or she develops and
adapts during his or her life time. The parallel exploration and the competition of alter-
native ways to categorise reality take place in a single individual interacting with the
environment and therefore are very rapid.
10 Several neurobiologists have presented suggestions and evidence in this direction. See particularly Edel-
man (1987) and Changeux (1997).
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4.2.4 Deriving new sensory channels
Obviously the sensory channels are a critical part of the categorisation process. When
the sensory data is not available, it is simply not possible to develop discrimination trees
along a particular sensory dimension. This raises the question as to where the sensory
channels themselves may come from. The most basic raw data is directly supplied by the
sensors themselves and is thus innately given. But processes calculating the values on
the more complex channels must somehow form under the influence of the environment,
and they are thus potentially partly influenced by language.
Here again both an inductive and a selectionist approach can be envisioned. In an
inductive approach, a learning process, such as embodied by a connectionist network, is
fed with a series of examples of situations exhibiting particular characteristics, and the
network becomes sensitive to the characteristics of these situations. Several concrete
examples of such a learning process have already been studied using the neural network
techniques mentioned earlier.11
In a selectionist approach, a repertoire of primitive operations is given, presumably
implemented by the basic biochemistry of the neural systems, and there are ways to com-
bine these operations into more complex visual programs. Those programs yielding an
outcome which is afterwards used successfully in categorisation are retained and the
others discarded, thus establishing a co-evolution between a repertoire of sensory chan-
nels and a repertoire of categories. We have already done some successful experiments
in this direction, see De Jong & Steels (1999), but this theme will not be pursued further
here as a full discussion would be too much a digression from the main line of investi-
gation. For the remainder of this book, the sensory channels will be pre-programmed,
although it is still up to the selectionist categorisation process to discover which ones
are useful in the environments presented to the agents and which ones are not.
4.2.5 Comparing approaches
A selectionist approach is different from both the rationalist and empiricist points of view.
In contrast with rationalism, it is not assumed that categories are universal and a priori
shared. Categories are not innate. In contrast with empiricism, it is not assumed that
categories are derived by induction from a large set of cases. Categories are not learned.
What is claimed to be innate is a general purpose growth and pruning dynamics which
could be realised by the biochemistry of neural cells. The growth process may generate
many categorieswhichmay turn out to be useless, but eventually it settles on a repertoire
which is adequate for the environment in which the individual finds itself.
A selectionist approach to category formation has some characteristics that make it
look like categories are innate. Categories may form in an individual without having
ever seen one single example. They appear to pop up from nowhere, but this does not
mean that genes determining this particular category have to be innate. They are the
result of a random growth process which has simply generated these possibilities. Alter-
natively, a selectionist process has some characteristics that make it look like categories
11 Examples are discussed in: Linsker (1990).
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have been learned. The individual ends up with a repertoire which is adapted to the
environments and tasks that are indeed encountered, and this ontology keeps evolving
to remain adequate when the environment changes or new tasks are encountered. Be-
cause the selectionist approach has characteristics of innateness as well as learning, it
is capable of helping resolve the paradoxes of the origins of categories discussed in the
beginning of this chapter. It explains adaptivity without learning and fast development,
even with a weak stimulus, but without innateness.
All of this sounds intriguing and brings in a refreshingly new point of view, but does
it really work? Can we invent the required growth and pruning dynamics and identify
the appropriate selectionist feedback loop? The remainder of this chapter focuses on this
question.
4.3 Discrimination trees
First I will introduce structures that can perform categorisation. The next section shows
how these structures may autonomously originate in an agent interacting with the en-
vironment.
4.3.1 Making distinctions
Empiricists start from the idea that categories capture what is common between objects.
Thus [red] is supposed to capture what is common or similar to all red objects. Hence
in theories of (formal) semantics, the meaning of a predicate is equated with the set of
all things that belong to the class it delineates. But we can also turn things around. We
can view a category as a way to capture what is different between objects. For example,
the distinction between [left] and [right] is based on the horizontal position (hpos) of
an object with respect to the viewer. The distinction is imposed on the scene (as long
as it is compatible) instead of recognised. This may seem a subtle difference, but it has
profound consequences, particularly for acquiring categories.
Consider the category [large]. What do all large objects have in common? At first
sight very little. Almost any physical object can be called large in one context or another.
It is going to be very difficult for a learning agent to determine some commonality, even
if given thousands of examples of large objects. In the beginning, the agent might be
confused by commonalities in colour or position or shape. Only with some luck, will the
learning algorithm start to zoom in on size. This is what makes inductive learning so
slow and why it is criticised, rightfully, by rationalists. In fact, searching for common-
ality hardly makes sense for many categories. [large] is only meaningful in opposition
to [small], [left] only makes sense in opposition to [right]. Often categorisation is
relative to the context (a block which is large when surrounded by smaller blocks may
be categorised as small when surrounded by larger blocks) and occasionally it is relative
to the objects themselves (a large mouse is always categorised as much smaller than a
small elephant).
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Few people would disagree that [large] and [small] are distinctions imposed on re-
ality as opposed to intrinsic properties of classes of objects, but what about colour? Is
it not an example where a category is absolute? We have already seen in the previous
chapter that this is not the case. The colour reflection depends strongly on the surface
reflection and thus on the light conditions and light sources in the environment. What
should objectively appear blue when measuring the wavelength might actually appear
green and vice-versa. Colour is not an intrinsic property but is actively mapped onto re-
ality in a context-sensitive way.12 This does not mean of course that categorisation does
not make use of sensory data. On the contrary, without sensory data, categorisation
would be entirely impossible.
Once categories are available, they can be used for much more than making distinc-
tions. For example, if an agent has the distinction between [large] and [small], he can
use it to group the objects in a scene into two subsets: those that are large and those that
are small. So in this case, the categories are used to group objects based on a characteris-
tic they have in common, namely being large and being small. My main argument here
is that categories form driven by discrimination tasks, afterwards they can be used for
many other semantic processes, including classification.
4.3.2 Categorisers
I will refer to the process capable of making a distinction as a categoriser. It operates on
the output of a sensory channel and decides whether a category or its opponent is valid.
A categoriser keeps track of its success by maintaining an internal counter. Consider
for example the category [large] which operates on the output of the area-channel.
This channel contains a scaled value between 0.0 and 1.0 for the area of a segment. A
distinction can therefore be made simply by dividing the set of possible values in two
halves: those whose area is between 0.0 and 0.5 and those whose area is between 0.5 and
1.0, giving us two categories, [small] and [large]. When the agent needs to categorise
an object, he checks in which region an object’s area falls. If it is between 0.0 and 0.5,
the category is [small], if it is greater than 0.5 the category is [large].
It is clearly possible to refine each category c by introducing categorisers that further
divide the region of possible values of c into smaller subregions. For example, the cat-
egory [small] which is applicable if the area is between 0.0 and 0.5, can be refined by
introducing two more specific categorisers: one responding to a region between 0.0 and
0.25 for [very-small] and another one for a region between 0.25 and 0.5 for [medium-
small]. The total set of distinctions using values of the same sensory channel can be
organised in a discrimination tree (Figure 4.1).
As mentioned earlier, I will label categories by using the sensory channel from which
a category operates, followed by theminimum andmaximum values of the region carved
out by the category. For example, [area 0.0–0.25] carves out the region [0.0,0.25] of the
area channel. When it must be emphasised that a category belongs to a particular agent,
for example a1, I will write [area 0.0–0.25]a1.










Figure 4.1: A discrimination tree contains a set of categorisers which categorise by check-
ing whether a sensory value falls in the region of one category or not. The
discrimination tree shown operates on values on the gray channel.
Conjunctive combinations of categories also have dedicated categorisers which are
linked to the categorisers of their components (see Figure 4.2). A conjunctive combina-
tion often yields a more efficient way to pick out the topic compared to a single, possibly
very fine-grained distinction. For example, it might be that [area 0.0–0.25] and [gray
0.5–1.0] together are distinctive but none of the two on their own is. Other logical com-
binations are equally of interest but I will restrict my attention to conjunctive combina-
tions. Conjunctive combinations of categories will be written between curly brackets
({,}) as in {[area 0.0–0.25] [gray 0.5–1.0]}.
Figure 4.2: More complex categorisers (shown as circles) are formed from the combina-
tion of primitive categorisers.
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4.3.3 The Discrimination Game
Here is a game, which I call the Discrimination Game, which is useful to study categorisa-
tion in a systematic way.13 The game is played by a single agent, randomly drawn from
a population of agents, and is equivalent to the conceptualisation phase of the guess-
ing game. The agent perceives the scene and chooses a topic from the possible objects
segmented in the scene. He then uses his discrimination trees, as developed so far, to
come up with a category or a conjunction of categories that is valid for the topic, but
not for any other object in the context. The Discrimination Game succeeds if the agent
has found distinctive categories, otherwise the game fails. When the game succeeds, the
success counter of the categorisers involved go up.
Figure 4.3: A computer generated scene from the geom world.
I will now develop some concrete examples, which imply that I make choices for the
kinds of sensory channels and scenes that the agents use. I will first use scenes from the
geom world as in Figure 4.3 and later real world scenes captured with a Talking Heads
camera.
Consider the scene in Figure 4.3. Assuming that the agent already has awell-developed
set of categories, he could use the category [gray-0.75,1.0] (very dark) to distinguish
shape 3 from the others. On the other hand, if shape 2 is chosen as topic, the grayscale
will not be enough because shape 2 has the same grayscale as shape 1. Maybe a combi-
nation of categories can be chosen, like [vpos 0.0–05] (lower), and [hpos 0.0–0.5] (left).
Indeed shape 2 is lower in the scene, as opposed to shape 1 and shape 3, and it is more
to the left compared to shape 0 and 2.
13 The Discrimination Game model together with the discrimination trees and its growth dynamics was pre-
sented for the first time in Steels & Brooks (1995). Based on this paper a new implementation of single
category discrimination was implemented by Angus McIntyre within the babel environment. Later on,
Joris Van Looveren re-implemented the use of conjunctive combinations.
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4.3.4 The Pachinko machine
Any visitor to Japan sooner or later comes across a Pachinko hall where eager players
sit before a machine in which a metal ball, inserted at the top, falls through a series of
gates until it falls in a winning or a losing bin. These games are a possible metaphor to
visualise the categorisation process based on discrimination trees.
Imagine that for each object in the scene and for each sensory channel, there is a ball
containing the value for that object on that channel. It is introduced in the top categoriser
of the discrimination tree associated with that channel. For example, suppose that there
are three objects in the scene: O1, O2, and O3, with gray-scale values 0.6, 0.4, and 0.9
respectively. We can therefore imagine three balls labeled with these datavalues which
are input to the top categoriser of the gray discrimination tree (Figure 4.4). A categoriser
divides the balls in two bins, those that fall in the range of one category and those that
fall into the range of the other category. In this case, the left bin contains {O2} (category
[gray 0.0–0.5]) and the right bin {O1, O3} (category [gray 0.5–1.0]).
A distinctive category is found when the ball of the topic is the only one left in one of
the bins. If the topic is O1, then this is not yet the case, because it is together with O3 in
the bin of [gray 0.5–1.0]. However when the next categoriser is exercised, it splits the
set {O1, O3} into two subsets: {O1} for [gray 0.5–0.75] and {O3} for [gray-0.75,1.0]. [gray
0.5–0.75] is a discriminating category because only O1 is left in its bin.
Balls thus trickle down from the top to the bottom of a discrimination tree, like in the
Pachinko game or a lottery machine. The trickling down process can stop as soon as a









Figure 4.4: Balls containing the data value for the different objectsO1,O2,O3 in the scene.
O1 is the topic. O1 has the value 0.6 on the gray-channel, O2 has 0.4 and O3
0.9.
89
4 The Discrimination Game
4.3.5 Competition between categories
A realistic agent has hundreds of sensory channels, and humans probably have tens of
thousands of them, probably grouped with respect to the domains to which they apply.14
There are discrimination trees for each of these channels or for combinations of them,
and each can possibly yield a distinctive category. The categorisation process can there-
fore be envisioned like a huge Pachinko hall, in which balls are trickling down in parallel
in hundreds or thousands of machines. It is highly likely that more than one solution
is found when there are a lot of trees, particularly if combinations of categories are al-
lowed as well. So, an additional competitive process must take place to rank categories
even though multiple solutions are offered to subsequent verbalisation processes. We
see therefore the same characteristics as for the perceptual layer, and thus the “sieve
architecture” also applies for the conceptual layer (Figure 3.5).
There are many possible criteria for preferring one category over another, equally
distinctive one. The first is based on simplicity. A single category is less complex than a
combination of categories, and a more abstract category is preferred over a more specific
one. The second criterion is based on success in earlier games. Each categoriser monitors
how many times it was used and howmany times it was successful, i.e. how many times
it could distinguish the topic and participate in a successful language game. Another
criterion, that I will bring in later once I have introduced the lexical layer, refers to
success of the lexicalisations of the category. The agent will prefer categories where it is
known that there is a well-accepted way to express it. When ranking categories, these
criteria are combined and the best ones enter with the most force in the lexicalisation
layer.
Notice the hidden positive feedback effect between success and use: A categoriser
which has already achieved a higher score wins the competition, everything else being
equal, causing its score to increase even more. This way a consistent behaviour emerges
where the same category tends to be used in the same circumstances, similar to the
way a walking path sometimes emerges for crossing a patch of grass between buildings.
Initially many paths are possible, but once one path is used a bit more than others, it
gets used more and more, as people reuse a path they perceive to be there. I will show
later (chapter 6) that this entrenchment of a particular solution by a positive feedback
loop can be exploited through the structural coupling between the ontology (the set of
categories) and the lexicon (the set of form-meaning pairs verbalising categories), so that
they become co-ordinated without a central co-ordinator.15
14 This is strongly suggested by psychological data on the presence of conceptual spaces in human categori-
sation. See Gärdenfors (2000).
15 I adopt here other general principles of complex systems. The notion of structural coupling has been




4.3.6 Variations on discrimination
There are obviously many variations on categorisation that could be imagined. For ex-
ample, a categoriser could make use of focal points instead of regions. A focal point is
a single significant data value of a sensory channel. The categoriser then has to com-
pute the distance between the value for a segment and the focal point of each possible
category. The category whose focal point is closest to the sensory value of a segment
applies. This implements a prototype-like approach to categorisation which has been ar-
gued to be more realistic with respect to human categorisation.16 For example, humans
typically label light at 482 nanometres as the most typical blue, so that a given object
reflecting light at or near this point is categorised as [blue]. Categories based on focal
points are interesting and have clear advantages but I will stick nevertheless in the first
instance to binary discrimination trees operating on single sensory channels to simplify
the explanations and to analyse better what is going on.
Still another way to categorise reality is by imposing an order on the segments based
on their values for a particular sensory channel. For example, we can order the seg-
ments based on the hpos channel (i.e. from left to right) and then introduce relational
categories like left of one segment in the series, or the left-most object. Similarly we can
order the segments based on the height channel (i.e. in terms of their size) and then
have categories that select the smallest (i.e. the first segment in this ordering), or those
greater than some other one.
Of course, I am well aware that this categorisation process captures only the most
basic way of generating meaning. Human beings make extended use of metaphor, anal-
ogy, metonymy, and other processes that adapt conceptual structures from one domain
to another one, see Johnson (1987). But before we can study such processes we must
understand how basic perceptually grounded categories can originate.
4.3.7 The Discrimination Game in action
Let us now look at some example games for an agent a1 taken from simulations using
computer generated scenes from the geom world and showing the internal structures
generated as well as the reports from the commentator. At first I will not take saliency
nor context-scaling into account. The first game (Game 8) fails. It takes place near the
very beginning when a1 has practically no repertoire of distinctions yet. The scene and
the discrimination trees available so far are shown in Figure 4.5. The object labeled 0 is
the topic. Only two channels have top level categorisers: height and width. The data
on these channels for the scene in Figure 4.5 are shown in Table 4.1.
height and width have been scaled with respect to the minimum and maximum
height and width of a figure (sensor-scaling) but no context-scaling has been performed.
The game is reported by the commentator as follows:
16 See Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991) and Taylor (1995).
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Table 4.1: Sensory data for the scene in Figure 4.5.
Object height width
0 (square) 0.413 0.317
1 (circle) 0.410 0.410
2 (square) 0.163 0.163
Figure 4.5: Top: The scene used in Game 8. Shape 0 is the topic. Bottom: The discrimina-
tion trees available for this game.
Game 8
a1 segments the context in 3 objects:
square-0, circle-1, square-2
a1 chooses square-0 as the topic
The discrimination game fails
The game fails because for the two sensory channels for which there are discrimination
trees, the values of the segments are all within the lower range and so no distinctive cat-
egory or category set could be found. This failure stimulates the discrimination network
to expand, but any node, including a top node of some of the other sensory channels can
be chosen for further expansion.
The next example shows a game (Game 22) based on the scene in Figure 4.6. The topic
is the triangle, shape 0. The discrimination trees for height and width have already
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Table 4.2: Sensory data for the scene shown in Figure 4.6.
Object hpos width height
0 (triangle) 0.167 0.437 0.573
1 (rectangle) 0.789 0.563 0.287
Figure 4.6: Top: The scene used in Game 22. Bottom: The discrimination trees available
to the agent.
more than one level and a discrimination tree for hpos has developed. The relevant
sensor-scaled data for these three sensory channels is shown in Table 4.2.
The scene is very simple so there are several possible solutions: The triangle is more
to the left, it is less wide and taller. Each of these possibilities is discovered and their
score (purely based on past performance) is looked up. The game is reported by the
commentator as follows:
Game 22
a1 segments the scene in 2 objects:
triangle-0, rectangle-1
a1 chooses triangle-0 as the topic
a1 categorises the topic as [HPOS 0.0–0.5] (score 0.57),
[HEIGHT 0.5–1.0] (score 0.09), or
[WIDTH 0.0–0.5] (score 0.0)
The discrimination game succeeds
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4.3.8 The importance of scaling and saliency
Game 22 shows at once why context-scaling and saliency is important. When we inspect
the scene in Figure 4.6, we do not quite see so clearly that the triangle is less wide than
the square, so why is [width 0.0–0.5] nevertheless considered? Examination of the data
shows that the width values, 0.437 for the triangle and 0.563 for the square, are very
close to each other, but just by luck fall within the two regions carved out by the width
discrimination tree. On the other hand, the values on the hpos channel are much further
apart and so they are preferred.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, saliency is the smallest of the absolute values
of the distance between the topic and any other object. It gives us an indication why a
certain sensory channel should be preferred over another. For the scene in Game 22, the
saliency for each channel with respect to the triangle is as in Table 4.3:
Table 4.3: Sensory data for the scene in Game 22.
hpos width height
0.622 0.125 0.286
From this table we see immediately that hpos is the most salient channel and should
be preferred by far, followed by height and then width. Thus we can expect the agent
to choose hpos based on saliency. When the saliency threshold is set to a reasonably
high value, the other channels would not even be considered, they would not pass the
sieve of the perceptual layer.
The sensory channel data for the same scene now scaled for context is shown in Ta-
ble 4.4. Such context-scaling pulls the data further apart and makes categorisation there-
fore much easier and much more stable, but the information on saliency is lost and so it
is no longer clear which channel is to be preferred for reasons of saliency.
Table 4.4: Sensory data for the scene shown in Figure 4.6.
Object hpos width height
0 (triangle) 0.0 0.0 1.0
1 (rectangle) 1.0 1.0 0.0
So the best thing to do (and this is what the Talking Heads effectively do) is to first
perform sensor-scaling, then compute saliency to determine which channel should be
preferred, then perform context-scaling, to get clearly distinguished sensory values, and
then do categorisation. Note that context-scaling has the same effect as using prototype-
based categorisation because the actual values are pulled towards extremes, and thus
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perceived as prototypes. Context-scaling is not always desirable. For example, in the
case of colour categorisation the actual channel data should be maintained because here
categorisation takes place on the basis of actual values.
4.3.9 Combinations of categories
The next game (Game 24) is based on the scene in Figure 4.7. The topic is triangle-0. The
discrimination trees are the same as for Game 22. The game (based on sensor-scaled
values) succeeds with a conjunctive combination of two categories:
Game 24
a1 segments the scene in 4 objects:
triangle-0, triangle-1, square-2, rectangle-3
a1 chooses triangle-0 as topic
a1 categorises the topic as
{[HEIGHT 0.0–0.5] [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]}
The discrimination game succeeds
Figure 4.7: The scene used in Game 24.
The relevant data after sensor-scaling for the two sensory channels involved is shown
in Table 4.5.
[height 0.0–0.5] is valid for triangle-0 and square-2 but filters out the other segments.
[width 0.5–1.0] is valid for triangle-0 and triangle-1 and filters out the others. The con-
junctive combination of these two categories only retains triangle-0 and is therefore the
one that is chosen.
4.3.10 A real world scene
The next example is taken from a series of discrimination games played by physically
instantiated agents using real world images. The series is discussed more extensively in
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Table 4.5: Sensory data for the scene in Figure 4.7.
Object height width
0 (triangle) 0.170 0.513
1 (triangle) 0.653 0.570
2 (square) 0.213 0.213
3 (rectangle) 0.613 0.310
Chapter 7. The agent a2 has captured the image shown in Figure 3.7 (top left) and done the
necessary segmentation and gathering of sensory characteristics. The resulting sensory
values (after sensor-scaling) for the segments are shown in Table 4.6. Object-0 has been
selected as the topic.
Table 4.6: Sensory data from a real world scene with segmentation shown in Figure 3.7.
channel obj-0 obj-1 Saliency
hpos 0.27 0.16 0.11
vpos 0.20 0.20 0.0
height 0.15 0.15 0.0
width 0.10 0.11 0.01
area 0.10 0.10 0.0
R 0.23 0.25 0.02
G 0.32 0.34 0.02
B 0.63 0.65 0.02
Clearly hpos is the most salient channel and should be preferred by the agent. When
performing context scaling, the two values for hpos are drawn apart with 1.0 for object-0
and 0.0 for object-1 so that the category [hpos 0.5–1.0] (to the right) easily distinguishes
the topic (object-0) from object-1. The game is reported as follows:
Game 3
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
object-0 object-1
a2 chooses object-0 as the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [HPOS 0.5–1.0]
This example illustrates well why the categorisation of the Talking Heads is so robust
and why agents often share the same conceptualisation even if the details of their raw
96
4.4 An ecology of distinctions
perception is quite different. The saliency factor helps to focus the agents on those as-
pects of the scene that stand out. There is an enormous reduction of variation, first by
scaling then by the categorisation process itself.
4.4 An ecology of distinctions
The previous section introduced mechanisms that enable agents to find a distinctive cat-
egory or conjunctive combination of categories given a set of segments and data on a
series of sensory channels for each segment. I will now focus on the issue how discrim-
ination networks and hence repertoires of possible categories may develop.
4.4.1 Growth dynamics
The process of growing categorisers is relatively straightforward. In the very beginning,
the agent constructs top level categorisers for each channel which have contained at
least once in the recent past relevant and distinctive data. If a channel has the same data
for every possible segment it is obviously not going to be possible to find a distinctive
category no matter how hard the agent tries.
A new subcategoriser is constructed by taking a categoriser node in the tree and di-
viding its range into two new subranges and thus two new subcategorisers. For example,
if there is a categoriser [hpos 0.0–0.5], which triggers when the object is in the left most
half of a scene, i.e. with hpos within [0.0,0.5], then two subcategories are created by
dividing [0.0,0.5] into two halves, one for the range [0.0,0.25] ([hpos 0.0–0.25] or totally
left) and one for the range [0.25,0.5] ([hpos 0.25–0.5] or mid-left). A new categoriser is
added to the tree for each of these halves.
A categoriser based on a combination of categories is constructed by combining ex-
isting categories into a new one. Of course, if done without limits, this could create
potentially a combinatorial explosion of possibilities. In the current implementation, the
construction of combinations is restricted by combining only those categories that have
been partially successful in a given scene, just as only categories that have ever been
relevant are expanded.
There are two key parameters to the growth process: (1) which category should be
expanded and (2) when should growth take place. In the Talking Heads experiment,
agents expand a category which was effectively applied in the recent past, even though
it may have failed in the game. This way the network is more likely to develop branches
that are potentially relevant, although there is still no guarantee that the expansion gives
the distinctions required for the case at hand, because it is not based on an in-depth
analysis of the case.
Growth rate is proportional to failure. The more failures occur, the higher the like-
lihood of more nodes growing. This has the net effect of many new nodes growing in
the beginning because there are many failures, but that the repertoire of categories sta-
bilises once discriminatory success is steady. When the environment starts to change
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again, causing new failures, more active growth is automatically triggered, which may
lead to a renewed expansion of the repertoire.
4.4.2 Pruning dynamics
Growth needs to be balanced by pruning. Pruning simply means that a categoriser and
thus its pending branches is cut away. There are again two issues: (1) which nodes should
be pruned and (2) when pruning should take place. Obviously the score of a category
should play a role in deciding whether it should be pruned. categorisers that have not
been used very much or have a low success rate are prime candidates for removal, unless
any of their subcategorisers has a high score. The monitoring of use and success already
played a role in determining which category should be preferred, so this information is
available to decide on pruning as well.
Whereas the growth rate is proportional to failure, the pruning rate is made propor-
tional to success, so that in the case of a high failure rate the new categorisers are given
time to improve their score or to grow refinements that may be successful. A new cate-
goriser obviously should be given a grace period to encounter enough cases to prove its
worth, otherwise it could be cut out too quickly. Categorisers therefore not only monitor
their use and success but also their age.
4.4.3 Average discriminatory success and repertoire size
The Discrimination Game is a dynamical system.17 A repertoire of categories emerges
in an agent gradually as an attractor of the growth and pruning dynamics coupled to
the environment. If growth is strictly proportional to failure and there is no pruning, a
point attractor is reached as soon as the repertoire is adequate, i.e. as soon as the agent
consistently has success for all the possible cases it encountered. However, as soon as the
environment or the sensory capabilities of the agent change, in other words when new
types of figures appear or when new sensory channels become available to the agent,
we expect that the repertoire of categories starts expanding again. This could be seen as
an illustration of the assimilation-accommodation dynamics envisioned by Piaget.
Let me introduce a few measures to test whether all this is really happening with the
mechanisms introduced so far. The first (crucial) measure monitors how well the agent
is doing by tracking the average success in the most recent n Discrimination Games.
Figure 4.8 shows the outcome of this measure, for agent a1, playing 500 Discrimination
Games in a simulation with scenes from the geom world. Success is averaged per 25
games. We see clearly that a1 has become successful in discriminating randomly cho-
sen topics from a consecutive series of scenes. Success rapidly climbs and reaches 100%,
even though the scenes are randomly generated combinations from a repertoire of fig-
ures along continuously varying dimensions making for literally billions of possibilities.
The Discrimination Game is successful because it does not try to detect invariants or
17 The theory of complex dynamical systems, which is well developed in the natural sciences, provides the
theoretical foundation for studying the Discrimination Game. For a general introduction, see Peitgen,
Jurgens & Saupe (1992).
98
4.4 An ecology of distinctions
commonalities between consecutive cases but focuses on finding what is distinctive be-
tween the topic and the other objects. This enables the agent to make such a gigantic
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Figure 4.8: The graph displays the average success per 25 Discrimination Games for a
series of 500 games played by a single agent. Success climbs to 100%. The
graph also displays the size of the agent’s repertoire of categories. Each scene
contains between 3 and 6 objects.
We can see whether a stable attractor has been reached by tracking the size of the
repertoire, which is simply the number of categorisers in the agent’s discrimination trees.
The result of this measure is also displayed in Figure 4.8. Once success is steady, the size
of the repertoire remains constant, which means that no new elementary distinctions
arise nor do any distinctions disappear. This is because there has been no pruning yet
and growth is strictly proportional to failure.
Figure 4.9 shows some snapshots of the evolution in the discrimination trees of a1
as the simulation continues and as additional situations arise. There are expansions,
contractions, and shifts in the constitution of the discrimination trees but gradually there
are fewer and fewer changes, compare for example (c) and (d), as a stable core emerges.
These simulations show that the category formation process based on a growth and
pruning dynamics is capable of creating a repertoire of discrimination trees adequate for
distinguishing the topic from other objects in the scene. The simulations worked with
computer-generated, stylised environments so that it is possible to probe the behaviour
of the mechanisms and vary the complexity of the environment. Note that the mecha-
nisms are neutral with respect to the type of channels supplied. The discrimination trees
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Figure 4.9: Some snapshots of an evolving repertoire in a single agent using growth and
pruning. Trees are shown after 500 games (a), 1000 games (b), 1500 games (c)
and 2000 games (d).
and growth and pruning dynamics can operate over auditory or bodily sensory channels,
or other kinds of visual information that is produced by low level perception.
4.4.4 Adaptivity in categorisation
An agent operating in a real world environment is always going to be confronted with
situations that he has not seen before. The growth and pruning dynamics of the Discrim-
ination Game is capable of dealing with this because new distinctions grow when the
failure rate is increasing. Here are the results of a computer simulation based on scenes
generated by the geom world that test whether this is indeed the case.
The simulation startswith a new virgin agent playing a series of DiscriminationGames
involving scenes which only contain rectangles of the same graylevel. The agent has
only channels for height (0), width (1), ratio (between the actual area of the shape
and the area of the bounding box), (2), gray (3) and area (4). We expect to see that
the discrimination trees on the ratio (channel 2) and gray channels (channel 3) do not
develop because the values on those channels are the same for all objects ever seen.
This is clearly confirmed in Figure 4.10: The ratio between actual area and bounding box
area is always 1.0 in the case of rectangles and they always have the same grayscale
value. We see clearly that the ratio (channel 2) and gray (channel 3) do not develop
and that the others develop to very fine levels of detail to still successfully discriminate.
So discrimination trees only develop as needed in a particular environment, which is
important for applying the selectionist principle to the generation of sensory channels.
The categorisation process gives feedback to the sensory processing on the adequacy of
particular sensory channels.
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Figure 4.10: Two snapshots from a series of 500 discrimination games developing cate-
gories to distinguish rectangles of the same average graylevel. Channel 2
(the ratio channel) and channel 3 (the grayscale channel) do not develop.
Let us now make the environment richer by letting the geom world also produce
scenes with circles and triangles, as well as rectangles. If the discrimination process
is adaptive, the ratio and gray channels should start to expand because these channels
now contain significant data. This is indeed the case as shown in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: Two snapshots from an additional series of 500 Discrimination Games after
the environment has become more complex. ratio (channel 2) and gray
(channel 3) have started to develop.
The simulation demonstrates that the proposed discrimination process is adaptive to
changes in the environment, because growth picks up as soon as the environment poses
new challenges, just like the immune system starts generating a larger repertoire (and
expanding already existing antibodies that partially matched) when challenged by the in-
vastion of foreign bodies. The adaptation can be tracked with the success and repertoire
size measures introduced earlier. When these measures are collected for the example
shown in Figure 4.12, phase one shows clearly that when only rectangles are present, a
stable repertoire gradually develops and that the success rate reaches 100 % after about
500 games. In phase two, when other types of shapes have been introduced, the discrimi-
nation trees begin to expand again, now exploiting the ratio and gray channels to cope
with the new types of objects. Existing categories will of course still be adequate for
many cases. After 500 more games, a new equilibrium is reached. Steady discrimination
success is seen with an enlarged repertoire.
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Figure 4.12: Evolution of success and ontology size in a series of 1000 Discrimination
Games played by a single agent. In phase 1, only rectangles of the same
graylevel are generated by the geom world. In phase 2, additional types of
shapes are generated by the environment.
4.4.5 Real world scenes
Very similar developments can be seen when we do experiments with embodied agents,
capturing real world scenes through their cameras. Figure 4.13 shows two snapshots of
developing discrimination trees for two agents. The game discussed earlier, based on
Figure 3.7 top, has been played with these trees. hpos is the most salient channel and
a distinction can be made easily. Note that the height and width channels have not
developed yet because no clear cases emerged in the environment where those channels
provided salient data.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter addressed the problem of how agents may categorise their environment
using information on sensory channels about each segment in the scene. I argued in
favour of a selectionist approach, which generates possible solutions in a relatively ran-
dom growth process and tests them in the cases presented by the environment. This
approach contrasts with instructionism, where the agent is assumed to make gradual
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Figure 4.13: The discrimination trees developed by two physically embodied agents a1
(left) and a2 (right). The top of the figure shows the trees after playing 100
games and bottom after 200 games.
abstraction from a series of examples using induction, and with a rationalist approach,
where perceptually grounded categories are assumed to be innate and hence derived
through genetic evolution.
The main conclusion of this chapter is that a selectionist approach to the origins of
categories is theoretically and practically feasible. I have defined a growth and pruning
dynamics which leads to an adequate repertoire for discriminating one object from the
others in the same context and I showed that the repertoire is continuously adapted
when the environment changes.
Wewill have plenty of opportunity in later chapters to further test themechanisms for
categorisation presented here. I will also introduce additional feedback couplings from
the lexical layer to these categorisation processes. Nevertheless we are now sufficiently
advanced to be able to turn to the next subtask the agents face when engaging in a




5 The Naming Game
The semiotic square captures the four entities in a linguistic interaction: the referent,
which is the object in the physical world that the speaker wants to communicate, the
segmented image, which is the internal perception of the referent, the meaning, which
is a category or combination of categories that picks out the referent in the present
context, and the utterance, which is the word form or set of word forms transmitted
by the speaker. In the previous chapters we looked at two sides of the semiotic square.
The relation between the real world and the perceived image was studied in chapter 3
and the relation between the perceived image and a conceptualisation that could act as
the meaning for a language communication was studied in chapter 4. We now turn to
the next side of the semiotic square: the relation between meaning and utterance.
We need to find an architecture by which an agent can establish the relation between
form and meaning, in other words verbalise a meaning to produce an utterance and
parse an utterance to retrieve its meaning. This mechanism needs to be flexible enough
to deal with the unavoidable synonymy and ambiguity that will arise. Second, we need
to find a mechanism by which an agent can acquire and help construct the lexicon of the
group. A shared lexicon should emerge through the distributed activities of the agents
without any prior design or global co-ordination. Third, the lexicon formation process
should scale up to handle a growing and ever changing set of meanings and continue
to work even with large populations whose constitution changes in time. It should be
possible for new agents to enter the population and acquire the existing language and for
agents to leave without destabilising the whole system. These are formidable challenges,
particularly because we want to find the simplest possible solution, something a one
year old child could do without fully developed intelligence.
Immediately we observe a major difficulty. In realistic language games, where agents
cannot inspect each others’ brain states nor transmit meanings directly, there is no feed-
back about the meaning of a word, only about the referent. For example, when a speaker
says wabo and the hearer has correctly pointed to the referent that the speaker intended,
neither the speaker nor the hearer can know whether they were using the same mean-
ing. They can only know that they arrived at the same referent. When a game fails, the
speaker can only point to the topic and the hearer then tries to figure out what possi-
ble meaning could have been applicable. The speaker cannot communicate directly the
“right” meaning, and very often more than one meaning is possible to distinguish a topic
from other objects in the context, so that the hearer will not necessarily guess the mean-
ing used by the speaker. I will call this the gavagai-problem, because Quine used this
word to illustrate exactly this difficulty.1 Quine evoked the problem of an anthropologist
1 See Quine (1960: 29–30).
5 The Naming Game
trying to figure out what a native speaking an unknown language might mean when he
utters gavagai while pointing to a white rabbit scurrying by.
In this chapter, I will bypass the gavagai-problem by assuming that agents get direct
feedback about the meaning of a word. This is done by assuming that all agents share
the same perception, that they already have a repertoire of shared meanings, that for
every agent a particular meaning always picks out a single referent, and that a given
referent is conceptualised with the same meaning by every agent. This scaffold allows
us to focus on the problem of how form-meaning associations might form and propa-
gate in a population without worrying how agents get feedback about the meanings of
forms. However, it does means that we cannot do experiments with embodied physical
agents but will have to accept the limitation of working only with computer simulations.
The next chapter will take the scaffold away, as any serious theory for word meaning
acquisition should. I will then show that given an appropriate coupling between lexical-
isation and categorisation, a communication system can still get off the ground based on
the mechanisms described in this chapter.
5.1 Inventing a lexicon
I will now introduce another game, the Naming Game, to allow us to focus on the origin
of the lexicon. The Naming Game defines a situation requiring a group of distributed
autonomous agents to develop and use a shared lexicon relating forms and meanings,
assuming they have a shared repertoire of meanings and get direct feedback about what
meaning corresponds to a certain form. The Naming Game can be thought of as the
lexical side of the Guessing Game.2 The game can be implemented with different mech-
anisms compared to the ones I will use, so it defines a task setting in which different
solutions can be compared. See also Hutchins & Hazlehurst (1995). A different task
setting for studying language acquisition (but not how a language may emerge from
scratch) is illustrated in Regier (1996). In this case, the agents are shown examples and
counter-examples together with words they should use in each case.
It can be objected that the Naming Game (and the Guessing Game) already assumes that
the agents want to communicate. This is true, but the game can be embedded in a larger
setting where communication is vital for survival. An example of such a setting is dis-
cussed in Werner & Dyer (1991).
Another issue concerns the evolution of the game itself. This topic is discussed in: Hur-
ford (1989). This paper is also the earliest paper posing the problem of the origins of
a lexicon through computational simulations. See also Oliphant (1996). Hauser (1996)
contains a further discussion of these topics from the viewpoint of biological continuity.
The Naming Game is played by two agents, a speaker and a hearer, which are picked
randomly from a population. The speaker selects a meaning from the shared repertoire
of meanings, looks up a possible word for this meaning in his lexicon, and transmits
the word to the hearer. The hearer interprets the word by looking it up in his lexicon,
2 The Naming Game and associated computer simulations were presented for the first time in Steels (1996).
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and transmits the meaning he thus obtained. If this meaning is the one that the speaker
originally had in mind the game succeeds, otherwise the game fails. When the game
fails, the speaker communicates the meaning directly so that the hearer can acquire a
new form-meaning pair for later conversations. When a speaker does not have a word
yet for a meaning he wants to communicate, he may create a new one.
5.1.1 Representing lexical associations
What cognitive architecture do agents need to engage in naming games? Clearly they
need some sort of associative memory to store their individual lexicons. Let us assume
that agents can construct and recognise arbitrary consonant-vowel combinations, like
coba or wabidu, for forming words, and that they have a repertoire of possible meanings
in the form of categories, for example [left], [dark], [large], etc. The contents of the
associative memory of a single agent can be displayed in a table as follows:





As an agent is acquiring his lexicon, there are going to be stageswhen he is not yet sure
about the meaning of a certain form. So it must be possible for the agent to store different
meanings for the same form and different forms for the same meaning. This can easily
be done by extending the memory capacity to cross-associate multiple items. Agents
can then handle ambiguity (one word can have different meanings) and synonymy (one
meaning can be associated with many different words).
A speaker can only transmit a single choice for expressing the meaning. When there
are alternative words for the same meaning in his lexicon, he must decide which one to
use and this decision should be such that it maximises success in the game. To estimate
this success, each agent should monitor for each form-meaning association how success-
ful it has been, which could be implemented by associating with every form-meaning
pair a score. The score of a form-meaning pair is specific to an agent and based only
on his own local interactions with other agents, in line with the principle that no single
agent has a complete overview of the lexicon nor controls the others. An example of
a lexicon with multiple associations and a score for every association is illustrated in
Table 5.2.
From this table we see that the agent prefers to use the word pama for [dark] and
limiri for [large].
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Table 5.2: Example lexicon with multiple associations
coba zapo bila pama wabidu limiri
[dark] 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 - -
[large] - - - 0.5 0.3 0.6
5.1.2 Updating the score
One of the crucial aspects of the Naming Game model is how scores are updated based
on the outcome of a game. Intuitively the score should be related to use and success. The
more aword is used and themore success it has, the higher the score should be. Moreover
there should be a time dimension, as recent use and success should obviously contribute
more to the current score. The following is a scheme that captures these characteristics.
Every time an agent successfully uses a form-meaning pair for speaking, he incre-
ments the score with a specific increment δ. δ is relatively high, typically equal to 0.1.
The scores of competing associations, i.e. associations that used another form for the
same meaning are decremented with δ. The score remains however bounded between
0.0 and 1.0. This way the “best” form-meaning pair stands out more clearly next time
around.3
When an agent plays the role of hearer, he also increments the association that was
successful with δ, and decrements competing associations, i.e. associations that related
another meaning to the same form. When a game fails, the associations used by the
speaker and the hearer that contained the transmitted word form are both decremented.
The operations of speaker and hearer are summarised in Figure 5.1 assuming that
speaker and hearer use both the score table above (in reality they of course always
have different score tables). The speaker collects all possible forms for a given mean-
ing [dark], chooses the one with the highest score (pama), and transmits that form.
The hearer collects all possible meanings for the transmitted form ([dark], [large]) and
again chooses the one with the highest score. If the hearer’s meaning is equal to that
of the speaker’s, the game succeeds. The score of two used associations increases and
the others decrease, implementing lateral inhibition. If the game fails, only the two used
associations go down.4
It is possible to impose an even stronger lateral inhibition, by assuming that in the
case of success, the speaker decreases the score of all the associations that imply the
word used in the game but with another meaning, and the hearer decreases the score of
3 A systematic investigation of alternatives for the updating function is contained in Oliphant (1997). The
dynamics of the mechanisms used in the Talking Heads experiments are being investigated in the Ph.D
thesis of Frederic Kaplan.
4 More or less neural realism can be introduced to model this associative memory. In our experiments we
have a perfectly working memory that can store an association as soon as it has seen it once. This makes
theoretical investigation easier and makes it possible to better follow the simulations and experiments. An
example of a neural network solution to lexical memory is discussed in Cangelosi & Parisi (1996).
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[LARGE]                      [DARK]
0.3 0.6 hearer
}
Figure 5.1: Score adjustments after a successful game. Scores of used associations go up
and their competitors go down.
all the associations that imply the same meaning but with another word. This obviously
requires additional processing from the side of the agents.
5.1.3 Constructing and acquiring words
When virgin agents start playing naming games, their associative memories are com-
pletely empty. Each agent needs two additional activities to get a lexicon emerging:
• When an agent does not have aword for ameaning hewants to communicate, he is
allowed to create a new word (by random combination of vowels and consonants)
and add that to his lexicon. Agents are assumed to have a shared repertoire of
syllables which they can all produce and recognise. This happens with a certain
probability, the word creation rate wc. This rate reflects how “free” the agent
feels to extend the lexicon.
• When an agent hears a word he has never heard before, he may add this new
word to his repertoire. Again this happens with a certain probability, the word
absorption rate wa. This rate reflects the critical attitude with which an agent
accepts the linguistic authority of other agents.
These rates are not critical but must of course be positive. Experiments continue to work
when agents always make a new word (wc = 1) and always absorb the word of the other
(wa = 1).
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5.1.4 The Naming Game in action
To become more familiar with the Naming Game, I will now go through a few examples
of its application, assuming a group of five agents: A = {a1,a2, a3, a4, a5} and five
possible shared meanings:M = {[dark], [large], [light], [small], [red]}.
Here is a trace of a first game as reported by the commentator, when the agents do not
have any lexicon at all.
Game 0
a5 is the speaker. a3 is the hearer.
a5 categorises the topic as [LIGHT]
a5 does not have a word for [LIGHT]
This trace lists the number of the game, the speaker, the hearer and the categorisation
of the topic. The speaker did not have a word and did not create one (because the word
creation probability is wc = 0.1): the game has failed. In the beginning most games fail
if the word creation rate has been set to a low rate.
In the next game shown below, the speaker is a4, the hearer a5 and the topic [small].
Now the speaker is successful in creating a word, namely di. The hearer receives the
word, does not know it, but stores it in association with [small]. The game still fails.
Game 29
a4 is the speaker. a5 is the hearer.
a4 categorises the topic as [SMALL]
a4 creates a new word: di
a5 does not know di
a4 points to the topic
a5 categorises the topic as [SMALL]
a5 stores di as [SMALL]
In game 32, something similar happens. This time a5 creates a newword pida for [large].
a3 does not know the word but stores it.
Game 32
a5 is the speaker. a3 is the hearer.
a5 categorises the topic as [LARGE]
a5 creates a new word: pida
a5 says: pida
a3 does not know pida
a5 points to the topic
a3 categorises the topic as [LARGE]
a3 stores pida as [LARGE]
A first success occurs in game 43, when a5 uses again pida for [large]. a3 hears pida,
has associated it in his lexicon with [large], and so the game succeeds.
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Game 43
a5 is the speaker. a3 is the hearer.
a5 categorises the topic as [LARGE]
a5 says: pida
a3 interprets pida as [LARGE]
a3 points to the topic
a5 signals OK
It is quite tedious to go through such games by hand. For large populations of agents or
meanings, even the most diligent researcher soon loses patience. Fortunately it is not so
difficult to implement the Naming Game model on a computer. This makes large-scale
simulations, even with hundreds of agents and meanings feasible, and ensures that they
have been done correctly. All traces and graphs of games reported in this book have been
produced by computer simulations or physical experiments with the Talking Heads.
5.1.5 Characterising the lexicon
The individual lexicon of one agent, a5, after 100 games is shown in 5.3.






Both the words di and pida are present but with weak scores. There are two synonyms
for [large]: pida and fobu, but pida is preferred. There is a word gi who is available for
[light] but does not have a positive score, because successive trials failed to yield a
successful game.
A table such as the one above only represents the lexicon of a single agent. It is highly
unlikely that two agents share the same lexicon because each agent will have had dif-
ferent encounters and hence different language experiences. A picture of the lexicon of
the group from the viewpoint of an outside observer can be obtained by inspecting the
internal states of each agent to construct the group lexicon. It groups the dominating
meaning-form associations for all possible meanings and the frequency of each associa-
tion. It gives a picture of “the” lexicon in the group. The group lexicon for the complete
population of five agents after 50 language games is shown in Table 5.4.
This reflects a situation where 40 % of the agents prefers to name [large] with pida. 60
% of the agents use gi for [light], and 40 % di for [small]. The other meanings ([dark]
and [red]) do not have names yet.
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Note that the group lexicon is not known by the agents and is not stored anywhere in
the total system. The only information which is locally stored in each agent is his own
lexicon, which might be quite different from that of the group lexicon. For example, the
lexicon of a5 shown earlier is different from the group lexicon. a5’s score for gi is 0.0
even though the word is already preferred by 60 % of the agents according to the group
lexicon. The group lexicon is a macroscopic structure that we as observers construct
from inspecting the internal states of the agents.
Let us now continue the simulation. Here are two additional games showing how ga
propagates from a4 to a2 in game 101 and from a2 to a1 in game 104.
Game 104
a4 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a4 categorises the topic as [RED]
a4 says: ga
a2 does not know ga
a4 points to the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [RED]
a2 stores ga as [RED]
Game 104
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 categorises the topic as [RED]
a1 says: ga
a1 does not know ga
a2 points to the topic
a1 categorises the topic as [RED]
a1 stores ga as [RED]
After a total of 250 games, the consensus is complete. The group lexicon is shown in
Table 5.5.
Once the agents have reached this stage, the lexicon does not change anymore, be-
cause all agents now prefer the same word for each possible meaning and would never
choose another one nor encounter another one.
The lexicons of individual agents contain quite a few form-meaning pairs that did not
make it in the shared lexicon that gradually emerged. It is entirely feasible to envision
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Table 5.5: Consensus in group lexicon, reached after 250 games.
meaning form frequency meaning form frequency
[dark] go 1.00 [large] pida 1.00
[light] gi 1.00 [small] di 1.00
[red] ga 1.00 - - -
a pruning mechanism that would eliminate from memory those form-meaning pairs
whose success has been non-existent (for example because an agent created it as speaker
but it was never picked up by anybody else), or whose score has become zero (because
another word became dominant). The impact of such a forgetting function has not been
explored yet in our experiments.
5.1.6 Monitoring
I use various measures both for actual lexicon use and for the coherence and evolution
of the lexicons of the individuals to see better what is happening. The first and easiest
measure is the average game success, also called the communicative success, of a
population of agents A in a set of n language games. When this measure is graphed
continuously for consecutive sets of games, the progress in the population towards suc-
cessful communication can be followed easily. This is shown in Figure 5.2 which plots
data from the games discussed in the previous paragraphs. We see at once that aver-
age success climbs from a starting point of zero to a maximum of 1.0. This can only be
because a shared lexicon emerged in the population.
When the population (both of meanings and agents) is larger, one would expect that
it takes longer to reach total average success. This is indeed the case (Figure 5.3).
We see for example that for 20 agents and 20 meanings success climbs to total suc-
cess after about 10,000 games. This is still surprisingly low particularly as success is are
already above 95 % after about 5000 games. Games can be played in parallel by different
agents because the system is entirely distributed. If we divide the number of agents by
the number of games, we see that about 250 games are needed by the agents to get 95 %
success, which means that every meaning needs to appear about 10 times for each agent.
Interestingly enough, the larger the population of agents, the more the success curve
approximates an S-shape, which has been observed empirically in the spreading of new
linguistic conventions. The same curve shape is familiar to biologists studying models
of competitive growth, suggesting a strong relationships between ecological dynamics
and language spreading.5
5 The S-shaped curve is discussed in McMahon (1994) p. 52. For examples of biological models with similar
properties, see May (1976).
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Figure 5.2: The graph displays on the y-axis the average success every 10 games in a pop-
ulation of five agents lexicalising five different meanings. The x-axis shows
the number of games. Average success rapidly climbs until it reaches total
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Figure 5.3: The graph displays the evolution of communicative success for larger and
larger populations. The number of games on the x-axis is divided by the num-
ber of agents.
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5.1.7 Measuring lexical coherence
To monitor to what extent the agents share the same lexicon, I propose a second mea-
sure, the lexical coherence. The lexical coherence is defined as the average of the
frequencies of all the form-meaning pairs in the group lexicon. If all agents prefer the
same form-meaning pair for all meanings, lexical coherence is 1.0. If they agree on none,
it is 0.0.
Consider the following group lexicon after 3000 games for the previous simulation
(with 20 agents), shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Group lexicon after 3000 games.
meaning form frequency meaning form frequency
[dark] dato 1.00 [large] biti 0.80
[light] pitu 0.60 [small] dopu 1.00
[red] gabi 1.00 [green] gu 0.85
[sqare] koti 0.50 [rectangle] totu 0.65
[left] toga 0.90 [blue] ku 0.80
[yellow] gubo 0.55 [charming] ge 1.00
[triangle] bu 0.85 [sqare] ba 0.60
[fast] beke 1.00 [slow] tu 0.95
[circle] ke 0.75 [right] gaba 0.95
[up] butu 1.00 [down] ki 0.95
The lexical coherence is at this point equal to 0.835.
Lexical coherence can be graphed alongside average success (see Figure 5.4). As ex-
pected, lexical coherence increases and we can see that as coherence increases the suc-
cess rate increases.
Does total success imply that all agents use the same lexicon? Not really. To have
success, the hearer must associate the form used by the speaker with the same meaning.
But it is not required that the hearer himself prefers to use the same form for the same
meaning, synonyms may occur. A speaker of British English typically uses the word
pavement, whereas an American prefers sidewalk, even though he understands pavement.
Thus there can be several forms active in the same population, even though the outcome
of a game is always successful. We will see later that synonyms do get damped, as is the
case in human natural lexicons.
Initially lexical coherence is higher than success, because a game fails if the hearer is
acquiring the form-meaning association used by the speaker. So two agents could have
stored the same association, and thus coherence would have increased, without already
having enjoyed the benefit in a successful communication. However, once success is
total, agents no longer make changes based on negative feedback from failure, simply
because there is no failure, even the less common forms are understood correctly by
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Figure 5.4: This figure shows the evolution of both average success and lexical coherence
for a group of 20 agents and 20meanings. Total lexical coherence climbsmore
slowly once the population has reached a high average success.
everybody. Further progress towards more coherence is therefore only due to the fact
that the more common forms occur more often so that their scores keep going up as they
are used more.
5.2 Scaling up
The associative memory and the score updating introduced in the previous section ap-
pears to allow a group of distributed agents to establish a shared repertoire of form-
meaning pairs. Of course, I still need to show that this mechanism remains adequate
when it is incorporated in a complete game, in which case there is no direct feedback
about meaning. But before doing so, let us see whether the mechanisms are adequate
from the viewpoint of scaling: Can they handle variation in the set of meanings to be
expressed? Do they cope with a changing population?
5.2.1 Coping with new meanings
In natural languages, newmeanings arise every day while other meanings become irrele-
vant. For example, none of the terms used for talking about the Internet (e-mail, surfing,
home page, etc.) would have made sense to anyone a few decades ago. On the other
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hand, most of us now have lost many categories and concepts for classifying plants, sim-
ply because they are no longer such a prominent part of our urbanised environments.
It follows that a mechanism claiming to explain the origins and acquisition of a lexicon
in a population of agents should cope with a fluctuating set of meanings as well. This
property is moreover crucial in the Talking Heads experiment because new meanings
will continuously arise as the agents encounter new situations in the environment.
Because the Naming Game included ways to handle new meanings from the start,
nothing should have to be changed to handle an increased set of meanings. Let us see
whether the Naming Game indeed copes through the next simulation (see Figure 5.5),
using arbitrary labeled meanings ([M1], [M2], etc.). In a first phase, the system is closed
and a shared lexicon emerges for the initial set of 20 meanings, as expected. The group’s
lexicon is now as in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Group lexicon after first phase.
meaning form frequency meaning form frequency
[M1] gebo 1.00 [M2] goge 1.00
[M3] koto 0.70 [M4] da 1.00
[M5] peko 1.00 [M6] ki 1.00
[M7] gipe 1.00 [M8] kedo 1.00
[M9] do 1.00 [M10] gige 1.00
[M11] pi 1.00 [M12] bu 1.00
[M13] pa 1.00 [M14] kipa 1.00
[M15] depi 0.95 [M16] pudi 1.00
[M17] tegi 1.00 [M18] ba 0.90
[M19] ko 1.00 [M20] guda 1.00
In phase 2, a relatively small meaning flux is introduced (one new meaning every
1000 games). As can be seen from Figure 5.5, the population copes with the change. New
words are created and propagate in the population. The following group lexicon shows
that for newcomers like [M22] or [M25] a total consensus has emerged. Words for the
latest new meanings, [M28] and [M29], still have low frequencies.
Next (phase 3 in Figure 5.5) a much higher meaning flux is imposed (one newmeaning
every 100 games). Lexical coherence decreases and average success plummets. There is
not enough time to propagate the new conventions in the group. Note that lexical co-
herence drops slower than success when the lexicon disintegrates. Coherence is based
on the average for all meanings, thus only the new ones are therefore affecting over-
all coherence. Success drops more rapidly because of the high rate of failure of new
meanings.
The system restores itself when the flux of meaning is brought back to 1/1000 games
(phase 4). Interestingly enough, coherence now increases slower than success. The in-
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Table 5.8: Group lexicon after second phase.
meaning form frequency meaning form frequency
[M1] gebo 1.00 [M2] goge 1.00
[M3] koto 1.00 [M4] da 1.00
[M5] peko 1.00 [M6] ki 1.00
[M7] gipe 1.00 [M8] kedo 1.00
[M9] do 1.00 [M10] gige 1.00
[M11] pi 1.00 [M12] bu 1.00
[M13] pa 1.00 [M14] kipa 1.00
[M15] depi 1.00 [M16] pudi 1.00
[M17] tegi 1.00 [M18] ba 1.00
[M19] ko 1.00 [M20] guda 1.00
[M22] to 1.00 [M23] de 0.85
[M24] tabo 0.95 [M25] piku 1.00
[M26] ku 1.00 [M27] pugu 1.00
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Figure 5.5: Both average success (every 100 games) and lexical coherence is shown in
cases of an inflow of meanings for a population of 20 agents starting with
20 meanings (phase 1). The inflow is 1/1000 in phase 2, 1/100 in phase 3 and
1/1000 in phase 4.
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stability caused by a rapid influx of new meanings has lead to many new forms for the
same meanings. These synonyms now spread in the population and lead to a rapid in-
crease in communicative success. Coherence climbs up more slowly because competing
synonyms are only gradually weeded out, based on their frequency of use.
We can conclude that the agent architecture manages to handle an influx of meaning,
as long as the flux stays within certain bounds.
5.2.2 Lexicon acquisition by virgin agents
The next question we need to investigate is whether the mechanisms explain how a lex-
icon, once it has formed, can be preserved from one generation to the next. This clearly
happens in human populations. Although lexicons show profound change, large parts
get preserved even over very large periods of time. Some linguists even claim that the
roots of certain words still in use today go back to the very beginnings of language which
is hypothesised to have been around 50,000 years ago, see Ruhlen (1994). A genetic so-
lution, where the lexicon is stored in the genetic code and thus transmitted from parent
to child, seems clearly out of the question. Nevertheless, a lot of the early work on com-
putational modeling of language origins relied on a genetic approach for transmitting
the lexicon, possibly with some additional adaptation. See for example: MacLennan &
Burghardt (1993: 603–631). This approach sheds light on the issue how signaling sys-
tems may evolve in animals but is not applicable to the transmission of human lexicons.
The lexicon of human languages is too diverse and changes too quickly to allow genetic
transmission. So lexicons must somehow be transmitted in a cultural process.
It turns out that the agent architecture I introduced in the previous sections does not
need to be changed at all to obtain a cultural transmission of a lexicon, illustrating the
explanatory power of the model despite its simplicity. New virgin agents entering the
group may occasionally create a new word, if they do not have one themselves, but if a
particular set of words with particular meanings is already strongly entrenched in the
population, these new words have a very low probability to survive. Instead, the virgin
agents will adopt the words that they abundantly hear in their environment, and the
score of these words goes up quickly.
Here is a computer simulation testing whether this is indeed the case (see Figure 5.6).
We begin with a population of 20 agents and let them develop a shared lexicon for 20
meanings (phase 1). Then I add new virgin agents at regular time intervals, at a rate of 1
every 1000 games (phase 2). A new agent has no knowledge of the existing lexicon and
therefore must acquire the lexicon present in the rest of the group. Figure 5.6 (phase 2)
shows that the population indeed copes. A new member initially causes some failures
in communication, but he quickly picks up the lexicon of the community and success
moves back up. The lexicon does not change, it is stable against minor perturbations.
However, when the birth rate is increased to 1/100 games (phase 3) the population is
less able to cope. Success stays relatively high (70 %), but there are too many new agents
coming in too fast. The lexicon cannot spread sufficiently quickly to the new agents and
therefore starts to disintegrate. In a final stage (phase 4), the birth rate is set again to 1
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Figure 5.6: Evolution of communicative success with different birth-rates, starting from
a population of 20 agents (phase 1). Next the birth rate is increased from 1
new agent every 1000 games (phase 2) to 1 new agent every 100 games (phase
3), and then to 1 every 50 games (phase 4).
new agent every 50 games. The population is no longer able to cope with the influx of
new members and disintegrates. If inflow is brought back to a lower rate, the population
would again establish a shared lexicon. However, the lexicon is now a different one from
the one that was established before. The dynamical process has moved from one stable
lexical state to another one.
We have seen earlier that the Naming Game scales up with respect to the size of
possible meanings. Nowwe see that it scales upwith respect to the size of the population.
As long as the rate of influx is not too high, the population can keep expanding. The only
constraining factor is that new agents must have sufficient opportunities to acquire the
lexicon present in the group.
5.2.3 Preservation in changing populations
In human populations, there is not only an influx of new members but also an outflux.
When somebody leaves the community knowledge about the lexicon should disappear
as well. Nevertheless, a lexicon clearly gets preserved from one generation to the next,
which implies that the know-how is distributed robustly over the agents.
The next computer simulation tests whether this is also true in the Naming Game
model. The simulation starts with a population of 20 agents who are left to develop a
shared lexicon for 20 meanings (phase 1). Then an in- and out-flux is introduced (phase
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2 in Figure 5.7) with one new virgin agent coming in and another agent leaving the pop-
ulation every 1000 games. The new agent has to acquire the lexicon present in the group.
Average success therefore dips but is quickly regained. In fact, the population can be
completely renewed without affecting the lexicon at all. After 16000 games nine agents
(50 %) have been replaced, but the lexicon has not changed. So, the Naming Game model
not only explains the formation of a lexicon but also its transmission: This transmission























































Figure 5.7: Success and population size is shown for a series of 35,000 language games.
The population starts with 20 agents and 20 meanings (phase 1). Then an
influx and outflux is introduced at the rate of 1/1000 games (phase 2). The
lexicon maintains itself. In phase 3 agents enter and leave at the rate of 1/100
games. Success lowers. In phase 4 the rate of change is brought back to 1/1000
games and success is regained.
Can we increase the flux in the population indefinitely? This is examined in phase 3
of Figure 5.7. In this phase a higher flux has been introduced. One agent is added and
removed every 100 games. Success goes down, although it is still maintained at a high
level. The lexicon is still not changing. However, previous examples have already shown
us that if we continue to increase the rate, the lexicon would disintegrate. Too many
new agents would be flowing in, who do not have a lexicon yet. On the other hand, if
we bring the rate of change back down to 1/1000 games (phase 4 in figure 5.7), success
regenerates.
These simulation illustrates how we can study lexicon transmission using a language
game approach. We have to set up an in- and outflow of the agents and study the impact
on their communicative success and their lexicon. In principle, we should not have to
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change the architecture of the individual agents, and indeed I have not done so. Language
acquisition is such an integral part of language use that a realistic agent architecture
must intimately integrate both capacities from the start. Of course, at this stage we have
only tested this with the agents getting direct feedback about meaning, we still must that
whether it will continue to work with the physically instantiated Talking Heads.
5.3 Self-organisation
These various simulations show that the Naming Game embodies robust mechanisms
for the emergence of a lexicon and we will use it as a core component for the Talking
Heads experiment. In retrospect, the following mechanisms are crucial for the success
of the model:
1. Agents must be able to represent multiple associations (one form can be associated
with many meanings and one meaning with many forms). Multiple associations
naturally arise in a population of distributed agents because an agent may create
a new form not knowing that one already exists in the population, or guess a
different meaning for a form than the one intended by the speaker. I will discuss
such examples in more detail later.
2. An agent must be able to record a score for each association. The score is necessary
for the agent to decide which meaning or which form should be preferred in a
particular interaction. When random choices are made lexicons do not converge.
3. Agents must be able to create new words when no words are available yet. When
there is a fixed set of words, the problem is much harder and the distributed search
process may get stuck into local minima. Lexical systemsmust be able to copewith
a steady influx of newmeanings so restricting the set of words from the beginning
would be odd.
4. Agents must perform lateral inhibition, which means that they must decrement
the score of competitors to the form-meaning pair which won a competition. This
is necessary to achieve convergence.
5. Agents must get feedback in the case of failure. At the moment the feedback is
direct, but I will soon embed the naming game into a more complex guessing game
in which feedback comes from the externally observed outcome of the language
game as opposed to the direct transmission of the intended meaning.
When any of these characteristics of the agent architecture or the game are eliminated,
the system does not work. Communicative success does not climb, convergence will not
go beyond a small percentage, the size of the lexicon explodes, and so on. The fact that
these architectural properties are crucial and non-trivial to discover strongly suggests
that similar mechanisms must be in place in the emergence of human lexicons.
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It is also important to stress what is not in the model. The mechanisms used by the
agents are deliberately kept as simple as possible. Complexity should arise only from the
enactment of simple construction rules. Agents do not go through complex reasoning
about words, they simply store the new associations they encounter and rely on the
updating processes to weed out wrong hypotheses.
5.3.1 Winner-take-all processes
Themost remarkable and at first mysterious property of the Naming Game model is that
the agents somehow reach a consensus without any central supervisor. They do not do
this by having a general overview or by changing their internal parameters so as to be-
come more conservative as the lexicon solidifies. It is solely due to the subtle interaction
between language use, which gradually becomes uniform, and each agent’s adaptation
to the language heard in the environment. If a certain word comes to be preferred by
a group of agents for a certain meaning, its frequency of use goes up so that others en-
counter this word more often and hence their scores for that word continue to increase
as well. The more agents use a word, the higher its chance of success and the more it
will be used. This effect is still enforced by lateral inhibition. The scores of competing
associations decrease, making it less likely that they will win in the future. This pos-
itive feedback therefore introduces an autocatalytic (self-enforcing) effect until the
population locks into an equilibrium state.6
To follow better how a consensus gradually emerges, I will visualise the competition
between different words for the same meaning in a meaning-form (MF) competition
diagram, such as the one in Figure 5.8, which monitors the frequencies of the different
forms in use for one meaning. The diagram shows clearly the struggle between different
forms until one form (pe) emerges as the winner. When we later study grounded lexicon
formation processes, we will see that the competition becomes much more complex and
the whole system is in constant evolution. A form-meaning pair which is dominating
may become weaker because its meaning fails to pick up the right referent in a new
context. This in turn may trigger the creation of new words or the resurgence of existing
words.
5.3.2 Collective behaviour and self-organisation
Biology is full of examples where structures spontaneously self-organise from the unco-
ordinated activity of distributed elements through a winner-take-all process. Each time
the same basic components as in the Naming Game model are seen: Random behaviour
creates various possibilities and the reinforcement of some of these variations through
positive feedback creates an autocatalytic effect. Perhaps the clearest examples can be
found in the collective behaviour of social insects, such as the formation of nests by
termites, although beautiful explanations have also been reported for the formation of
6 Such positive feedback loops and the stability criteria associated with them have been widely studied in
non-linear dynamical systems and applied to chemical and biological processes. See Babloyantz (1986).
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Figure 5.8: Simulation with a population of 20 agents. The meaning-form competition
diagram shows the frequency of all competing forms for a single meaning.
We see a winner-take-all situation with one word (pe) dominating.
patterns on sea shells, the growth of cell tissue, the aggregation of individual cellular
slime mold amoebae into a slug, the flocking and collective movement of birds or mam-
mals, etc., Meinhardt (1982). A classical example for collective behaviour, first developed
by Jean-Louis Deneubourg, is the formation of paths in an ant society through mass re-
cruitment, Pasteels & Deneuborg (1987).
When ants carry food or other materials, they organise themselves in a chain which is
typically the shortest path between the source and the nest. These chains can sometimes
be surprisingly long (20 meters is quite common for European ants) and are maintained
as long as the food supply lasts. The whole process has many intriguing properties. First
of all, there is no central planning agency that regulates which food sources are to be
explored. The coherence and co-ordination between hundreds or sometimes thousands
of ants is established in a completely distributed fashion. There is no dependence on
individual ants. Ants can be removed from a path or new ones can be introduced ran-
domly without too much interference for the stability of the path as a whole. The paths
are robust. If objects are put in the way or if the path is destroyed, the ants manage
to reestablish it in a relatively short time span. The paths are adaptive. If the food sup-
ply terminates, the path disintegrates and a new path will appear linking the ants to an
alternative food source.
We see here many of the properties found in natural languages and integrated in the
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Naming Game model: absence of central planning, no critical dependence on a single
element, resilience to influx or outflux of elements, and adaptation to changing circum-
stances. Even more interestingly, the ants manage to establish these dynamic paths by
a process which is similar to the language formation process used in the Naming Game,
namely a positive feedback loop having an autocatalytic effect. An individual ant ap-
pears to move around in a random fashion while searching for a source of food. When
a food source is discovered, the ant returns to the nest using a global landmark like the
sun. The food-carrying ant also deposits a chemical substance known as a pheromone
as he travels back to the nest. This pheromone influences the otherwise random move-
ment of the other ants, in that ants are attracted by the pheromone. Thus more ants are
drawn to the path and hence led to the food source. As these ants in turn go back to the
nest they also deposit pheromone. This gives the self-enforcing, autocatalytic effect: The
more ants are on the path, the more pheromone is deposited, and therefore the stronger
the attraction to the other ants. Very soon all the ants which were sufficiently close to
the path form a chain. There is no central planning agency needed and the whole system
does not depend on an individual ant. The order is emergent.
These simple mechanisms also explain other features of the process. When the food
source is depleted, the ants going back no longer deposit pheromone. And because the
pheromone is a chemical that evaporates, it will soon have disappeared and consequently
the ants will return to a randommovement. When a path is interrupted because obstacles
are put in theway or because the pheromone is temporarily removed by an experimenter,
the ants resort back to a random movement. This introduces a random search process
which will eventually lead to the discovery of a connection and the reestablishment of
the path. When two ants find two food sources one closer than the other, the society will
go for the closest source. Not because they exchange sophisticated signals but because
the trail leading to the closest source will be amplified faster. Adaptivity is explained in
terms of errors in following the path. Although ants are attracted to the pheromone, the
attraction is only partial and very often (how often depends on the species) they will go
astray. This sloppiness is however a source of new discoveries. When a lost ant hits upon
a new food source the path formed by the whole society may gradually shift particularly
if it is more abundant.
5.3.3 Increasing-returns economics
Self-organisation is not unique to biological phenomena, on the contrary, similar situa-
tions have been intensively studied in economics, where the complex adaptive systems
paradigm has recently also led to many interesting new insights, as discussed in Arthur
(1996). For certain types of products, particularly in information technology where the
cost of manufacturing and distribution is neglectible compared to the cost of design, a
winner-take-all situation can be observed. One product, for example a particular operat-
ing system or a particular microprocessor, comes to dominate the market.
Brian Arthur and others have analysed these economic situations and identified a
positive feedback loop as being the ultimate cause. Themore customers choose a product,
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the more others are attracted to it, particularly because other suppliers develop useful
derivative products. Prices can be decreased keeping newcomers out of the market and
customers get locked in, unable to move to other suppliers because they have invested
too much and became dependent. For the companies who manage to manoeuver their
products in such a situation there is a bonanza of increasing returns. This contrasts with
the decreasing returns familiar from traditional equilibrium economics, where there is
a damping of profits due to proliferating production and distribution cost as a product’s
market share increases.
5.3.4 Lessons from nature
The analogies between self-organisation in language and other fields is important for
three reasons. First of all, if self-organisation is ubiquitous in nature and has successfully
explained so many phenomena, its incorporation into a model of language becomes inde-
pendently motivated, and therefore the explanatory force of the model increases. What
is new and different is that the principle is applied to a non-material self-organising
entity, but nevertheless the same sort of dynamics can be seen.
Second, the large arsenal of mathematical tools and analysis techniques developed
in the sciences of complexity over the past decades can be carried over to the study of
language. For example, the mathematical models of economists like Arthur or biologists
like Deneubourg help us develop mathematical explanations why language reaches co-
herence if autocatalysis is present.
Third it suggests many aspects of the mechanisms which might be relevant for lan-
guage. For example, the errors ants make in following a trail allow them to discover
occasionally better food sources. Could such stochasticity also play a role in the adap-
tive capabilities of language? The chaotic regime seen in many natural systems is known
to be a source of new order (Kaneko 1996). Could language innovation also be explained
that way? In other words, is it possible that language may occasionally exhibit a chaotic
dynamics out of which new order emerges?
5.4 Lexical dynamics
This discussion begins to illustrate a major theme of the present book, namely that lan-
guage as a macroscopic phenomenon can be viewed as a complex adaptive system with
the same characteristics as other complex adaptive systems.
It is well known that the dynamics of language change are related to the dynamics
of the underlying population. Basically we can see two phenomena. On the one hand,
human populations are not fixed for ever. New children without any knowledge of the
language are born and other members die, taking knowledge about the language away
with them. Populations renew at a certain rate which is known to have a significant
impact on language. If the population changes quickly a language evolves more quickly
and subsystems may even destabilise. For example, linguists have argued that English
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lost its case system due to the Black Plague which decimated the population so that there
was not enough opportunity for children to acquire the existing conventions.
Second, human populations mix. Throughout the history of mankind there have been
migrations or intense contact between geographically diverse groups. This again impacts
then the languages of the groups. When a given population splits into groups that have
no longer contact, their languages start to deviate. Conversely when there is an intense
and prolonged contact between languages, structures from one language get adopted
by the other and vice-versa. The degree of adoption depends on which group is dom-
inant. Sometimes groups adopt another lexicon while retaining their own syntax, and
sometimes they take over the syntax while retaining their own lexicon.7
These phenomena are fascinating and interesting from the viewpoint of language evo-
lution, and may even explain some of the characteristics of human languages. Linguistic
systems must be such that they can be transmitted from one generation to the next, oth-
erwise they will not survive. In the Talking Heads experiment, new agents may enter
into the group at any time and agents are geographically distributed. The local inter-
actions with humans at a particular site, which is a kind of language contact between
human and artificial populations, may impact the evolving lexicons and ontologies.
5.4.1 Spatially distributed naming games
Language game models provide us with new fantastic tools to study language transmis-
sion and language contact: We can introduce a particular dynamics in the population in
a controlled way and then study the impact on the dynamics of the language itself. I now
focus on such a model to investigate the impact of the migratory dynamics of a popula-
tion on the dynamics of language. We can introduce a two-dimensional grid and assign
every agent randomly a position on this grid. The position assignment can be modulated
so that the agents form clusters (Figure 5.9). Such a population structure can be thought
of as a geographical distribution in space but might as well represent a social, genetic
or economical structure. We could even envision models integrating several of these
alternate dimensions. The physical Talking Heads network connecting installations in
different geographical locations allows to do these experiments for real.
In earlier simulations agents were randomly picked out of the population. Now we
can base the probability with which two agents interact on their respective distance and
on an interaction factor, which determines the weight of the distance. If the interaction
factor increases, the role of distance becomes more important and interactions tend to
reflect the spatial clustering more. Based on this parameter we can study the evolution
of language when communications between clusters of agents increase.
Initially we let each subgroup evolve towards a shared communication. Success is
never total because there are occasional interactions with members of other communi-
ties, however inner-cluster communication reaches total success. However inspection of
the agent lexicons reveals that agents will develop a stable language within their cluster,
7 A representative example of empirical investigations into language dynamics is contained in Nichols (1992).
See also Romaine (1988).
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Figure 5.9: The figure shows the spatial distribution of a set of 20 agents. There is clus-
tering around three centers.
but also a second language, an interlingua, which is weaker but shared among the dif-
ferent clusters. This interlingua will become stronger as more agents interact between
clusters. Thus we observe language diversity due to the spatial distribution but at the
same time the rise of an interlingua.
The following vocabularies illustrate this point clearly. The first vocabulary is taken
from an agent from the leftmost cluster in Figure 5.9. All the words associated with a
particular meaning are shown together with their score.
{}[M0]: kube[0.88] gutida[0.00] moko[0.00]
{}[M1]: nugini[0.97] gi[0.83] majiba[0.00]
{}[M2]: go[0.98] ta[0.00]




{}[M7]: mepabo[0.97] jabeto[0.71] di[0.00]
{}[M8]: kude[0.90] nado[0.00]
{}[M9]: pe[0.94] da[0.00]
{}[M10]: na[0.94] nuguge[0.90] pa[0.80] ne[0.00]
{}[M11]: mu[0.98] gite[0.00] paku[0.00]
{}[M12]: gema[0.96] do[0.33] gapu[0.00]
{}[M13]: ja[0.67] jo[0.00]
{}[M14]: dodine[0.88] pibo[0.83] gije[0.00] pupeto[0.00]
{}[M15]: jiti[0.94] gato[0.64]
{}[M16]: bimogu[0.98] ba[0.00]
{}[M17]: bapi[0.96] ki[0.81] damuti[1,0,0.00]
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{}[M18]: kutume [0.94] bu [0.00] ni[0.00]
{}[M19]: mugu[0.95] NINU[0.50] pi[0.43] ji[0.00] tu[0.00]
This is the vocabulary for an agent taken from the rightmost cluster in Figure 5.9:
{}[M0]: gutida[0.79] kube[0.00]
{}[M1]: gi[0.89] matu[0.85] pumoni[0.00]
{}[M2]: go[0.95] ta[0.20]
{}[M3]: kene[0.89] moma[0.82] nudo[0.00] koko[0.00]
{}[M4]: nebu[0.97] me[0.00] bukugo[0.00]
{}[M5]: tine[0.90]
{}[M6]: babige[0.93] bo[0.00]
{}[M7]: mepabo[0.90] junipe[0.75] di[0.00]





{}[M13]: jo[0.96] ji[0.89] ja[0.00]
{}[M14]: dodine[0.96] pupeto[0.56] pibo[0.00] gije[0.00]
{}[M15]: jiti[0.97] gato[0.46]
{}[M16]: bimogu[0.97] ba[0.83] pipebe[0.00]
{}[M17]: ki[0.97] bapi[0.00] ke[,0.00]
{}[M18]: ni[0.94] kutume[0.80] moko[0.80] mekami[0.00]
{}[M19]: ninu[0.81] mugu[0.00] pi[0.00]
Somewords (for example tine for [M5] or go for [M2]) are shared. But generally there are
at least two words. One word is used preferentially inside the cluster, the other is known
but preferentially used by members of another cluster. Thus the word mugu for [M19] is
preferred for the first object in the first cluster and known but not preferentially used by
the agent in the second cluster. Conversely, ninu is preferred for the same meaning by
the agent in the second cluster, although he also knows mugu. mepabo for [M7] belongs
to the interlingua. Both agents know and use it but they have a strong alternative jabeto
for the first and junipe for the second agent.
5.4.2 Language contact
When the interaction factor increases, we see further differentiation because there is less
communication between clusters. When it is decreased, we see more coherence because
there is more intercluster communication. Thus we can effectively tune divergence or
convergence in the simulations based on the probability of interaction between commu-
nities (clusters) of agents. The effect of increased language contact and hence conver-
gence is demonstrated in Figure 5.10. The simulation starts from the situation described
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earlier with three clusters of agents that have each evolved a lexicon. The interaction be-
tween clusters is initially very weak. At some point (after 4000 games) the intercluster
communication is increased drastically. At first there is a drop in communicative success












Figure 5.10: Evolution of average communicative success per 25 games in a group of
agents with first weak (phase 1) and then strong interactions (phase 2).
However, this general evolution hides the more interesting developments. Figure 5.11
shows the evolution of coherence for each cluster (a, b, c) separately and also for the
total set of agents. As long as the agents have relatively little contact, total coherence
is low although the lexical coherence within each cluster is high. Total coherence starts
to increase with increased contact. Coherence in each cluster diminishes somewhat be-
cause the agents in the cluster are in the process of accommodating to the global lexicon.
This means that the languages of the different groups are in the process of merging due
to the increased language contact.
Simulations show that, just as in human languages, increased contact causes at first
a rapid increase in bilingualism, then a gradual mixing of the languages, and, if the
contact continues, an evolution towards complete coherence. Themore rapid the contact
is increased, the faster the three phases can be observed.
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Figure 5.11: Evolution of coherence in the total population and in the individual clusters
is shown on the same scale as the previous figure. When contact is increased
(phase 2), global coherence begins to rise steadily.
5.5 Conclusions
A population of agents following a simple set of behaviour rules and using an associative
memory can give rise to a shared repertoire of form-meaning associations, giving the
agents a total average success in communication. Once a shared repertoire comes into
existence, it locks into an equilibrium state and gets transmitted from one generation to
the next in a cultural process, as long as the rate of population change is not too high.
The population can also cope with an in- and outflux of meanings, in the sense that the
lexicon constracts or expands in relation to the demands from an evolving set of possible
meanings.
The mechanisms I have proposed here for the Naming Game are remarkable in many
ways. It clearly shows that a shared set of conventions can arise without an omniscient
central co-ordinator andwithout any prior knowledge of the lexicon built into the agents.
The Naming Game also demonstrates a new way to model and thus investigate linguis-
tic phenomena. Existing formal models of language, such as generative grammars, only
model static competence of a single idealised speaker in a homogeneous language com-
munity. Using the framework of language games played by populations of agents, we
can model the emergence and evolution of language in an inhomogeneous community
and study language use as well as change through language contact.
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The Naming Game is a minimal model of communication between agents and far re-
moved from the full complexity of human natural language. Moreover we made a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions, thus putting up scaffolds to construct this initial model.
The most important assumption was that the meaning of a word can be unambiguously
known by the speaker and hearer independently of language. This assumption is of
course not valid for human beings, and neither is it valid for the Talking Heads.
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The problem how a physically embodied situated agent might refer to objects using lan-
guage is extraordinarily difficult. If we then further want to find out how a group of such
agents might autonomously bootstrap a language system, the task seems almost unsur-
mountable. That is why I proposed earlier on to start by dividing this task into its three
main subtasks along the lines of the semiotic square (Figure 6.1). The previous chapters
each focused on one of these tasks. Chapter 5 has introduced perceptual mechanisms
to process the raw image, segment the scene, derive characteristics about each segment,
and give feedback by pointing to the referent. Chapter 4 studied categorisation mecha-
nisms needed for conceptualising a scene and thus for generating the possible meanings
of a verbal communication. Chapter 5 looked at how agents can lexicalise meanings and
build up a sufficiently shared lexicon to engage in verbal interactions.
Given that we now have reasonable solutions for these basic processes, at least for its
most simple instantiations, we can now start to put the pieces together and thus study
the complete guessing game. I will proceed in two steps. First I will but the lexical layer
and the conceptualisation layer together in this chapter, and then I will ground the whole
system by coupling the conceptualisation layer to the perceptual layer in Chapter 7.
Another technique I proposed earlier on for handling the enormous challenges ad-
dressed in this book, is to scale up gradually. I will follow this strategy as well. In this
chapter, I will assume that the referent and the perceived image are the same. This im-
plies that we are really dealing with semiotic triangles as opposed to semiotic squares
(Figure 6.1). I will start simulations with only 2 agents and then scale up to a larger
number. This increases the degree of synonymy in the lexicon. I will furthermore start
by letting the agents consider only the most salient channel, so that they much more
easily guess the same category for the same scene. Then I will scale this up so that the
agents now consider more sensory channels and hence more categories. This increases
the degree of ambiguity in the lexicon. Both synonymy and ambiguity are sources of
incoherence and we will have to make sure that agents still manage to be successful
despite of these.
This chapter shows that agents still manage to bootstrap a shared lexicon due to care-
fully established feedback couplings between the different processing layers introduced
in the previous chapters. The language game gives feedback to the lexical layer so that
words become preferred that are understood by others. The lexical layer gives feedback
to the conceptual layer so that categories become preferred that have been successfully
lexicalised. Each layer is a selectionist system that generates possible ways to solve a
subproblem, of which some are kept and others discarded based on feedback of their use.
I will examine in this chapter whether these couplings indeed cause a coordination of
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the different internal layers in a single agent and whether they lead to shared ontologies
and lexicons.
6.1 Defining the Guessing Game
The guessing game was already introduced in Chapter 2. Here is a first example game,
game 500. a2 plays the role of speaker and a1 the role of hearer. The game is about the
scene in Figure 6.2. The topic is the rectangle labeled 1. The grayscale channel is the most
salient channel. The different sensory values (after sensor-scaling) for the segments in
Figure 6.2 are shown in Table 6.1. The last line shows the saliency of the topic segment
1. Clearly the grayscale channel is the most salient.
Table 6.1: Sensory data for the scene shown in Figure 6.2.
obj hpos vpos height width gray area
0 0.66 0.95 0.01 0.71 0.19 0.27
1 0.69 0.83 0.07 0.33 0.97 0.21
2 0.99 0.87 0.54 0.72 0.22 0.57
saliency 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.39 0.75 0.06
All rectangles are relatively close to each other and have more or less the same height
and width. But the grayscale is clearly the more salient because rectangle-1 is much
darker than the others. I assume that there are only two agents in the population and
that they always use only the most salient to conceptualise the scene. The speaker and
hearer have to traverse only two sides of the semiotic square (Figure 6.1) because we
assume that perceived image and object being referred to are identical for both agents.




Figure 6.1: The semiotic square becomes a triangle when the perceived image and the
referent in the real world are assumed to be identical.
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6.1.1 Example of a coupled game
The speaker first plays a Discrimination Game traversing the semantic side of the square
going from the referent rectangle-1 to a possible meaning [gray 0.5–1.0]. He then plays
a Naming Game traversing the lexical side of of the square to find the word pokuneso for
this chosen meaning. The hearer traverses the lexical side of the triangle in the other di-
rection to interpret the word pokuneso as [gray 0.5–1.0], and then identifies the referent
by filtering the objects in the context with this meaning. Only rectangle-1 remains, so
the game succeeds. The whole game is reported by the commentator as follows:
Game 500
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 3 objects:
rectangle-0 rectangle-1 rectangle-2
a2 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
a2 says: pokuneso
a1 interprets pokuneso as [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
a1 points to rectangle-1
a2 signals OK
The game is perfectly successful because both agents associate the word okuneso with
[gray 0.5–1.0] (dark) and they perceive the scene in the same way.
Figure 6.2: Example scene used in game 500.
Before examining the architecture behind these games in more detail, we can already
see from Figure 6.4 that a1 and a2 clearly manage to build autonomously a communica-
tion system and its underlying ontology from scratch by playing the guessing game. The
communicative success moves up to reach almost 100 % after a mere 500 games. Given
that the environment keeps generating novel situations, there is always a chance that a
scene occurs which requires new categories. So there is always a chance of failure, but
it will further trigger expansion of the discrimination trees and of the lexicon.
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rectangle-1 
[GRAY 0.5-1.0] pokuneso 













































Figure 6.4: Success (left y-axis) and average ontology size (right y-axis) for two agents
playing 500 guessing games.
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Figure 6.4 also shows the average number of categories in each agent. There is a steep
rise in the early phases, when no categories exist, but then the creation of new cate-
gories levels off as discrimination mostly succeeds. When the environment becomes
more complex, possibly exercising additional sensory channels, the discrimination trees
would start to expand again, as we have seen in the previous chapter and then the lexi-
con would start to expand as well. Obviously the lexicon can only start to develop when
there is an adequate ontology which explains some of the delay before the communica-
tivesuccess curve starts to climb.
Table 6.2 displays the complete lexicon of the two agents after 100 games, together
with the score for each assocation for a1 and a2. Only associations where the score is
above 0.0 for at least one agent are shown. A dash (-) indicates that the agent has not
stored this association yet.
Table 6.2: Complete lexicon of a1 and a2 after 100 games
Meaning Word Translation a1 a2
[hpos 0.0–0.5] vapola left - 0.1
[hpos 0.5–1.0] gonapa right 0.1 -
[height 0.0–0.5] suwaxugo short 0.6 0.8
[height 0.5–1.0] kusone tall 0.4 0.5
[width 0.0–0.5] bepupepa narrow 0.1 0.1
[width 0.0–0.25] kutaki very narrow - 0.1
[width 0.5–1.0] zikorika wide 0.0 0.3
[gray 0.0–0.5] fesasado light 0.5 0.7
[gray 0.5–1.0] pokuneso dark 0.8 0.9
[area 0.5–1.0] mafanoda large 0.1 0.1
We see that, at this point, the agents have lexicalised only the most general distinc-
tions, such as ‘dark’ (pokuneso) versus ‘light’ (fesasado) or ‘short’ (suwaxugo) versus ‘tall’
(kusone). Words for the grayscale and height dimensions have the strongest scores, al-
though this is purely accidental. When we would start another simulation from scratch,
we would end up with different words and perhaps other distinctions would be more
successful.
Table 6.3 is the complete lexicon after 500 games and Table 6.4 after 1000 games.
We see that words for basic distinctions have further established themselves. Words
for ‘short’ (suwaxugo) and ‘tall’ (kusone), or ‘light’ (fesasado) and ‘dark’ (pokuneso) now
have scores of 1.0. Words for more refined categories, like ‘very short’ (tawube) or ‘very
narrow’ (kutaki), are beginning to establish themselves.
Two steps in the evolution of the discrimination trees underlying this lexicon are
shown in Figure 6.5. There is a progressive refinement of all trees as time goes on, be-
cause all sensory channels have the same chance of being most salient. But the trees are
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Table 6.3: Lexicon of a1 and a2 after 500 games
Meaning Word Translation a1 a2
[hpos 0.0–0.5] vapola left 0.7 1.0
[hpos 0.5–1.0] gonapa right 0.6 0.5
[vpos 0.0–0.5] rixuzime up 0.2 0.7
[vpos 0.5–1.0] gofugage down 0.6 1.0
[height 0.0–0.5] suwaxugo short 1.0 1.0
[height 0.0–0.25] tawube very short 0.4 0.5
[height 0.25–0.5] narofi medium short 0.1 0.4
[height 0.5–1.0] kusone tall 1.0 1.0
[height 0.5–0.75] wuruzo medium tall 0.3 0.6
[height 0.75–1.0] bowaluro very tall 0.6 0.2
Table 6.4: Lexicon of a1 and a2 after 1000 games
[width 0.0–0.5] bepupepa narrow 1.0 1.0
[width 0.0–0.25] kutaki very narrow 0.1 0.5
[width 0.25–0.5] wukogo medium narrow 0.2 -
[width 0.5–1.0] zikorika wide 1.0 1.0
[width 0.5–0.75] mitula medium wide 0.1 -
[width 0.75–1.0] wupixo very wide - 0.2
[gray 0.0–0.5] fesasado light 1.0 1.0
[gray 0.0–0.25] sanize very light - 0.1
[gray 0.5–1.0] pokuneso dark 0.9 1.0
[gray 0.5–0.75] wavosoru medium dark 0.2 0.5
[gray 0.75–1.0] kuragoni very dark 0.3 0.2
[area 0.0–0.5] babifewa small - 0.1
[area 0.25–0.5] togule medium small 0.1 0.1
[area 0.5–1.0] mafanoda large 0.2 0.5
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not the same for the two agents at every stage of development because even though they
prefer to expand the salient channel, the agents have encountered different environmen-
tal situations in which different channels were salient. For example, after 100 games, a1
has less refinements for the width channel than a2. After 500 games, all trees have at
least one level of refinement. Not all categories have been lexicalised. For example, the
width channel is three levels deep in both agents but no words exist yet for the deepest
level.
Figure 6.5: Evolution of the discrimination trees of a1 (left) and a2 (right). Snapshots
have been taken after 100 games (top) and 500 games (bottom).
Note that this simulation is very different from the ones shown in the previous chap-
ter. The agents now get only feedback through overt selection of the referent. The hearer
points to the identified referent and the speaker decides on the outcome of the game
based on this non-verbal information, but speaker and hearer do not knowwhether they
have used the same meaning or not. Very often there are alternative ways to conceptu-
alise reality, so even if agents would have completely shared ontologies, there is still the
possibility of guessing the wrong meaning. I have called this the gavagai-problem, in-
spired by the philosopherQuine, who tells the story of the anthropologist puzzled by the
word gavagai uttered by a native in an undecoded language. Does gavagai mean rabit,
animal scurrying by, the direction in which I will go now, or white furry object? The
child who is acquiring a lexicon has exactly the same problem. It explains why overex-
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tensions or underextensions are seen in a child’s first words. For example, the word for
orange is applied to any small circular round object, including a ball, or a doorknob.
6.1.2 Input-output coupling
Obviously the first thing I had to do to get these results, is make the inputs of one layer
the outputs of the other (Figure 6.6). When the speaker has conceptualised the scene, the
possible solutions enter the lexical layer for lexicon lookup. The resulting words get into
a competition and the one with the highest score wins. In a more complete system with
a syntactic layer, different lexicalisations would be considered by the syntactic layer to




outputs =  
  inputs 
outputs 
Conceptual layer  
Lexical layer  
Figure 6.6: Flow of solutions through coupled layers from perception to conceptualisa-
tion and lexicalisation with re-entry links between them.
The importance of having re-entry links now becomes clear. The choice which con-
ceptualisation is finally chosen as the best one will depend on the lexical layer because
the speaker should prefer those categories whose lexicalisation is best established, if he
wants to maximise success in the game. Due to the constant evolution of the lexicon
and the presence of synonyms, the conceptual layer cannot know once and for all what
the most appropriate conceptualisation from the viewpoint of language will be. And it
needs to know the outcome of the lexical layer to later update the scores of participating
categorisers.
The hearer uses the same layers but now with solutions flowing in the other direc-
tion. He gets a set of words which generate possible conceptualisations through lexicon
lookup and these then are applied to the scene to find the referent (Figure 6.7). Because
layers have this dual mode of operations, it is perfectly possible that the hearer has
already guessed words and thus strong expectations based on the scene and his own
conceptualisation of it, although this has not been implemented in the Talking Heads
yet.
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outputs =  
  inputs 
inputs 
Conceptual layer  
Lexical layer  
Figure 6.7: Layers operate in two directions. The flow of solutions in the hearer is shown
from words to categories and perceptions and in the other direction through
re-entry.
Also for the hearer, the re-entrant flow is important. A hearer can only know which
meaning was intended for a particular word after trying out the meaning on the scene.
He therefore uses the context to determine the meaning of the utterance. For example,
a particular word may mean both [large] and [dark], particularly during the phase of
early language acquisition. However if only one of these categories picks out a single
referent, it is chosen as the meaning, and the hearer will act upon this choice by pointing
to the object it singles out from the scene.
This architecture takes care of synonymy and ambiguity and makes sure that the most
plausible form/meaning/referent chain stands out. A similar architecture may explain
how humans effortlessly pick out the appropriate meanings from the many possible
meanings a word typically has and not even be aware of the alternatives. If our language
sytems could not cope this way with ambiguity and ambiguity we would have had to
use a lexicon where every word can have only a single meaning. Language has had to
recruit whatever capacity was already available.
6.1.3 Updating the scores
Thenext thing I had to do is reconsider the score updatingmechanisms, even though they
are basically the same as used earlier (Figure 6.8). For a given referent, there are multiple
meanings possible (in casemore than one channel is considered to be sufficiently salient),
and for each meaning there are multiple words. The best one of this whole lot is chosen
by the speaker and used for the utterance transmitted to the hearer. We have seen that it
is important for the hearer to use lateral inhibition based on the outcome of a game. But
although the speaker is considering all the possible conceptualisations, lateral inhibition
should only take place between the lexicalisations of themeaning that was finally chosen.
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So when the game was successful, the speaker increases the association that was used
with δ and decreases all the other associations with the same meaning. delta is still set to
a reasonable low value, namely delta = 0.1. The hearer does the same as explained earlier
in the Naming Game. The score of all the alternative meanings for the word (or words)
that are used by the speaker are decreased. When the game fails, both the speaker and
the hearer decrease the association that they used with δ. No change takes place to the
scores of any of the other associations.
square-1
[WIDTH 0.5-1.0]













Figure 6.8: Score adjustments after a successful game. Used associations go up and com-
peting associations go down. The game producing these relationships is dis-
cussed later as game 10008.
The scores of the categories and category combinations in the discrimination trees
should also be updated. When a category or category combination is used as part of the
communication in the game (as meaning for the speaker or the hearer), its use counter
goes up. When the game is successful, its success counter goes up. To know the score of a
particular category or category-set, the agent simply divides success by use. Because the
score of the categories thus depends on their success in the language game, a strong co-
ordination gradually arises between conceptualisation and lexicalisations. After a while,
categorisations will be preferred that are amenable to yield successful language games
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and of course the language only lexicalises categories that are nodes in discrimination
trees. We thus get a progressive coordination of both the repertoire of categories and
the lexicon, as I will discuss in more detail later.
The other criteria discussed earlier (simplicity of the categories and level of depth in
the tree) are still used for ranking the possible conceptualisations coming out of the
lexicon, particularly when none of the meanings has been lexicalised yet or whether
there are multiple possibilities. The human brain is clearly capable to integrate many
more criteria in lexical choice. For example, when talking to a child we might use more
common words than we would use when talking to another adult.
6.1.4 Repair processes
Of course the other repair processes discussed earlier are still going on as well. Agents
expand their discrimination trees when they fail to categorise and they invent newwords
or adopt words from the other if necessary. The task is more complicated compared to
the simple Naming Game because the hearer now gets no direct feedback of the meaning
only of the referent. In case of failure, the hearer must try to find himself a distinctive
category or category set discriminating the referent from the other objects in the context.
Here is an example game illustrating this type of repair process. The data for game 77
(after sensor-scaling) is shown in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Sensory data for game 77 after sensor-scaling.
Obj Hpos Vpos Height Width Gray Area
0 0.51 0.98 0.90 0.47 0.79 0.60
1 0.75 0.68 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.20
2 0.76 0.54 0.56 0.26 0.94 0.36
The speaker is again a2. height is the most salient channel. a2 has a word for [height
0.75–1.0] (very tall), namely bowaluro, and uses it. The hearer a1 does not know the word,
conceptualises the scene, and arrives at the same category, so the hearer stores the new
word with the same meaning as the speaker.
Game 77
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 3 objects:
rectangle-0 rectangle-1 rectangle-2
a2 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0]
a2 says: ’bowaluro’
a1 does not know ’bowaluro’
a1 says: ’bowaluro?’
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a2 points to rectangle-1
a1 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0]
a1 stores ’bowaluro’ as [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0]
The reason why a1 has guessed the right meaning of bowaluro is because both agents
use only the most salient channel and they both share the same perception of reality. We
will soon see that if these constraints are not valid, agents are not always so lucky and
hence multiple meanings start to circulate for the same word.
A similar repair action takes place when the hearer cannot guess a unique referent, as
illustrated in game 96 drawn from the same simulation series. The scene contains three
rectangles and the topic is the most narrow rectangle. The segments in the scene of game
279 have the characteristics (after sensor-scaling) shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Sensory data for game 279
Obj Hpos Vpos Height Width Gray Area
0 0.51 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.80 0.56
1 0.51 0.91 0.53 0.41 0.42 0.41
The hearer guessed the meaning used by the speaker right away, because both share
the same perception and both use the most salient channel as basis for categorisation.
Game 96
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 3 objects:
rectangle-0 rectangle-1 rectangle-2
a1 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a1 categorises the topic as [WIDTH 0.0–0.25]
a1 creates a new word: ’kutaki’
a1 says: ’kutaki’
a2 does not find a unique referent
a2 says: ’kutaki?’
a1 points to rectangle-1
a2 categorises the topic as [WIDTH 0.0–0.25]
a2 stores ’kutaki’ as [WIDTH 0.0–0.25]
6.2 Synonymy
When we scale up the population, synonyms (several words for the same meaning) will
start to appear. Indeed, when there are only two agents, the hearer picks up a word as
soon as the speaker has created it. With a larger group, it is much more likely that agents
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create words not knowing that words already exist in the population, and it takes time
for a new word to propagate.
Synonyms are not a positive feature of a language. They make it less efficient for
the speaker to find the most appropriate word to express a meaning, they require more
memory to store the lexicon, and confuse a new virgin agent coming into the group. In
natural languages, synonyms get damped and we have seen in the previous chapter that
the positive feedback loop between use and success (implemented by lateral inhibition
in the agent’s score updating process) has the same effect. Let us now see whether this
is still the case if the hearer does not get any feedback about the meaning used.
The following simulation uses a group of ten agents. Each agent still only uses the
most salient channel so that the agents can guess the meaning easily in case a word is
not known. The evolution of communicative success for a series of 4000 games, which
means about 800 games per agent, is shown in Figure 6.9. An effective lexicon and









































Figure 6.9: Communicative success (left y-axis) and average ontology size (right y-axis)
is shown for a series of 4000 language games played by 10 agents.
Part of the lexicons of five of the ten agents after 2000 games (only those words which
have positive scores) are shown in the Table 6.7. We see that synonymy does indeed oc-
cur. For example, twowords are in the running for [hpos 0.5–1.0]: rutaxese and xomupovi,
and three for [vpos 0.5–1.0]: wavone, zaxawe, and dazofo. Some words are already well
established, for example numefuli for [gray 0.5–1.0] (dark).
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Table 6.7: Lexicon of five agents after 2000 games.
Meaning Word a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
[hpos 0.5–1.0] rutaxese 0.1
xomupovi 0.1 0.2 0.1




vubupo 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.1 1.0
[width 0.5–1.0] pawixona 0.1
rikepule 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
[width 0.5–0.75] gowinoge 0.1
wesurodi 0.2
[width 0.75–1.0] besabi 0.2
lituvi 0.1
[gray 0.5–0.75] goxomixe 0.1
korufo 0.2
[gray 0.0–0.5] numefuli 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
[gray 0.0–0.25] rekemaxi 0.2
[gray 0.5–1.0] faluleru 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
nupanu 0.2
referent 
[GRAY 0.5-1.0] notabefe 
faluleru 
vivevobo 
Figure 6.10: In the case of synonymy, there are multiple words for the same meaning and
hence the same referent.
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The positive feedback loop between use and success has already dampened some syn-
onyms. For some cases, like [gray 0.5–1.0] the competition has died out with one word
faluleru being the winner. For others, like [hpos 0.5–1.0], the competition is still going
on, although we can guess that xomupovi is probably going to be the winner.
It is instructive to follow the history of the words in use for a particular meaning. For
example, let us look at the words for [gray 0.5–1.0] (dark) in the very early phases of
lexicon development. Three different words are quickly created, and faluleru is the first
one that has some success.
Game 76
Speaker a4 creates ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a5 adopts ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Game 79
Speaker a2 creates ’vivevobo’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a7 does not adopt ’vivebo’
(failed to discriminate)
Game 88
Speaker a7 creates ’faluleru’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a4 adopts ’faluleru’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Game 100
Speaker a7 uses ’faluleru’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a4 correctly interprets ’faluleru’
The semiotic triangles existing at this point in the population are summarised in Fig-
ure 6.10. Agent a4 is now already in a dilemma because he has created notabefe and
picked up faluleru from a7.
With a lower word creation rate (wc), fewer new words would be created. The initial
bootstrapping of the lexicon would then take a bit longer but the process of weeding
out synonymy would be shorter. With a lower word adoption rate (wa), agents are less
inclined to adopt a word and that again diminishes the chance that new words spread,
if words already exist for the same meaning. But even with high word creation and
word adoption rates, the whole system stabilises automatically. The stronger a lexicon
is already in place, the fewer new synonyms arise because new words created by virgin
agents entering the population have hardly any chance to propagate.
Note that the word creation rate can never be completely zero because then the agents
would no longer be able to handle new meanings. The word adoption rate can never
be equal to zero either because then new words cannot spread in the population and
there would be a high chance that the lexicon does not become coherent with subgroups
getting stuck with different words for the same meaning.
Because there are synonyms, agents must now choose which word to use. The one
with the highest score should clearly be preferred because based on the evidence the
agent has gathered so far, this gives the highest chance of success in the game. a4 is
faced with this kind of choice in the next game in the series involving the meaning [gray
0.5–1.0]. a4 chooses faluleru because this word has the highest score. It is immediately
picked up by a1:
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Game 101
a4 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a4 segments the context into 2 objects:
rectangle-0 rectangle-1
a4 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a4 categorises the topic as [GRAY 0.5–1.0]




a1 does not know ’faluleru’
a1 says: ’faluleru?’
a4 points to rectangle-1
a1 categorises the topic as [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
a1 stores ’faluleru’ as [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
After this game, three agents “know” the word faluleru for [gray 0.5–1.0]: a4, a1, and a7.
When we continue to inspect the simulation we see that notabefe takes a bit of a revenge.
The next games with the meaning [gray 0.5–1.0] all involve the word notabefe:
Game 111
Speaker a5 uses ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a4 correctly interprets ’notabefe’
Game 113
Speaker a4 uses ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a9 adopts ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Game 127
Speaker a9 uses ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a6 adopts ’notabefe’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
But then there is another occurrence of faluleru:
Game 135
Speaker a1 uses ’faluleru’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a2 adopts ’faluleru’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
And now a6, which has not been involved yet in any interaction concerning the meaning
[gray 0.5–1.0], further confuses the situation by creating a new word, sopine, which a5,
playing the role of hearer, adopts.
Game 140
Speaker a6 creates ’sopine’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
Hearer a5 adopts ’sopine’ for [GRAY 0.5–1.0]
This kind of evolution continues with a struggle between notabefe and faluleru. The
agents know both words so the games do not fail. But faluleru, just by chance, starts
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to occur a bit more often which causes its score to go up a bit more. This results in
faluleru being used even more, and, due to lateral inhibition, notabefe used less. Gradu-
ally faluleru dominates for the whole population. After 2000 games, the competitors to
faluleru have all disappeared from the group lexicon.
6.3 Ambiguity
We now continue in small steps to scale up the challenge to the agents by progressively
adding more realism to the simulation. So far I assumed that agents use only the most
salient channel for categorising the topic and that their perception of the world is iden-
tical. Consequently a hearer can guess with 100 % success the meaning of an unknown
word and it is therefore no wonder that the agents arrive at a shared communication
system, even though neither the lexicon nor the repertoire of categories has been sup-
plied in advance by a designer nor their development centrally coordinated. The main
problem for them so far is the rise of synonyms which need to be damped to increase
the probability of successful and efficient communication.
I now relax the saliency assumption. When there is a lower saliency threshold, more
than one sensory channel is considered by the conceptual layer, possibly leading to sev-
eral alternative conceptualisations of the scene. The question is then whether the agents
are still able to reach a shared communication system despite the unavoidable word am-
biguities that this generates.
We begin again by looking at simulations with two agents so that we can clearly
see the impact of multiple conceptualisations. The architecture of the agents has not
changed, I only lowered the saliency threshold. The scenes have become a bit more
complex as well. They now not only contain rectangles but also squares, circles, and
triangles. This has a limited impact because the same sensory channels are used as before
and none of them is really sensitive to shape properties.
Figure 6.11: Scene used in game 3.
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6.3.1 How words may still get the same meaning
When inspecting the simulation results, we see first of all that we may still accidentally
get the same situation as before, i.e. one where the hearer selects the same channel as
the speaker for conceptualising the scene, even though several channels are salient. This
happens in the following game which involves a scene with a rectangle and a square
(Figure 6.11).
The data for game 3, after sensor-scaling, are shown in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8: Sensory data for game 3 after scaling.
Obj Hpos Vpos Height Width Gray Area
0 0.37 0.44 0.92 0.92 0.69 0.10
1 0.98 0.55 0.25 0.11 0.78 0.88
Values for vpos and gray are very close so they are not considered as sufficiently
salient.
Game 3
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 2 objects:
square-0 rectangle-1
a1 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a1 considers as salient AREA WIDTH HEIGHT HPOS
a1 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5]
a2 creates a new word: \smplenquote{mibati}
a1 says: ’mibati’
a2 does not know ’mibati’
a2 says: ’mibati?’
a1 points to rectangle-1
a1 considers as salient AREA WIDTH HEIGHT HPOS
a1 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5]
a1 stores ’mibati’ as [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5]
[height 0.0–0.5] has been chosen by the speaker because height was one of the salient
channels (even though clearly not the only salient one) and because a successful distinc-
tion already existed in the ontology. The same distinction was chosen by chance by the
hearer, but he could just as well have chosen a distinction based on the area, width or
hpos.
In the next game of the simulation series, mibati is used again, now by a2 as speaker.
It is based on a scene with a triangle and a rectangle. The data for game 4 are shown in
Table 6.9 (after scaling).
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Table 6.9: Lexicon of a1 and a2 after 500 games.
obj hpos vpos height width gray area
0 0.47 0.23 0.90 0.83 0.49 0.34
1 0.21 0.22 0.67 0.79 0.86 0.63
The rectangle is chosen as topic. Two alternative categories can be used by a2 (and
are listed by the commentator) but the one preferred is the one with the strongest lexi-
calisation, which is mibati.
Game 4
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
triangle-0 rectangle-1
a2 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a2 considers as salient AREA GRAY HEIGHT HPOS
a2 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5]
{}[GRAY 0.5–1.0]
a2 has the word
mibati for [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5] (1.0)
a2 says: ’mibati’
a1 interprets ’mibati’ as [HEIGHT 0.0–0.5]
a1 points to rectangle-1
a2 signals OK
This example illustrates two points. First of all the language interpretation process in-
fluences which conceptualisation of the scene is preferred. For the speaker, both [height
0.0–0.5] (short) and [gray 0.5–1.0] (dark) are possible ways to distinguish the topic from
the other objects in the context. But [height 0.0–0.5] is chosen because its lexicalisa-
tion has a higher score. Second, we begin to see why agents will manage to coordinate
their ontologies, even though they do not have any direct feedback about each other’s
internal structures. The score of [height 0.0–0.5] goes up after this game and if the
agent has to choose a category later purely based on the score of the categories them-
selves, [height 0.0–0.5] will be the one being preferred. Unless [gray 0.5–1.0] manages
to become successfully lexicalised itself, it even risks to get pruned away.
6.3.2 How words get different meanings
Here is an example where ambiguity slips in the lexicon. The game involves two objects:
a rectangle and a square (Figure 6.12). The data for game 9, after sensor-scaling, are
shown in Table 6.10.
The discrimination trees of the two agents at this point are shown in Figure 6.13. The
speaker uses a distinction based on the vpos channel namely [vpos 0.5–1.0] (top), cre-
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Figure 6.12: Scene used in game 9. Square-1 is the topic. Several conceptualisations are
possible so the agents get divergent meanings.
Figure 6.13: Discrimination trees of speaker a1 (left) and hearer a2 (right) available in
game 9
Table 6.10: Data for game 9 after sensor-scaling.
obj hpos vpos height width gray area
0 0.92 0.38 0.59 0.83 0.36 0.61
1 0.32 0.88 0.54 0.54 0.12 0.42
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ates a word for it puxazi, and transmits this to the hearer. The hearer does not know
the word, conceptualises the scene based on this non-verbal hint from the speaker, and
identifies the category [gray 0.0–0.5] (light) as distinctive. So this meaning is stored and
it is different from the one used by speaker. The current constellation of meanings is
summarised in Figure 6.14.
square-1 
[VPOS 0.5-1.0] puxazi 
[GRAY 0.0-0.5] 
Figure 6.14: Semiotic triangles underlying game 9. For the same referent and the same
word, there are two different meanings. Dashed lines indicate the relations
used by the speaker a2. Straight lines indicate those used by the hearer a1.
Game 9
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 2 objects:
rectangle-0 square-1
a1 chooses square-1 as the topic
a1 considers as salient GRAY WIDTH VPOS HPOS
a1 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.5–1.0]
a2 creates a new word: ’puxazi’
a1 says: ’puxazi’
a2 does not know ’puxazi’
a2 says: ’puxazi?’
a1 points to square-1
a2 considers as salient GRAY WIDTH VPOS HPOS
a2 categorises the topic as [GRAY 0.0–0.5]
a2 stores ’puxazi’ as [GRAY 0.0–0.5]
A subsequent game (game 11) illustrates that despite semantic incoherence, a game
can still succeed. The agents do not know that each of them means something else by
puxazi and if the meanings are compatible, they have no reason to change their internal
lexicon:
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Game 11
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 3 objects:
circle-0 rectangle-1
a2 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a2 considers as salient AREA GRAY WIDTH HPOS
a2 categorises the topic as [GRAY 0.0–0.5]
a2 says: ’puxazi’
a1 interprets ’puxazi’ as [VPOS 0.5–1.0]








Figure 6.15: Semiotic triangles used in game 14. Dashed lines are the relations used by the
hearer a2. Straight lines those of the speaker a1. After this game, a1 adopts
yet another meaning for puxazi, namely [height 0.5–1.0].
Here is next a game (game 14) where a2 comes to adopt the other meaning of puxazi,
because the first meaning does not work in the present context. The game involves three
objects: two rectangles and a triangle (Figure 6.16). The data for game 14, before context
scaling, are shown in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Sensory data for game 14 after scaling.
obj hpos vpos height width gray area
0 0.60 0.49 0.12 0.09 0.78 0.06
1 0.95 0.71 0.51 0.60 0.07 0.15
2 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.65 0.03 0.33
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a1 conceptualises the scene using [vpos 0.5–1.0], which he has lexicalised as puxazi.
For a2, puxazi means [gray 0.0–0.5] (light), but this meaning identifies both rectangle-2
and triangle-1 (Figure 6.15). The game therefore fails and the speaker points to the topic.
The hearer conceptualises the scene based on this non-verbal hint from the speaker using
the height dimension and adopts this as the second meaning of puzaxi.
Game 14
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 3 objects:
rectangle-0 triangle-1 rectangle-2
a1 chooses triangle-1 as the topic
a1 considers as salient HEIGHT VPOS HPOS
a1 categorises the topic as
{}[VPOS 0.5–1.0] [HEIGHT 0.5–1.0]
a1 says: ’puxazi’
a2 interprets ’puxazi’ as [GRAY 0.0–0.5]
a2 identifies rectangle-2 triangle-1
a2 says: ’puxazi?’
a1 points to triangle-1
a2 considers as salient HEIGHT VPOS HPOS
a2 categorises the topic as [HEIGHT 0.5–1.0]
a2 stores ’puxazi’ as [HEIGHT 0.5–1.0]
Note that the hearer could in principle also have categorised the scene using vpos and
hpos, because they are equally salient. So there was absolutely no guarantee that puxazi
would have been associated with [height 0.5–1.0] by a2. Moreover a2 stores an associ-
ation between puxazi and [height 0.5–1.0], even though there is already another word
for [height 0.5–1.0] in his lexicon. The fact that several meanings are possible to distin-
guish the topic in a given context has not only the consequence that ambiguity arises
but also that synonyms may enter into the lexicon, even with only two agents!
6.3.3 Competition between word meanings
Once a word has more than one meaning (ambiguity), and once several words exist
for the same meaning (synonymy), a struggle between word-meaning pairs sharing the
same word or the same meaning develops. The lateral inhibition carried out by the
speaker in case of a successful game pushes down alternative lexicalisations for the same
meaning, thus damping synonyms, and the lateral inhibition carried out by the hearer
pushes down alternative meanings for the same word, thus damping ambiguity.
Game 25 illustrates this effect of lateral inhibition. The situation before the game is
as depicted in Figure 6.17. Two words (with different meanings) are competing in a2 to
identify the referent: puxazi (meaning [gray 0.0–0.5], i.e. light) and torigusu (meaning
[vpos 0.0–0.5], i.e. lower). puxazi has a higher score and wins the competition. Because
the game was successful, the score of puxazi goes up. The score of torigusu does not
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Figure 6.16: Scene used in game 14. Synonymy arises because the hearer conceptualises




[GRAY 0.0-0.5] torigusu 
Figure 6.17: Semiotic triangles used in game 25. The score of the relation between [gray
0.0–0.5] and puxazi is increased in both agents. The relation between puxazi
and [gray 0.0–0.5] gets damped.
change because it concerns another meaning. Two meanings for puxazi are competing
in a1: [gray 0.0–0.5] (light) and [vpos 0.0–0.5] (down). [vpos 0.0–0.5] gets damped and
the score of [gray 0.0–0.5] goes up, thus helping to further disambiguate puxazi.
Game 25
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
rectangle-0 rectangle-1
a2 chooses rectangle-1 as the topic
a2 considers as salient GRAY VPOS
a2 categorises the topic as [VPOS 0.0–0.5]
{}[GRAY 0.0–0.5] [GRAY 0.0–0.25]
a2 has the words
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puxazi for [GRAY 0.0–0.5] (0.20)
torigusu for [VPOS 0.0–0.5] (0.0)
a2 says: ’puxazi’
a1 interprets ’puxazi’ as
{}[GRAY 0.0–0.5] (0.20)
{}[VPOS 0.0–0.5] (0.0)
a1 points to rectangle-1
a2 signals OK
After this game, the association between [gray 0.0–0.5] and puxazi will have a score of
0.3 in both agents. The association between puxazi and [vpos 0.0–0.5] in the hearer is
decreased, but because it was already 0.0, it cannot decrease further.
Note that the speaker not only conceptualises the scene using themost generic distinc-
tions ([gray 0.0–0.5], [vpos 0.0–0.5]) but also with more specific ones ([gray 0.0–0.25]).
Indeed it may happen that there is no word for a more generic distinction, but there
is one for a more specific one, in which case it should be used. So, all discriminative
distinctions, whatever their level of detail, are transmitted from the categorisation layer
to the lexical layer and it is up to the lexical layer to choose. Of course, everything else
being equal, other criteria are still important. If there is a more abstract category (mean-
ing one higher in the discrimination tree) it is preferred over a more specific one if they
have equal lexical scores.
6.3.4 Lexical and ontological development
Despite additional complication of mutually compatible meanings for unknown words,
the two agents nevertheless manage to build up a shared communication system, as can
be seen from Figure 6.18. Each time the ontology is extended, communicative success
dips because a new word needs to be acquired, but the agents clearly manage to become
successful in the guessing game.
Success does not mean that the lexicons are completely identical. As we have seen in
game 11, it is possible to have communicative success with different meanings for the
same word as long as the different meanings pick out the same referent. Of course in
the domain of the geom world, it is a pure coincidence that two categories pick out the
same referent and therefore alternative meanings for the same word will get damped.
However, if there are more regularities, ambiguity persists much longer. In fact, ambi-
guity may persist in natural languages if the different meanings of a word are so closely
related that it is sufficiently often unclear which meaning is intended.
Here are some snapshots of the developing lexicon. After 30 games, the lexicon of the
established words (i.e. associations with a score greater than 0.0 for at least one agent)
is as in Table 6.12.
Note that there are two meanings for puxazi: [gray 0.0–0.5] (light) and [height 0.5–
1.0] (tall).
The lexicon after 200 games is shown in Table 6.13.
The second meaning of puxazi has now disappeared from the lexicon. So we basically
see the same situation as before when only one most salient channel was considered by
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Figure 6.18: Communicative success (left y-axis) and average ontology size (right y-axis)
for a series of 2000 language games played by two agents.
the agents. Words for more general distinctions happen to be lexicalised first because
they are more often useful in the game, but when needed words for more specific mean-
ings start to develop.
Table 6.12: Group lexicon after 30 games.
Meaning Word Translation a1 a2
[vpos 0.0–0.5] torigusu left 0.4 0.3
[height 0.0–0.5] mibati short 0.6 0.6
[height 0.5–1.0] puxazi tall 0.2 0.0
[gray 0.0–0.5] puxazi light 0.6 0.7
[gray 0.25–0.5] turawa medium light 0.1 0.0
[gray 0.5–1.0] xubevilo dark 0.0 0.1
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Table 6.13: Group lexicon after 200 games.
Meaning Word Translation a1 a2
[hpos 0.0–0.5] lefividi left 0.2 0.2
[hpos 0.5–1.0] vuvovo right 0.2 0.4
[vpos 0.0–0.5] torigusu left 0.8 0.2
[vpos 0.5–1.0] rugomoto right 1.0 1.0
[height 0.0–0.5] mibati short 1.0 0.9
[gray 0.0–0.5] puxazi light 0.3 0.6
[gray 0.25–0.5] turawa medium light 0.4 0.4
[gray 0.5–1.0] xubevilo dark 0.4 0.5
[gray 0.5–0.75] visuxa very dark 0.3 0.3
6.4 Scaling up
Conforted by having reached a new plateau in the challenges confronting the agents, I
now go one more step further. First we scale up the population to see whether despite
the ambiguity now persistently present, a larger group of agents still manages to develop
a shared communication system.
6.4.1 Increasing the population size
We already know from the previous section that a larger population automatically in-
creases the risk for synonymy. Figure 6.19 shows the evolution of communicative suc-
cess and average ontology size in a population of ten agents. We see again a steady
progression towards an effective communication system. Recall that these games are
played with randomly generated scenes from the geom world.
It is instructive to examine in detail the lexicon that has emerged after this series,
where every agent has on average played about 2000 games. The table shown in Ta-
ble 6.14 shows word-meaning pairs whose frequency is larger than 0.8.
We see that for all the sensory channels, solid words exist for the top level categories.
There is however one exception: there are no words in this group for area nor for
[height 0.5–1.0]. We do find these words, and words for more refined notions as well,
in the batch of word-meaning pairs whose scores are between 0.5 and 0.8, shown in
Table 6.15.
Although most of these words are on their way towards total coherence, because the
competition has already been damped completely, this is less the case for area/height
words. Closer inspection reveals that there are two words competing for expressing
area and height: texiraxi and wixizode (Figure 6.20). Both words have both meanings
but there is a strong divergence of opinion in the population. Some prefer the area
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Figure 6.19: Communicative success (left y-axis) and average ontology size (right y-axis)
for a series of 20,000 language games played by ten agents.
Table 6.14: Group lexicon after 2000 games.
Word Meaning Translation Frequency
larubo [hpos 0.0–0.5] left 1.00
tituroxu [hpos 0.5–1.0] right 1.00
fumetese [vpos 0.0–0.5] top 1.00
tokadapa [vpos 0.5–1.0] bottom 1.00
povomovi [width 0.0–0.5] thin 1.00
kilokawe [width 0.5–1.0] wide 1.00
legoka [height 0.0–0.5] short 0.94
vuwusugu [GREY 0.0–0.5] light 1.00
kewenoku [GREY 0.5–1.0] dark 1.00
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Table 6.15: Table of word meaning pairs and their average scores.
Word Meaning Translation Frequency
nifavipa (hpos 0.0–0.25) very left 0.55
nodanova (vpos 0.0–0.25) very top 0.58
texiraxi (height 0.5–1.0) tall 0.69
poxalu (height 0.0–0.25) very short 0.70
fovibilo (height 0.25–0.5) medium short 0.61
wixizode (area 0.5–1.0) large 0.78
tebuwona (GREY 0.75–1.0) very dark 0.76
mogevo (GREY 0.25–0.5) medium light 0.60




[AREA 0.5-1.0] teriraxi 
Figure 6.20: Two different words have the same two meanings and have difficulty disam-
biguating because they are often both equally distinctive in a given situation.
meaning, others prefer the height meaning. This can be seen from the scores of the
different meanings.
For the word texiraxi, the scores of the different agents for the area and height cat-
egories is as in Table 6.16.
A game where the two meanings are compatible is shown below:
Game 10008
a2 is the speaker. a4 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
circle-0 square-1
a2 chooses square-1 as the topic
a2 considers as salient AREA WIDTH HEIGHT
a2 categorises the topic as
{}[HEIGHT 0.5–1.0] [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0]
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Table 6.16: Scores for area and height categories.
Agent Scores texiraxi Scores wixizode
height area height area
a1 0.00 0.9 0.6 0.4
a2 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
a3 0.90 0.2 0.0 1.0
a4 1.00 0.0 0.0 1.0
a5 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.6
a6 1.00 0.0 0.0 1.0
a7 1.00 0.0 1.00 1.0
a8 1.00 0.0 1.00 1.0
a9 1.00 0.0 1.00 1.0
a10 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.8
{}[WIDTH 0.5–1.0] [WIDTH 0.75–1.0]
{}[AREA 0.5–1.0] [AREA 0.75–1.0]
{}[HEIGHT 0.5–1.0] [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0]
a2 has the words
wixizode for [HEIGHT 0.5–1.0] (1.0)
kilokawe for [WIDTH 0.5–1.0] (1.0)
texiraxi for [AREA 0.5–1.0] (1.0)
powugeme for [HEIGHT 0.5–1.0] (0.8)
wetami for [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0] (0.5)
wofetizo for [WIDTH 0.5–1.0] (0.4)
kufule for [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0] (0.1)
lisexese for [HEIGHT 0.75–1.0] (0.1)
a2 says: ’wixizode’






Note the abundance of choices for the speaker. He finally picks wixizode. The hearer
interprets this using area and the game succeeds. A partial overview of the different
choices and subsequent updating is given in Figure 6.8. The speaker decreases the score
of powugeme which is also competing for expressing [height 0.5–1.0]. The hearer on
the other hand damps the alternative meanings ofwixizode, which includes the meaning
[height 0.5–1.0] used by the speaker.
162
6.4 Scaling up
This example shows that there will be a divergence of opinion among the agents if the
environment does not provide enough disambiguating cases. It is still possible of course
that the semantic incoherence will disappear from the lexicon, but it is understandable
that agents have difficulty in this domain to disentangle the meanings of words for tall
and large. French has one word grand encapsulating both of these categories.
Here are the words in the lexicon with still lower frequencies in the population (be-
tween 0.2 and 0.5). We see more clearly several synonyms in heavy competition, for
example kodawika and togixa for [gray 0.5.0.75], or vavuvosi and radude for [width
0.75–1.0]. See Table 6.17.
Table 6.17: Lexicon with lower frequencies.
Word Meaning Frequency
lovifo [hpos 0.5–0.75] 0.21
petenuga [hpos 0.5–0.75] 0.25
gafizuru [width 0.25–0.5] 0.24
vavuvosi [width 0.5–0.75] 0.27
radude [width 0.5–0.75] 0.30
wofetizo [width 0.75–1.0] 0.42
wetami [height 0.75–1.0] 0.40
donadewe [height 0.5–0.75] 0.41
turede [area 0.0–0.25] 0.26
likiwewe [area 0.0–0.5] 0.27
savifo [area 0.25–0.5] 0.21
rapoguwe [area 0.5–0.75] 0.22
texiraxi [area 0.5–1.0] 0.31
kodawika [GREY 0.5–0.75] 0.23
togixa [GREY 0.5–0.75] 0.45
So all the mechanisms proposed earlier do what they are supposed to do, even when
we scale up the population. The Discrimination Game generates the repertoire of dis-
tinctions necessary in this domain, the Naming Game generates the shared repertoire of
form-meaning pairs. The coupling between the two based on feedback from the environ-
ment causes a convergence even if the agents do not have any direct knowledge about
which meanings are used by the others.
6.4.2 Lexicon acquisition by new agents
We finally scale up on the same dimension but now towards an open population. The
following simulation examines what happens when a new agent enters into the popula-
tion. The agent has no prior ontology nor any knowledge of the existing lexicon in the
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group and no additional components or processes are added, compared to the agents in
the simulation so far. Introducing a new agent tests in how far the cognitive architecture
put in place enables a new agent to acquire a lexicon that already exists.
The first words learned (after about a dozen games by the agent) are shown in Ta-
ble 6.18.
Table 6.18: First words after about a dozen games.
Word Meaning Score
larubo [hpos 0.0–0.5] 0.30
sakezomo [hpos 0.0–0.5] 0.00
tituroxu [hpos 0.5–1.0] 0.50
tokadapa [vpos 0.5–1.0] 0.20
legoka [height 0.0–0.5] 0.30
kuvodogi [width 0.0–0.5] 0.00
gafizuru [width 0.25–0.5] 0.10
nopofi [width 0.5–1.0] 0.00
As expected, the new agent sometimes creates newwords (this is the case for sakezomo
and nopofi). But these words are very short-lived. The new agent has already picked up
larubo which is the word in use expressing the meaning of sakezomo. larubo has already
a higher score so sakezomo will definitely disappear.
The most widespread words in the lexicon such as tituroxu or legoka are the ones that
are most likely to be picked up because the chance that they will be heard is higher. This
suggests that the entry of new agents in the population does not destabilise the lexicon
but on the contrary it makes it more coherent 1
For example, the new agent has solidly associated the word texiraxi with [height 0.5–
1.0] and wixizode with [area 0.5–1.0] as the majority of the population. Thus resolving
the incoherence shown in Figure 6.20.
Notice also that the new agent first acquires words for the more abstract categories.
This is the case because (1) the discrimination trees are still developing and so more spe-
cific categories are not yet available, and (2) even if more specific categories are available,
agents do not try to be more specific than needed in the game.
Table 6.19 is the set of words of the new agent with scores above 0.4 after 500 total
games (which means more or less 100 games in which the new agent was involved).
The agent clearly picks up the lexicon circulating in the population and generally
associates the same meanings to the words (compare with the lexicons given earlier for
the total population). Occasionally there are still incoherences. For example, fumetese
1 The importance of a flux in the agent population for streamlining a language has been stressed by Simon




Table 6.19: Score of new agent after 500 games.
Word Meaning Score
texiraxi [height 0.5–1.0] 0.80
lepowaxu [height 0.25–0.5] 0.50
kewenoku [GREY 0.5–1.0] 0.80
wixizode [area 0.5–1.0] 1.00
vuwusugu [GREY 0.0–0.5] 0.50
tokadapa [vpos 0.5–1.0] 1.00
tituroxu [hpos 0.5–1.0] 1.00
legoka [height 0.0–0.5] 1.00
larubo [hpos 0.0–0.5] 1.00
fumetese [width 0.0–0.5] 0.40
has been associated with [width 0.0–0.5] whereas the rest of the population uses this
word for a distinction on the vpos-channel. The meaning of this word will later shift
as the agent encounters disambiguating cases. We can conclude that the guessing game
shows not only how a population may emerge a lexicon from scratch but also how new
agents entering the group may acquire the existing lexicon.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has coupled the Discrimination Game and the Naming Game, so that agents
now can play language games without getting explicit feedback about meanings. As in
the case of humans, feedback only comes through the non-verbal outcome of a game.
This may generate semantic confusion because usually more than one conceptualisation
is possible to distinguish a topic from the other objects in the context. However we have
seen that despite this complication agents still manage to build up an ontology and a
lexicon which is effective for communicating in their environment.
Although this chapter took away the assumption of direct meaning feedback, it still
made a number of simplifying assumptions with respect to real world physical agents, in
particular it assumed that the perception of the scene was identical for the speaker and
the hearer. The next chapter takes away this assumption and thus sets the final step to





Ludwig Wittgenstein went through two major periods in his thinking. During the first
period he worked within the framework of logical empiricism, initiated by Bertrand Rus-
sell and others at the end of the 19th century. The logicist approach defines a language
by listing the elementary building blocks (the words), the combination rules (the syntax),
and a mapping from words and syntactic structures to semantic interpretations (the se-
mantics). It assumes that there is a universal, logical structure to the world which can be
captured once and for all in a non-ambiguous logical language and that the permissible
inferences can be catalogued exhaustively. This project has its roots in the 17th century
dream of Leibniz and Descartes to streamline rational thinking so that it becomes as
clear and non-controversial as numerical calculation. Wittgenstein enthusiastically par-
ticipated in this project, which is still vigorously being pursued today by logicians and
linguists alike, even thoughmany of them do not necessarily subscribe to the universalist
thesis motivating the early developments of logic.1
But some drastic events happened in Wittgenstein’s life which caused a radical shift
in his philosophical orientation. One of them was that he became headmaster of a small
school in the Austrian mountains, without losing his interest for philosophising about
language and meaning. By working with children and by seeing concretely how they
engaged with language, Wittgenstein realised that the logicist approach did not address
some basic questions one can ask about language, particularly how the semantics of
a language might arise, or how people ever develop a shared communication system.
Wittgenstein saw clearly that a language imposes a certain view on the world, which
gives each language its own strength as well as its limitations. The logicist framework
might be ideal as a tool for constructing a post factum formal description of the semantics
of an (ideal) language, just as a structuralist grammar identifies the frozen state of its
syntax, but not for modeling how language achieves its communicative purpose, comes
about, or evolves.
Wittgenstein proposed to study the use of language in terms of games. This notion
captures that the most basic form of language involves a social interaction between in-
dividuals within a specific setting, which acts as a context restricting the possible mean-
ings. The interaction is played out along a conventionalised set of rules, as is chess or any
other game. The notion of a game captures that a language interaction has a purpose, for
example, to identify an object in a context, to gather information, to transmit emotion,
to try and invoke an action by another person, etc. Words get their meaning as part of a
language game. Language is a tool fully integrated in the rest of human social activity.2
It should be abundantly clear by now that the mechanisms explored in this book are
1 Wittgenstein’s main work from this period is Wittgenstein (1922). A prototypical example of the logicist
research program is found in Carnap (1928).
2 See in particular Wittgenstein (1953).
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strongly indebted to a Wittgensteinian point of view. Of course, we studied only one
relatively simple language game, but we have explored it at great depth so that there is
now a framework for studying language games with the same rigor as the framework of
classical logic or structural syntax.3
We are also exploring many issues that were not raised by Wittgenstein, the most
important one being the origins of words and meanings and how they may spread in a
population. In this chapter, I set the ultimate step on this path, which is to ground the
cognitive architectures of the agents in the world through their perceptual and behav-
ioral apparatus. I will show concrete examples from a series of language games played
by autonomous robotic agents perceiving real world scenes and we will see that very
similar phenomena as the ones observed in the previous chapter emerge.
The second goal of this chapter is to study the semiotic dynamics that thus unfolds
in the population. Already in the beginning of this book, I introduced the notion of
a semiotic square, which captures the relation between a referent, a perceived image,
a meaning, and a form. The collection of semiotic squares that can be observed in an
agent’s behavior or in the behavior of a group of agents forms a semiotic landscape. This
landscape undergoes continuous change as new words are created, word-meaning rela-
tions shift, andmeanings are applied to new referents. This chapter introduces additional
tools to study this dynamics, focusing in particular on how synonymy and ambiguity get
introduced or damped and how language influences the conceptualisation of reality.
7.1 A first grounding experiment
We have arrived at a point where experiments with physically embodied autonomous
agents become conceivable. To do so, we first have to ground the language game, which
means that we have to couple the conceptual layer to the sensory-motor layers of the
agent.
7.1.1 Integrating perception and action
The coupling between the perceptual layer and the conceptual layer is from an archi-
tectural viewpoint very similar to the coupling of the conceptual layer and the lexical
layer which we studied in the previous chapter. For the formulation of an utterance,
the outputs of the perceptual layer are inputs to the conceptual layer which in turn pro-
vides inputs to the lexical layer (Figure 7.1). Just as the other layers, the perceptual layer
generates a set of possibilities: a set of possible segmentations and a set of sensory char-
acteristics about each segment. These possibilities are ranked based on various criteria
such as saliency and made available to the conceptual layer which further expands on
the best solutions. The conceptual layer in turn generates a set of possible solutions
with different rankings which are then processed by the lexical layer. Re-entry is nec-
3 There have been several attempts to develop a more formal investigation of language games, see one of the
earliest efforts in Hintikka (1998).
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essary because the final perception of the scene depends on the ontological and lexical
repertoires of the agent and cannot be decided on the basis of sensory processing alone.
re-entry 
re-entry 
outputs =  
  inputs 
outputs 
Conceptual layer  
Lexical layer  
re-entry 
inputs 
Perceptual layer  
outputs =  
  inputs 
Figure 7.1: Flow of solutions through the different cognitive layers when an utterance
is being produced. Re-entry is necessary because the decision at each layer
depends on decisions at subsequent layers.
For the interpretation of an utterance, the main flow of information goes in the other
direction. The lexical layer sends a variety of hypotheses to the conceptual layer and
the conceptual layer makes use of data from the perceptual layer to see which concep-
tualisation yields a referent. Several solutions are considered by the conceptual layer
because words are typically ambiguous and so the perceptual layer must produce the
appropriate segmentations and sensory characteristics to test each solution. Even if a
sensory channel was not considered to be very salient by the hearer, it may have been
used by the speaker in his conceptualisation of the scene and hence the hearer’s per-
ceptual processes must actively try to seek in the image the information required to see
whether it is applicable to the specific context. The interpretation of an utterance thus
strongly takes the real world context into account. The utterance literally influences the
way the hearer sees the world. The two-way flow (from perception to conceptualisation
and language and from language and conceptualisation to perception) resolves one of
the paradoxes of meaning discussed in Chapter 4. The clear picture of reality that we
consciously experience results from a dynamical process in which local constraints keep
propagating until a globally coherent solution emerges.4
Grounding language games in the real world not only requires a link between con-
ceptualisation and real world perception. Of equal importance is the physical actions
undertaken by the agents to point to the object they believe to be the topic. The accu-
racy of pointing heavily influences overall communicative success. Indeed, a game may
4 Dynamical systems which enter into an attractor based on a similar relaxation process have been widely
studied, particularly in physics. One of the prototypical examples is a spin glass whose magnetic states
keep switching until a globally coherent state is reached.
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fail not because the speaker and the hearer did not agree on the meaning nor because
they did not refer to the same object, but because the speaker misperceived which object
the hearer has pointed to. These differences in perception leading to difficulties in com-
munication do happen and may cause communicative failures despite a shared lexicon.
7.1.2 Concept acquisition
I now show a series of example games taken from an experiment in which two situated
embodied agents, a1 and a2, play grounded language games based on coloured figures
pasted on the white board in front of them. The following channels are available to the
agents in the experiments in this section: hpos (the horizontal position of the midpoint
of the segment’s bounding box), vpos (the vertical position of the midpoint of the seg-
ment’s bounding box), height (the height of the bounding box), width (the width of
the bounding box), area (the area of the segment, calculated by counting the number
of pixels that belong to it), r (the average redness of the pixels in the segment), g (the
average greenness of the pixels in the segment), b (the average blueness of the pixels
in the segment). These “colour” channels are not to be confused with the human oppo-
nent colour channels so the distinctions that form of them are not directly perceivable
by human observers.
Because there are only two agents, the risk of synonymy is almost non-existent. The
saliency threshold is sufficiently low so that more than one sensory channel might be
salient and hence ambiguity is unavoidable.
A first word is acquired by the agents in game 3 based on the segmented images shown
in Figure 7.2 (top). The different sensory values (after sensor-scaling) for the segments
in game 3 are shown in Table 7.1.
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Figure 7.2: Three examples of segmented images. The topic is indicated by a dashed
bounding box in the image of the speaker. Segments which are too small
are ignored. The topics have all been conceptualised as being ‘to the right’
and so the same word gofubo has been used to refer to them.
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hpos is the most salient channel. After sensor-scaling, the two values for hpos are
still be drawn further apart with 1.0 for object-0 and 0.0 for object-1 so that the category
[hpos 0.5–1.0] easily distinguishes the topic (object-0) from object-1.
The left image is that of the hearer a1, the right one that of the speaker, a2. a2 had
already invented the word gofubo for [hpos 0.5–1.0] (to the right) in an earlier game, but
the word was not acquired in that game by a1 because he still missed the appropriate
distinction. Meanwhile the hpos category is available to a1 due to an expansion of his
discrimination networks and so he can store the word:
Game 3
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
object-0 object-1
a2 chooses object-0 as the topic
a2 categorises the topic as [HPOS 0.5–1.0]
a2 says: gofubo
a1 does not know gofubo
a1 says: gofubo?
a2 points to object-0
a1 categorises the topic as [HPOS 0.5–1.0]
a1 stores gofubo as [HPOS 0.5–1.0]
This game proceeds essentially like in the computer simulations studied before. The
major difference is that now real images have been used, the objects considered are the
outcome of segmentation processes, the sensory characteristics have been derived from
the image itself, and the pointing has been done by physically moving the cameras.
7.1.3 Generalisation without learning
Immediately the agents apply this word to very different scenes, such as the ones in
Figure 7.2 (middle and bottom). The middle picture shows on the left the segmented
scene from the speaker in game 5, and on the right the one from the hearer. In game
5, the figures are blue rectangles. They are much further apart than the two circles in
game 3. Nevertheless, after scaling, they are categorised and conceptualised similarly
and therefore the same word could be used effectively. The concept of [hpos 0.5–1.0]
and hence the word gofubo is general from the very start. The agents do not need to
see many examples because they do not use inductive generalisation. Instead, the hpos
category is constructed in a top-down fashion as soon as the hpos channel has been
salient and is immediately available for use in the discrimination game and hence in
verbalising the scene. This explains why the word-meaning acquisition process observed
in the experiments goes so amazingly fast.
The bottom of Figure 7.2 shows yet another scene where the word gofubo was used
with success. The topic is the rightmost shape in the scene and so [hpos 0.5–1.0] is once
more distinctive. To an outside observer it may look like the agents have performed a
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gigantic inductive leap, but this is not the case at all. The agents do not try to abstract the
commonalities from different examples but construct distinctions in a top down fashion
and try to apply them to the perceived image.
After a mere 50 games, the lexicon shown in Table 7.2 has emerged. Only associations
with scores greater than 0.0 are shown.
Table 7.2: First words after about a dozen games.
Word Meaning Translation a1 a2
wawosido [hpos 0.0–0.5] left 0.4 0.4
meluri [hpos 0.25–0.5] medium left 0.1 0.0
gofubo [hpos 0.5–1.0] right 1.0 1.0
wiwigapo [vpos 0.0–0.5] left 0.1 0.0
fozumoba [area 0.5–1.0] large 0.0 0.1
wefoto [r 0.0–0.5] low redness 0.2 0.2
togene [r 0.5–1.0] high redness 0.5 1.0
fumudanu [g 0.0–0.5] low greenness 0.2 0.2
puxedu [g 0.5–1.0] high greenness 0.4 0.4
There is already a word (gofubo) which has a score of 1.0! After 100 games, the lexicon
has become more solid and now looks as in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Population lexicon after 100 games.
Word Meaning Translation a1 a2
wawosido [hpos 0.0–0.5] left 0.7 0.5
meluri [hpos 0.25–0.5] medium left 0.4 0.4
gofubo [hpos 0.5–1.0] right 1.0 1.0
vokomutu [hpos 0.5–0.75] medium right 0.2 0.2
buwonipo [hpos 0.75–0.875] strongly right 0.1 0.0
wiwigapo [vpos 0.0–0.5] down 0.6 0.6
fozumoba [area 0.5–1.0] large 0.2 0.4
wefoto [r 0.0–0.5] low redness 0.2 0.3
togene [r 0.5–1.0] high redness 1.0 1.0
fumudanu [g 0.0–0.5] low greenness 0.7 0.7
puxedu [g 0.5–1.0] high greenness 0.7 0.9
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Figure 7.3: The discrimination trees of two embodied agents a1 (left) and a2 (right) after
playing 100 games (top) and after 200 games (bottom).
7.1.4 The influence of the environment
One thing is striking about this lexicon. It contains words for fine-grained distinctions
along the horizontal position axis, but none for width or height. Indeed if we look at
the discrimination trees as they exist at this point (figure 7.3 top) we see that there are
no discrimination trees for the height and width channels. This is entirely due to the
environment. There have simply been no situations on the white board yet where these
distinctions are salient enough.
As human experimenters, we can stimulate conceptual development by configuring
scenes where these channels are needed, for example, a scene which contains two ob-
jects with the same size, colour, and position but of significantly different width. The
conceptual layer in each agent should then start to develop again and the lexical layer
should follow with the construction of new words.
A game where this happens is game 126 with the segmented images shown in Fig-
ure 7.4 (top). Width is now the most salient channel. The segments and sensory data for
game 126 (after sensor-scaling) are shown in Table 7.4.
Clearly width is the most salient channel for the speaker. It is therefore chosen and
because the agents have already grown distinctions on this channel, discrimination suc-
ceeds and a new word can be constructed and stored.
Game 126
a2 is the speaker. a1 is the hearer.
a2 segments the context into 2 objects:
object-0 object-1
a2 chooses object-0 as the topic
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Figure 7.4: Top and bottom: Examples of new segmented scenes that stimulate concep-
tual development and hence expansions of the lexicon. The most salient char-
acteristic in the top scene is width and in the bottom scene height.












a2 categorises the topic as [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]
a2 creates a new word: vaviwumu
a2 says: vaviwumu
a1 does not know vaviwumu
a1 says: vaviwumu?
a2 points to object-0
a1 categorises the topic as [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]
a1 stores vaviwumu as [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]
Figure 7.4 (bottom) contains another example of segmented images which have stimu-
lated conceptual growth and hence an expansion of the lexicon. In this case, categorisa-
tions on the height channel are relevant and a word developed for tall.
Figure 7.5 shows another series of image segments, where categorisations based on the
area channel were effective and Figure 7.6 shows additional image segments exercising
vpos, hpos and colour distinctions.
After 200 games, the lexicon of the population looks as in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Population lexicon after 200 games.
Word Meaning Translation a1 a2
wawosido [hpos 0.0–0.5] left 0.9 0.4
gixepo [hpos 0.0–0.25] very left 0.4 0.4
wonuxa [hpos 0.0–0.25] very left 0.10 0.0
meluri [hpos 0.25–0.5] medium left 0.4 0.4
gofubo [hpos 0.5–1.0] right 1.0 1.0
vokomutu [hpos 0.5–0.75] medium right 0.4 0.4
buwonipo [hpos 0.75–0.875] strongly right 0.1 0.0
wiwigapo [vpos 0.0–0.5] down 0.5 0.4
putuwenu [vpos 0.5–1.0] up 0.5 0.5
vaviwumu [width 0.5–1.0] wide 0.5 0.5
pesidumu [area 0.0–0.5] small 0.2 0.2
fozumoba [area 0.5–1.0] large 1.0 1.0
wefoto [r 0.0–0.5] low redness 0.2 0.1
togene [r 0.5–1.0] high redness 0.9 1.0
fumudanu [g 0.0–0.5] low greenness 0.7 0.9
puxedu [g 0.5–1.0] high greenness 0.9 0.9
Note that new words have come into the lexicon for ‘up’ (putuwenu), ‘down’ (wi-
wigapo), and ‘wide’ (vaviwumu). The discrimination trees of the width and height
channel have started to expand (Figure 7.3 bottom).
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Figure 7.5: Segmented images where distinctions on the area channel have been used.
The topic (with dashed bounding box) in the two top cases has been cate-
gorised as large. In the bottom case, a word meaning ‘small’ was used.
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Figure 7.6: The image segments from the top game require distinctions on the vpos chan-
nel and caused the creation of a word for ‘upper’. The image segments in the
middle led to the use of refined distinctions on the hpos channel, so as to
identify the middle square. The topic in the image segments at the bottom
was done with a conjunction of categories: blue and tall.
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7.1.5 Coping with perceptual anomalies
Grounding language games in physical environments makes it obviously harder for the
agents in a number of respects. First of all because perception and segmentation may
differ, the salient characteristics of objects may not be the same and as a result the hearer
may guess another meaning for an unknown word, compared to the one used by the
speaker. This happens for example in the following game (game 128) which is based on
the segmented images shown in Figure 7.7 (top). The speaker’s perception is shown to
the left and the hearer’s to the right.
Game 128
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 3 objects:
object-0 object-1 object-2
a1 chooses object-0 as the topic
a1 categorises the topic as
[HPOS 0.0–0.25] [HPOS 0.0–0.125]
a1 creates a new word: ‘bagaxe’ for [HPOS 0.0–0.25]
a1 says: bagaxe
a2 does not know bagaxe
a2 says: bagaxe?
a1 points to object-0
a2 categorises the topic as [AREA 0.5–1.0]
a2 stores bagaxe as [AREA 0.5–1.0]
Although the difference may not appear significant to the human eye, the topic (the
leftmost rectangle) is in the raw perception of the speaker less wide as the same rectangle
perceived by the hearer. The segments and sensory data of the speaker in game 128 (after
sensor-scaling) are shown in the Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Sensory data for game 128.
channel obj-0 obj-1 obj-2
hpos 0.03 0.15 0.33
vpos 0.29 0.29 0.01
height 0.37 0.39 0.07
width 0.10 0.08 0.27
area 0.29 0.22 0.16
R 0.95 0.97 0.97
G 0.33 0.40 0.93
B 0.35 0.44 0.26
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Figure 7.7: Examples of scenes causing confusion due to perceptual anomalies. In the top
scene, the segmentation of the speaker (left) makes the topic’s most salient
characteristic the horizontal position, whereas for the hearer (right) the most
salient characteristic of the same segment is its area. In the bottom scene,
speaker and hearer have segmented the scene into two, respectively three
segments. This causes the game to fail even though both agents had the same
meaning for the word used by the speaker.
Context-scaling further amplifies this difference which shows that it is not always
beneficial to do so. a1 uses the horizontal axis, creating a newword bagaxemeaning ‘very
left’ [hpos 0.0–0.25] whereas a2, for whom the area is the most salient characteristic,
associates this word with [area 0.5–1.0] (large). This example shows that grounding
introduces additional risks for the introduction of semantic incoherence in a group’s
lexicon.
Due to perceptual anomalies, a game may fail even though both agents already have
the same meaning for the same word. This happens when this meaning yields different
objects (or no objects at all) for the speaker and the hearer. As a consequence, the hearer
adopts another meaning for the word which starts to compete with the one he already
had. This happened in the following game (game 127) based on the segmented images
shown in Figure 7.7 (bottom). The speaker (left image) has identified only two objects,
but the hearer three. The speaker (left image) uses green as distinguishing characteristic
which is indeed appropriate. but because the hearer’s third object (the top rectangle) is
also green, this distinction fails for him. Even though the hearer had already a well estab-
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lished meaning for puxedu, he associates a new meaning based on the width-channel
with this word because this channel is now the most salient.
Game 127
a1 is the speaker. a2 is the hearer.
a1 segments the context into 2 objects:
s-object-0 s-object-1
a1 chooses object-0 as the topic
a1 considers as salient G R AREA HPOS
a1 categorises the topic as
[HPOS 0.0–0.5] [HPOS 0.0–0.125]
[AREA 0.0–0.5] [R 0.0–0.5] [G 0.5–1.0]
a1 has the words
puxedu for [G 0.5–1.0] (1.0)
wawosido for [HPOS 0.0–0.5] (0.7)
pesidimu for [AREA 0.0–0.5] (0.2)
wefoto for [R 0.0–0.5] (0.2)
buwonipo for [G 0.5–1.0] (0.0)
a1 says: puxedu
a2 segments the context into 3 objects:
h-object-0 h-object-1 h-object-2
a2 interprets puxedu as
[G 0.5–1.0] (0.20)
a2 identifies h-object-0 h-object-1
a2 says: puxedu?
a1 points to s-object-0
a2 categorises the topic as [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]
a2 stores puxedu as [WIDTH 0.5–1.0]
After 500 games, the lexicon is as in Table 7.7.
The global evolution of success and ontology is shown in the graph in Figure 7.8. The
graph is not fundamentally different from the ones we have seen in the computer simu-
lations in the previous chapter, except that more failures occur after a lexicon is estab-
lished due to the contingencies of real world images and the unavoidable stochasticity
associated with physical interactions.
So despite the difficulties caused by perceptual anomalies and errors in non-verbal real-
world interaction, the mechanisms used by the agents appear sufficiently robust that a
shared communication system manages to get off the ground. We have been able to take
away all the scaffolds put up in earlier chapters and the complete language system now
stands on its own feet. Of course we now need to further scale up the challenge to the
agents, particularly along three dimensions: complexity of the environments, complexity
of the sensori-motor apparatus (particularly the number of sensory channels available to
the agents), and size of the agent population. Only the latter type of scale-up is studied
in the remainder of this chapter.
181
7 Grounding
Table 7.7: Population lexicon after 500 games.
Word Meaning Translation a1 a2
wawosido [hpos 0.0–0.5] left 0.9 0.4
gixepo [hpos 0.0–0.25] very left 0.4 0.4
wonuxa [hpos 0.0–0.25] very left 0.10 0.0
meluri [hpos 0.25–0.5] medium left 0.4 0.4
gofubo [hpos 0.5–1.0] right 1.0 1.0
vokomutu [hpos 0.5–0.75] medium right 0.4 0.4
buwonipo [hpos 0.75–0.875] strongly right 0.1 0.0
wiwigapo [vpos 0.0–0.5] down 0.5 0.4
putuwenu [vpos 0.5–1.0] up 0.5 0.5
vaviwumu [width 0.5–1.0] wide 0.5 0.5
pesidumu [area 0.0–0.5] small 0.2 0.2
fozumoba [area 0.5–1.0] large 1.0 1.0
wefoto [r 0.0–0.5] low redness 0.2 0.1
togene [r 0.5–1.0] high redness 0.9 1.0
fumudanu [g 0.0–0.5] low greenness 0.7 0.9
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Figure 7.8: Success (left y-axis) and average ontology size (right y-axis) for two agents
playing 500 guessing games about real world scenes perceived through their





Semiotic dynamics refers to the changing relationships between words, meanings, per-
ceptions, and real world scenes observedwhile a group of autonomous distributed agents
play language games about scenes from an open evolving environment. The possible ut-
terances and possible meanings are not fixed but continuously changing as the agents au-
tonomously evolve their communication systems and adapt to changing environments.
Tracking and understanding these changes is a non-trivial task. It is comparable to the
investigation of other non-linear complex dynamical systems and therefore similar tools
are useful.5 The study of semiotic dynamics is an entirely new subject for linguistics, and
I will give here only some examples to illustrate the approach.
7.2.1 Tracking language evolution
The first thing we need is a systematic way to collect data. In studying the lexical and
ontological development of the agents, I have so far played god, inspecting the internal
states of the agents. With larger agent populations that are travelling over the Internet
and engage in interactions in different physical sites, it becomes impossible to perform
these computations, because ontologies and lexicons are distributed over many agent
servers throughout the world and different language games are going on in parallel. We
are forced in these circumstances to adopt the viewpoint of a linguist, who can only
observe the overt linguistic behavior in the community, not the internal states of each
individual. So we have built tools that track the language games as they take place in
parallel on a world-wide scale. The tools are available to anyone who logs on through
the Internet and wants to see for him or herself how the language system is evolving.6
Of course, an external observer’s point of view is only partial. As we have seen in the
previous chapters, many words and categories are latently known by the agents, without
their being used in overt behavior, just as we carry genes in our bodies that are not being
expressed. Nevertheless, observations of the actual behavior of the agents is in a sense a
more natural way to characterise ontologies and lexicons and reflects well the semiotic
dynamics in the population. For the remainder of this chapter, all data are taken from
observing experiments with the Talking Heads as they play grounded language games.
7.2.2 Semiotic landscapes
A semiotic landscape contains all the semiotic relationships that effectively occurred
at least once in the games played by a particular population of agents during a certain
period of time. The semiotic landscape is a graph. The nodes in the graph are formed
by situations (referents in a specific context), meanings, and forms (words), and there
are links if the items associated with two nodes indeed co-occur (Figure 7.9). In a more
5 See Badii & Politi (1997). Examples of ways to model evolutionary systems are shown in Kauffman (1993)
and Maynard Smith (1989).
6 Thewebsite http://talking-heads.csl.sony.fr/ contains the latest statistics on this world-wide evolution. The









Figure 7.9: Typical segment of a semiotic landscape capturing the co-occurrence rela-
tions between referents, meanings and word forms. The FM/MF relations are
in thick lines, the RM/MR relations in regular lines, and the RF/FR relations
in dashed lines.
complete picture, the landscape makes a distinction between external referents and seg-
mented images but I will not do so in the present chapter. The relations in the landscape
are labeled as in Table 7.8.
The partial landscape in Figure 7.9 (taken from an actual experiment) contains an exam-
ple where the agents use two possible meanings for conceptualising situation2, namely
[gray 0.0–0.25] (very light) and [hpos 0.5–0.75] (medium right ). The words katapu and
tisame lexicalise [gray 0.0–0.25] andwobo and tisame [hpos 0.5–0.75]. Eachmeaning has
therefore two synonyms and tisame is ambiguous; it can mean both [gray 0.0–0.25] and
[hpos 0.5–0.75]. Three words are used to communicate the situation: ‘katapu’, ‘tisame’,
and ‘wobo’. Such a structure is typical for grounded lexicon evolution and complexity
rapidly increases when the same meanings are used to communicate about other situa-
tions (which is obviously very common and indeed desirable).
Table 7.8:
Label Relation
RM referent to meaning
MR meaning to referent
FM form to meaning
MF meaning to form
RF referent to form




The degree of coherence of a language system can be studied by collecting data on the
frequency of the members of each relation in the semiotic landscape for given periods
of time (for example periods of 100 games). The result is represented in competition
diagrams, such as the RF-diagram in figure 7.10 taken from actual experiments. It plots
the evolution of the frequency of the referent-form relations for a given referent. In other
words, all games during a certain period are collected where this particular situation (i.e.
a specific referent in the same context) occurred and then the frequencies of all words
used to refer to this referent in the same series of games are computed. Similar diagrams
can be constructed for the other semiotic relationships. The FR-diagram plots all the
referents for a given form, the MF-diagram all the forms for a given meaning, the FM-
diagram all the meanings for a given form, the MR-diagram all the referents for a given

















Figure 7.10: This RF-diagram shows the frequency of all forms used for the same referent
in 3000 language games, played by a group of 20 embodied situated agents.
The RF-diagram in Figure 7.10 shows the frequency with which certain words were
used to communicate a particular situation. We see that in the beginning the word ‘de-
sepu’ has been dominant, then there is a period of turbulence in which different words
compete, but after a while a new word va wins the competition and becomes the dom-
inant way to communicate about this situation. Figure 7.11 shows another competition
diagram plotting the evolution of the FM-relation, for the word form va, in other words
the frequencies of all the meanings that co-occurred with the word va. We see an early
peak when va was used in 70 % of the games with the meaning [b 0.3125–0.375], i.e. a
particular shade of blue. Then there is a struggle during which additional distinctions (on


























[BLUE - 0.3125, 0.375]
[VPOS -0.25,0.5]
[RED - 0, 0.125]
[RED - 0, 0.125]
[BLUE - 0.3125, 0.375]
Figure 7.11: This FM-diagram shows the frequencies of each form-meaning pair with the
form equal to va in a series of 5000 games. A disambiguating situation occurs
in game 3000 causing the loss of one meaning of va.
These competition diagrams are an important tool to try and make sense of the onto-
logical and lexical evolution taking place in evolving groups of agents as they are playing
their language games. Typically we pick a dominating word, for example the word va
in Figure 7.10, and try to understand why it has become dominant. The FM-diagram for
va (Figure 7.11) explains part of the story. Three stable meanings for va have emerged
at around 1000 games: [r 0.0–0.125], [b 0.3125–0.375], and [vpos 0.25–0.5]. They are all
equally adequate for distinguishing the object va designates, and there are no situations
yet that would have forced the disambiguation of va. In game 3000, the environment
(which is continuously changing in this experiment) produces a scene in which a cate-
gory which was distinctive for the object designated by va is no longer distinctive. The
lexicon adapts immediately. Around game 3000 the vpos-based meaning disappears, and
the distinction based on red shoots up and becomes dominant.
7.2.4 RMF coherence
The average frequency of the dominating relations along a particular semiotic dimension
is an indication how coherent the community’s language system is along that dimension.
For example, suppose we want to know the coherence along the meaning-form dimen-
sion, in other words whether there are many synonyms in the lexicon or not. For a given
series of games, we calculate for each meaning that was indeed used in the series, the
frequency of the most common form for that meaning. Then we take the average of
these frequencies and this represents the MF-coherence. If all meanings had only one
form, the MF-coherence is equal to 1.0. If two forms where used for the same meaning
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with equal frequency, MF-coherence is 0.5. When plotting the MF-coherence we can
therefore follow the tendency towards an increase or decrease of synonyms.
Examining the coherence along the other dimensions is equally instructive. Studying
the coherence along the FM dimension informs us about the degree of ambiguity in the
lexicon, because it is based on the average frequency of the preferred meaning for each
word. When all word forms have only one meaning, the FM-coherence is 1.0. The more
the forms in a language have different meanings with non-zero frequencies, the lower
the FM-coherence becomes.
The coherence along the RM dimension informs us about how many possible concep-
tualisations of the same situation are used by the population. If RM-coherence is high,
this means that the population has uniform conceptualisations. For every referent, all
agents typically use the same meaning. Usually there are initially many possible ways
to conceptualise a scene, but there is a tendency for agents to view the world in a similar
way under the influence of language because the scores of the discrimination trees are
affected by success of a distinction in language games. I will discuss this in more detail
in the final section of this chapter.
The inverse relation (MR, between meanings and referents) tracks the frequency with
which certain situations are covered by specific meanings. It informs us about the gen-
erality of the categories available to the agents, assuming that all agents statistically
encounter the same sort of environments. If a particular meaning can pick out many
possible referents in many contexts, this meaning must be abstract and the agents must
have managed to develop a lexicon that is not tied up completely to specific situations.
7.3 The ideal language
Complex adaptive systems show a tendency to optimise their internal functioning de-
spite the absence of a global overall control center. For example, each species in a sin-
gle ecology tends to become better in exploiting its niche and the global system moves
towards a balanced equilibrium where different species play different roles in a com-
plex ecological web.7 This book explores the idea that language is a complex adaptive
system like a natural ecology, which is shaped and reshaped by the local interactions
of autonomous agents without a central controlling agency regulating what linguistic
conventions should be adopted. We have seen that in computer simulations and exper-
iments with robotic agents a shared communication system emerges, but in how far is
this system optimal?8
7.3.1 Total coherence
A first desirable property of a language system is perhaps that it is totally coherent along
all semiotic dimensions. In terms of semiotic landscapes, this means that the graph con-
sists of unconnected triangles. Each object in a specific context has a unique meaning,
7 See examples in Margulis (1991).
8 See for the discussion on whether languages ever can be said to optimise: Kirby (1999).
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each meaning has a unique form and picks out a unique referent, and each form has a
unique meaning and hence a unique referent as well. The coherence along all possible di-
mensions is then always 1.0. Given such a system, the agents would not need to consider
different hypotheses while speaking or listening, there would never be any confusion,
and a new agent learning the language would never be confronted with different uses
of the same word.
Such an ideal language has been a dream of many philosophers, including Descartes
and Leibniz, but the investigations reported here show clearly that it is not attainable.9 A
language must be open to the expression of new meanings because the communicative
objectives and the environments which are the subject of communication keep changing.
Hence synonymy (incoherence along the MF dimension) is unavoidable because words
are created by some agents not knowing that words already exist in the population for
the same meaning. In addition, one agent may “wrongly” infer that a certain word has
a particular meaning due to perceptual anomalies, even though the same word had al-
ready another meaning in the lexicon. Word-meaning pairs that thus arise may start to
propagate in the population and actually supersede the “original” word-meaning pairs.
Ambiguity (incoherence along the FM dimension) is unavoidable as well for similar
reasons. The same situation can often be conceptualised in more than one way and so an
agent guessing the meaning of an unknown word or trying to make sense of a word in a
particular context may easily derive another meaning than the one used by the speaker.
Perceptual anomalies further aggravate the risk that a certain form becomes associated
with another meaning by the hearer, as we have seen in some grounded example games
earlier on.
Different conceptualisations of the world (incoherence along the RM and MR dimen-
sions) are even harder to avoid because every agent develops its own ontologies inde-
pendently and without any direct feedback from the other agents. The ideal language
system is not only impossible to attain for autonomous agents engaged in grounded lan-
guage games, it would be very inefficient to store and use as well because new words
and meanings would be required for every new situation ever encountered. The larger
the lexicon, the harder the task of a language learner to acquire it. So there is a trade off
between coherence and expressibility. This is why natural languages constantly try to
recruit existing words to keep down the repertoire of forms that have to be stored and
hence learned.
7.3.2 Communicative success despite incoherence
A grounded language system cannot be fully coherent. This implies that communication
among autonomous embodied agents can only work if their internal architectures are
capable to handle incoherence. Of course, incoherence may not necessarily impinge
on communicative success. Alternative conceptualisations may be compatible with the
same situations. Agents may not even realise that their language systems are different
because even though their words have different meanings these meanings may always
pick out the same topic. Thus the RMF-landscape in Figure 7.9 leads to total success for
communicating situation2. Even if a speaker uses ‘tisame’ to mean [gray-0.0,0.25] and
9 The history of this search for such an ideal language is discussed by Eco (1997).
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the hearer understands ‘tisame’ to mean [hpos-0.5,0.75], they still have communicative
success. The goal of the language game is to find the referent. It does not matter whether
the meanings are the same. The agents cannot even know which meaning the other one
uses because they have no access to each other’s internal states.
The architecture of the agents in the Talking Heads experiment has been carefully de-
signed so that incoherence can be handled. The context is at every level strongly taken
into account. When producing an utterance, the meaning of a word is partly determined
by whether that meaning makes sense in the specific context of the language game. This
makes it possible to handle ambiguity. To handle synonymy, agents store several words
in their lexicons so that they can understand more words than the ones they prefer them-
selves. Agents maintain different ways to conceptualise reality so that they can apply
conceptualisations used by others even though they would not prefer these themselves.
The agents behave in their own selfish interest to maximise success in the game. They
increase the score of the word-meaning pairs that yielded success and decrease those
that resulted in failure so that next time around they are more likely to use that word-
meaning pair. But a side effect of this behavior is that synonymy and ambiguity get
damped. Success depends on use in the rest of the population. The more agents use a
word, the more it will have success, the higher the scores will be, and the more it will
be used. The global effect is that the language becomes more coherent without a central
coordinator.
7.4 Damping synonymy and ambiguity
To conclude this chapter, I now discuss in more detail an example of this kind of semi-
otic dynamics as gleaned from an actual experiment with twenty Talking Heads, taking
turns to materialise themselves in two robotic bodies at a single physical site. The agents
have only R, G, B, and gray-scale channels. This case study illustrates how the tools intro-
duced in the previous section help us to make sense of the very complex lexical evolution
spontaneously arising in the system. We have set up the experiment in such a way that
the agents first see a limited set of objects. Then we have progressively added new situ-
ations to the environment (by pasting new figures on the white board or reconfiguring
existing figures) and studied the impact on the lexicons and ontologies of the agents.10
Figure 7.12 plots the global result of the experiment for 35,000 games. It shows the pro-
gressive increase in environmental complexity (after every 5000 games) and the average
communicative and discriminative success in the game. During the final 15,000 games,
no new objects were introduced.
We see clearly that the agents manage to bootstrap a successful lexicon from scratch
in the first 1000 games. Success then drops every time the environment increases in
complexity but regains as the agents invent new words or create new meanings. Pro-
gressively it is less and less difficult to handle increased environmental complexity be-































































Figure 7.12: The graph shows the communicative and discriminatory success for a series
of 35000 language games played by a group of 20 Talking Heads. The envi-
ronment has progressively been made more complex.
cause distinctions are already available to cope with the novel situations, words are less
ambiguous, and the lexicon is covering more and more meanings.
7.4.1 The story of fepi
Only looking at macroscopic measures like communicative success hides away the in-
teresting rich lexical dynamics that unfolds in the population. Let me examine just one
word, fepi. By looking at the FR-diagram, we see that this word is used consistently for
identifying two objects (O3 and O5) in a certain set of contexts (Figure 7.13).
We can see the meanings of fepi, by inspecting its FM-diagram (Figure 7.14). The
dominant meaning of fepi is a particular shade of green [g 0.25–0.5]. There are some
other competing meanings (including [gray 0.25–0.3125]) but most of them are hardly
ever used. We observe clearly the tendency for ambiguity to get damped.
What about synonymy? Let us look at the MF-diagram of [g 0.25–0.5], so that we
can see whether there are any other words in use for expressing the same meaning
(Figure 7.15). fepi has indeed emerged as dominant for this meaning, but this has not
been without an intense struggle. The tendency for synonymy to get damped is clearly
present. Even though the lexicon occasionally destabilises, the lateral inhibition and
the positive feedback loop between use and success causes self-organised MF-coherence.
There is however something curious going on. In the early phases xuwas dominant. Why
did it destabilise and how has fepi has managed to become the dominant expression for
[g 0.25–0.5]?
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Figure 7.13: FR-diagram showing the frequencies of the objects referred to by the word








































































Figure 7.15: MF-diagram showing the different words circulating in the population for
expressing the category [g 0.25–0.5]. First xu dominates and then fepi wins
the competition after an intense struggle.
7.4.2 The story of xu
When inspecting in more detail the game traces, we see that fepi is created in game 328
by agent-3, playing the role of speaker, in order to refer to object O3 using the meaning
[g 0.25–0.5]. Agent-19, the hearer in the same game, acquires the same meaning for [g
0.25–0.5]. In one sense, we could say that agent-19 has learned this meaning of fepi from
agent-3 but that is not entirely accurate. Agent-19 has constructed a possible meaning
for fepi and this happened to be the same as the one used by agent-3, but this is partly
accidental. Agents only indirectly learn the language from others. They construct a
language which is compatible with the language used by others. Coherence among the
individual language systems occurs through the positive feedback between language use
and communicative success.
fepi entered into the lexicon to refer to O3, but we see from the RF diagram for O3
(Figure 7.16) that xu was already well established for O3 and initially fepi had no success
at all. So the puzzle is still there, how did fepi manage to overtake xu?
Let us look at the different meanings of xu on a magnified scale by inspecting the
FM-diagram of xu (Figure 7.17). Only the first 10,000 games are shown because after that
xu is no longer used. In the first 5000 games, xu has the same dominant meaning as fepi,
namely [g 0.25–0.5]. There are some other meanings associated with xu, which are all
effective to conceptualise O3.
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Figure 7.17: FM-diagram showing the different meanings of xu. After game 5000, the
meaning of xu becomes unclear and the word falls in disrespute.
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7.4.3 The entry of O3
The mystery is unveiled by looking at what happened when O3, a new object, entered
the environment around game 5000. The word xu now not only picks out O3 in certain
contexts but O5 as well. Hence games where both objects are occurring fail and conse-
quently the association between xu and [g 0.25–0.5] is weakening. Closer examination
reveals that O5’s green value is a bit lower (in the range [0.25,0375]) than that of O3
(which is in the range [0.375,0.5]), so that a more refined distinction on the G-channel is





























Figure 7.18: RF-diagram showing the different words used for O5. Initially a word rimebi
dominates. It destabilises and fepi takes over.
As seen from the RF-diagram in Figure 7.16, xu is no longer used for O3. Instead the
word ‘pasi’ comes to dominate. ‘pasi’ has indeed the more specific meaning [g 0.375–
0.5] which is only applicable to O3, not to O5. At the same time we see from the RF-
diagram for O5 (Figure 7.18) that the word ‘rimebi’ initially dominates for designating
O5. ‘rimebi’ has the more specific meaning [g 0.25–0.375] which is not applicable to O3.
The more general word xu is still useful in some contexts where the refined distinction is
not necessary (for example where either O3 or O5 is present but not both). So we would
expect that xu continues to exist. However this is not the case. xu loses out completely
and its role is taken over by fepi.
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Understanding why this is the case tells us a great detail about the kind of hidden
semiotic dynamics that takes place. xu loses its strength because (1) it fails in games
where its meaning is not distinctive enough so that its score goes down, and (2) because
there are other meanings competing with xu which do not have strong alternatives and
are therefore less prone to failure. This is notably the case for fepi. fepi carries the more
general meaning of green and does not have competitors. It therefore overtakes xu.
This example shows many things. Clearly lexical dynamics can be very complicated,
despite the fact that the underlyingmechanisms are relatively simple. Complexity comes
partly from the complexity of the environment that continues to challenge the agents
with novel , and partly from the internal complexity the semiotic dynamics sponta-
neously generates. There are strong tendencies in the agents’ lexical systems towards
FM and MF coherence, in other words towards shared lexicons. These tendencies are not
due to a central controlling authority which has a global view of the lexicon and dictates
to the agents what they should do but because incoherent form-meaning pairs do not
resist when the environment changes. As we have seen, the word fepi could overtake
xu, because xu had alternative meanings that caused failures in novel situations and fepi
did not. fepi had a higher coherence and therefore survived, even though xu was used
more often but with an ambiguous meaning.
7.5 Rousseau’s paradox
The self-organised coherence of lexicons is an important outcome of the experiments,
but what about the other semiotic dimension, the relation between situations and their
conceptualisation? In how far do the agents use the same conceptualisations of reality
in the same situations (RM-coherence) and in how far do they pick out the same topics
given the same meaning (MR coherence). Many different ways to conceptualise reality
may exist side by side and if each one can be expressed, it would lead to successful
communication. So there is less a clear pressure to make the RM-coherence increase. The
advantage of high RM-coherence is that the agents are more uniform in their behavior,
so that fewer hypotheses need to be considered and the acquisition of the lexicon by
virgin agents is easier.
7.5.1 Universality versus relativism
This raises a fundamental question, which has been heavily debated throughout the his-
tory of philosophy, namely in how far have different languages different ontologies and
in how far does the use of a language influence ontological coherence in a population.
From one point of view, words are seen as labeling existing (innate or learned) categories,
and so the problem of learning a lexicon consists in learning the association between
unknown labels and known internal categories.11 On the other hand, ethnologists and
linguists studying non-European languages almost invariably arrive at the conclusion
11 “The speed and precision of vocabulary acquisition leaves no real alternative to the conclusion that the
child somehow has the concepts prior to experience with language, and is basically learning labels for
concepts that are already part of his or her conceptual apparatus.” p.21. in Chomsky (1987).
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that there are profound differences between languages, not simply in which words they
use but also in which way they conceptualise reality. This implies that there is a kind of
co-evolution between language and meaning.12
Here is a seemingly trivial example of the interaction between language and meaning.
In French, the second singular person pronoun (‘you’) has two forms: ‘tu’ and ‘vous’.
Textbooks say that the first is colloquial and the second form is polite. A speaker is
therefore required to categorise the social relation between himself and the hearer, which
he is not forced to do in English. But polite/colloquial is too simplistic to capture the
underlying usages. The categorisation of the speech situation is quite subtle, possibly
incorporating age differences, professional status, class differences, pragmatic context,
speaking style, etc. Someone learning to speak French must not only learn that ‘you’
has two forms but also what the subtle distinctions are between the situations where
you use one or the other. If you think learning this distinction is difficult, just consider
Japanese, where there are dozens of words for ‘I’, some of them listed in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Words for ‘I’ in Japanese
A Chin As-shi Fu-sho
A-i Da-i-ko A-ta-i Ge-kan
A-ta-ki Ge-se-tsu A-ko Da-ra
A-ta-ku-shi Ge-sho A-re Fu-bin
A-te Gi-ra A-shi Fu-ko-ku
A-ta-shi Go-jin Bo-ku Gu
Here is another example which is more related to the perceptually grounded distinc-
tions we are studying here. To categorise space, a viewer typically imposes a frame of
reference on the scene before him and categorises regions and positions in terms of this
frame of reference. For example, standing in front of a chair we could say in English the
table is to the right of the chair, where to the right of designates an area to the right within
the frame of reference relative to axes emanating from the observer. This seems the most
natural and simplest way to categorise space and it is used by the Talking Heads when
they expand the hpos channel. However, there are quite a few languages which impose
an absolute frame of reference, see Levinson & Wilkins (2006). For example, the Tene-
japans from Chiapas, Mexico speak a Mayan language known as Tzeltal. They live in a
mountaneous region that is generally sloping north-northwest. They use this regional
characteristic to introduce an absolute frame of reference with three distinctions: uphill,
downhill, and across. Standing in front of the chair, they would literally say something
like ‘standing at its uphill chair the table’, in other words, ‘the table is uphill from the
chair’. The spatial categories left, right, front, back, etc. simply do not exist in Tzeltal.
Something that is to the left from the viewpoint of English could be ‘downhill’, ‘uphill’,
or ‘across’ depending on its absolute position. If we want to translate to the left of in
12 The best known representative of this position is Whorf (1956). See for a wider discussion Lee (1996).
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Tzeltal, we first have to conceptualise the global reference frame that is valid in the sit-
uation being described, and only then we can choose whether ‘uphill’, ‘downhill’, or
‘across’ are appropriate translations. It could be argued that these differences are purely
due to differences in lexicalisation. But this is not so. An absolute frame of reference
has not only an impact on language but also deep implications for other cognitive tasks.
Psychologists have invented non-verbal tasks where speakers of Tzeltal make other spa-
tial inferences than Europeans. Ignoring such profound cultural differences is therefore
a sure recipe for disastrous misunderstandings.
The degree of sharing (or non-sharing) of an ontology in a group raises the paradox,
first expressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Language requires a sufficiently shared cat-
egorisation of reality, otherwise no communication is possible. But, if every language
employs its own categorisation (even if there are large overlaps), how is a particular indi-
vidual entering a language community supposed to know the categorisation implicit in
his or her language? It is clear that language helps foster shared meaning because mean-
ing is transmitted through language, for example when a speaker explains the meaning
of aword to a hearer. On the other hand, successful language interaction already requires
at least some shared meaning, how could the system otherwise bootstrap itself? So we
have a chicken and egg situation, a causal circularity that somehow must be broken.
7.5.2 Ontological coherence
The Talking Heads experiment shows a way to resolve this paradox. Different agents
develop their own ontology in a selectionist fashion, using the growth and pruning dy-
namics discussed in Chapter 4. Because there is some randomness in the growth process
and because different agents see different cases in which other channels may be salient,
it is highly unlikely that they all end up with exactly the same set of categories, even
though agents operating in the same environment with a similar sensori-motor appara-
tus will develop similar distinctions.
On the other hand, the coupling between the conceptual and lexical layer discussed
in the previous chapter causes a strong interaction between the two. Those distinctions
whose lexicalisations are themost successful are preferred, and the scores of categorisers
is influenced by the outcome of the games in which they were used. This structural
coupling causes a progressive coordination of the ontology and the lexicon of the agents,
even though ontologies will never be completely identical.
Figure 7.19 shows the result of some experiments focusing on ontological coherence
(i.e. RM-coherence). The agents reach a close to 100 % discriminatory success, and coher-
ence climbs to 75 %. Multiple solutions are possible, and so there is no reason why the
agents would have completely convergent ontologies.
A more fine-grained way to visualise the emerging coherence between the agents’
ontologies is through a coherence web (see Figure 7.20). There is an axis for each agent
as well as a line emanating from the center of the web. Let a1 and a2 be two agents,
then a1’s line intersects with a2’s axis at the level of coherence between a1 and a2. For




































































Figure 7.19: This figure shows the discrimination success as well as the ontological (RM)
coherence for a series of 5000 discrimination games in a group of 10 agents.
axis at point 0.5. The intersection between an agent’s line and its own axis represents the
average coherence of this agent with respect to all the other agents. When there is little
coherence, the lines cluster around the center of the cobweb. As coherence increases,
the lines approach more and more the edges of the diagram. If all lines end up exactly
on the edges, there is complete coherence. Similar coherence webs can be constructed
for the other semiotic relations studied earlier.
The evolution in the coherence webs in Figure 7.20 shows clearly that the agents are
coordinating their ontologies, despite direct feedback about themeaning of a game. Feed-
back only comes from the pointing through the external world. More experiments need
to be done to with more channels so that the set of possible alternative conceptualisa-
tions is sufficiently significant to investigate the co-evolution of language and meaning
more precisely. Nevertheless, the experiments show that ontologies can be coordinated
without needing to be innate.
7.6 Conclusions
The experiments reported in this chapter have demonstrated that the various mecha-
nisms introduced in earlier chapters not only work in computer simulations but also in
experiments with embodied situated agents. The grounding of language games in physi-
cal reality introduces perceptual and behavioral anomalies which may cause failures and
additional ambiguities in the lexical systems of the agents. However the mechanisms in-
troduced before, particularly the forces damping synonymy and ambiguity, still prove
to be adequate to lead the population towards a coherent successful language system.
The lexical and ontological evolution observed even in small populations of agents
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quickly becomes too complicated to investigate by hand. I therefore introduce a number
of tools, such as the semiotic landscape, the coherence diagrams, and the coherence
web. We clearly need more of these tools and we need to study additional properties of






























































Figure 7.20: Coherence diagrams visualising the coherence of ontologies in a group of
10 agents for a series of 1000 discrimination games. Lines emanate from the
center when there is close to 0 % coherence. They approach the edges in the
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The ideas and results that have been discussed in Part I of the present volume were
based on results obtained in idealised conditions. Computer simulations are able to test
the validity of the basic algorithms, but simulations are still theoretical in nature. It is
well known that technologies can only become a reality after experiments have been
carried out in open-ended real world conditions. Nobody would want to fly an airplane
that has only been tested in computer simulations.
We did the same for the Talking Heads experiments and this was a huge step. Many
more people had to get get involved: for making the code more robust, setting up the
teleportation infrastructure, and installing and maintaining the physical installations in
different countries. The mechanisms about language evolution discussed in Part I of
this book did not significantly change. On the contrary, they received solid experimen-
tal confirmation. At the same time, we learned a huge amount about the dependencies
between these mechanisms and the environments in which agents use them. We also
learned a great deal about running software agents in an open infrastructure distributed
over the entire globe. Furthermore we learned a lot about the interaction between hu-
mans and agents ranging from enthusiastic participation and enjoyment to nasty attacks
by English hackers, set on destroying the experiment.
This chapter provides more detail on the first main experiment that took place in the
summer of 1999 as part of the Laboratorium exhibition in Antwerp. The next chapter doc-
uments follow up experiments that took place within the context of the N01SE exhibition
in Cambridge and London and at several other locations.
8.1 The Laboratorium exhibition
The Laboratorium exhibition was a major artistic event in Europe during the summer of
1999 organised by Bruno Verbergt of an organisation called Antwerpen Open. It was one
of the first exhibitions that put so much emphasis on art as a research activity and on
profound interactions between art and science. Participants included both scientists and
science historians such as Peter Galison, Bruno Latour, Israel Rosenfield and Isabelle
Stengers, as well as architects such as Rem Koolhaas and artists with an affinity for
research such as Peter Fischli and David Weiss, Gabriel Orozco, Carsten Höller, Pana-
marenko, Lawrence Weiner and others. The exhibition was visited by 8000 people.
The introduction to the catalog edited by curators Hans Ulrich Obrist and Barbara
Vanderlinden1 stated the objectives as follows:
1 The catalog of the Laboratorium exhibition was published as Obrist & Vanderlinden (1999).
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Laboratorium is an interdisciplinary project in which the scientific laboratory and
the artist’s studio are explored on the basis of their various concepts within the dif-
ferent disciplines. How can we attempt to bridge the gap between the specialized
vocabulary of science, art and the general interest of the audience, between the ex-
pertise of skilled practitioners and the concerns and preconcepts of the interested
audience?
Laboratorium will search the limits and possibilities of the places where know-
ledge and culture are made. Throughout the summer we will establish within the
city of Antwerpen networks, fluctuating between highly specialized work by sci-
entists, artists, dancers, and writers. “Working places” where the participants com-
municate their findings on the “work in progress”. Also the scientific laboratories
in Antwerpen will be involved in the initiative.
Laboratorium started as a discussion that involves questions such as: What is
the meaning of laboratories? What is the meaning of experiments? When do ex-
periments become public and when does the result of an experiment reach public
consensus? Is rendering public what happens inside the laboratory of the scientist
and the studio of the artist a contradiction in terms? These and other questions
are being offered in this interdisciplinary project that starts with the “workplace”
where the artists and the scientists experiment and work freely.
The event was part of the activities, celebrating the famous Antwerp painter Anthony
van Dyck born 400 years earlier. In preparation of the exhibition a series of discussions
were held between Carsten Höller, Bruno Latour, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, Luc Steels and
Barbara Vanderlinden. These discussions helped to shape the general concept of the
exhibition and the selection of the artists and scientists who would participate. Excerpts
appeared in the exhibition catalog and other publication fora, Obrist (2003).
The exhibition took place in two locations: the photography museum in Antwerp,
which was the main location, and an annex occupying several floors in a high rise office
building close to the central station (the so called President’s Building). The Photography
Museum Exhibition featured work by several well known artists, architects and scien-
tists. The annex featured the Talking Heads experiment as well as work by artists Joseph
Grigely and Matt Mullican and science philosopher Isabelle Stengers, who had set up
a reconstruction of Galileo’s famous experiments. There were also a number of public
presentations under the heading “TheTheatre of Proof”, organised by Bruno Latour. The
catalog was designed by Bruce Mau and his team.
In addition to the installation at the exhibition in Antwerp itself, there were two ad-
ditional external sites for the Talking Heads experiment operating within the same time
frame: The Paris site at the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris and the Brussels
site at the Free University (Vrije Universiteit) of Brussels.
Months of preparation and testing took place before we attempted to go “live” and
public. Once this happened, work continued frantically to shake out bugs, get the semi-
otic dynamics right and then maintain the general communication infrastructure and
the ongoing interactions with participants. The fascinating email correspondence (see
section 8.3) shows that most of the difficulties initially came from running the agent
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Figure 8.1: Hans-Ulrich Obrist and Luc Steels during the opening of the Laboratorium
Exhibition in Antwerp, summer 1999.
teleportation infrastructure. The reader has to keep in mind that this was late nineties,
when large-scale uploading and downloading, cloud computing, agent architectures, etc.
were totally in their infancy.
The real heros of the first Talking Heads series were Angus McIntyre, who was the
chief architect of the agent teleportation infrastructure, Fréderic Kaplan, who kept an
eye on the Paris site in particular, Joris Van Looveren, who looked after the Brussels and
Antwerp sites, and Mario Campanella, an aeronautical engineer from Brazil who had
shown up at the last minute to help keep track of the Antwerp installation. I focused
on the overall dynamics of the experiment, which initially was certainly not going the
way it should, and on handling the contact with the exhibition organisers and the press.
Silvere Tajan, Alexis Agahi and Holger Kenn helped to create the telecommunication
infrastructure.
8.2 The installation
The installation in Antwerp was announced as a “Laboratory for Cognitive Robotics
and Teleportation” (Steels 1999). It featured various rooms as shown in the layout in
Figure 8.2. The rooms had different functions:
1. The central room which was visible on entering the space contained the experi-
ment itself, i.e. the two cameras mounted on tripods, the computers driving them,
the screen with geometric figures, and a projection of what went on. The activities
of the agents were audible through a narration.
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2. A reading room contained background philosophical and scientific papers and
excerpts from books about language, meaning and their origins.
3. A user interface room contained a workstation where visitors to the exhibition
could create their own agents, direct them to play games on certain sites, and teach
new words to their agents.
A typical example of the kind of images that the cameras picked up are shown in Fig-
ure 8.4. To play a game, the agent had to find a sufficiently delineated group of objects
and each object had to exceed aminimal size. Initially quite complex configurations were
put on the white board but this made it very difficult for agents to find a coherent group
and to develop good concepts for referring to the topic. The right image in Figure 8.4 pro-
vides clear examples of up, down, left and right, different colors, and also opportunities
to use multiple words (such as red bottom).
A typical example of an interaction is shown in Figure 8.5. The speaker (called “rub-
ber”, an agent created and named by a user) has selected the blue object at the bottom left
of the screen. We see the discrimination trees of the agent at that point and the data for
each of the objects recognised. The coordinates of the respective objects (scaled within







Figure 8.2: Layout of the “Laboratory for Cognitive Robotics and Teleportation” at the
Laboratorium exhibition in Antwerp.
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Figure 8.3: A single Talking Head at the Paris site. In the background we see (bottom)
the display with an image that the agent picked up, (on top of that) a screen
displaying the processed image and the discrimination trees, and to the right
the loudspeaker broadcasting the speech output of the agent.
Figure 8.4: Examples of images picked up by the cameras. The chosen topic was signalled
by drawing a bounding box around it. During experimentation, it was found
that configurations such as in the right image led to more stable performance.
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for the red one, and (0.42, 0.0) for the green one. The values are displayed as hp (horizon-
tal position), vp (vertical position), h (height), w (width), a (area), r (red), g (green), y
(yellow), b (blue), l (lightness). The blue object is chosen as the topic and the value on the
blue channel has the most discriminative power, although there are other possibilities.
There are three competing words for naming blue: Xagadude, Nibidesu, and Tetipi. None
of them have a score higher than 0 and so a random choice of Xagadude is made.
The hearer (called “me”) perceives an image which is slightly different from the one
seen by the speaker. Also the discrimination trees built up so far by this agent are dif-
ferent from the ones used by the speaker. The hearer does not know the word, so the
game fails. After the speaker has then pointed to the topic, the hearer conceptualises
and guesses that the meaning of this word is ‘blue’ because that is also for him the most
discriminating feature of the topic (which has coordinates 0.0, 1.0) compared to the other
objects in the context.
The experiment had also a presence on the web, designed by AngusMcIntyre. Anyone
could log in on the Talking Heads website, create an agent with a given name, and launch
it on a tour of the various physical sites. There was also a forum on which users could
discuss the experiment as it was progressing, a hall of fame for the agents that were the
best communicators, and an overview of the lexicon that had formed so far. The website
allowed inspection of what was happening at each site (Figure 8.6): Users could check
which agents were waiting there to play a game, and what the current game was about.
It also displayed statistics about the communicative success and agent activity at each
site. The site is no longer operational due to changes to the underlying software but
some remnants can be visited here: https://ai.vub.ac.be/talking-heads/
An example of how the web interface displayed a single game is shown in Figure 8.7.
There are two agents: Antonusius is the speaker and Zelebot is the hearer. The green
object has been chosen as topic and correctly recognised by the hearer using the word ka-
zozo. The meaning of the word was not visible through the interface because we wanted
users to learn themselves the language of the agents.
8.3 Start up of the experiment
Once the physical installation at the Antwerp site was completed, work focused on get-
ting the experiment itself up and running. It is interesting and instructive to look at some
snippets of the email correspondence during the first weeks. The despair when trying
to cope with the unavoidable problems but also the excitement as a language began to
emerge shines through. The English humor of Angus McIntyre was a welcome antidote
to all the stress. The correspondence reprinted here is a small selection but also neces-
sary fragmentary because a lot of communication took place face-to-face or through the
telephone, as email was not always possible.
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“xagadude”!Rubber hole!
speaker!
(0.00, 1.00): HP=0.37 VP=0.71 H=0.48 W=0.21 !
   A=0.45 R=0.17 G=0.00 Y=0.00 B=0.39 L=0.28!
(1.00, 0.96): HP=0.70 VP=0.69 H=0.38 W=0.22 !
   A=0.45 R=0.98 G=0.00 Y=0.52 B=0.00 L=0.36!
(0.42, 0.00): HP=0.51 VP=0.31 H=0.21 W=0.51 !
   A=0.70 R=0.00 G=0.99 Y=0.73 B=0.00 L=0.46!
Categorization: ((B 0.25-0.5))!
Words: ((XAGADUDE ((B 0.25-0.5)) 0.00) !
             (NIBIDESU ((B 0.25-0.5)) 0.00) !
             (TETIPI (B 0.25-0.5)) 0.00))!
Choose: ((B 0.25-0.5)) -- (XAGADUDE)!




(1.00,0.96): HP=0.70 VP=0.69 H=0.38 W=0.22  	
 A=0.45 R=1.00 G=0.00 Y=0.50 B=0.00 L=0.32 !
(0.00,1.00): HP=0.45 VP=0.67 H=0.50 W=0.22 	
 A=0.48 R=0.17 G=0.00 Y=0.00 B=0.39 L=0.23 !
(0.42,0.00): HP=0.59 VP=0.25 H=0.23 W=0.54 	
 A=0.77 R=0.00 G=0.77 Y=0.82 B=0.00 L=0.40!
Unknown word. !
New association: (XAGADUDE) + ((B 0.25-0.5))!
Figure 8.5: Top: Source image, conceptualisation, and word choice of the speaker. Bot-
tom: Source image, parsing and interpretation of the hearer.
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Figure 8.6: The Talking Heads website main interface. Users could create and manage
their own agents and inspect what was happening at each site. Here 12 agents
located at the Brussels site are listed.
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Figure 8.7: Example of an interaction that took part in Antwerp. This gamewas a success.
The agents recognised the same set of objects and the meaning of kazozo was
effective in finding the same topic.
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We pick up the email correspondence on June 23, 1999 when the first experiments are
taking place to try and make language games at the three sites possible and allow the
scheduling and activation of agents.
23 June 1999
–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Re: Brussels is back
At 9:04 pm +0200 23.06.99, Joris Van Looveren wrote: >Brussels
is officially back on line. I forgot to make sure that there
>were no agents here before I launched it, so don’t be surprised
if it
>turns out that some agents have suddenly been cloned :)
I don’t think agents can be cloned; ’headnet’ will probably just
say ”Oh, back so soon?” and overwrite existing definitions.
This may lead to inconsistencies if two copies of an agent are
out and about at the same time ...
Brussels is active, which is good. Paris appears to have gone
to sleep, either because the lights are out, or because it’s
past its pre-defined bedtime. Still, the Babel software still
seems to be running with nothing more than the usual email
process errors.
>- The machine is still fast enough to do other work. The only
> thing that is a bit annoying is that it stalls when images
> are being grabbed (read: sent over the bus).
There’s a lot of data moving over a slow line, and evidently the
MacOS is giving it priority to prevent dropped frames when doing
video capture.
>- Since there is no sound, it is blazingly fast compared to
> the Antwerp installation (2-3 games per minute or so)
Speech and camera motion are the big slow downs. This means
that we’re not under a lot of pressure to optimize the agent
code, as the agents can do all their discriminations faster than
we’ll ever be able to drive the cameras (until we try using the
little EVI-G21’s, which only have to move a little CCD unit
rather than a whole camera assembly, and apparently track very
quickly indeed).
I’ve announced the site to a handful of links pages (Peter
Norvig’s AI links collection, Chris Bogart’s Constructed
Languages page, the NASA real robots page - links to all these
sites are under ’background’ on our site). I haven’t yet done a
massive submit of the site to the big search engines or
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announcement sites; I suggest that we let traffic build slowly
so we can find out what we can handle. A
24 June 1999
The (faster) machines that were planned are now available, so that a switch has to be
made while the experiment is already running.
–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: ’headnet’ now running on new PII 400 server.
Silvere and Alexis have installed Linux and the headnet software
on the new 400Mhz Pentium II server, and I’ve done the DNS
switch (and updated /etc/hosts, and csl.zone, and sony.rev, and
sony.zone, and killed half a dozen in.named processes, and
killed squid, and restarted squid, and killed squid, and
restarted squid, and killed squid, and deleted squid’s cache,
and restarted squid, and flushed my Netscape cache, and flushed
everyone else’s Netscape cache, and flushed the Netscape cache
of eight dozen people in Australia who I’ve never met, and
individually inspected and edited every packet on the Internet
to make sure that ’headnet.csl.sony.fr’ now points to the new
box).
The result of this is that ’headnet.csl.sony.fr’ should now get
you the P400 server, and ’headnet-dev.csl.sony.fr’ should get
you the old 200Mhz Vectra, which can be recognised because it
has the words ’test site’ in the banner that appears at the top
of the page.
With luck, the change should be transparent and you shouldn’t
need to do anything. You should however check to make sure that
your agents are going to the right server, however, and that
when your browser looks for ’headnet’, that it gets the correct
machine. If your Babel server accesses ’headnet’ via a cacheing
proxy server, you may also need to ask your sysop to clear the
server’s cache and restart it.
Enjoy A
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–============_-1278188520==_d============
To: Joris Van Looveren <joris@arti.vub.ac.be>
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Re: Brussels 2pm
At 2:00 pm +0200 24.06.99, Joris Van Looveren wrote: >We’re
planing to go to Antwerp in 1 hour. There is no telephone there,
>so we will communicate by email ... We’re thinking of clearing
the
>database around 4 pm. ... do you want to do it from Paris ?
You do it. At 3:55pm, I’ll kick all the agents off ’paris’ and
pause it. When I see headnet has been cleared, I’ll restart
’paris’ and make some new agents.
I’ll upload the changed TH website with the direct links to
’headnet’ at the same time.
A
–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Things to do in Antwerp when you’re head(net) ...
There seems to be some problem with the changeover of the
machines. What’s happened is that the new address for ’headnet’
(193.105.194.10, which is to say the PII 400, rather than
193.105.194.8, which is the Vectra formerly known as ’headnet’
but now represented by an unpronounceable symbol that means
’headnet-dev’) has not yet propagated through the DNS as far as
Belgium.
So Antwerp (yeah! welcome to the net!) is sending its agents to
’headnet-dev’, rather than ’headnet’. There’s no great problem
here as far as testing your installation goes, except that
’paris’ is pointing at the new ’headnet’ and ’brussels’ is
apparently dead, so you won’t be seeing any foreign agents.
In theory, if you reboot, the DNS results cached on the
Macintosh should go away, forcing a re-lookup which ought to get
the correct values. If that doesn’t work, you could try taking
the MacTCP DNR file which lives in the System Folder *out* of
the System Folder and then rebooting. And if that doesn’t work,
we just have to be patient and wait for the changes to propagate.
You could also consider entering the address of ’headnet’ as
dotted IP (193.105.194.10) in the network configuration dialog.
A
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From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Re: Database cleared
At 5:47 pm +0200 24.06.99, Joris Van Looveren wrote: >The
databases have just been cleared. You can create new agents now.
>Brussels might be down for some more time, so check if it’s up
before you
>send any agents there.
OK. I notice there are bugs in the server code which cause it to
generate scads of errors when the database is empty, but those
should clear.
I’ve restarted ’paris’, and I’m now going to make some agents to
send there. Antwerp is showing up on ’headnet’, and the error
messages strewn all over the site should go away when we get
some data into the database.
When it begins to look a little more solid, I’ll upload the
changed pages on ’talking-heads’, and then we’ll really be live.
A
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Re: Webcam
At 6:28 pm +0200 24.06.99, Joris Van Looveren wrote: >The
Antwerp webcam is on-line:
I’ve added a link from the Antwerp page on the main site, and
I’ve also added a link in the descriptive text about the Antwerp
server which appears on the ’server overview’ page.
I actually saw one of you - Fred? - through the Antwerp webcam a
moment ago.
> Also, the Antwerp and Brussels site are up ’permanently’,
> so can send agents to them.
I’ve created a bunch of agents and sent them round the sites.
The server seems to be acquiring consistency.
I’m off home now. If you need me to come back and kick the
server, call me on: +33-1-42-78-xx-xx Bye, A
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25 June 1999
The different sites and the teleportation infrastructure are now running but there are
still basic problems stemming from hardware and software glitches.
–============_-1278188520==_d============
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 1999 05:13:55 EST
From: ”frederic kaplan” <fred@captage.com>
Subject: First night
The talking-heads in Antwerp have passed the night OK... 34
agents 18 users... It goes fast
It seems that Paris and Brussels are not playing anymore ?
Fred.
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Re: Antwerp & Brussels live!
At 10:52 am +0200 25.06.99, Joris Van Looveren wrote: >I got
e-mails from Antwerp and Brussels that they resumed normally
this
>morning. So they both survived their first night on the job!
Paris seems to be still ticking along. One thing I notice is
that it’s quite easy for agents to ’pool’ on one particular
server at the expense of others. The more agents you have on any
one server, the longer it takes for each agent to get through
its assigned 50 games or whatever. So servers with many agents
tend to stay occupied, and others which are waiting to receive
agents can often stand empty waiting for the agents to play out
their games on the crowded servers.
It’s probably a good idea to have a few agents (either the ones
owned by ’adm’ or your own agents) set up to make round trips,
playing five games here, five games there, and so on. Long
routes of small numbers of games rather than short routes
involving many games is probably the way to load balance and
prevent servers drying up.
> ... the database is still accessible through a simple URL,
>without any protection (password). I think since headnet has
gone
>public, it would be a good idea to change this ...
The same idea had occurred to me. I’ll look into that (trans:
I’ll try to find the piece of paper on which I wrote down the
root password to ’headnet’ and, if I find it, I’ll set up an
.htaccess file to keep strangers out).
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I’ve told a few friends of mine about it, and the response so
far has been generally positive, although Sylvia - Luc’s
proofreader - apparently has some reservations about the
usability of the site.
Hmm. News update.
A friend of mine, who shall be nameless, sent down an agent with
route: ’brussels paris antwerp’ As I predicted a few days ago,
this will (and did) cause a LISP-level error.
I patched the route by hand and then made the mistake of trying
to use MCL’s rather flaky ’Restart frame’ option to go on. At
first this seemed to have worked, but about one game later
things went bad and the whole machine locked. One of the three
agents then on the server managed to get out just seconds ahead
of the meltdown, but two more were caught on the server and are
now in limbo. I’ve edited the database for one of them to try to
resurrect it, and if that works, I’ll try to revive the other as
well.
I’ll also write a quick bit of code to do route-checking to try
to make sure that this doesn’t happen again.
A
–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Angus McIntyre <angus@raingod.com>
Subject: The Lazarus Syndrome
When a Babel server falls over and agents get lost, it’s
possible to restore them to life by going onto Headnet’s ’admin’
page and editing the agent’s entry in the ’THAgent’ table.
Basically, if you reset the ’isonserver’ field to 1 (it will be 0
when the agent’s away), the agent should spontaneously reappear
on headnet and then move off to wherever it was meant to go.
There will be inconsistencies in the database - ’headnet’ will
remember all the words that the agent used before the crash, but
the agent’s own memory is reset to what it was when it left
’headnet’ - but with luck they shouldn’t be too serious.
By the way, there’s a bug in the ’headnet’ software with respect
to routes; there’s a finite limit on the field length for the
’route’ field. If you make a route that’s too long, it gets
truncated, so you can have an agent whose route goes:
... paris 10 bruss The agent will complete its games on ’paris’
and then go into stasis waiting for a server called ’bruss’ to
pick it up. A patch for this would probably be nice to have at
some point. A
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–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Holger Kenn <kenn@arti9.vub.ac.be>
Subject: Alpha box in Antwerpen gone...
Hi !
The alpha box in Antwerpen is gone.
Please somebody reboot it ASAP, or we won’t have a connection to
Antwerpen anymore...
Holger p.s.: To reboot: Disconnect Printer. Switch alpha box
off. Switch on again. Wait about 5 Minutes. Reconnect printer.
Holger
28 June 1999
After the basic hardware appeared to be operational, attention turned to the actual be-
havior of the emergent language system. Initial results are not very encouraging.
–============_-1278188520==_d============
From: Luc Steels <steels@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: paris site
I just examined the Paris site a bit. The error rate is
distressing. This is due to many things.
1. The calibration is way off. Even if they get it right,
calibration mixes up completely the game. It is obligatory to
calibrate much better tomorrow morning (can you do this
frederic?)
2. The light conditions were very bad and have been improved a
bit so that patches of white light are no longer seen as objects.
3. The visual situations about which the agents are playing
games are way too complex. Even humans would not be able to play
the game. I simplified enormously. We need to make similar
clear situations AT ALL sites so that the agents can really
learn the very basic concepts first. Also salience might have
to be set lower to have multi-categories and consequently
multi-words (although there is a fundamental bug in the
multi-word thing it seems). Now the agents are making much too
deep discrimination trees because of the confusing nature of the
situation and the errors in pointing. If the top agent only has
20 in the setup because it is pure chance. The fact that success
drops means that self-organisation is NOT taking place.
4. We might have to change the word creation rate to be less
than 1.0. In the present circumstances I believe that every
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agent will make for every node in the tree at very great depth
his own word.
I suggest that tomorrow we go through games with the agents step
by step and fix the environment and the lights, etc. so that the
game is at least feasible; at the moment it is not. The same
exercise will have to be done in Brussels and Antwerp. There is
a question how we can get rid of all the garbage that is being
created right now.
luc
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 13:07:48 +0200
From: Joris Van Looveren <joris@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: Re: paris site
Luc Steels wrote: > 2. The light conditions were very bad and
have been
> improved a bit so that patches of white light are
> no longer seen as objects. The problem is reflections on the
whiteboard. In brussels the lights are covered so that there is
no direct light falling onto the whiteboard. Consequently, it
happens rarely if ever that parts of the background are seen as
objects.
Also, turn on the ’back light’ option of the cameras. This
improves the image quite a bit, especially at lower light
intensities. I’ll try to find out if it can be turned on and off




From: Luc Steels <steels@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: Major error in feedback
Based on the dismissal performance in Paris, we discovered a
major error in the feedback. I suggest that all sites at this
point PAUSE until we fix this and then we update versions on
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29 June 1999
–============_-1278188520==_d============
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 11:38:23 +0200
From: Joris Van Looveren <joris@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: Antwerp OK
Antwerp has not been down, contrary to what the server page
showed. The problem whas that the network was not accessible
any more because the network interface of the alpha machine was
down. This meant that the proxy was not available. According to
Mario, the games have continued, so probably in a couple of
hours when all interactions and agents have been uploaded, the
database will be up to date again.
At this moment, Brussels and Paris have been paused until
further notice. Interactions continue to be uploaded until the
network interface has caught up.
Joris (in Brussels) & Mario (in Antwerp).
–============_-1278188520==_d============
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 16:35:46 +0100
From: Frederic Kaplan <kaplan@csl.sony.fr>
Subject: Patches
Bugs fixed
1. Feedback mechanisms and find-segmented-pointed by the hearer
(this was not working at all...) corrected in:
segment-tools.lsp and th-world.lsp
2. scaling. If a value is higher than the maximum, it gives max
as opposed to 1.0!!! corrected in: geom.lsp
3. Masking. Eliminating zero channels should be done on the
source not on value (= value after scaling, so it is often zero).
corrected in: prototype.lsp (in the functions folder)
After theses patches, sites can be running again.
Fred and Luc.
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–============_-1278188520==_d============
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 23:25:45 +0200 (MET DST)
Subject: There is hope for robokind
After fixes to the Paris site by Frederic and me, I relaunched
some agents. Things are now beginning to work as they should.
We can see the agents quickly build up a successful lexicon.
It is a pity that at the moment one can no longer give more than
20 games (although I can see the goal of getting to a global
coherent lexicon that way). I try to circumvent by immediately
sending them 3 times to Paris but I am not sure this works.
Brussels and Antwerp should wait until all the fixes have been
made before re-entering the network. Frederic and I will send a
mail tomorrow morning. Once the system works, it is quite




Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 11:16:41 +0200 (MET DST)
From: Luc Steels <steels@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: progress
The mails to talking-heads go in a log file and I suggest that
everybody not only sends technical issues but remarks.
The Paris site is really taking off now. A lexicon is beginning
to be in place, mostly focusing on positional information (left,
right, up, down). Because the lexicon is getting established,
it is now easier for new agents to acquire the existing lexicon
and be successful. The agents have less bushy discrimination
trees and fewer but effective words. This was demonstrated by
frederic’s agent (Kant) which quickly came to the top as speaker
after only a few games!
The word ”green” apparently means red. So I am teaching my
agents the word rouge instead of green. It is not yet clear to
me whether you can influence the lexicon once it is already
firmly established.
Later this afternoon we might enrich the agents’ experiences by
changing the environment a bit.
Luc
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–============_-1278188520==_d============
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 17:16:19 +0200
From: Joris Van Looveren <joris@arti.vub.ac.be>
Subject: Re: paris site
Luc Steels wrote: > 4. We might have to change the word
creation rate to be less than
> 1.0. In the present circumstances I believe that every agent
will
> make for every node in the tree at very great depth his own
word.
Don’t do this yet. It will cause the system to crash sooner or
later, as I experienced in Antwerp and Brussels today. The
reason is the method utterance-word-string is not defined on
null-utterances. I’m trying to find out what result this method
should return.
I’ve been in Antwerp today to get it running again and to apply
the patches. It had run well for quite some time when I left,
but something caused it to crash again half an hour later. I’ll
try to fix it tomorrow with Mario, if he has the time to go
there.
Joris.
By mid July, the basic infrastructure, the teleportation mechanisms and the semiotic
dynamics were running smoothly and so the experiment could operate without constant
care.
8.4 Results of the experiment
The first Talking Heads experiment ran for 4 months during the summer of 1999 and
showed the validity of the mechanisms that were used for the agent architecture and
of the interaction patterns and group dynamics of the agents. A shared lexicon and an
underlying conceptual repertoire emerged, enabling successful communication by the
agents about the scenes before them. In total, 400,000 grounded games were played. The
population of agents rose to just under 2000, increasing steadily over the period of the
experiment. Despite the many perturbations due to grounding, intermittent technical
failures, a continuous influx of new agents entering the population, and unpredictable
human interaction, the lexicon was maintained throughout this period.
The rate of communicative success for the first 200,000 games is shown in Figure 8.8.
We see that the success rate is generally between 70 and 80%. There are occasionally
crashes (e.g. around 90,000) caused by problems at a particular site (such as bad light
conditions).
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Figure 8.8: The y-axis shows the average communicative success of agents at each of the
three different sites for a total of 190.000 games shown on the y-axis.
A total of 8000 words and 500 concepts were created by the agents, with a core vocab-
ulary consisting of 100 basic words expressing concepts like up, down, left, right, green,
red, large, small, etc. Of these, 8 words represent a large majority of words used (about
80 %). 4 of these words refer to the position of objects: gorewa (top), down (bottom),
wogglesplat (left), and sesubipu (right). 4 other words refer to colors: rouge (red), ka-
zozo (green), wegirira (blue), and empty (light). The distribution of these words after
130,000 games is shown in Figure 8.9.
Figure 8.10 shows the semiotic dynamics related to an expression of the meaning for
the concept ‘left’, i.e. a horizontal position between 0.0 and 0.25 (after scaling). The word
“wogglesplat” becomes dominant although there is a very strong competition in the be-
ginning. We see that users try to give other words to the samemeaning, such as ”gauche”
or ”links” (both words expressing left in French and German or Dutch respectively). We
also see that other words such as ”red” or ”yellow” get associated with this meaning,
because the hearer may guess the wrong meaning in learning the word for left.
Figure 8.11 shows another example of the semiotic dynamics in the experiment, this
time looking at all the meanings for a particular word, namely droite (meaning ‘to the
right’ in French). This word clearly has been introduced by a human user and the domi-
nating meaning progressively becomes a region (between 0.75 and 1.0) on the horizontal
position, as could be expected. On the way we see some confusion, Specifically there
must be objects that appear both on the right and up (vertical position between 0.5 and
1.0).
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Figure 8.9: Distribution of word use. There are only a fewwords that are dominant. Many
words are short-lived, either because the circumstances in which they fit are
rare or because they do not get settled in the population. Moreover sometimes
users create agents which they do not keep rescheduling for new games.
Figure 8.12 shows different meanings competing for the same word bozopite. Domi-
nant ones are a large area (area scaled between 0.5 and 1.0) or extended width (width
scaled between 0.5 and 1.0). These two concepts apparently could both be applied in
many situations, but at some point new situations appeared that caused a symmetry
breaking and area became dominant.
It was also possible that different meanings which were highly compatible were main-
tained in the population. An example is shown in the form-meaning diagram in Fig-
ure 8.13, which plots the average frequency of meanings for the word down. The mean-
ings are all concepts on the vertical position channel vpos, but they carve out smaller
and smaller regions.
8.5 Conclusions
The Talking Heads experiment was without doubt a success from many angles. The
mechanisms for concept formation, lexicon formation and alignment (as discussed in
Part I of this book) all worked out the way it was expected, even in very difficult ’real
world’ conditions. The complex hardware could be maintained at the different physical





































































































































Figure 8.10: Meaning-Form diagram: Different words for expressing the meaning ’left’,
i.e. horizontal position is less than 0.25 (scaled). New words come up all the
time but there is a clear winner-take-all effect with ”wogglesplat” winning.
despite a significant scale-up. An enthusiastic user group formed and they actively cre-
ated agents and sent them out on the network, often also teaching their agents human
language words which then propagated in the rest of the population. Users became very
attached to their agents, upset when their agents could not get to the sites they had sched-
uled (because it took almost 1 minute for a complete language game and so other agents
had to wait), and trying to figure out how and why they had learned certain words.
Numerous talks were given and various papers published in scientific fora. There were
also various talks within the art context.2 The experiment received wide coverage in the
media thanks to its public exposure as part of amajor exhibition. The Süddeutsche Zeitung
called it “Angels with Internet wings”. All this led to invitations to show the experiment
also in other venues, as discussed in the next chapter. Regrettably, the challenge just
to keep the experiment in the air with the available human resources and the pressure
for going on with new experiments prevented us from doing more adequate data gath-
ering and analysis. Nevertheless some analyses appeared, particularly as carried out by
Frederic Kaplan (Kaplan 2001).
2 Examples are a “gallery talk” as Salon 3 at the Elephant and Castle Centre in London on 2 December 1998,
organised by Hans Ulrich Obrist and Molly Nesbit, and a presentation together with Hans-Ulrich Obrist
and Rem Koolhaas in Antwerp to launch the Laboratorium book on 3 October 2001.
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Figure 8.11: Form-Meaning diagram: Different meanings associated with the word droite.
The dominant meaning is in line with the human use of the word, namely
horizontal position (hpos) to the right of the image.
The field of complex systems science was at that time still in its infancy and adequate
tools for analysing language as a complex adaptive system were in the early stages of
development.
The experiment ended with the following “tongue-in-cheek” post by Angus McIntyre
on the Forum:
1999-10-14 15:08:29 Angus McIntyre
Bad news and good news
As the subject says, we have some bad news and some good news.
First, the bad news. The current run of the Talking Heads
experiment will come to an end on the 5th of November. After
that date, access to the system will be closed off, meaning that
you won’t be able to create, launch or inspect agents any more.
We realise that this will be a sad day for all of you who’ve
participated so enthusiastically in the experiment. We will
consider setting up self-help programs for anyone unable to cope




































ite AREA 0.5 1.0 
WIDTH  0.5 1.0 


























n VPOS 0.5 1.0
VPOS 0.75 1.0
VPOS 0.875 1.0
Figure 8.13: Form-Meaning diagram: Different meanings associated with the word down.
There are in particular two meanings. one is a region on the red-channel and
another one a region on the vertical position channel.
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Now the good news. The Talking Heads *will* be back. We
currently expect to launch an improved version of the system
early in 2000, probably late in January. We shall use the
intervening months to try to make our software faster and more
stable. When the system returns, we should also have some new
sites, both public and private. And we’re thinking about trying
to find ways to make the system more interesting (i.e. by
giving you greater control over your agents and the way that
they learn and interact with other agents).
If you’d like to comment on your experiences with the Talking
Heads, or suggest ways that the system could be improved, this
forum would be a good place to do that. I can’t promise that
we’ll implement all your suggestions (we don’t have very much
time), but all your messages will certainly be read and
considered.
In the meantime, on behalf of all the Talking Heads team, I’d
just like to say ’thank you’ to all of you for taking part and
making the experiment a success.
Angus McIntyre
Agent Public Relations Officer
Here is one commentary of a dedicated user:
1999-10-27 18:52:04 Kampi
RE: Bad news and good news
Are you crazy? Why do you do this at a time where winter with
its long darkness is just ahead. Taking away from me the last
beeings I can realy understand? So, of course I’m very sad about
the bad news. And I insist on a self-help program otherwise I
don’t know what will happen to me. I propose to create some kind
of holiday-camp for my agents which I can run on my computer;
for example with some beach scenery, quiet apartment with TV and
pool and only a little bit of teaching abilities, so that they
don’t become totaly stupid although they will be able to recover
from all these mad and debile cans in Paris, Brussels and Tokio;
please implement the possibility that it’s me who swiches off
the light at night; then, and only then, I can be sure they have
a good time until the restart. But for serious: I hope very
much that the Talking Heads will return as soon as possible.
And I think you should inform those who are interested (me for
example) by e-mail about the re-start. Some wishes for the
improved project: a better performance, especially for the
lexicon. And much, much more information about the scientific
background. How do the agents create their words? Are these
guys on the Web realy part of the ’official’; experiment? Why
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did one of my agents suddenly create a three-part word (was
there a bug in the software, how could it asume, that anyone
would understand this, is it a syntactical genius and therefore
its only natural that noone understands it or is it simply too
stupid to understand the rules of the game? Is it the only agent
who did this, why did it never try this again?... and so on).
Anyway, more explanation for the ’future-heads’; about the
experiment so that I understand why I should teach the agents.
As far as I understood they were created to make sense (develop
language) by their own. Yes, I know, ’stop making sense’;. It’s
their job, not mine. Therefore at least a very big ’thank you;
for having published the ’talking-heads’; on the net.
A very sad user
P.S.: Please send me the holidy camp including 2 single rooms
and my agents caspar and Leyla as a zipped file by e-mail.
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9 The second series (2000–2001)
Shortly after the first Talking Heads exhibition in Antwerp, a new opportunity arose in
2000 to set up and run another large-scale experiment as part of a major exhibition called
N01SE, curated by Adam Lowe and Simon Schaffer in Cambridge and London. This was
potentially a great occasion because the exhibition was about issues of language origins,
coding, replication, and noise. Moreover it would allow the expertise that was built up in
the first experiment to be reused, tested again and hopefully yield more data for analysis.
So two new installations were set up: one in Cambridge and one in London with addi-
tional installations at the VUB Artificial Intelligence Laboratory in Brussels, the Sony
Computer Science Laboratory in Paris and in Tokyo, and at the Intelligent Autonomous
Systems laboratory of the University of Amsterdam (at the initiative of Ben Kröse). Later
on a further opportunity presented itself to add an installation at the Palais de la Décou-
verte, the main science museum of Paris. We also created a mobile version that was
shown temporarily in several locations, as parts of other exhibitions, workshops, and
conferences. All this further expanded the audience. The Paris exhibition alone was
already seen by 300,000 visitors, augmented with hundreds of active participants and
many on-lookers through the Internet.
Although all these installations were very instructive from a technological point of
view, and certainly spread the word, we were reaching a point where it was no longer
of interest from a scientific point of view. The problems of maintaining public sites were
overwhelming our scarce resources and the N01SE experiment was invaded by a group
of hackers intended on its destruction. This episode, discussed in Section 9.2, was more
insightful from the viewpoint of sociology and anthropology than science or engineer-
ing.
9.1 The N01SE exhibition
9.1.1 The exhibition
The N01SE exhibition was about information and transformation. Various locations in
Cambridge (UK) participated: The Kettle’s Yard university gallery, the Cambridge Whip-
ple Museum of the History of Science, the Cambridge University Museum of Archae-
ology and Anthropology and the Fritzwilliam Museum. The installations ran from 22
January until 26 March 2000. There was also a site in London at the Wellcome Trust
Two10 Gallery in Euston Road, which ran from 28 January to 1 May 2000. Apart from
the usual press coverage for art exhibitions, articles appeared in Science1 and the Lancet2
showing that the exhibition resonated also in the scientific press.
1 http://www.firstpulseprojects.com/sciencerev.html
2 http://www.garnettmckeen.net/lancet.html
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Figure 9.1: View through the street window inside the Kettle’s Yard gallery in Cambridge.
The cameras are located before the towers. The geometric figures are attached
to the wall and explanations of the experiment are located on the right.
The N01SE exhibition was curated by Adam Lowe (see Figure 9.2) and Simon Schaffer.
Adam Lowe is an artist and technologist. He is currently the director of Factum arte
(Madrid) which is specialised in making life-like replicas of paintings, sculptures and
archaeological objects, using laser-scanners and 3d printers. Recent realisations include
the sculptures of Giambattista Piranesi (Lowe 2010), the paintings of Caravaggio and the
tomb of Tutankhamun. Simon Schaffer is a science historian, professor at the University
of Cambridge at the department of History and Philosophy of Science. He wrote exten-
sively about the historical developments in scientific research (Schaffer & Shapin 2011)
and animated television and radio programs, including Light Fantastic (BBC4).
The exhibition was announced in the following way by its curators:
A multi-site multimedia exhibition in Cambridge with “realtime” links to London,




N01SE is not limited to electronic media, but traces the digital imagination
from such myths as Noah’s Ark, through the early modern experiments of Charles
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Figure 9.2: Adam Lowe (curator of N01SE) during installation of the Talking Heads ex-
periment at the Wellcome Gallery in London. The backwall contained the
figures. On the right wall, posters were displayed explaining the experiment.
Babbage’s Difference Engine and Morse’s Telegraph, up to today’s charge coupled
devices (CCDs), robotics and beyond …
Displays highlight digitality in history, technology, art and science, drawing
upon a wide range of objects and images from artists and scientists around the
globe – everything from 3000BC artefacts to the latest state-of-the-art pictures of
the surface of atoms.
Not a virtual reality “hall of mirrors”, but a cultural gallery of hard (and fuzzy)
fact.
n01se celebrates theworld as signal-and-noise – the constant simultaneous cre-
ation of content with discontents, as communication society filters “meaningful”
messages from background “babble” . . . and back again. Ingenuity, serendip-
ity and excess all play up the sensory wonderment of N01SE: The Digital and Its
Discontents.
N01SE is news. It’s the nuisance others make, a cacophony which prevents us
being heard, or even thinking. Now the big noise is digital, offering us an escape
from disorder by arranging, preserving and transmitting information. But is the
cloudless noiseless world of digital technology the truth?
N01SE, hazy images and sudden sparks, randommutations and puzzling glitches,
can all become the sources of innovation and beauty.
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N01SE celebrates the essential excess from which information is drawn. It
probes many different ways of seeing and being in the world. Chances are your
own sense of order is already someone else’s N01SE.
9.1.2 Installation at Kettle’s Yard in Cambridge
“The Kettle’s Yard Gallery is associated with Cambridge University. It acted as the main
site of the N01SE exhibition and showed a variety of historical artefacts (including the
brain of Babbage and the original DNA structure built by Watson and Crick) together
with new artistic works. The catalogueue published by the Kettle’s Yard Gallery 3 fea-
tured articles by Brian Smith, Umberto Eco, Bruno Latour, Bruce Sterling, Luc Steels,
Peter Weibel and others. Below is my text as it appeared in the catalogue:
Meanings are not a priori Platonic entities independent of language; meanings are
the result of embodied interactions with the world, obtained via the role words
play in verbal interactions called “language games”. The Talking Heads experi-
ment explores one kind of language game: a guessing game played by two robotic
agents about the scene directly in front of them. One agent acts as Speaker and
attempts to draw the attention of the Hearer to some object by transmitting a ver-
bal description of it; the Speaker succeeds if the Hearer correctly guesses which
object is “meant”.
To play the game, the Speaker segments the scene and performs pattern recog-
nition to extract features – area, shape, colour, position – about the segments se-
lected. The Speaker then conceptualises the focus element “topic” as distinct from
those of other segments - be it the largest or the furthest to the left or the green
one. Next the Speaker verbalises this conceptualisation using descriptive words
selected from its lexicon. The Hearer works the other way around; it queries the
words transmitted by the Speaker and applies the resultant meanings back to the
scene to find what topic the Speaker intended.
To express conceptualisations, agents need a lexicon relating words to mean-
ings. It must function bi-directionally (words-to-meanings and meanings-to-
words); it must also store synonyms (more than one word for the same meaning)
and ambiguities (more than one meaning for the same word). The agents have not
been given a lexicon; they must acquire their own common lexicon as a bi-product
of the game.
New words accrue in two ways: either an agent creates its own new words
from random combinations of syllables; or it stores transmitted words together
with possible-meaning guesses inferred from the scene, then uses a hypothesis-
test strategy to render lexicons mutually compatible. Agents keep a running score
for every word-meaning pair in their lexicon. When word-topic recognition suc-
ceeds the score for that pair goes up, and that of other alternates goes down. This
dynamic forces the lexicon of each individual agent to progressively conform,
3 www.kettlesyard.co.uk/noise
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and keeps it adapting to any language changes or new meanings that need to
be expressed. During the course of the exhibition, a group of robotic agents au-
tonomously constructs a shared language about real world scenes in front of them.
Humans can interact with the installation through the Internet; they can teach
their agents words and follow the general progress towards the construction of
the language.
Intriguing questions: How to bridge the enormous gap between the noisy real
world of images and behaviors, and the discrete digital world of symbols and lan-
guage required for communication and thought? How do language and meaning
originate? Why do languages keep changing so as to adapt to the needs of their
users? How can a language be transmitted between generations without any cen-
tral coordination nor telepathy?
The installation consists of two computer-controlled robotic camera heads that
capture images from “scenes” in front of them consisting of colored geometric
shapes pasted on a magnetic whiteboard. The configurations on the board can be
changed at any time, making the robots’ world unpredictable and open.
Two robotic structures will be active in this exhibition: one at Kettle’s Yard
in Cambridge and another one at the Wellcome Institute in London. along with
additional installations in Brussels, Paris, Tokyo and elsewhere. A website has
also been created for the experiment (http://talking-heads.csl.sony.fr/)4 allowing
anyone to create new agents. People can teach them words, so that elements of
human natural languages can sneak into the emerging vocabulary. The agents are
autonomous and do not necessarily stick to thewords given to them but try tomax-
imally adapt to the behavior of the group and invent their ownwords. Through the
website it is also possible to monitor the progress of the experiment: the lexicon
being created, the success rate, the coherence among the agents, the complexity
of the language, etc. There is a Hall of Fame listing the best speakers and hearers.
This motivates humans to take care of their agents thus ensuring that they move
to the top in the Hall of Fame.
The creation of a shared language by a group of autonomous distributed agents
is extraordinarily difficult because there are many sources of noise, in the form of
disturbances that cause incoherence between the agents:
• Two embodied grounded agents always see the situation fromdifferent points
of view so that they capture different images. Consequently they may have
divergent perceptions and hence great difficulty to arrive at a successful
game.
• The word(s) transmitted may not be accurately produced or received. For
example, one agent may produce ‘wabaku’ but the other agent may hear
‘mabaku’. This introduces noise in the signal itself and hence possibly confu-
sion among the agents.
4 This website is no longer operational but some remnants can be accessed here: https://ai.vub.ac.be/talking-
heads/
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• A scene can usually be conceptualised in many different ways, so that there
is seldom certainty among the agents whether they share the same meaning.
This causes great difficulties in learning the meaning of unknown words.
• The lexicons and conceptual repertoires are never exactly the same as each
agent develops them autonomously. This generates in additional sources of
confusion.
Any theory claiming to explain the origins of word-meaning must confront
the handling of noise head on.
Noise plays yet another role, namely as a motor of language evolution. Indeed
natural lexicons evolve - even if there are already perfectly good words in a lan-
guage. Noise on the word form causes changes in the form which propagate in
the remainder of the population. Misunderstandings may destabilise a word and
cause its meaning to shift.
Another factor in language evolution is due to changes in the environment.
Thus two alternative meanings for a word may be compatible for a while but are
then disambiguated when a series of scenes arises in which the two meanings are
no longer both applicable. For example, all objects may be both green and small
and therefore there may be a word ‘sesubipu’ which may mean both, until a clear
situation arises where a green object is no longer the smallest and a misunder-
standing arises.
Semiotic evolution is continually present. Different meanings for a particular
word will emerge over over a large number of language games. During specific
periods, different words dominate. The word ‘droite’ (originally introduced by a
French speaker) gains the dominant meaning ‘to the right’, then shifts to ‘at the
bottom’, and then to ‘very much to the right’. Particularly the words introduced by
humans have a tendency to undergo this kind of strong evolution because human
users do not know which meanings their agents employ.
How to bridge the enormous gap between the noisy real world of images and
behaviors and the discrete, digital world of symbols and language required for
communication and thought? How do language and meaning originate? How do
languages keep changing yet remain adapted to the needs of their users? How can
a language be transmitted between generations without any central coordination
nor telepathy?
What is most remarkable about this experiment, is that the robotic agents do
not come with pre-programmed ways of conceptualising reality but have to de-
velop their own concepts.
Each agent has been given a mechanism to ‘grow’ new distinctions by expand-
ing discrimination trees. Each tree discretises one sensory dimension. For example,
there is a tree for the area of a segment (scale with respect to the image) which
divides the range of possible values into two discrete regions, which would be
named in English ‘small’ and ‘large’. Other trees focus on position (left versus
right or top versus bottom), shape (rectangular or oval), color, etc. Trees can go
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as deep as necessary to carve out smaller and smaller subregions of a continuous
space.
The nodes of the discrimination trees grow in a random fashion but the dis-
tinctions that are not successful in the game are pruned. This way the conceptual
repertoire of an agent can continue to adapt to the needs of the agent.
How do agents manage to reach coherence in their lexicons without a central
coordinator and despite all these sources of noise? The answer is self-organisation.
Coherence is reached in the same way as an ant society manages to form a coher-
ent path between a food source and the nest, namely by a positive feedback loop.
In this case, there is a positive feedback loop between use and success: The more a
word is successful, the more it is chosen by the agents, and the more success it will
have. This causes the agents to settle in an attractor where they all prefer the same
word for the same meaning and vice-versa. We see a damping of synonymy as in
the case of natural languages. Noise has the beneficial impact of getting agents
out of attractor states (so called local minima) which are not optimal from the
viewpoint of the whole although they are a possible solution.
How do agents manage to share their conceptualisation of the world without
their concepts being innately given (pre-programmed) nor centrally coordinated?
The answer is structural coupling, another concept adopted from biology. Two sys-
tems have a structural coupling if one creates a context for the other and vice-versa,
so that each system develops to be maximally co-ordinated without any prior de-
sign or global control. The conceptual system and the lexicon of each agent is
structurally coupled in the sense that agents prune distinctions that are not suc-
cessful in the language game, and conversely they keep the ones that are useful and
successful. This makes the conceptual system progressively well adapted both to
the scenes encountered by the agents and the lexicons used in the group. Sources
of noise are again beneficial to foster structural coupling. First of all they help
the group to push towards the use of categorisations that are robust against noise.
Second, they help agents to explore alternatives and avoid them getting stuck in
sub-optimal behavior.
A website has been created for the experiment5. Through this site, anybody
who wants can create new agents and follow their progress. Owners of agents can
teach them words, so that words already used in human natural languages sneak
into the emerging vocabulary. The agents are autonomous and do not necessarily
stick to the words given to them but try to maximally adapt to the behavior of
the group and invent their own words. Through the website it is also possible to
monitor the progress of the experiment: the lexicon being created, the success rate,
the coherence among the agents, the complexity of the language, etc. There is a
Hall of Fame listing the best speakers and hearers. This motivates humans to take
care of their agents thus ensuring that they move to the top in the Hall of Fame.
5 http://talking-heads.csl.sony.fr/
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To express a conceptualisation, agents need a lexicon relating words with
meanings. The lexiconmust be consultable in both directions (fromwords tomean-
ings and from meanings to words). It must be able to store synonyms (more than
one word for the same meaning) and ambiguities The agents have not been given
a lexicon a priori. They have to acquire their own lexicon as a side effect of the
game. New words get into a lexicon in two ways: When an agent has no word
to express a particular distinction, the agent can create a new one by a random
combination of syllables. When an agent hears a word that he does not know, he
stores the newword with his own guess of what the meaning could be in the scene
being perceived.
Agents then use a hypothesise-and-test strategy to make their lexicon compat-
ible with the rest of the group. They keep a score for every word-meaning pair
in their lexicon. When a word has success in the game, the score goes up, and
its competitors go down. When the game fails, the score of the used word(s) goes
down. This creates an inhibition-excitation dynamics making the lexicon of the in-
dividual agent progressively conform to the most successful lexicon of the group.
It also ensures that an agent’s lexicon keeps adapting if the language changes or
if new meanings need to be expressed.” (N01SE exhibition catalogue)
9.1.3 Installation at the Wellcome Gallery in London
The second installation during the N01SE exhibition was installed in the Wellcome Gal-
lery in London (see Figure 9.3) from 22 January until 26 March 2000. This gallery is
associated with the Wellcome trust and featured additional art works by Joseph Grigley,
Evgen Bavcar, Manuel Franquelo, Garret and Jones, and Giles Revell. The local curator
Denna Jones described the exhibition as follows:
“Digitality is transforming traditional ways of thinking about the impact of tech-
nology on culture. This exhibition looks at how complex structures can be trans-
formed, translated and transmitted changing the nature of communication. A
multimedia multi-site exhibition, N01SE demonstrates how language and our five
senses can be changed or enhanced through ‘digitality, and introduces visitors to
pioneering developments in cross-disciplinary art and science.”
The installation itself was similar to the one in Cambridge. There was a wall with
geometric figures pasted on it, posters explaining the exhibition, the two pan-tilt cameras
mounted on tripods, and the computers driving the software (see Figure 9.4). The London
site posed particularly hard problems in the alignment of the cameras. It turned out that
a subwaywas passing under the gallery and causing strong vibrations every fewminutes,
which caused the cameras to physically shift on the floor. Because the pointing behaviour
was sensitive to alignment and prior calibration, this led to growing pointing errors and
subsequent errors in feedback, causing a strong decline in the success rate and occasional
chaos in the agents’ vocabularies. This was partially offset by stable conditions in other
sites but nevertheless made the task of reaching coherence virtually impossible.
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Figure 9.3: Catalogue cover and poster of the N01SE exhibition at the Wellcome Gallery
in London.
Figure 9.4: Installation at the Wellcome Gallery in London. Left: Talking Heads cameras
oriented towards the wall on which geometric figures were pasted. Right:
Projection of interaction during ongoing experiment. A game just failed and
the speaker says “no”.
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The exhibition catalogue, assembled by Denna Jones, contained the following text by
Luc Steels:
“The Talking Heads Experiment is a collective effort of members of the Sony Com-
puter Science Laboratory, Paris and VUB Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Brus-
sels, in particular Luc Steels, Frédéric Kaplan, Angus McIntyre, and Johan Van
Looveren. This research has been sponsored by the Sony Computer Science Lab-
oratory in Paris and a GOA grant from the Belgian government to the VUB AI
Lab.
1. How can a cognitive agent bridge the enormous gap between the noisy real
world of images and behaviours and the discrete, digital world of symbols
and language required for communication and thought?
2. How do language and meaning originate? How come languages keep chang-
ing and how do they remain adapted to the needs of their users? How can a
language be transmitted between generations without any central coordina-
tion nor telepathy?
Situated robots and teleports
The installation consists of two robotic heads. These are steerable cameras con-
trolled by a computer that hosts the architecture and knowledge state of each
agent. The robots capture images from scenes in front of them. The scenes consist
of coloured geometrical shapes pasted on a magnetic white board. The configura-
tion on the board can be changed at any time, making the robots’ world unpre-
dictable and open. The robot infrastructure is connected to the Internet, so that
an agent may dematerialise from a body and travel over the internet to another
body in which it can re-materialise. Two robotic structures will be active as part
of the N01SE exhibition: one at Kettles’Yard in Cambridge and another one at the
Wellcome Trust Two10 Gallery in London.
There will be additional installations in Brussels, Paris, Tokyo and other places.
The agent teleporting facility makes it possible to have thousands of robotic agents
and to confront each agent with many different scenes.
Constructing perceptually grounded concepts
What is most remarkable about this experiment is that the robotic agents do not
come with pre-programmed ways of conceptualising reality but have to develop
their own concepts. Each agent has been given a mechanism to ‘grow’ new distinc-
tions by expanding discrimination trees. Each tree discretises one sensory dimen-
sion. For example, there is a tree for the area of a segment which divides the range
of possible values into two discrete regions, which would be named in English
‘small’ and ‘large’. Other trees focus on position (left versus right or top versus
bottom), shape (rectangular or oval), colour, etc.
Trees can go as deep as necessary to carve out smaller and smaller subregions
of a continuous space. The nodes of the discrimination trees grow in a random
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fashion but the distinctions that are no successful in the game are pruned. This
way the conceptual repertoire of an agent can continue to adapt to the needs of
the agent.
Sources of noise
The creation of a shared language by a group of autonomous distributed agents is
extraordinarily difficult because there are many sources of noise, in the form of
disturbances that cause incoherence between the agents:
• Two embodied grounded agents always see the situation fromdifferent points
of view so that they capture different images. Consequently they may have
divergent perceptions and hence great difficulty to arrive at a successful
game.
• The word(s) transmitted may not be accurately produced or received. For
example, one agent may produce ’wabaku’ but the other agent may hear
‘mabakau’. This introduces noise in the signal itself and hence possibly con-
fusion among the agents.
• A scene can usually be conceptualised in many different ways, so that there
is seldom certainty among the agents whether they share the same meaning.
This causes great difficulties in learning the meaning of unknown words.
• The lexicons and conceptual repertoires are never exactly the same due to the
fact that each agent develops them autonomously. This brings in additional
sources of confusion.
Any theory claiming to explain the origins of word meaning must confront the
handling of noise head on.
Cultural evolution
Noise plays yet another role, namely as a motor of language evolution. Indeed
natural lexicons evolve - even if there are already perfectly good words in a lan-
guage. Noise on the word form causes changes in the form which propagate in
the remainder of the population. Misunderstandings may destabilise a word and
cause its meaning to shift.
Another factor in language evolution relates to changes in the environment.
Thus two alternative meanings for a word may be compatible for a while but are
then disambiguated when a series of scenes arises in which the two meanings are
no longer both applicable. For example, all objects may be both green and small
and therefore there may be a word ‘sesubipu’ which may mean both, until a clear
situation arises where a green object is no longer the smallest and a misunder-
standing arises.” (Catalogue N01SE exhibition)
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9.2 Iconoclasm
The second series of TalkingHeads experiments whichwere part of the N01SE exhibition,
featured again a website with which human users could create their own agents, teach
them words by going through images of past games, and send them off on the teleporta-
tion network. In the first series, a large group of users participated, posting enthusiastic
commentaries on the forum, suggesting improvements to the interface, and discussing
possible theories of language evolution. Unfortunately, during the second series, a group
of students mostly from the University of Hull (UK) evolved from enthusiastic and inter-
ested participants into a mob of rude thugs that wanted to destroy the experiment at all
cost, stimulated by local curator Denna Jones and insiders at the Wellcome Gallery, who
apparently were strongly opposed that the N01SE exhibition took place at their location
and somehow had a personal crutch against Adam Lowe, global curator of the N01SE
initiative. This iconoclastic event was (in the year 2000) a forerunner of the damage
that hackers have been inflicting on the web, destroying the spirit of collaboration and
sharing with which the web was founded.
The British hackers realised that they could give dirty names to their agents and, be-
cause they could teach their own agents these words, they could also teach their agents
dirty words for colours, shapes, or any other concept that agents were using. These
words would unavoidably propagate in the population. As these hackers were extremely
active, creating many agents, continuously launching them to different sites, and teach-
ing their agents words, the global vocabulary progressively became unacceptable. The
installations were in public spaces visited by school children, and so concern grew with
the exhibition organisers at other locations (except the London site where those respon-
sable for the exhibition actively encouraged this destructive behaviour). As a response,
the experiment was temporarily halted and provisions put in to avoid that a small group
would have excessive influence. It was still possible to provide a name to your agent and
teach your agents words but some form of decency had to be respected. This change re-
stored order but resulted in an overreaction of the part of the English hacker group who
now used all possible means to attack the Talking Heads servers themselves, encouraged
by Denna Jones and aided by others at the Wellcome Gallery.
This episode showed a phenomenon that a decade later has become very common. The
web is far from an idealistic common ground through which people can exchange ideas
and tools. It brings out the worst in some people, particularly if there is a mob effect
in which different individuals with unstable ethical values push each other to do things
they would otherwise not do.
It is instructive and rather fascinating, particularly from a sociological and anthropo-
logical point of view, to follow the dialog on the Talking Heads Website Forum between
the main protagonists of the story. It went from enthusiastic interaction and experimen-
tation to aggressive and hateful destruction. The misspellings, grammatical errors and




We pick up the dialog on the 25 February 2000. Until that date the forum was very
active both with general discussions about the future of intelligence or the origins of lan-
guage, and with specific questions, mostly why agents were so slow in playing games.
Many users were too impatient and did not seem to realise that playing a language game
could easily take a minute or two. However the major problem was the deviating align-
ment of the cameras, which had to guarantee that there was a common frame of refer-
ence between the agents, and hence the possibility of sharing attention. The cameras
were mounted on tripods. When somebody accidentally moved the tripod, the frame of
reference was no longer exact. As mentioned earlier, traffic (particularly subway traffic
in London) caused vibrations of the cameras so that they kept shifting and getting out
of balance.
A group of University of Hull students (with names like Trash, yeah8a8y, schedski)
became very much involved. They communicated through the Forum using often slang
and sexist language and making a surprising number of spelling errors and grammatical
mistakes. The group had been trying to impose their own language by very actively
teaching their agents and sending them to the same site, namely Paris, which they had
noticed had themost stable operating conditions. Thisworked (as indeed it was supposed
to) at which point they decided to do the same with the London site although the camera
alignment was too unreliable to allow the evolution of a stable language.
2000-02-25 21:37:24 Yeah8a8y
Paris
”Hey there peeps... Thanks to the greatness of yeah8a8y, Paris
has a great success ratio... Oh yeah with a little help from
TRASH.... Ok a lot of help... Heres to Paris!!!
The next server to be conquered is London!!!”
2000-02-25 21:40:13 Yeah8a8y
RE: Paris
And you may notice the succes of a few of our words on the
Lexicon.... God the greatness of a couple of wasters from Hull




”Yeah London being the capital of the greatest country in the
world and currently last in the server league well if we can get
them frogs to say words the brits WILL CONQUER
2000-02-25 21:55:49 Trash
yellow MK 1 ESCORT
Hey mate nice seeing you around paris !!!! Enjoy the company
especially since you know most of our words AND get the Biatches
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right... you can have my sister anyday... so then mate see ya
round keep driving the crap car. Have noticed the absence of
fine ass girls in here am i wrong.... hope soooo.
At this point, they realised that the London alignment was off and this is the first
time that Phlox (as Denna Jones called herself) intervened. She immediately shows a
negative attitude towards the experiment triggered by her personal conflict with Adam
Lowe. Colleagues of hers (fish andA Londoner) respondwith inside joke remarks that the
Hull group does not understand. Fish had been trusted with admin passwords because
he was responsable for maintaining the London site, but he greatly abused this trust as
the experiment proceeded.
2000-02-25 22:02:36 LondonCalling
CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS London
”Can London PLEASE calibrate their cameras???? PLEASE!!!!!
2000-02-26 16:52:32 Yeah8a8y
RE: CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS London
very good.... Absolutely no chance of Domination if the cameras
arn’t calibrated... SORT IT!!
2000-03-02 15:46:50 phlox
RE: CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS
i manage the two10 gallery in which the talking heads display is
currently installed. would that it were so simple to sort it
and keep the cameras correctly calibrated. all equipment was
installed by the brussels group and whenever the cameras need
calibrating - for whatever reason - it means one of the brussels
boffins has to pop over to fix it. they’ve been over once since
the exhibition opened and decided to move the cameras forward 2
feet. not really an exact science is it? the grand master - luc
steels - is coming to the gallery tomorrow, so perhaps he will
enlighten me as to why the cameras seem to need constant
calibration, and i’ll let you know. cheers.
2000-03-02 20:04:52 fish
RE: CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS London
that’s as maybe, phlox, but i’m guessing you secretly come into
the exhibition and kick the cameras when you’re in a bad mood,
like say when someone has been horrid to you.
2000-03-03 20:08:36 schedski





RE: CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS London
come on, admit it, you guys there spend all day stomping around
your exhibits, breaking the displays, unplugging the monitors
and generally mucking things up. i’m surprised london’s still
got two cameras even working and they haven’t already been
flogged down some boozer for a monkey and a couple of jellied
eels
2000-03-07 13:03:46 A Londoner
RE: CALIBratioN OF CAMERAS London
Well, if you people will confuse the poor things with your
outrageous diction, they might know which way to point... One
of them was practically in tears the other day as I watched it
shaking its head in disbelief at the language it was meant to
repeat. What ever happened to ‘Adam’s a cool bloke’?
Meanwhile the Hull group is pursuing and explaining their particular experiment that
they carry out within the Talking Heads framework. The experiment itself is interesting
and shows that they understand what is going on and are creative. Also the overall
dynamics is working. The group realises that a language can form on its own or that
it can be influenced by humans teaching agents their own language. At the same time,
there is already one user (called Cheesy) who is pushing to introduce dirty words to the
agents. He does not belong to the Hull group but is most probably somebody from the
Wellcome Gallery already trying to put the N01SE exhibition in a bad light.
2000-02-25 22:55:28 Norton
Teaching
While participating in this experiment seemed quite interesting
- I’m simply not getting it. When I try to comprehend what is
meant by certain words so that I can teach my agents - I cannot
understand the distinctions made. Does anyone get it?
2000-02-26 16:47:55 Yeah8a8y
RE: teaching
The best thing to do is to leave them for a number of games...
Like the tips say ‘bout 50... then start looking at the words
they use, have to be successful tho’... then teach your other
bots this word for that picture! It is a bit hit and miss tho’
coz a lot of words are ambigious (?Sp) and mean different
things... remeber it is actual properties and not usually
shapes... But you can have success! Check out some of mine and
Trash’s word in the top 20 lexicon,
Hullcitynutter,eightyfiftyone, msixtytwo, wotsit, mamorys
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(Childish I know, but hey I’m a student) and you’ll realise you
can actually do it... Helps if your at Paris tho’!
2000-02-26 20:41:20 Trash
RE: teaching / TRIBES
Basically think about it like this... On the Earth there are
many different languages spoken by people usually in a specific
geographical location. Now myself and yeahbaby looked at this
experiment (as we are very interested in AI and have done much
work in this field) and decided to test the idea of “Tribes”
where all those in that tribe speak the same lingo. We also
figured that tribes rarely move out of their “Birth Location” so
kept them at one site. As can be seen now ALL our Agents speak
the same language and have even taught it to others outside the
Tribe (such as the esteemed Yellow Mk 1 Escort and possibly even
Anne’s little Agent). These agents we considert to be
forreigners!! But stilll they can communicate with our Agents...
If you have noticed our words in the lexicon as explained by
yeahbaby have very few deviations from what was intended unlike
others such as “Gumble” which appears to mean Everything!!!!!
This I do beleave Validates mine and my colleagues (Yeahbaby)
opinion that language can only evolve in the pressence of small
but tightknit communities.
As the next stage we wish to see what happens when 2 “Tribes”
get together Hopefully they become multilingual !!. My theory
is thatconfusion of words will be short lived and all will be
ironed out after only a few games . Especially if the “tribes”
are allowed to consolidate they meanings by once again returning
to their own community with little outside influence....
I am sure you will all agree that personel experiments like
these improve this and we would be interested to hear any
opinion from others ...... are we doing the right thing or just
playing gods etc??? Does this prove evolution as a basis or is
there a need for gods etc....
Also anyone interested in settingg up a tribe PLEASE talk to us
first as we have much experiance in these matters!
2000-02-27 14:39:10 Oisin
RE: teaching / TRIBES
Perhaps tribes could be created by sending agents to a specific
server only eg only paris or only brussels and to see what words
develop at the separate servers then switch after 2,4,6 months
maybe any suggestions?
2000-02-27 19:39:10 Trash
RE: teaching / TRIBES
You mean by not playing god ???? and letting them get on with it
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at one site?? .... well yes but the server would have to be
locked down by that tribe otherwise you would get outside
inflences teaching them stupid like gumble which meanbs
everything... it would probably take just 100-300 games each
agent to develop a usable language (Aslong as the server has no
agents from outside the tribe in there)
By teaching them myslef and Yeahbaby got usable language going
in less than 2 days!!!!!!! Just see the success of most of our
words in the lexicon top 20!!
God us 2 are good!!
2000-02-27 19:39:55 smartypants
RE: Collusion Tribes
I think the theories that are starting to surface is the most
interesting part of the experiment for me. I started ignoring
the ‘teaching’ mails as they seemed concerned with the technical
side but thanks Trash for pointing out you had posted up your
theory (p.s. when you talk about definitions of your words where
are these, or are you just talking about studying the images?).
The bit that I would like more explanation of (’cause
Smartypants is an ironic name) is the bit about the two tribes
coming together, especially as Paris is really the only viable
option at the moment. I noticed that Virtuoso (the only one of
my robots that managed to get into Paris in the last day) was
unranked yesterday, but today has jumped to 140ish as both as
speaker and a hearer - I guess this is because that one ‘tribe’
have been forced to cement that language.
The trouble is, without a good interpreter (us I suppose), won’t
it just cause confusion in our robots when they go and meet the
other ‘dumber’ ones? i.e. they teach the others our words, but
the others teach them the wrong words back as well. This means
you would keep playing several iterations of the games.
My thoughts on collusion were centered around this - we could
reduce the iterations by all agreeing on common words to teach
our robots, thus perpetrating more of the ‘right’ words whilst
eliminating the ‘wrong’ words...
... any thoughts on my incoherent ramblings??
2000-02-27 19:52:20 Trash
RE: Collusion Tribes
At the minute me and Yeah are off the Paris server (we are
regrouping our thoughts for further action!!!) But yes I did
mean view the pictures when i said definition.
By 2 tribes I mean obviously two who have been taught on the same
server. So say that i train my agents on there this week and you
train your tribe next week on the same server with different
words..... when both tribes are capable of good communication we
then take half of each tribe and place them together in the 3rd
week on the Paris server and see if they become multi lingual.
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We then sned these linguists back to their own tribe and see
what happens.
Unfortunately many people have tried to jump on the band wagon
of Paris success and send their Agents there with no idea what
they are doing ... this has meant that we can not get our tribe
to dominate as we would like.....
The problems with organising tribe transfer is immense and it is
a shame people don’t exp[lain what they are doing on this fprum
so that all could help out by say teaching their agents the
words being used or even evacuating a site so that two tribes
can collide ...
It is a real shame that an experiment into AI and Language is
hampered because people are unwilling to communicate with each
other ....
Well I guess that those of us who want a proper experiment
should just ry their best in difficult circumstances...
About the wrong words being taught !!! If your Tribe is more
than 60% of the server then your tribe generallly succeeds in
teaching the “foreigners” with little effect on themselves ...
This has more to do with Probability than anything else.
2000-02-27 20:46:29 smartypants
RE: Collusion Tribes
Thanks Trash. I was thinking in different terms...
... seeing as anyone doing anything is on the Paris server, I
was imagining that as one ‘big’ tribe and that any outsiders
(stuck on the other servers, or new) are the ‘other’ tribes so
thanks for clearing that up for me.
I’d be interested in working with you and Yeahbaby for a more
meaningful experiment, particularly as loads of ‘dumber’ robots
(by that I mean ones not enjoying the Paris success) will soon
be unleashed on us.
Just to clarify, my plan up until now was to let my robots learn
40-50 words (as suggested in the tips), I started to teach them
the most successful words from the lexicon yesterday (most of
which were yours - grrrrrr, jealous!) and then I sent them to
Paris. (This was before I started putting stuff up on the forum
and saw your theory unfortunately).
The only one that got in was Virtuoso, and even then he didn’t
really get to play enough games as I was experimenting to see if
the number of games you choose has any effect on getting into
that server.
Anwyay, let me know if you’re interested (I’ve only created 7 at
the moment).
By the way, do I remember seeing somewhere that you’re both
girls?????
... ‘cause I am...
248
9.2 Iconoclasm
If so it is interesting to see different ways people approach
the experiment. If I was running the experiment I reckon I could
do research from the forum, as well as the actual experiment.
2000-02-28 14:25:01 Yeah8a8y
RE: Collusion Tribes
At the moment it seems I can’t get on the Paris server for love
nor money... Never mind... Anyway Trash has good theories!!!
Two particully good tribes at the minute, which also ‘collided’
( Wait a minute, Frankie goes to Hollywood anyone? ) on the
Paris server are run by me and Trash. There are some other out
there (Cheesy) that are more content teaching obscene word to
their bots. Anyway by both me and him filling up Paris (Max. of
16 agents from 20 at one point) a successful dialect has been
taught between them. We now rank 5 words in top 10, and 9
overall in top 20. Again Trashs theories ring true.
And the bit about words getting taught wrong is more a case of...
well if a french person tuaght you the word for “Tower” and you
where listening to someone who understood french, “Tower” would
be used in the french wording, but you also retain your
interpretation of “Tower” and use this one which you consider
more successful in the speaking sense. This is what happened
with our own “hullcitynutter” and “lafizana”. My agents now
understand both, but only seem to say “hullcitynutter” (Thier
original word, not the learnt one)
This, of course, all goes out the window when you yourself
teachs them... Maybe another bad aspect of this AI programming.
2000-02-28 16:24:47 Yeah8a8y
RE: Collusion Tribes
OK no... I’m no girl!!! But there you go... I’m a bloke
2000-02-28 17:04:23 Yeah8a8y
RE: Collusion Tribes
I’m posed with another problem... As you know Brussels and
Paris have been inactive for a bit... do I keep with the project
and just send the bots out to Paris... or use this as a change
point and educate them in Brussel’s...
I’m going to stay with Paris... Teach other people the use of
the words carefully set out by me and Trash... and generally
gather more success!
I now have 18 bots by the way most are ranked within the top
100.. 1 or 2 exeptions... anyway I have been successful by
sending the all to Paris... for top gamage action
It usaully takes all night but there you go... even the Earth
took an entire week to sculpture.
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To deal with the problem of agent congestion, software issues, and camera misalign-
ment at the London and Cambridge sites, maintenance was carried out which led to a
temporary unavailability of the experiment. Surprisingly, the reaction of the Hull group
was entirely negative as they saw it as a way to prevent them from gaining or keeping
control of the language used by the agents, even though Angus McIntyre clearly and
patiently explained why maintenance was necessary. Also, Denna Jones (Phlox) took it
personally as she did not realise that the calibration errors were due to vibrations caused
by traffic of the London Underground near and under the Wellcome Gallery.
2000-03-01 15:28:10 Angus McIntyre
Performance, problems and fixes
As some of you have noticed, there’ve been some problems with
this round of the Talking Heads experiment. For one thing,
success rates have generally been very low, because the language
has never properly stabilised. For another, a large backlog of
agents has built up, and there have been considerable delays in
getting certain agents to and from servers.
We are aware of these problems, and are actively working on
fixing them. Part of the problem is that the Talking Heads has
been a victim of its own success - lots of people participating
enthusiastically makes for lots of agents, with new ones being
added every day. Moreover, the Talking Heads is a ‘real world’
experiment, with real physical moving parts (the cameras) which
means that each game takes a certain and non-trivial amount of
time. These are just two reasons why things may sometimes move
slowly in the world of the Talking Heads.
Problems have also been caused by the cameras losing calibration
(that evil ‘real world’ strikes again), so that our agents
sometimes seem to be looking at entirely different parts of the
scene, something which is bound to cause problems. Last but not
least, there turn out to have been some bugs in our software,
particularly in the area of learning. The good news is that
we’ve identified a number of things that may have an impact on
success, and are currently busy fixing them.
We’re about to start applying some fixes and making some changes
to the way things work. We hope that there will be minimal
disruption, but it’s possible that the system may be a bit
‘up-and-down’ over the next few days. We may also start imposing
more limits, for instance on the number of agents that each user
can make, and on the number of agents that can land on a site at
any one time. (When I talk about ‘imposing’ limits, I don’t
mean that we’re going to hunt you down and kill you if you make
too many agents, but we might ask you politely to be a little




We hope that once we’ve made the changes, things should start to
work better. In the meantime, we’d just like to apologise for
any frustration or inconvenience, and to thank you all for
taking part in the experiment.
Angus McIntyre Talking Heads Current Affairs Correspondent
2000-03-01 16:29:54 Trash
RE: Performance, problems and fixes
Hi Angus, (Are you Threatening me ??? Bunghole!!!! ..... I am
Cornholio)
Ok I take the limited number of agents business is directed
against my plans for world domination.... Well then its a
fight!!! lol...
Yeah take your point but just trying to create order out of
anarchy.... strange really when i is an anarchist at heart...
At last you is taking an interest in sorting out the
problems/cheats used by people like me to pervert the way the
system is run. Well in the best style of Hull University’s
Electronic Engineering Department you stop the cheats and I’ll
create new ones!!... only kidding mate ... but world domination
is mine...
One request though is if you could have many smaller servers ....
I’m sure this would speed up the learning process.....
May i suggest waterpistols at dawn for the fight???
Bungholio....
Laters mate..
P.S What do the scots know about language??!!!???
2000-03-01 16:09:48 Marvin
Reduced server list
I notice that only Brussels and Paris are now on the server list.
Has Cambridge been removed all together ???
I see there have been problems, but reducing the number of
server’s down to just two, increases the load. Could you not
just add more server’s, and spread the load around ?
So far I have two agents, waiting since 23rd Feb to get into
Brussels.”
2000-03-02 22:21:25 Angus McIntyre
RE: Reduced server list
Cambridge and London have been temporarily taken offline because
of problems with the alignment of their cameras. If the cameras
drift too far out of alignment, the agents end up looking at
totally different things, making it impossible for them to agree
on a topic of conversation. Under such circumstances, a
language can’t form and any agent that ends up on such a site
will come away deeply confused. While it’s true that taking
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sites offline throws a greater load on the remaining sites, in
this case it seemed like the lesser of two evils.
We hope to restore service on these sites within the next few
days, and to take steps to prevent a recurrence of the problem.
We are looking into the possibility of adding some more sites to
the network, but this depends not just on the availability of
equipment but also on finding generous, public-spirited people
who are prepared to find space to set up a Talking Heads
installation and devote some of their time to keeping it running
smoothly. We do have a few candidates in mind, however (some of
whom don’t even yet know that they’re candidates, he said with a
sinister laugh.)
Angus McIntyre
Talking Heads Junior Camera Joggler
2000-03-03 13:46:06 phlox
RE: Reduced server list
so just how do you think the cameras “drift out of alignment”?
and what steps do you plan to take to prevent recurrence? ask me
to place a cctv camera watching your cameras so we can see what
naughty person is touching them?? slap my wrists for not
maintaining proper control in the gallery? hmmmm?? (ps - see my
posting yesterday in response to yeah8a8y and london calling’s
messages of 25th and 26th)
2000-03-07 00:56:52 Martin
Nowhere to launch!!!
All my agents are at home and I can launch them...nowhere!!!!!
2000-03-07 13:30:22 Yeah8a8y
RE: Nowhere to launch!!!
Doh!!!... What do you think it says on the server page?
”Due to essential maintance the interactive part of the site
will be turned off”
Hence no launching of agents...
2000-03-07 15:08:20 phlox
RE: Nowhere to launch!!!
cant you play nice? do you have to be rude to everyone on the
site?
2000-03-07 16:32:44 Yeah8a8y
RE: Nowhere to launch!!!
Yeah... shitface...
Nah anyway... I was pointing out the obvious!!!
How is that message rude???





Resident Hull Uni director of derogatory comments
The fact that servers went offline was partly a technical matter, because a new site
was being linked in from Amsterdam. But this was seen once more as a negative action
and it triggered a call to start introducing foul languages both by giving names to agents
and teaching obscene words.
2000-03-07 20:44:09 Oisin
RE: Nowhere to launch!!!
I agree, our poor agents have no swearwords how arn the
procrastinate against the stupider agents. TEACH YOUR AGENTS
SWEARWORDS NOW!!!!!!!!
2000-03-07 22:10:09 Yeah8a8y
RE: Nowhere to launch!!!
All hail “cheesyslurpscum”!!! Very good aimed at the
cheesymeister himself... “hullsuckx” indeed!!!
Chris
Resident Hull Uni director of Poonani
Once the site came on-line, we began to remove the swearwords based on complaints
from the public sites where the experiment was shown (in particular from Cambridge).
This was the chance for Denna Jones (alias phlox) to stimulate attacks on the experi-
ment’s servers by playing on the sentiment of the players that there was a higher au-
thority impinging on their freedom. The Hull hackers then started to divert the php
script of the agents so that they could reschedule agents, encouraged by fish who had
admin rights to the London site. However they became suspicious of fish (who also had
created an agent with the name Francis Crick) because they realised he had these ad-
min rights and therefore should (normally) have been part of the crew that maintained




new agents cant be launched because all sites are in the process
of being “flushed’ by angus, luc steels et al of the non-lexicon
made up words and theyre now busy re-installing their master
lexicon. this is the real reason no one can launch new agents
from any of the sites. so what is the point of this game? if
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players cant create their own language - and we can only use the
master lexicon - why bother??
2000-03-08 13:39:58 Yeah8a8y
Bahhh‼!
Well if I can’t play fair I just might as well tip the board
over eh?
If this is the only way they can stabilise AI, I feel sorry for
the poor fools that buy a Cyberdog... It’ll be in and out of the
repair shop more times then a real dog shits in the street!!!
So the big brass can’t play eh? Well there’s me thinking this
was a valid experiement... Yaknow, God playing and that shite...
Well, I’ll be going now!!!
Chris
Resident Hull Uni’s deluded scientist”
2000-03-08 14:53:31 Trash
RE: this is rigged
Who can’t get in to servers ?? There are ways around everything.
2000-03-08 14:57:22 phlox
RE: this is rigged
good. well see to it you stop the powers that be from trying to
regulate the game.
2000-03-08 15:23:06 TRASH!!!!!
RE: this is rigged
My good friend ... who you all know has got into this piece of —
and made it so we (Me and him) can still launch!!! look for us
on the servers and also nice bots called nice things about
Angus...
Thats what Mr Scotish bloke gets from messing with a person who
has developed his skills instead of working at this esteemed
UNI....
Hull remains the forefront of Electronic skill....
Angus and his fellow friends at sony... your good kid but while
ever the hull crew is i town you’ll always be number 2
As i write this I beleave that sony will once again allow us to
launch in the conventional way ... we shall see Until then just
watch the best at work
2000-03-08 15:33:00 fish
RE: Hull5 Sony 0
big hand to the hull boys. you may be a bit sensitive to
personal insults but atleast you can kick ass when it needs
it.....




RE: Hull5 Sony 0
glad to see someones stopping sony’s ethnic cleansing of our
bots. excellent.
2000-03-08 15:51:52 Yeah8a8y
In t’ kingdon of t’ blind, t’ 1-eyed man is king
Thanks Fish, been rumbled by Francis Crick tho’... I think he
has administrative capabilities... either
that or he’s another of us here HACKDEMONS.... HAHAHAHA
Chris
Resident Hull Uni worshipper of all thing Satanic and Electronic
2000-03-08 15:54:17 phlox
RE: In t’ kingdon of t’ blind, t’ 1-eyed man is ki
i know who francis crick is. and as he’s good mates with luc and
angus - they probably gave him admin rights. believe me, he’s
no hackdemon . . . .
2000-03-08 16:01:19 Trash
Ahhh thats why!!
Oh nice to see that ... I thought that you just hated asomeone
caled adam wasn’t aware that adam IS A CUNT... may have to
reopinionate myself with you ... nice on efella you deserve
respect
Hull Uni Coordionator of Total System Breakdown
The story continues as the Hull hackers entice Denna Jones (Phlox) to stand in front
of one of the talking heads cameras so that they could see her. She actually does, to great
acclaim of the hackers – who seem surprised she is a woman. Denna Jones keeps further
encouraging the Hull hackers. And from here on, the tone gets increasingly aggressive
as loopholes are closed to prevent manipulation of the experiment and attacks on the
servers. There are again suspicions against fish who clearly has access from the inside
using a password only given to trusted collaborators but which he abuses for destroying
the experiment. The group is also now beginning to communicate directly instead of
through the Forum associated with the Talking Heads website.
2000-03-08 17:23:07 Trash
Phloxy Lady
Hey ahhhhhhhhhhhhhh stop the loving start the warring
trash
Dropouts Director of Assault Forces Against Sony Talking Heads
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2000-03-08 17:31:27 phlox
RE: Phloxy Lady
too right. do it.
2000-03-08 20:50:28 fish
RE: OK try not to :)
now, i dont think it is angus mucking us all around - it’s not
his style. it’s far more likely to be someone else who’s maybe a
bit annoyed at having agents being taught certain words....?
2000-03-08 21:03:19 Trash
who is on whos side??
Just a question how you met angus, adam and clive????
Second ques... How you get on?? do you do it the same way as
us???
(Please email fire-for-effect@hotmail.com with this one!!)
Finally to get straight to the point are you one of them??? dun
dun dungggggggggggggg
Trash (Hull Uni’s Commander of Conspiracy Theories)”
2000-03-08 23:14:10 fish
RE: who is on whos side??
i am most definitely NOT one of them!
2000-03-09 14:26:15 fish
We are continuing to test software fixes...
”yeah, right, and i’m a jelly called Tracy why dont you just
admit that you’re trying to censor the site and rid it of all
unwanted terms? infact, since you’re so busy playing with
yourselves, why not just take the whole thing offline and carry
on in private in your labs?
2000-03-09 15:14:28 Yeah8a8y
Yeah how about it!!
Then Luc and his mates can all go off... With huge wood... Coz
they screwed someone off a site for something inoccuous
2000-03-09 15:52:11 Trash
RE: Yeah how about it!!
It matters not who screws who at thsio point the fact remains if
they want to run this experiment their way and by their rules
they should set it up purely in their own labs .... without us
having access if they want us to contribute then they should let
us do it our way ..
Hey Luc and all the rest of you get on this forum and have the




we’re still waiting. . .
come on sony own up. if youre gonna exercise stalinistic
control at least do it up front; not under the guise of testing
software;. the only agents on site at the mo are owned by luc,
angus, adam and joris. if it’s in the public domain - and it is
- then let the public play!
The postings on the Forum keep going in crescendo for a while until the exhibition
ends March 2000.
Many aspects of this episode are remarkable, not in the least that those responsable
for an exhibition (i.c. Denna Jones (i.e. phlox) and “fish”) were bent on creating a wave
of negative reactions and destructions against one of the exhibition pieces entrusted
to them. Apparently this behaviour was triggered through a conflict with Adam Lowe,
curator of the N01SE exhibition, but the team behind the Talking Heads experiment
had nothing to do with this. Another remarkable fact is that the hacker group became
aggressive as soon as they felt they were no longer able to have control the way they
wanted to, specifically to introduce disrespectful language or to subvert agent scripts to
circumvent the central scheduler so that they could send their agents in priority to the
sites of their choosing. This style of behaviour is a personality trait which is commonly
recognised as characteristic for hackers, including by members of the hacker community
themselves:6
“Hackers have relatively little ability to identify emotionally with other people. …
Unsurprisingly, hackers also tend towards self-absorption, intellectual arrogance,
and impatience with people and tasks perceived to be wasting their time. Because
of their passionate embrace of (what they consider to be) the Right Thing, hackers
can be unfortunately intolerant and bigoted on technical issues, inmarked contrast
to their general spirit of camaraderie and tolerance of alternative viewpoints oth-
erwise. … As a result of all the above traits, many hackers have difficulty maintain-
ing stable relationships. At worst, they can produce the classic geek: withdrawn,
relationally incompetent, sexually frustrated, and desperately unhappy when not
submerged in his or her craft.”
Why did we not interfere in what was going on or directly defend our points of view
on the Forum? There were two reasons. First, our team was small and engaged with
many other activities. The destructive activities of Denna Jones and her friends were not
really worth our continuous attention and precious time. Second, this whole episode was
yielding significant data about how individuals behave with respect to artificial agents
and about the personality traits of those who are most likely to engage with them. The
most obvious conclusion from these data is that we should not attempt to launch such ex-
periments in the public domain, not because they are not feasible from a technical point
6 Raymond, E. (2013)The new hackers dictionary. Available as http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/index.html.
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of view, particularly today with much more reliable web technologies, but because the
way that (some) individuals are likely to behave with respect to these technologies. The
job of figuring out how to create artificial societies and cultures that can cooperate with
human societies is an unsolved problems and it will require help from anthropologists
to figure out how it can be set up. Undoubtedly anonymity is one of the main sources of
deviant behaviour (Knight, Dunbar & Power 1999).
9.3 Installation at the Palais de la Découverte in Paris
As the N01SE exhibition was in full swing, the Palais de la découverte, the largest science
museum in Paris, took the initiative to integrate the experiment as part of their running
exhibition for several months. This lead to the design of a sophisticated framework for
housing the computer equipment (see Figure 9.5), additional educational materials ex-
plaining what the experiment was about, and a new run in much more relaxed circum-
stances with therefore much more interesting results. This new installation started its
operation during the social dinner for the Evolution Of Language Conference in Paris
organised by Jean-Louis Desalles on 5 April 2000. It was seen by an estimated 300,000
visitors during its installment and an article with results of this experiment appeared in
the “Revue du Palais de la Découverte” (Steels & Kaplan 2000).
9.4 The portable Talking Heads
As news of the Talking Heads experiment was spreading, more and more inquiries were
made to show the experiment live in other locations. So we made a portable version
(see Figure 9.6) that could easily be installed and assembled. Initially this version was
used to link into the live teleportation infrastructure, but once the N01SE exhibition was
finished, it was used to develop focused experiments, in particular on colour language.
Some of the noteworthy locations where the portable installation was used are the
following:
1. The European Conference on Artificial Life at the EPFL in Lausanne (Switzerland)
in September 1999. Papers on computational and robotic models of language evo-
lution were (and still are) greeted with hostility at linguistics conferences (even
conferences on computational linguistics) and they are still routinely rejected for
linguistics journals, as being irrelevant for understanding more about human lan-
guage. However the Artificial Life conferences and journals welcomed the ap-
proach from the beginning. This is not surprising because agent-base modeling is
one of the main tools used in that field and an evolutionary stance is seen as obvi-
ous to biologists. The Lausanne conference was organised in line with earlier con-
ferences on artificial life, showing work on life-like robots, computer simulations,
and new chemically based forms of life. It also featured a series of live demos. The
portable demonstration of the Talking Heads was part of these demonstrations, set
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Figure 9.5: Talking Heads installation at the Palais de la Découverte. It featured new
fancy structures that made the installation more attractive visually. Daily
explanations were given to visitors by the staff of the Palais de la Découverte.
Figure 9.6: Portable installation with two pan-tilt cameras and a portable computer that
was able to run the TH software.
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Lausanne!
EPFL- ECAL 99 Conférence!
Figure 9.7: Live installation and demonstration of the Talking Heads experiment at the
European Conference on Artificial Life in 1999.
up to accompany a presentation at the conference by myself and Fréderic Kaplan7
It was linked in with the ongoing experiment during Laboratorium in Antwerp.
2. The Neuer Aachener Kunstverein in Aachen (Germany) in collaboration with the
RWTH (the technical university of Aachen) organised a general exhibition onmod-
elling called Modell-Modell. Within this framework, artist Anne-Mie van Kerck-
hoven invited me to cooperate in a laboratory on language and colour called “Cy-
berlabor Chromosophy”. As part of this laboratory, the portable Talking Heads
experiment was installed and ran from 5 May to 16 June 2000. It featured not only
the portable Talking Heads, which was demonstrated live, but also posters, talks
about the project and additional art works.
3. The portable Talking Heads was also featured in an exhibition at the Ludo Mich
Gallery in Antwerp. This exhibition focused on colour again and showed several
other pieces related to colour and colour perception. It was accompanied by a very
well attended gallery talk.
9.5 Look into the Box
The Musée d’Art Moderne in Paris organised a solo exhibition of artist Olafur Eliasson
entitled “Chaque matin je me sens différent. Chaque soir je me sens le même” between
22 March and 12 May 2002. (Scherf 2002) Olafur Eliasson is known for his thorough
investigations of colour, such as using monochromatic light to create an artificial sun
7 The paper published for this conference is Steels & Kaplan (1999).
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Figure 9.8: Live installation at the gallery of Ludo Mich in Antwerp. There was no white
board but different small pancartes with possible scenes (see in the middle of
the picture). The game was displayed much larger against the back wall.
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in the Modern Tate Gallery in London (2003). Eliasson invited me to jointly work out a
new interpretation of the Talking Heads experiment, which became “Look into the Box”.
Nicolas Neubauer, a master student working at that time at the Sony Computer Science
Laboratory, was the chief implementer together with Angus McIntyre. The set-up and
results are described in detail in Steels (2004) and Neubauer (2004).
“Look into the Box” consisted of a box inwhich a camerawasmounted that would take
a picture of the eye of a person who looked into the box. The eye was then projected
much bigger on a wall opposite to the box, which in itself gave a very strong visual
effect (see Figure 9.9). At the same time two artificial agents looked at the eye colour and
played a colour language game. Visitors to the exhibition could hear the dialog between
the agents and follow on a nearby screen the progression in the emergence of a colour
vocabulary. During the course of the exhibition an artificial colour language emerged,
reflecting the eye and skin colour of visitors.
Figure 9.9: Look into the Box installation at the Paris Museum of Modern Art. Left: Box
with camera inside. A lens would make the eye look bigger for the camera.
Right: Projection of the eye on a big screen.
This experiment was fundamentally different from the original Talking Heads experi-
ment because it was no longer a discrimination game but a description game. The agents
extracted the main colours from the image of the eye and then described them to an-
other agent. Moreover the domain was now restricted to the colour domain, which had
meanwhile become a focal topic of research in the lab (Steels & Belpaeme 2005).
The Look into the Box installation was shown again at several locations. One was
in July 2003 in the context of a yearly music festival in Spoleto. In 2003, the theme
of semiotic dynamics was chosen and various presentations and discussions were held
curated by the Italian semiotician Paolo Fabbri. A new installation of Look into the Box
was realised and operated (see Figure 9.11). A system for playing language games with
human users, created by Tony Belpaeme of the VUB AI Lab, was also demonstrated. This
system was intended to collect data about colour category prototypes and names from
human speakers in order to gather more data about colour language in discrimination
games.
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Figure 9.10: Example interaction of the “Look into the Box” art piece. Left: Top and pix-
elated eye of a spectator. Right: the main colours that were extracted from
this image. Agents played language games to describe these eye colours.
Figure 9.11: Left: My presentation at the Spoleto Science Festival. Right: Nicolas
Neubauer debugging the Look into the Box installation.
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The Look into the Box installation was also shown during the “Intensive Science” ex-
hibitions organised in October 2006 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Sony
Computer Science Laboratory. It was first shown in Paris at the exhibition space “La
Maison Rouge” near the Bastille in Paris, which featured science/art installations and
collaborations involving members of the Sony Computer Science Laboratory, including
work by Atau Tanaka, Francois Pachet in collaborationwith Jazz pianist Albert van Veen-
daal, Peter Hanappe in collaboration with photographer Armin Linke, Frederic Kaplan in
collaboration with the Design School of EPFL in Lausanne. The same exhibition traveled
to Tokyo where it was shown in the Sony Explorascience museum from 22 December
2006 to 12 February 2007 (see Figure 9.12).
Figure 9.12: Installation at the Tokyo Explorascience Museum. The box is in the left cor-
ner. The eye is projected on a big screen. A smaller screen shows the image
captured by the camera, the colours recognised, and the words used by the
agents.
9.6 Conclusions
The many installations and experiments taught us a lot about how it was possible to
technically set up andmaintain a distributed network of agents grounding their activities
in the real world through cameras. These pioneering experiments happened at a time
when the Internet was not as common as today and not as stable. It was before up- and
down-loading and apps became widespread and sufficient bandwidth was available even
in private homes. The experiments were stopped around 2002 because they took a lot of
264
9.6 Conclusions
time and not much more could be learned from a technical and scientific point of view.
The installations were also one of the pioneering attempts to develop a strong inter-
action between art and science, which today are more common and more recognised
than they were in the late 1990s. They were conceived to be part of exhibitions and well
established artists, such as Olafur Eliasson, took great interest and collaborated to give
them a twist to function better within an art context. The context of an exhibition is a
very effective way to reach an audience that has normally no access to ongoing scien-
tific experiments. It also generated a stream of newspaper articles, and contributions to
radio and television programs, which normally pay only little attention to what goes in
science.
The experiments also taught us a lot about the interaction between humans and artifi-
cial agents. The idea that a benign symbiosis between artificial agents and humans was
possible proved to be naive. There are too many people around with sufficient computer
skill but without any ethical consciousness. They see no problem in destroying compu-
tational infrastructure simply for their own joy. More recent examples show that these
hackers go much further, using their power to do harm or widespread theft. As artificial
systems will never be immune to this behaviour, it is probably not possible to imagine a
future in which there are autonomous robotic agents, not because the robots would be
harmful in themselves but because of the use some individuals will most likely make of
them.
Finally, the experiments taught us that the proposed mechanisms for lexicon and con-
cept formation and for reaching coherence worked out. The lateral inhibition learning
dynamics and the structural coupling between lexicon formation and concept forma-
tion used by the agents proved later not only relevant for lexicon formation but also
for grammar. On the other hand this dynamics is not robust enough in the face of ex-
treme uncertainty coming from embodiment (i.e. camera disalignment), high population
flux, uncertain environmental conditions or destructive human user interventions. Pre-
sumably in such conditions child language and concept learning would also be heavily
compromised and perhaps impossible. Anthropologists have argued that the origins of
language required a strong form of sociality which is not found in other primate species
(Knight & Lewis 2014). The experiment indeed confirms that without empathy, respect
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experiment
TheTalking Heads experiments were obviously not an end point, but only the beginning.
They confirmed the results that had been obtained with earlier theoretical models and
computer simulations but did not push these models towards greater complexity. But
subsequent work did expand the envelope of our understanding and modelling way be-
yond these boundaries, thanks to the work of many researchers who have since joined
the research programme. The expansion has happened along several dimensions: in-
creased sophistication of the robots, a deeper theoretical understanding of semiotic dy-
namics, growth in the complexity of semantics and grammar, and new breakthroughs by
studying the emergence and evolution of language strategies. An exhaustive survey of
these exciting profound developments is beyond the scope of the present book. Instead, I
will highlight here only some of the key language game experiments that used real phys-
ical robots and were direct variations or further extensions of the environments, game
scripts and strategies used in the Talking Heads experiment. This chapter focuses on ex-
periments in the period before 2005, particularly work with the aibo robots and the first
attempts towards the emergence of grammar.1 The next chapters focus on experiments
after 2005.
10.1 Experiments with the aibo robots
From 1996, even before the first TalkingHeads experimentwas started, experimentswere
already conducted in our laboratory, primarily by Paul Vogt, exploring language games
on the cybernetic mobile robots that we were able to build ourselves at the time. These
robots were constructed from Lego bricks and used a basic processing board for linking
directly simple sensors (touch sensors, infrared sensors) and actuators (left and right
motors) using an adaptive dynamical system (see Figure 1.3). They were however too
unreliable for long-term repeatable experimentation and the sensori-motor experiences
were too restricted to hope for the development of interesting languages. The use of pan-
tilt cameras, as in the TalkingHeads experiment, was an attempt to have an experimental
set-up at relatively low cost that was reliable and used vision as the source of information
about the world. Of course this came at the price of less mobility and no true physical
interaction with the real world. Nevertheless, many further fruitful experiments were
done using the same set-up, particularly to explore in much greater depth the domain of
1 An overview of these experiments is also given in: Steels & Belpaeme (2005).
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colour lexicons2 and multi-word naming games.3 A Talking Heads simulator was also
built by Paul Vogt in order to speed up such experiments and prepare the way for more
advances with real robots (Vogt 2003).
10.1.1 aibo’s first words
Meanwhile significant developments started to happen in the world of robotics that
pushed the state of the art in fully-embodied mobile robots forward. Around the year
2000, a new generation of robots was becoming available, built by industrial companies
which mastered the technology to manufacture very robust machines, and these robots
could therefore be used continuously without constant breakdown. Because of experi-
ence and contacts in the field of robotics, our team was able to move language game
experiments to a new level of sophistication. The first platform we could use was the
Sony aibo robot.
The aibo is a fully autonomous 4-legged mobile robot, inspired by a small dog. It is
fully autonomous with more than a thousand behaviours coordinated through a com-
plex behaviour-based motivational system.4 The robot was pioneered by Toshi Doi and
designed byMasahiro Fujita and his team at the Sony Corporation in Tokyo at the end of
the nineties (Fujita & Kitano 1998). In all 150,000 aibo’s were sold to customers. The aibo
featured 4-legged locomotion, a camera for visual input, two microphones, a wide range
of body sensors, on-board batteries and the necessary computing power. This robot was
the most complex reliable robot available in the early 2000’s. The aibo was also the first
robot that was explicitly designed for human interaction so that basic useful compo-
nents (for example for face recognition) were available. Language game research could
therefore focus entirely on the linguistic and conceptual aspects of the semiotic cycle,
even though we still had to program the physical interaction patterns and behaviours
necessary for language games.
Language Game experiments started on the aibo when the Talking Heads experiment
was still going on, namely in 2000. Frédéric Kaplan was the main developer.5
These experiments extended the Talking Heads experiment in several directions:
1. Vision. The pan-tilt cameras and the flat white board with geometric figures en-
sured that the vision system of the Talking Heads was relatively reliable, although
light conditions and camera misalignment could occasionally cause havoc. The
aibo experiments now used 3d objects in the real world that were seen frommany
2 Colour became a focal point of research because there is an extensive literature in cognitive science that has
been gathering empirical data about colour and its evolution and because it is relatively straightforward
to do colour naming games. One of the main papers on our colour naming research is Steels & Belpaeme
(2005).
3 Multi-word games were the focus of the Ph.D research by Joris Van Looveren, with a thesis defended in
2004.
4 This robot was entirely based on a series of design principles that I had pioneered together with Rodney
Brooks in the mid-nineties under the label ’behaviour-based AI’. See: Steels & Brooks (1995), Steels &
McDermott (1994).
5 A paper summarising the aibo experiment was published as Steels (2001). Kaplan wrote his Ph.D thesis
on the subject which is published (in French) as Kaplan (2001).
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different angles and in different light conditions (see Figure 10.1, right). This obvi-
ously pushed up the difficulty of visual perception enormously and it also made it
muchmore difficult to acquire stable categories for reliably recognising the objects
in the environment.
2. Speech. The interaction with the robot used spoken language, which implied that
the robot needed speech synthesis and a speech recognition system that could ac-
quire new words. These components were available on the robot and could there-
fore be easily integrated.
3. Flexible scripts. The Talking Heads experiments used a single very streamlined
interaction scenario whereby the robots played a Guessing Gamewith a clear turn-
taking script. The aibo experiments targeted different kinds of interactions with
humans and therefore the robot needed not only a way to represent and execute
these different scripts but also a much more flexible way to move from one step to
another within a script and to move between scripts. Moreover the scripts had to
be integrated intimately with the physical behaviours that were steering the robot
itself, which could in many cases not be overridden or directly controlled.
Figure 10.1: Left: Frédéric Kaplan interacts with the aibo robot in an experiment for the
social learning of lexicons. Right: View of the ball through the eye of the
robot. As the same object is now seen from many different viewpoints it
becomes much more challenging to consistently recognise it.
The first aibo experiments did not involve a population of agents but rather a sin-
gle agent that was interacting directly with a human experimenter. The agent had to
learn the lexicon of the human through social interaction within the context of situated
language games. The 2001 paper “aibo’s first words” by Steels and Kaplan described ex-
periments in which an aibo robot learned words about objects in the environment, such
as ball or smiley, as well as words for actions, such as sit down or stand up.
A typical example of a game is the DO game, used to learn the names of behaviours.
The robot is programmed with a repertoire of behaviours, such as walk, sit down, stand
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up, look left/right/up/down, push ball, etc. When the human utters a word, the hearing
robot looks up the word in its own memory and performs that behaviour. If it does not
know the word, it performs one of the behaviours for which it does not have a word
yet. If this behaviour is the wrong one, the robot receives feedback and correction, thus
learning (i) that the behaviour is not associated with the word and (ii) what the right
word is for the behaviour just performed. When the right behaviour was chosen, the
association between this behaviour and the word can be stored if the association was
not yet in memory, or reinforced if it was using the lateral inhibition learning strategy.
Games therefore always come with two variant scripts. There is one with a successful
interaction, which then leads to a reinforcement of the existing lexicon, and one with a
non-successful interaction, where the robot gets corrected and learns a new word. Here
are the two variants for the DO Game:
Reinforcement script Correction script
Human: Listen, Walk. H: Listen, Walk.
R: Walk? R: Walk?
(walks) (sits)
H: Yes H: No, this is ‘sit’.
R: Sit ?
H: Yes.
The scripts of the agents are represented internally using probabilistic finite state ma-
chines with temporal annotations. This computational formalism (pioneered by Rodney
Brooks) was also used to program the physical behaviour of the robots (Figure 10.2).6
Each state in a behaviour network represents a decision point. A transition is an event
happening in the real world or a condition in the internal memory of the agent. Occa-
sionally there is more than one possible continuation from a state and a transition is
then decided purely based on a probabilistic basis. When waiting for events in the envi-
ronment, the transitions have a timer, so that the robot can recover when an expected
event is not occurring. In the subsumption architecture networks are stacked and one
network may overtake another one. For example, an obstacle avoidance behaviour will
become active when touch, vision or infrared sensing has detected an object, whatever
other network is governing at that time the robot behaviour.
The main conclusion of these experiments was that the state of the art in robotics and
language game research was sufficiently advanced at that time (i.e. in 2001) to imple-
ment these more complex games. Moreover several experiments were done to compare
different learning methods and interaction patterns, comparing social, situated learning
with observational learning. In social situated learning, the learner maximally uses infor-
mation from the context, the interaction, and the existing state of his language system,
to make the best possible guess about the meaning of unknown utterances. He gets help
6 This architecture was first described in Brooks (1986). For the experiments I implemented a LISP-based
Behaviour Language that ran also on the aibo.
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R: repeat      
“Name of action” 
H:”No” 
R: name in 
memory?  
R: name not 
in memory?  






Figure 10.2: The behaviour on the aibo, including the language game scripts, are pro-
grammed using probabilistic finite state machines that bring the robot
from one internal state to another one depending on internal or external
conditions.
from the speaker which is acting as a tutor and gives useful feedback to constrain the un-
certainty as much as possible. An utterance is seen as purposeful and the hearer assumes
that the speaker conceptualises and expresses what is relevant to achieve communica-
tive success. In observational learning, the learner is passively observing interactions of
others and stores them as data. When there is a sufficiently big corpus he can employ
cross-situational learning to grasp the meaning of each word by scanning through the
data to find the commonalities between situations using the same word. This approach
works also to some extend but experiments showed that it was much slower and not so
easily made incremental (De Beule, De Vylder & Belpaeme 2006).
The aibo experiments were the first robotic experiments demonstrating social, situ-
ated learning in action. They were highly relevant for discovering the subtle interaction
patterns that would work and could be realistically implemented in human-robot sce-
narios. The goal of these experiments was not to address the question of the origins
of a new language in a population of agents. However, another experiment, still with
the aibo robots, did substantially advance the state of the art: the Perspective Reversal
experiment carried out by Martin Loetzsch and Luc Steels in 2004–2005.7
10.1.2 The Perspective Reversal experiment
The Perspective Reversal experiment focused on the question how a spatial language
could emerge that employed perspective reversal. It was the first experiment to system-
7 Very little was published about this experiment, partly because reviewers had the greatest difficulty to
grasp its underlying rationale or understand the technical details. The main paper is Steels & Loetzsch
(2008). Subsequent work by Michael Spranger significantly scaled up the experiment, as discussed in the
next chapter.
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atically compare different language strategies, thus introducing for the first time the
comparative method that would inform all later language game experiments.
A language strategy prescribes how some aspect of meaning needs to be concep-
tualised, expressed, and acquired. The Talking Heads experiment used a single strategy:
find a discriminating category for the topic and employ a word for that category. But
languages use a variety of strategies all intermixed. For example, speakers might have
a strategy for expressing argument structure using cases (as in Latin or German) or a
strategy for expressing tense and aspect using morphological markers on the verb (as in
Spanish). Each strategy gives rise to a particular feature of a language and in order to
demonstrate why languages exhibit this feature it is therefore possible to compare a lan-
guage with the feature to one without the feature by doing an experiment where agents
are endowed with a strategy that generates this feature and another one where they
employ a different strategy that does not. The performance of the resulting system, for
example, its average communicative success, the time to reach linguistic convergence,
the amount of cognitive effort involved, can be measured and thus the adaptive value of
one strategy (and hence one feature of language) can be compared with another.
The comparative method fits within the larger framework of selectionist theories of
language origins, which argue that language users are able to configure strategies by
recruiting and configuring cognitive mechanisms (such as sequence detection, categori-
sation, perspective reversal, etc.) and that those strategies that make a positive contribu-
tion to the language are retained.8 The strategies being compared have to form a chain
where one strategy is a slight variation on the previous one, typically an additional com-
ponent is begin recruited and linked into the strategy, so that we can begin to imagine an
evolutionary trajectory in which strategies progressively complexify (see Section 11.1.2)
The Perspective Reversal experiment applied this methodology to explain a remark-
able universal feature of human languages, namely, that speakers may use a different
perspective on the scene than their own when conceptualising what to say, and that
they may explicitly mark perspective switching, using lexical or grammatical means.
Suppose a speaker is facing a hearer, then it indeed makes a big difference whether she
says the door to your left or the door to my left. If the speaker says the door to my left she
expects the hearer to perform an egocentric perspective transformation and see the sit-
uation from her own point of view. Perspective switching is here signalled by explicitly
expressing which perspective is used: your left versus my left. The German prepositions
herein and hinein, both meaning ‘into’ are another example of perspective marking. They
distinguish whether the direction of movement is towards the speaker herein or away
from the speaker hinein, analogous to English come (to where I am) versus go (to another
location). Although there are obvious differences in how languages express perspective,
there can be no doubt that perspective marking is pervasive across languages and lan-
guage families, and that speakers make abundant use of it.
The Perspective Reversal experiment worked as follows. A population of aibo robots
roam around freely in an unconstrained in-door environment. As soon as one sees the
ball, it comes to a stop and searches for another robot nearby, which also looks for the
8 More on the recruitment theory of language origins in Steels (2007). And on the selectionist framework in
general in Steels (2012).
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Figure 10.3: Luc Steels demonstrates live the Perspective Reversal experiment in Tokyo,
April 2005. aibo robots track the movement of a ball and the robot acting as
speaker describes to the hearer an observed movement, possibly taking into
account the perspective of the hearer. For example, the speaker might say
the ball rolls from my left to your right.
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ball and stops when it sees it. Then the human experimenter pushes the ball with a stick
so that it rolls a short distance (see Figure 10.3). The two robots next play a description
game. One robot (acting as the “speaker”) describes the ball-moving event to the other
robot (the “hearer”), going through the same semiotic cycle as the Talking Heads agents.
The game is a success if the meaning conveyed by the speaker is compatible with the
hearer’s own perception of the scene.
The robots start without any prior lexicon or ontology and have to come up with
their own purely based on the feedback in the game and without any human interven-
tion. They have been programmed to achieve autonomous locomotion and vision-based
obstacle avoidance, and maintain a real-time analogue model of their immediate sur-
roundings based on visual input. Using this vision-based world model, the robots are
able to detect and track other robots as well as orange balls using standard image pro-
cessing algorithms (see Figure 10.4). Furthermore, the robots have been endowed with
mechanisms to segment the flow of data into distinct events and they have a short term
memory in which they can store a number of past events.
Within this experimental setting three different strategies were tried in a long-term
experiment where a new strategy was injected at certain stages and performance moni-
tored:
• In stage i, agents use the Discrimination Game strategy and the Naming Game
strategy discussed in chapters 4 and 5. A lexicon is emerging and there are some
successful games (those for which the speaker and the hearer see the situation
from the same perspective). But the lexicon keeps expanding and success is very
limited as games where robots have a different perspective on the rolling ball all
fail.
• In stage ii, agents have an extended strategy where agents can geometrically trans-
form a model of the scene, based on their own perspective, into a model of the
scene as seen from the perspective of the hearer. They can then conceptualise the
scene from that perspective. Communicative success significantly increases and
the lexicon starts to decrease. However there is ambiguity because the hearer can-
not know whether the speaker has conceptualised the scene from his own view-
point or performed a perspective reversal, leading to a large number of failed com-
munications (more than 50 %).
• In stage iii, a more elaborate strategy is used. The speaker now expresses whether
he has performed perspective reversal (as in to your left vs. simply left). Only
with this strategy are agents able to reach high communicative success with a
stable inventory.
The Perspective Reversal experiment was significant in many ways. Not only did it
use for the first time mobile robots in a sophisticated open real world set-up, but it also
pioneered the use of perspective reversal that was the basis of later experiments in spatial
language games with the qrio robot by Michael Spranger and it was the first convincing
example of the comparative method that now underlies all advanced language game
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Figure 10.4: Chain from visual image (left) to an analogue world model (middle) and a
discrete event description that is the topic of the language game (right). The
top row shows this chain for robot A and the bottom row the chain for robot














communicative success (left axis)
lexicon size (right axis)




Figure 10.5: Three strategies are compared. In Stage I (left) agents categorise the event
from their own perspective. In Stage II (middle) they conceptualise the scene
from the viewpoint of the other agent as well. In Stage iii (right) they express
that they performed a perspective reversal. Only the third strategy leads to
successful performance.
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research. What this experiment did not address was how agents could come up with
new strategies themselves and howmore adapted strategies could propagate and become
shared in the population.
10.2 Scaling up to grammar
We now look at other dimensions in which language game research moved beyond the
original Talking Heads experiment. The original experiments focused exclusively on the
question how a vocabulary of grounded concepts could arise in a population of agents.
Agents could already use multiple word utterances but without any notion of grammar.
The obvious next question was how all this could scale up towards grammar. This is
of course an extremely difficult challenge that required significant advances both for
the representation of the linguistic inventory available to the agents and how meaning
is expressed and interpreted. As common in scientific and engineering research, we
moved step by step, systematically adding more complexity but testing out each step
before moving to the next one, and this progressive complexification is still on the way
today.
10.2.1 Early syntax experiments
The earliest attempts to investigate the emergence of syntax date back to 1997, in other
words even before the first Talking Heads experiment started. The first report appeared
as a paper in the Artificial Intelligence journal as Steels (1998). It was described by the
journal editors (Dan Bobrow and Mike Brady) as “obviously in an early stage, but very
provocative and suggestive.” The paper was based on my keynote lecture at ijcai 1997
in Nagoya and used a precursor of the pan-tilt cameras built by Tony Belpaeme. (see
Figure 1.6).
The paper describes the grammar formalism as follows:
The grammar is seen as a natural continuation of the lexicon, in the sense that
it consists also of associations between forms and meanings. Use and success
are monitored for each association so that the same type of self-organised coher-
ence arises in the group, as seen in the lexicon. The form is now a more complex
structure, defined as a syntactic schema. The meaning is a semantic schema. The
schemas circumscribe a feature-set in terms of a set of slots, restrictions on the
fillers of each slot, and constraints on the combination of the fillers to form the
total covered by the schema.
Syntactic schemas describe word groups. They have an associated category which
corresponds in linguistic terms to grouping categories like noun-group, verb-group,
sentence. The slots in syntactic schemas correspond to syntactic functions (also
called grammatical relations) such as subject, object, modifier, complement. They
name the roles that certain words or word groups play in the group. The categories
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used to restrict possible slot-fillers correspond in linguistic terms to syntactic cat-












Of course, instead of noun, noun-group, subject, etc. computer-generated symbols
are used such as syn-cat-77, syn-slot-50, etc. The constraints on the schema are
represented in terms of a constraint system. Each constraint has a dual procedu-
ral function: to enforce the constraint when re-enacting the situation described by
a schema or to test the constraint when determining whether a schema fits with
a situation. In the present case only a precedence relation is recorded as a con-
straint. Agreement, intonation, or morphological endings, are some other possible
constraints on syntactic schemas.
The categories restricting slot-fillers are either themselves defined in terms of schemas
(for example, syn-cat-77 could be the restriction on a slot-filler in another schema),
or they are defined as rules that are applied in a forward-chaining fashion during
matching. Two examples of rules related to the above schema are:
rule 101: ([WORD (W U)]) => ([MEMBER syn-cat-761])
rule 99: ([WORD (W O)]) => ([MEMBER Syn-Cat-751])
Semantic schemas describe the language-specific semantic structures underlying
the meanings of complete word groups. The closest linguistic correspondent to a
semantic schema is the notion of a case-frame. The constraints indicate how the
total meaning is constructed/decomposed into the meaning of the parts. During
interpretation such constraints therefore perform the same role as Montague style
semantic interpretation functions. The slots correspond to cases such as agent, pa-
tient, time, distance, or arguments of semantic functions. The categories used to
constrain what can fill a slot correspond in linguistic terms to selection restrictions
like animate, human, edible, future, etc. The schema has also an associated cate-
gory for the whole so that hierarchical combination is possible. An example of a
semantic schema is:
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([sem-slot-50 sem-cat-751] [sem-slot-51 sem-cat-761])
CONSTRAINTS:




Inference rules such as the following define the selection restrictions:
rule 102: ([VISIB v-4111) => ([MEMBER sem-cat-761)
rule 100: ([VER v-4311) => ([MEMBER sem-cat-751)
Each association in the grammar couples a syntactic schemawith a semantic schema.
The association can be used in two directions. If a syntactic schema is recognised,
i.e., all its constraints are satisfied by the input utterance, the semantic schema is
used to reconstruct its meaning. If a semantic schema is recognised, the syntactic
schema is used to reconstruct the form. The association contains a mapping of the
slots in order to enable this reconstruction. For example, the association combining








An application of these schemas in producing the utterance (WO) (WU) is represented
in Figure 10.6 and shown here:
127 ++> Speaker: head-40 Topic: 2 Context: 6 5 4 3 1 0
Categorial Perception:
([VISIB v-4111] [VER v-431])
([VER v-4311] [AREA v-4061])
Lexicon lookup: (Association-259 Association-234)
Syntactic structure:
(syn-cat-77
(syn-slot-50 (syn-cat-75 |(W O)|))
(syn-slot-51 (syr-cat-76 |(W U)|)))
Semantic structure:
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152 L. Steels /Artijcial Intelligence 103 (1998) 133-156 
r 
([WORD (W Ql) (WORD (W U)ll ([VISIB v-41 l] [VER v-4311) 
syn-cat-75 syn-cat-76 sem-cat-76 sem-cat-75 
syn-slot-50 sem-slot-5 1 sem-slot-50 
sem-cat-78 sem-cat-77 
Associat ion-271 
Fig. 8. Top: two lexicon associations have become active (association-259 and association-234) to cover the 
distinctive feature-set ([VISIB v-41 I][VER v-43 11) resulting from discrimination and perception. Bottom: the 
group of words and the meanings match with schemes forming part of a grammatical association. The matching 
implies some inferencing to see whether the categories associated with the schemes apply. 
Association-271 
MEANING: Schema-542 
FORM : Schema-541 




5.2. Operat ion of the gmmmar 
As discussed in the previous sections, a speaker chooses a distinctive feature-set 
resulting from perception and discrimination, and then performs lexicon lookup. The 
lexicon may yield a group of words which cover the chosen distinctive feature-set (see 
Fig. 8). Rather than simply transmitting these words to the hearer, the cognitive memory 
system comes in action and attempts to find an association (or set of associations) for 
the total. The inference rules operate on both the word forms and the meanings to see 
what syntactic categories and semantic categories are satisfied. Schemes match when all 
slots are filled by elements which belong to the appropriate categories (Fig. 8) and when 
the constraints on the semantic schema apply. When there is a match, the constraints on 
the syntactic schema are enacted and added to the description of the form. For example, 
the precedence relation between the words is added. Only then the form is rendered and 
transmitted to the hearer. A language game in which all this is happening with the above 
example schemes and rules is given below: 
Figure 10.6: Top: Two lexical association have beco e active (associati n-259 and
association-234) to cover the disti ctive feature-set ([VISIB v-411] [VER v-
431]) resulting from discrimination and perception. Bottom: The group of
words and the meanings match with schemas forming part of a grammatical
association that combines the words.
(sem-cat-78
(sem-slot-50 sem-cat-75 (VER v-431)))
(sem-slot-51 (sem-cat-76 (VISIB v-411))))
Meaning:
([VISIB v-4111] [VER v-4311)
Expression: ((W 0) (W U))
So this experiment already contained several kernel ideas that would become the basis
of further developments towards computational formalisms that could handle evolution-
ary language game experiments, such as the representation of the grammar in terms of
form-meaning pairs – similar to the lexicon – , the use of schemas to represent the syn-
tactic and semantic pole of a coupled feature structure, and the use of constraints to
specify the properties of each pole, so that the grammar can be used in a bi-directional
fashion. The relationship to construction grammar, which came to the foreground in
linguistics around 1995, was not yet clear at the time.
Th paper also briefly described the mechanisms by which such a grammar emerged
in the experiment in terms of a cognitive memory system:
“The cognitive memory system acts in a first instant purely as a device that records
a particular way in which language has been produced so that it can later be re-
produced in the same way. Also the hearer can perform this recording operation.
He is presented with a specific set of word forms from which he can abstract a
281
10 Beyond the Talking Heads experiment
syntactic schema. He derives meaning from the definition of the words in the lexi-
con and the distinctive feature-set coming out of perception. From this, a semantic
schema can be extracted. More interesting grammars emerge when additional op-
erations to restructure the set of grammatical associations are used. For example,
in the case of a partial match, substructures may be recategorised so that they nev-
ertheless fit, two partially overlapping schemes with common fillers may lead to
a new schema that integrates both, etc.”
10.2.2 The Case Grammar experiments
The first of these efforts started around 2001 and focused on case grammar, i.e. on how
grammatical constructions for expressing the arguments of a predicate describing a re-
lation or event could emerge and convergence in a population of grounded agents. Case
grammar is one of the core functions of grammar and focusing on this domain would
guarantee that we are addressing empirically attested core phenomena of human lan-
guage. The first wave of work on case grammar took place from 2001 to 2003. It re-
quired the construction of a more sophisticated vision system (accomplished by Jean-
Christophe Baillie) and the design and implementation of a more sophisticated grammar
formalism (accomplished by Luc Steels and Nicolas Neubauer), although this was still
only one step on the way towards later developments in Fluid Construction Grammar.
Based on these components, I implemented an initial experiment with two agents.9 In
2005 Remi van Trijp picked up this line of research again and worked out the experiment
further with great skill and sophistication. He extended the 2-agent simulation to amulti-
agent simulation and could finally report a complete running system in his 2008 Ph.D
thesis (van Trijp 2014b). Here I give only a brief account of the first attempts towards
case grammar and how this pushed the state of the art in language game research.
But first we need a clearer idea on what case grammar is. In the sentence John gave
Mary a book, John plays the role of agent, the giver of the book, Mary that of recipient
or beneficiary and the book is the “patient” or object of the action. Languages differ in
terms of the strategies that they use to express these participant roles. Some of them, like
German, have an elaborate system of morphological markers attached to constituents of
the noun phrase. These markers signal that the phrase is nominative, accusative, dative,
etc., and these cases then map in complex ways onto semantic roles such as agent and
patient. Other languages, like English, use a strategy based on word order and preposi-
tions. For example, Mary gave John a book contains the same participants as John gave
Mary a book but nowMary is the agent and John the recipient. Still other languages, like
Japanese, use a strategy based on particles following the noun, as in the Japanese sen-
tence Tanaka-san wa Tokyo de o-to-san ni atta meaning ‘Tanaka met his father in Tokyo’.
Tanaka-san is the name of a person, oto-san means ‘father’ and atta means ‘met’. The
markers are wa for the topic, de for location and ni for another sense of location which
9 These experiments were first reported at the Harvard Evolution of Language conference in 2002 with
a paper by Luc Steels entitled “Computer Simulations of the origins of Case grammar”. The paper was
later deemed “too incomprehensible for the Evolution of Language community” to be acceptable for the
conference proceedings edited by Maggie Tallerman.
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can also function as possessive. The case grammar experiments focused on modelling
the latter strategy.
It used the comparative method again to compare three progressively more complex
strategies:
1. Lexical strategy. The experiment starts from a purely lexical language that is pre-
defined in all agents. The lexicon contained words for expressing properties of
objects (such as smooth, red, etc.) as well as actions involving objects (such as
move-away-from, move-towards or push). English words were chosen to make the
experiment easier to follow. Agents form multi-word utterances using straightfor-
ward lexicon lookup, producing utterances like move-towards red jill (Jill moves
towards the red object) or push jack jill green (Jack pushes the green block to Jill).
There is no syntax at all. Agents can nevertheless already achieve communicative
success when they use the real world as a way to figure out the participant roles,
even though the utterance does not provide any information. For example, to de-
tect whether Jack pushes the green block to Jill or Jill pushes the green block to
Jack.
2. Specific marker strategy. The second strategy introduces markers in the form of
particles added to words referring to objects, in order to specify what argument
the object fills in the predicate describing the event. For example, there could be
two markers: pi and pa specifying that the referent plays the role respectively of
giver and gift in a give event, as in pi jill pa block give. Themarkers are entirely spe-
cific for each event in the sense that there is no generalisation yet to agent, patient
or other more abstract semantic roles. This already yields a more effective com-
munication system because the complexity of seeking an interpretation matching
with the world model is heavily reduced and residual ambiguity (i.e. there is still
more than one way in which the meaning matches with the world model) is also
avoided.
3. Role strategy. The third strategy introduces generalisations of the markers, so
that fewer markers are needed. This decreases the size of the inventory and thus
makes the language more efficient to process and easier to learn. There are many
strategies that could be used for generalisation. Our experiments have explored
the use of analogy: When arguments need to be expressed for an event e, agents no
longer create new specific markers for each argument of e but look for analogies
between this event e and other events for which markers already exist. If a good
analogy can be found they reuse it and generalise the argument-specific marker.
This analogy-based method of generalisation is explained in some more detail later in
this section, but first we look briefly at other advances that were needed: What world
was made available to the agents for their language games? How did the vision system
work? And what grammatical formalism was devised to handle case grammar?
We used a similar set-up as the Talking Heads experiment (see Figure 10.7), but the
world had to be made more complex, involving dynamical scenes in which different
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Figure 10.7: The installation for the case grammar experiments used a more sophisticated
vision system and objects that could be moved around. We see the two Talk-
ing Heads cameras in the background. They are oriented towards objects on
the table or situations in the environment. The monitors show the camera
images and the states of image processing, just as for the original Talking
Heads experiment.
Vision system (Peract - JC Baillie) 
time!
Segmen 
  tation 
Tracking 
Figure 10.8: Top: Some of the images recorded during the action of picking up a cylinder.
Middle: Results of segmentation algorithms. Bottom: The spatio-temporal
continuity of objects is tracked.
284
10.2 Scaling up to grammar
Give bluething jill jack  
Push jill block Figure 10.9: Top: Computer animation of the speaking and hearing agent used in public
demonstrations of the case experiment. Middle: Example of a puppet scene,
where Jill gives a block to Jack. It shows the source image (left) and a (partial)
result of image processing (right). Bottom: Another example of a puppet
scene where Jill pushes the block.
animate objects performed actions. So I decided to use puppets and enacted little scenes
before the cameras (see Figure 10.9 middle and bottom). There were two puppets, named
Jack and Jill. They were actually sold at that time as puppet versions of Harry Potter
and Hermione Granger inspired by the famous Harry Potter book series. The puppets
appeared and disappeared within the field of view of the cameras. They manipulated
small objects, for example pushing a green cube, picking it up, sliding the cube towards
the other puppet, putting it in a box, etc. To make the simulation more lively and easier
to follow for a lay public, the agents engaging in a language game were also visually
animated (see Figure 10.9 top).10
10 The animations were developed by Veronique Caraux in Paris.
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10.2.2.1 Scaling up the vision system
The vision system of the Talking Heads only dealt with static scenes. This had to be
scaled up to deal with dynamical scenes and event recognition. It was the focal work
of Jean-Christophe Baillie at the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris, who built
a vision system called peract inspired by an event-recognition developed by Jeffrey
Siskind.11 The vision system was decomposed into three subsystems with information
flowing both in a bottom-up (from image to world model) and top-down way (from
world model and predictions to image): the subsystems achieved object identification,
event identification, and derivation of qualitative descriptors.
10.2.2.2 Object identification
The first subsystem attempts to detect and track visual units at different hierarchical lev-
els. It detects and “latches onto” regions in the image that are generated by objects of in-
terest in the environment. This results in deictic pointers or “anchors” that establish and
monitor indexical references between internal symbols and external objects. Tracking
not only takes place for a single object, but for an open-ended set of objects at different
hierarchical levels, as long as they are part of the same spatio-temporal context.
The detection and tracking of units at different hierarchical levels starts in a bottom-
up manner from the images captured by the camera, and goes through various process-
ing steps: figure/ground separation based on colour perception, creation of a cellular
occupancy grid, spatial region growing to identify spatial regions, and construction of
spatio-temporal continuities based on color histograms of the objects (Figure 10.8).
10.2.2.3 Event identification
The second subsystem detects and tracks events, again at different hierarchical levels.
The task is similar to that of detecting objects but the grouping is based on changes in
properties of objects rather than on invariances. Event detection is organised in three
steps:
1. Detect change by computing qualitative descriptions for the movement of an ob-
ject, the contact between two objects, the approaching of two objects, the posi-
tioning of an object with respect to another one, etc.
2. Detect micro-events by grouping image subsequences during which the same con-
figuration of qualitative descriptors holds.
3. Detect events which are defined as sequences of micro-events recognised using
probabilistic state machines. For example a pick-up event (as in Figure 10.8) in-
volves three micro-events: (1) the hand moves towards the object, (2) the hand
touches the object, and (3) both move away together. Processes concerned with
11 The vision system is described in the Ph.D thesis of J-C Baillie. A summary is found here: Steels & Baillie
(2003). Inspiration for the event recognition system came primarily from the paper by Siskind (2000).
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recovering such events use a library of event definitions which is matched against
the stream of micro-events.
An example of output from this subsystem is shown below. Each event has an index (e.g.
77), a time period (e.g. from 780 to 803), other events or properties that have played a
role in recognising this event, a label (e.g. Appear}),and information of the status
(like ongoing or finished).
...
(77 780 803 ((780 2) (783 20)) Appear 5 ONGOING)
(89 784 810 ((784 5) (790 20)) Halt 5 ONGOING)
(87 780 919 ((780 118) (899 20)) Appear 1 ONGOING)
(87 780 924 ((780 123) (904 20)) Appear 0 ONGOING)
(82 904 928 ((904 20) (925 3)) Halt 0 FINISHED)
(95 900 933 ((900 12) (913 20))
Approach_Resttogether 1 5 ONGOING)
(93 904 933 ((904 8) (913 20)) Put 1 0 5 ONGOING)
(92 780 937 ((780 123) (904 33)) Appear 0 FINISHED)
(74 924 937 ((924 3) (930 7))
Resttogether_Moveawayfrom 0 1 FINISHED)
(97 900 944 ((900 23) (924 20)) Halt 1 ONGOING)
(93 929 958 ((929 8) (938 20)) Halt 0 ONGOING)
(80 929 1017 ((929 8) (938 79)) Halt 0 FINISHED)
(91 938 1038 ((938 79) (1018 20)) Appear 0 ONGOING)
...
10.2.2.4 Qualitative descriptors
The third subsystem consists of feature detectors that attempt to find qualitative descrip-
tions for units at different levels of the object or event hierarchy. The result of all these
processes is a set of streams, reporting objects and their properties dynamically in re-
sponse to a changing world as well as the roles these different objects play in the events.
A (short term) memory of these streams is kept as events unfold. It is used by the seman-
tic system to construct or interpret the semantic structures that have to be expressed.
Here is a small snapshot of the state of this visual memory with time stamps when the
states occurred.
...
(CAUSE-MOVE-INSIDE ev-7 TRUE) <15:50:2>
(CAUSE-MOVE-INSIDE-TARGET ev-7 obj-1) <15:50:2>
(CAUSE-MOVE-INSIDE-PATIENT ev-7 obj-2) <15:50:2>
(CAUSE-MOVE-INSIDE-AGENT ev-7 YOU) <15:50:2>
(HALT ev-3 TRUE) <15:49:41>
(HALT-ARG ev-3 obj-1) <15:49:41>
(MOVE ev-1 TRUE) <15:49:24>
287
10 Beyond the Talking Heads experiment












Since this pioneering vision work, subsequent language game experiments on robots
have all been using similarly sophisticated vision systems and currently such systems
are standard components on commercially available robots.
10.2.2.5 Scaling up the language system
Not only the vision system, but also the language system had to be scaled up significantly
to do these experiments. Together with Nicolas Neubauer, I built upon the formalism I
had developed for the early syntax experiments, designing and implementing a next
generation system, called cogar, which stands for Cognitive Grammar Architecture.12
Here is a brief description of this formalism.
cogar represents syntactic and semantic structures as frames with units, slots and
constraints on the slots. The frames are in many ways similar to the feature structures
used in feature-structure based grammars such as hpsg, although there are many impor-
tant differences. For example, each unit has a unique name so that it becomes possible to
refer back to units in defining constraints. cogar also used logic variables (denoted by a
symbol with a question mark in front) as opposed to path descriptions, which lead to the
adoption of techniques from logic programming. The syntactic and semantic structure of
a particular utterance are coupled together as a coupled feature structure by making the
unit-names shared. Often both are combined when the coupled feature structure needs
to be displayed as in this example below.
((unit-15
(scope utterance)
(subunits (unit-17 unit-18 unit-16))




12 No official publication of the cogar system exists. Such technical papers are virtually impossible to get
published in journals or conferences. There was however a technical report: Steels (2001).
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This example could have been constructed, either in parsing or producing, for the utter-
ance po smooth move-away-from. Syntactic properties such as the form of the word, the
ordering of the units, or the grammatical categories of a unit are represented explicitly
on the syntactic side and the meaning and referent are represented on the semantic side.
In general, cogar allows the representation of any kind of information at whatever level
of linguistic analysis as part of a feature structure.
Notice that the arguments for a predicate describing an event are decomposed into
separate predicates, one for each argument. For example move-away-from (?event, ?ob-




?state is bound to true, false or unknown.
The lexicon and grammar in cogar takes the form of a set of bi-directional rules.
The rules have two poles which are typically the semantic and syntactic pole, although
there could be rules that work only on the syntactic level and others that work on the
semantic level. The rules are applied from right to left in production and from left to right
in parsing. The rules can have variables at any position and in any of the two poles. In
order to be applicable, one pole of the rule has to match, which means that the structure
defined in the pole had to have correspondents within the target structure, possibly after
binding the variables to concrete symbols in the coupled feature structure. If a complete
match is found, the other pole is merged with the target, which means that all variables
get instantiated and every element which is not yet in the target is added. The underlying
computationalmodel of cogar is therefore similar to a rule-based inference system, with
an inference engine that cycles through the rules until no more rules can be applied. The
variables are logic variables and hence thematching andmerging is similar to the process
of unification as used in prolog or other logic programming languages.
Here is an example of a lexical rule that defines the meaning of the word for an event
move-away-from. The referent is the object that is referred to by the word, in this case it
is the event itself.
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((?unit
(meaning







Next, here is an example of a rule for the marker po. On the semantic side it ensures that
the referent of one unit whose referent is ?source is equal to the object filling the argu-
ment move-away-from-2 in a move-away-from event. On the syntactic side, it triggers
when there is a word that has the grammatical category takes-marker-1 and is preceded














There are additional rules that specify which word takes which marker, by assign-






((?unit (form (== smooth))))
Themarker po in the above example is entirely specific for one argument of the move-
away-from predicate, as would be the case when the second strategy is enacted. To
implement the third strategy (to achieve more abstract semantic roles) requires that the
markers become generic, which implies that we get additional rules that recategorise the
arguments of a predicate in terms of semantic roles like: agent, patient, source, etc. Here
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is an example of a rule that has this effect. role-1 is an example of a semantic role created












(expanded-meaning (== (role-1 ?evnt ?source))))
And the rules that click everything together now operate over semantic roles as shown
in the following example:
((?predicate
(expanded-meaning (== (role-1 ?event ?source))))
(?unit (referent ?source)))
<--->
((?unit (gramcat (== takes-marker-1)))
(?marker-unit (form (== po)))
(<< ?marker-unit ?unit))
Recall that all rules must be reversible and that the conditional part must match and the
concluding part must unify.
10.2.2.6 Analogy as the driver of generalisation
There is of course a lot more to say about how all this works computationally and about
how these rules are built during learning. The reader is referred to the references given
earlier. But let us here just focus only on the very non-trivial question where role-
abstractions like agent, patient, or source come from. Analogy, which is clearly a basic
feature of human cognition in general, is proposed as the key mechanism. When agents
have to express which argument an object fills in an event, they first try to see whether
there is already amarker that expresses an argument in an analogous event. When this is
the case, the marker is first generalised to express a new semantic role (if it was not yet a
role) and then the unexpressed event-argument is categorised in terms of this role. If the
hearer encounters a new use of a marker, he will also use analogy to find the connection
between the event used earlier on and the newly encountered event.
Operationalising analogy is extremely difficult because humans tend to incorporate
almost anything in how they make analogical inferences and inferences are heuristic as
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opposed to rigid logical derivations. The analogical mapping used in the case grammar
experiment starts from two events, further called the source-event, for which some rela-
tions have already been expressed, and the target event for which a marker needs to be
constructed. The first step in analogy-making consists in decomposing both events into
the primitive micro-events that the vision system is using to recognise the event. The
second step is to find a mapping between them.
Here is an example showing how the argument walk-to-1 is mapped onto the argu-
ment move-inside-1. The walk-to event features two arguments, walk-to-1 (the agent
walking) and walk-to-2 (the target towards which the agent is walking). It consists of
four micro-events: The agent does not move, the target does not move, then the agent
approaches the target, and then the agent touches the target. This means that the event
(WALK-TO-2 ev-100 JILL) (WALK-TO-1 ev-100 JACK)
(WALK-TO ev-100 TRUE)
expands into:
(MOVE ev-165641 TRUE) (MOVE-1 ev-165641 JACK)
(MOVE ev-165419 FALSE) (MOVE-1 ev-165419 JILL)
(APPROACH ev-165486 TRUE) (APPROACH-2 ev-165486 JILL)
(APPROACH-1 ev-165486 JACK)
(TOUCH ev-165633 TRUE) (TOUCH-2 ev-165633 JACK)
(TOUCH-1 ev-165633 JILL)
The move-inside event has also two arguments: move-inside-1 (the agent moving) and
move-inside-2 (the location in which the agent is moving). It consists of eight micro-
events: The agent is visible, the location is visible, the distance between the agent and
the location decreases, the location does not move, the agent does not touch the location,
then the agent touches the location, and then the agent becomes invisible. The following




therefore expands into the following micro-events:




(MOVE ev-161794 FALSE) (MOVE-1 ev-161794 HOUSE-1)
(TOUCH ev-161801 FALSE) (TOUCH-2 ev-161801 HOUSE-1)
(TOUCH-1 ev-161801 JILL)
(TOUCH ev-162493 TRUE) (TOUCH-2 ev-162493 HOUSE-1)
(TOUCH-1 ev-162493 JILL)
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(VISIBLE ev-161791 TRUE) (VISIBLE-1 ev-161791 HOUSE-1)
(VISIBLE ev-162665 FALSE) (VISIBLE-1 ev-162665 JILL)
Next each micro-event in the target-event is paired with all micro-events in the source-
event which use the same predicate. Micro-events which cannot be mapped this way are
ignored. The temporal information which is part of the hierarchical event description is
not used either. For the mapping from the move-inside event to the walk-to event, we
get the following result:
move-inside event => walk-to event
(TOUCH ev-162689 TRUE) => (TOUCH ev-165633 TRUE)
(TOUCH-1 ev-162689 JACK) => (TOUCH-1 ev-165633 JILL)
(TOUCH-2 ev-162689 HOUSE-1) => (TOUCH-2 ev-165633 JACK)
(TOUCH ev-161796 FALSE) => (TOUCH ev-165633 TRUE)
(TOUCH-1 ev-161796 JACK) => (TOUCH-1 ev-165633 JILL)
(TOUCH-2 ev-161796 HOUSE-1) => (TOUCH-2 ev-165633 JACK)
(MOVE ev-161794 FALSE) => (MOVE ev-165419 FALSE)
(MOVE ev-165641 TRUE) (MOVE-1 ev-161794 HOUSE-1) =>
(MOVE-1 ev-165419 JILL) (MOVE-1 ev-165641 JACK)
A goodmapping is such that the filler of the argument of interest (in this case Jack, which
fills the move-inside-1 argument in the move-inside event) always maps onto the same
object in the source-event. This is indeed the case here because Jill, which fills the role of
move-inside-1 in the walk-to event, always plays the same role in all source micro-events
as Jack in the matching target micro-events. Note that walk-to-2 would not extend by
analogy to move-inside-2 because the object house-1 (which fills the role of move-inside-
2) maps onto different object roles in the source-event. Once the analogy established, the
marker already available for the walk-to-1 event-object relation is re-used for marking
the move-inside-1 relation.
Here are some results from comparative experiments using real world data. The graph
in Figure 10.10 compares the number of markers that have been derived by the agents
for two experiments, each using data from the same series of 1300 language games. The
first experiment (top graph) does not use analogy, hence new markers are created for
every argument in every predicate that needs to be expressed. The grammars basically
stabilise after about 700 games with 28 markers. In the second experiment (the two
bottom graphs) the strategy with analogy has been used. There is a graph showing
the growth in the number of role markers and another one in the number of argument
markers. Agents generated 4 role markers in the second experiment, covering a wide
range of events, and 7 more specific argument markers, which might still be generalised
later. The grammars of the agents stabilised much earlier after 200 games, which proves
the point that the use of analogy not only results in a more compact grammar with more
expressive power, but also in a grammar that is faster to emerge and easier to learn.
This first case experiment was only the beginning of more thorough and systematic
research by Remi van Trijp who scaled up the experiment to multi-agent simulations and
made several additional discoveries, such as the necessity to use multi-level alignment
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(Steels, van Trijp & Wellens 2007). But the early experiment was already of huge impor-
tance to open the path towards realistic grammars. In parallel, other areas of grammars
began to be tackled, particularly grammars for tense and aspect.13
10.3 Conclusions
This chapter described a first batch of language game experiments, happening at the
same time or right after the Talking Heads experiment. They were beginning to climb
slowly up on the long andwinding path towards languages that are similar in complexity
from the viewpoint of interaction, perception, conceptualisation and grammar to human
natural languages. The research landscapewas becoming clearer but at the same time the
enormity of the challenges that remained became obvious. There is clearly not a single
simple mechanism that can explain all of language. Instead we have to do concrete case
studies to advance the state of the art step by step, both for the explanation of concrete
language phenomena such as perspective reversal or case grammar, and for finding the
general theory that underlies the emergence and evolution of language.
Increased efficiency 
games 
Argument markers without analogy!
Argument markers!
Role markers!
Figure 10.10: Comparison between two different strategies: The top-graph shows the
growth in the average number of markers for the event-specific marker
strategy. The bottom two graphs show the average size of the set of mark-
ers when analogy is used. As usual, the y-axis shows the number of games
played. Overall, fewer markers are needed, making the case marking sys-
tem more efficient and thus explaining why we get abstract semantic roles.
13 Work on tense and aspect was first carried out by Joachim De Beule and reported in: De Beule (2004),
De Beule, De Vylder & Belpaeme (2006). It was then continued in (Gerasymova, Spranger & Beuls 2012),
although this domain still remains in an exploratory phase today.
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robots
This chapter discusses additional language game experiments directly inspired by the
Talking Heads experiment, set up after 2005. Major breakthroughs along several di-
mensions have been achieved. Robots became hugely more complex, with humanoid
shapes, and going from a few degrees of sensing and actuation to close to a hundred. The
grammar formalisms developed for language game experimentsmatured, specifically the
Fluid Construction Grammar formalism, developed as a successor of the cogar formal-
ism reported in the previous chapter.1 Semantics was scaled up from propositional and
predicate logic to fully open-ended procedural semantics. And last but not least the the-
ory of semiotic dynamics received a major impetus when statistical physicists became
seriously involved, applying techniques and methods from complex systems science to
study language game dynamics, Loreto & Steels (2007). A large number of contribu-
tions were made by Loreto’s Statistical Physics group at the University of Rome (La
Sapienza), see in particular: Dall’Asta et al. (2006) and Baronchelli, Loreto & Tria (2012).
A full overview of all these developments is beyond the scope of this book. Instead we
only look here at developments that directly pertain to language game experiments with
robots.
While introducing these experiments I will highlight two conceptual breakthroughs:
semiotic networks and language strategies.
• A semiotic network consists of a weighted network that links words to concepts,
concepts to prototypes, and prototypes to sensory experiences. Each agent con-
structs his own semiotic network but through consecutive interactions these net-
works become progressively similar. From this perspective, setting up a language
game requires a definition and operationalisation how new nodes are created in
this network, how new links are made between the nodes, and how the weights
between nodes are adjusted.
• A language strategy is helpful to think about how we can go beyond individ-
ual words and towards more complex grammatical expressions. It was already
introduced in the previous chapter. A language strategy is a particular way to
deal syntactically and semantically with one domain of meaning. It includes ways
for conceptualising, expressing, acquiring and expanding a specific domain. For
example, the colour domain requires not only strategies for basic colour terms
1 A full introduction into Fluid Construction Grammar is beyond the scope of this book. The interested
reader is referred to the following two paper collections: Steels (2011) and Steels (2012).
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(like ‘blue’), but also for graded membership expressions (‘very blue’), composite
colours, (‘greenish blue’), analogical colours (‘sky blue’), a.o. The Talking Heads
experiments used a single strategy that was entirely hard-coded: discrimination
trees for categorisation and words without syntax to express distinctive categories.
Research efforts moved towards the study of other strategies, and to the question
how such strategies may arise (discussed in the next chapter).
The remainder of the present chapter illustrates these two notions through different
language game experiments: The Proper Naming Game and the Action Naming Game
illustrate the use of semiotic networks. The Colour Description Game and the Spatial
Language Game illustrate the use of language strategies. These experiments also show
how the focus of research progressively moved towards the emergence of grammar in
co-evolution with more complex compositional, but still grounded, semantics.
11.1 The Proper Naming Game
Around 2005, the same team that had built the aibo robot at the SonyCorporation central
laboratories, managed to make another enormous leap forward by building the qrio
humanoid robot. This robot is about 60 cm tall and weighs 7.3 kg. Its sensors include two
cameras in the head, a microphone, and sensors in each motor joint to monitor posture
and movement. The robot has enough computing power and battery to autonomously
walk around on its two legs and perform various actions in the world. The qrio never
made it to a commercial product for economical reasons. However, we were able to use
qrio robots to carry out a series of ground-breaking experiments that without doubt
pushed the state of the art in language games forward considerably. The teleportation
infrastructure developed for the original Talking Heads experiment was used again to
allow experiments with populations of agents, despite having only a few robotic bodies
available. For every game, two agents were downloaded into the on-board memory and
processors of the qrio robot and after a game, the state of the agent was uploaded back
to a central server. Agents never interacted without being physically instantiated in the
world.
Initially the experiments were very close to the Talking Heads experiments but pro-
gressively they tackled more and more challenging semantic domains including action
description, spatial expressions, and quantifiers, and consequently the complexity of the
grammar increased. This section discusses one of the first experiments, namely for the
emergence of a vocabulary of proper names, i.e. names for individuals.
In January 2007, Luc Steels, Martin Loetzsch, and Michael Spranger travelled to the
Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Tokyo to do the first experiments with the qrio
robots. We decided to redo the Talking Heads experiment, but focusing on proper names
for individual objects, rather than the emergence of generic terms such as colours, shapes
or positions.2
2 The first paper on the Proper Naming Game is: Steels & Wellens (2007) It also discusses the concept of a
semiotic network. Amore recent paper is: Steels et al. (2012). Amore in-depth discussion of the experiment
is included in the Ph.D thesis of Martin Loetzsch, defended in 2014 at Humboldt University.
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We also introduced games with multiple turns: While the agents were looking, we
changed the environment for them, for example putting down a standing block so that
agents could learn the appearance of object from different perspectives and in different
positions. Not many changes were made to the Naming Strategy itself. The lateral in-
hibition strategy of the Talking Heads experiment was entirely adequate. The big issue
was how to identify and consistently recognise objects as individuals and to figure out
how language could help agents to do so.
The general set-up for the Proper Naming Game experiment is shown in Figure 11.1.
We see two qrio robots and an environment consisting of objects of various sizes and
shapes. At any time a new object can be added or the position of an object can be changed.
So the world is entirely open and robots do not know how many individuals there are.
Importantly, the robots had to recognise an object as an individual, independently of its
position. If a specific object disappeared from the world and was put back later, the same
name would still have to be used.
Figure 11.1: Set-up for the Grounded Proper Naming Game. Two Qrio robots are playing
a game of reference about individual objects in their environment. They are
using proper names and hence have to recognise objects as individuals.
11.1.1 Challenges
It is useful to emphasise how extraordinary difficult this task is, even though the Talk-
ing Heads experiment and earlier experiments with the aibo already provided a good
foundation. These difficulties are encountered for communication within any group of
autonomous physically embodied agents and hence also humans. First of all it is ex-
tremely challenging to set up joint-attention frames with free roaming robots, which
may explain why no other animals except humans can self-organise shared symbolic
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systems. For the Proper Naming Game experiment, a robot moves around until another
robot comes into view and remains sufficiently stationary. Both robots follow this strat-
egy and so sooner or later a pair of robots find each other and a game becomes possible.
Next the robots both scan their immediate environment and build up an initial world
model. They keep tracking the environment because it may change as games are being
played. Because the robots can detect each other, they can reconstruct what the scene
looks like from the other’s point of view, which is particularly relevant for experiments
on spatial language discussed later. Moreover the speaker could provide a correction
in case of communicative failure by physically pointing to the topic, although the reso-
lution of the vision system of the qrio was not fine-grained enough to actually detect
pointing gestures, so the direction of pointing was transmitted directly, although this is
still a noisy communication channel because the observer has to interpret this direction
in terms of his own perception of what the other agent might be seeing.
Second, it is non-trivial to identify physical objects based on visual sensations, partic-
ularly if both the objects and the robot move around. The robot cameras yield images
at a rate of 30 images/sec. Each image must be analysed in quasi-real time to detect re-
gions that may correspond to objects and track them over time. Once object regions are
found, feature detectors can compute values for colour, brightness, position, width, size,
texture, speed of movement, direction of movement, etc., but these will always be very
noisy (see Figure 11.2).















































Figure 11.2: A robot is looking at consecutive scenes (from top to bottom) and tracking
the objects in the scene. One object (labelled O716) is moved by a human
experimenter. We see from left to right: the original source image, results
of region detection and colour segmentation, the (average) value for one di-
mension of one object (O716), the segmented and labelled objects, and the
world model, including the position of the other robot (indicated by a point-
ing arrow).
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We call the feature vector for each object a sensory experience. It is represented
using a spiking diagram, with a spike for each dimension and the value on that dimension
marked (see Figure 11.3, left-most column). Real world vision is difficult enough, but
because the robots look at the scene from different points of view, they often do not
carve out the same regions and they will certainly see different views of the objects
and locate them in different positions within their own egocentric reference frame. So
sensory experiences of the same scene are always going to be different. This makes
coordination and hence successful communication very challenging.
Third, it is very difficult to establish which individual is associated with a particu-
lar sensory experience because the appearance of an object changes, depending on its
posture, its position with respect to the viewer, and the changing light conditions in
the environment. A standard method in object recognition, for which there is also ev-
idence in human subjects, is to capture the invariant properties of a particular view of
an object in terms of prototypes. A prototype has for each sensory dimension a typical
value and a tolerated variance within which the certainty of recognising the prototype
decreases. Prototypes are also displayed using a spiking diagram, with a spike for each
dimension and an indication of the best value as well as the minimum and maximum
(see Figure 11.3). Internally, agents store a set of cases and compute the mean value for
each dimension as the typical value and the variance as a way to determine minimum
and maximum cut-off points. So the learning and adjustment of categories is statistical
in nature.
The best matching prototype for a given sensory experience is found by a weighted
sum of the match for each dimension. Many neural network models exist that perform
this kind of computation, such as Radial Basis Function networks, and their behaviour is
well understood. But the difficulty here is that robots do not have access to a clear data set
of examples and counter examples from which they can learn how a prototype should
be defined. Moreover clusters found through unsupervised learning (such as through
Kohonen nets) may not necessarily correspond to the prototypical views of an object. In
addition, each agent independently and autonomously develops his own repertoire of
prototypes based on his history of interactions with the world and others. Hence it is
totally unlikely that the agents have exactly the same set of prototypes, which further
aggravates the coordination and communication problem.
Fourth, although an individual may have some notion of the invariant properties of
an object, usually there are significant differences between different views of the same
object. So reliable object recognition requires the acquisition of different (prototypical)
views and this raises the question how the robots can know whether two quite different
views (for example a front view of an object standing up and a back view of the same
object laying down) belong to the same object.
Finally, the robots must build up a lexicon associating names with individuals. When
no name exists yet, the robots can baptise the object with a newly invented name that
will spread in the population through consecutive games because hearers can acquire
the meaning of an unknown name based on feedback from the speaker after a game.
But since a language game is always a local interaction between only two agents, it is
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possible that another agent has invented a different name for the same object which
also has propagated to some extent, and so synonymy (different names for the same
object) is unavoidable. Moreover because of the inherent noise and unreliability of visual
perception and recognition of pointing gestures as well as different prototype boundaries
for different agents, it is possible that one agent makes an incorrect guess about the
meaning of an unknown name or misinterprets feedback and thus acquires a different
meaning for a name. So homonymy (different objects for the same name) is unavoidable
as well. This raises the critical question how a shared optimal vocabulary can be reached
at the level of the population without central control or telepathy, which will require
mechanisms for damping synonymy and homonymy at the individual and population
level.
11.1.2 Semiotic networks
We have already seen from earlier experiments that the solution to these various issues
lies in setting up the right kind of “semiotic dynamics”. In the present case, this dynamics
should gradually coordinate sensory experiences, prototypical views, individuals, and
names, both within a single individual and across the population. This led to the notion
of a semiotic network, which was a significant conceptual advance in the methodology
of conceiving and carrying out language game experiments.
A semiotic network of an agent a is defined as Sa = Oa × Va × Ia ×Na where Oa is
the set of sensory experiences of the agent grouped per scene, Va the set of prototypical
x position: 0.45 






































Figure 11.3: In the Proper Naming Game experiment the memory of the agents is con-
ceived in terms of a semiotic network that spans the full semiotic cycle from
sensory experience and conceptualisation to naming.
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views maintained by a, Ia the set of individuals known to a, and Na the set of names
in a’s vocabulary (see Figure 11.3 ). Each link in the network is weighted (with a real
number between 0.0 and 1.0). The weight of the link between a sensory experience and
a prototypical view is based on nearest neighbour computation. The other weights are
stored in memory and reflect the confidence of the agent in the use of that link based on
past experience.
A semiotic network is bidirectional and dynamic in the sense that new nodes can be
added or removed as a side effect of a language game and the weights between nodes
change based on the outcome of a game. In order to decide which name to use for a
chosen topic, the speaker traces pathways in his private semiotic network. He starts from
the set of sensory experiences perceived in the current scene, activates the best matching
prototypical views, activates the individuals linked to these prototypical views, and then
looks up the names for these objects. The pathway that has the highest cumulative score,
which is the sum of all weights of the links involved, is considered to be the winner and
the name occurring at the endpoint of this path is the name transmitted by the speaker
to the hearer.
Conversely, in order to decide which physical object to point at given a name, the
hearer traces pathways in his own semiotic network but in the other direction. He starts
from the name, looks up the individuals associated with this name, then the possible
prototypical views associated with this individual, and then the sensory experiences
belonging to the object regions in the current scene which are the best matches with
these prototypical views. The pathway with the highest cumulative score is the winner
and the object occurring at the endpoint of that path is considered by the hearer to be
the topic to which he should point. The speaker then interprets the pointing gesture and
gives non-linguistic feedback about success or failure.
Given this notion of a network, the key question for designing an effective strategy
for playing the language game becomes: What are the operators that are building and
changing the semiotic networks in each agent? We focus first on the vocabulary, i.e. the
links between nodes for individual objects mi and their names fi. We use a variant of
the strategy used in the Talking Heads experiment. Only the hearer changes the score
after a game. In the case of a successful game, the score σfi,mi of the used association is
increased and its competitors are decreased according to the following equations with
the alignment rate γ = 0.2:
σmi,fi≤← σmi,fi(1− γ) + γ (11.1)
σmj ,fi≤← σmj ,fi(1− γ)j ̸= i (11.2)
σmi,fk≤← σmi,fk(1− γ)k ̸= i (11.3)
A competitor is another individual mj stored in the hearer’s memory for the name fi
or another name fk for the individual mi. When the speaker is using a name which is
not linked in the network of the hearer to any individual, then the hearer adds a new
301
11 Language strategies for humanoid robots
relation between the recognised individual (after pointing by the speaker) and this new
name. This alternative then competes from now on with existing associations through
the lateral inhibition dynamics. We already know from many other experiments that
this strategy, when used collectively in consecutive games between randomly chosen
members of the population, leads to the self-organisation of a shared lexicon due to
positive feedback.3
When an agent sees a scene in which there are different segments, each yielding their
own sensory experience, he can safely assume that these segments belong to different
individuals and therefore must match best with different prototypes. If this condition
is violated, the agent can use the sensory experiences without a unique match as seeds
for new prototypical views and link them to newly introduced individuals. Prototypes
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Figure 11.4: Left: Results for Proper Naming games in a population of 10 agents that have
to name 15 individual objects. We see that a vocabulary establishes itself
after agents have played a few hundred games. There is again the typical
peak until alignment kicks in. The number of individuals is larger than 15,
implying that agents name prototypical views rather than individuals. Right:
Results after the addition of a heuristic based on tracking an object over time.
We see that there are fewer individuals than stored prototypical views, which
means that agents have improved their ability to recognise object identity.
With these mechanisms, the population reaches a high level of communicative suc-
cess (above 90 %). However the average number of individuals in the agents’ semiotic
networks is much larger than the number of distinctive objects introduced in the exper-
iment (see Figure 11.4, left). Apparently, agents are naming prototypical views of indi-
vidual objects instead of the individuals themselves. So we did not adequately address
how a robot learns to interrelate different views. To do this, various heuristics need to
be added.
3 The semiotic dynamics of lateral inhibition has been studied thoroughly by Bart de Vylder as reported in
his Ph.D thesis (2007 at the VUB AI Lab) and summarised in this paper: De Vylder & Tuyls (2006).
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We have operationalised just one example of such a heuristic. When an object is
moving or being moved, its appearance may change but the observer tracking the object
still knows that he is dealing with the same object and so he can exploit this information
to fine-tune his semiotic networks. Because the vision systemwe used on the qrio robots,
developed by Michael Spranger,4 is able to track an object, it can align object regions
across different images, enriched with top-down predictions of how an object region
will change over time based on Recursive Bayesian estimation using Kalman filters. The
object being moved by the experimenter in Figure 11.2 yields two quite different sensory
experiences when standing up or lying downwhichmatchwith two different prototypes,
but thanks to the tracking heuristic, the semiotic network can be rearranged to reflect























Figure 11.5: When the identity of two objects is discovered (because two prototypical
views have been established as belonging to the same individual object), the
former nodes for identities can be merged while keeping the links to their
names intact.
Figure 11.4, right shows what happens when the robots use this heuristic. The popula-
tion exhibits still the same capacity to achieve communicative success as in Figure 11.4,
left, but now the number of individuals has significantly lowered, becoming equal to the
number of distinct objects that were introduced (i.e. 15). So the heuristic has done its
work.
Clearly humans use many additional heuristics. For example, if we see somebody
walking into a building with a refrigerator and we later see the same person on the top
floor handling a refrigerator we assume it is the same refrigerator, even if we could not
track this object. Or if we know that a particular person is going to come and visit, and
next we hear the bell and open the door, we expect and recognise this particular person
even if clothes or hair have changed drastically. The point of the present experiment
was not to operationalise all imaginable heuristics but to show that heuristics help to
4 This system is described in-depth in: Spranger, Loetzsch & Steels (2012).
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optimise and coordinate semiotic networks and thus further increase the ability of a
population to develop internal shared representations anchored in the world.
11.2 Action Games
As a second example of how thinking in terms of semiotic networks is useful, we turn
to an experiment building further on the work on action-word learning using the aibo
reported in the previous chapter. It was first designed and carried out with the qrio robot
in 2007/2008 by Luc Steels and Michael Spranger with considerable help from Martin
Loetzsch5 and then ported in 2010 to the myon, a robot developed by Manfred Hild and
his team at the Humboldt University in Berlin (see Figure 11.6) (Steels et al. (2012)). A
BBC video clip of the experiment can be seen at: https://youtu.be/lmoXByLkK14. The
porting exercise showed that once we discover how to do a certain type of language
game on one robot we can relatively easily transfer it to another one, after adapting the
lowest level sensing and actuation routines.
Figure 11.6: Two Myon robots playing an action game. One robot (the speaker) names
an action and the other robot (the hearer) has to perform the action. When
the hearer performs the right action the speaker signals success by nodding
the head, otherwise he performs the action himself so that the hearer can
adjust his semiotic network accordingly. Left: the speaker requests an action.
Middle: the hearer interprets this as moving up both arms. Right: correction
by the speaker.
The basic goal of the experiment is to simulate the emergence of a repertoire of actions
and action terms, such as ‘move up your left arm’, or ‘stretch out both arms’. As often, a
seemingly straightforward semantic domain generates a set of fundamental subproblems
that need to be solved and integrated so that the solutions work together:
1. The robots need a repertoire of actions. So they need a sensori-motor system that
allows them to carry out repeatedly and reliably an action. They can themselves observe
the action both in the visual domain, looking at their own body or looking at their body
in the mirror, or through proprioception, using sensors attached to the motors and joints
on the body. There are many ways in which an action repertoire can be built up. One
5 Papers describing this experiment more fully are: Steels & Loetzsch (2008) and Steels & Spranger (2008a).
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way is through motor babbling: The robot makes random movements and thus explores
the sensori-motor space in order to find possible coherent actions. In the experiments
reported here, the motor actions are acquired by kinesthetic learning: The experimenter
moves parts of the body of the robot. These movements are recorded by the robot and
he can then play the movement back.
2. The robots need to be able to recognise actions carried out by others. This can be
accomplished again with a prototype-based approach, as in the Proper Naming Game
described in the previous subsection. Each individual action is always slightly differ-
ent from another instance of the same action and so totally accurate matching would
not work. For example, two instances of the same ‘moving up both hands’ gesture will
always look slightly different because of the position of the hands and arms and the
exact starting body posture of the robots or the perspective from which the gesture is
perceived.
The features used in the experiment focus on the upper torso of the robot and are based
on a binary version of the original image. They rely on a standard pattern recognition
technique, known asNormalised CentralisedMoments (Hu (1962)). Moments are a global
description of shape, capturing the statistical regularities of its pixels for area, centre of
mass, and orientation. Centralised moments are invariant to translation and normalised
moments are invariant to translation and scale. Here we use seven moments, so that
an image schema of the upper torso is captured in terms of a feature vector with seven
data points, represented as a graph, although it could also be represented using the spike
diagram used in the Proper Naming Game (Figure 11.7, right). These feature vectors are
then classified using the same prototype-based approach as in the Proper Naming Game.
A prototype of a posture consists of typical points for the seven moments, as well as
a minimum and maximum deviation from each point. The best matching prototype is
found by nearest neighbour computation. New prototypes are created when there is
no prototype that matches distinctively with the sensory experience of a body posture
and matching prototypes are slightly adjusted to integrate new instances, so that the
prototype progressively and adaptively reflects the body postures observed in the world.
3. The robots need a mirror system that relates perceived actions carried out by others
to their own actions. The topic of mirror systems has received a lot of attention the past
decade because cells were discovered in the brain that serve this purpose.6 However the
fact that such cells are discovered in the brain does not yet tell us how mirror systems
are being learned or how they operate. For the action language game, we tried several
approaches.
In one of them, the robot stands before the mirror (Figure 11.8) and observes its own
postures, which generates the data for learning the association between body postures
and prototypes. The robot selects a posture, and activates the corresponding motor be-
haviour. This motor behaviour generates a sensory image and hence a sensory experi-
ence categorised with a particular prototype. Through standard Hebbian learning (which
enforces the connection between nodes that are simultaneously active) the link between
the posture prototype and the motor action gets established and progressively enforced.
6 An overview of mirror system research and its relevance to the question of the origins of language is given
here: Rizzolatti & Arbib (1998).
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Because all robots have the same body shape, a robot can use visual posture prototypes
of himself in order to categorise the body image of another robot, after perspective rever-
sal. Perspective reversal means that the robot is able to detect the position of the other
robot and is able to perform a geometric transformation to map the visual image of the
other robot onto the canonical body position of itself.
4. Once the robots have a reliable mapping between image schemata of postures and
body movements, the lateral inhibition dynamics used in the Proper Naming Game can
easily solve the task of evolving a shared vocabulary. The score of the association be-
tween a word and a posture prototype is increased in a successful game and synonyms
decreased. In an unsuccessful game, the score of the used association is decreased. Fig-
ure 11.9 shows the global behaviour of a population of 10 agents after each individual has
coordinated motor behaviour and visual body-image through the mirror for 10 postures.
100 % success is reached easily after about 2000 games. After 1000 games, which means
200 games/agent, there is already more than 90 % success. The graph shows the typical
overshoot of the lexicon in the early stage as new words are invented in a distributed
fashion followed by a phase of alignment as the agents converge on an optimal lexicon.
This experiment shows that other language games, which do not rely on feedback
through pointing, can be set up easily. Here the feedback happens through the actions
of the hearer. The experiment also shows that the same technique of setting up a semiotic
network can be applied to other domains. The network used here is shown in Figure 11.10.
Compared to the Proper Naming Game, we see the same relation between sensory ex-
periences, visual prototypes, postures (instead of nodes for individuals), and words. But
now there is an extra dimension because motor behaviours achieving a posture are also
linked with the posture nodes. This suggests also another approach besides the use of a
mirror for coordinating the relationships between perception and motor action: When
the hearer has learned to associate a word with a particular posture node through the
visual prototype of this posture, he can later get feedback on which motor behaviour
should be associated with the same posture node, or, vice-versa, he can first learn the
association between a motor behaviour and a word (when the speaker asks to perform
the posture) and then learn what visual prototype corresponds to that. Experiments
show that this method indeed also works to achieve a coherent mirror system, Steels &
Spranger (2008b).
11.3 The Colour Description Game
Already from 2001, as a direct follow up of the Talking Heads experiment, in-depth ex-
periments were started on the emergence of colour vocabularies. This topic was chosen
because there is a substantial body of research on colour in the cognitive sciences, with
detailed analysis of its underlying biology, psychological experiments on colour per-
ception and categorisation and extensive work, often building further on the studies of
Berlin and Kay, on colour language. It is also relatively easy to carry out colour naming
game experiments, because it does not require complex feature extraction and pattern
recognition. Moreover the grammar for colour descriptions is highly restricted and so
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Figure 11.7: Left: Example postures of the robot (which is the qrio in this case). Right:
Visual analysis. From left to right we see the source image, the fore-
ground/background distinction and object segmentation (focusing on the up-
per torso), and the feature signature of this posture represented as a graph
connecting the values (on the y-axis) of the seven centralised normalised
moments (on the x-axis).
Figure 11.8: The qrio humanoid robot stands before a mirror and performs various mo-
tor behaviours thus observing what visual body-images these behaviours
generate.
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Figure 11.9: Results of the Action Game played by a population of 10 agents for 10 pos-
tures after coordinating image schemata and motor control through a mirror.
The x-axis plots the number of language games. The y-axis shows the run-
ning average of communicative success and average lexicon size.
Figure 11.10: Semiotic network linking sensory experiences, visual prototypes of pos-
tures, nodes for postures acting as mirror neurons, and nodes triggering
the motor behaviour that achieves the posture. Nodes for words (shown as
squares) are associated with the posture nodes.
308
11.3 The Colour Description Game
it is a good micro-domain for advancing not only research in the interaction between
categorisation and naming but also in grammar.
In our group, Tony Belpaeme became the main Ph.D researcher for Colour Naming,
finishing his thesis in 2005.7 This work was then continued by Joris Bleys, who managed
to scale up from colour naming to colour description with a thesis defended in 2010.8
The colour domain has attracted several other language game researchers, attempting to
explain universal trends in colour categorisation.9
Figure 11.11: Set-up with two qrio humanoids, similar to Munsell chip tests used in psy-
chology. The same game as the Talking Heads was used, but only colour
chips were provided as input and the robots use pointing and head move-
ments to provide feedback.
When the qrio humanoid robots became available, we decided to use this existing
work for pushing forward the state of the art in colour language research in two ways:
• To use more realistic circumstances of object perception. Because robots are mov-
ing around in three dimensions and see the situation from different points of view,
the reflection of light changes and is different for speaker and hearer (see Ta-
ble 11.1). This difference did not play a role in earlier experiments but it certainly
plays an important role in the stabilisation and choice of colour prototypes.
• To focus on colour descriptions beyond basic colour terms, i.e. descriptions like
slightly blue, blue-green, bluish green, very bright, shiny yellow, dark red, sky blue,
very dark bluish red, etc. Indeed, it turns out that basic colour terms are used
only in about 10 to 15 % of the occurrences of colour descriptions. The rest are
7 The first extensive paper on this research appeared as: Steels & Belpaeme (2005).
8 This thesis is published as another volume in the present series as: Bleys (2015)
9 Most notably: Puglisi, Baronchelli & Loreto (2008), Baronchelli et al. (2010).
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more complex expressions. Complex colour descriptions require scaling up the se-
mantics and introducing grammar, they also require the introduction of language
strategies as a layer of abstraction above lexical and grammatical constructions.
Table 11.1: Colour perceptions of two robots for the same scene. The robots see the yellow
duck (obj-17 for the left robot and obj-15 for the right robot) fromdifferent sides
and distances and thus perceive very different colour values on the a* and b*







L* 35.5 51.2 50.5
a* 7.7 -17.1 26.7





Together with Joris Bleys and using the vision system developed by Michael Spranger,
we performed language game experiments both for the same set-up as shown in Fig-
ure 11.1, i.e. geometric objects in an environment but now ignoring all dimensions except
those related to colour, and from a set-up that was similar to the Munsell chips used in
psychological experiments (see Figure 11.11). The colour space used by the agents was
the CIE L*a*b* space, where L stands for lightness and a* and b* are the two opponent
channel dimensions (yellow-blue and red-green).
A language strategy has two components: (i) a particular way of conceptualising real-
ity (and learning the categories involved in this conceptualisation) and (ii) a particular
grammatical pattern that suggests to the listener what strategy is intended and provides
the contents to execute the strategy. For example, in the phrase very green, the combina-
tion of an adverb very and a basic colour adjective green suggests a “graded membership
strategy” where not only a basic colour prototype (green) is introduced but also how
close the sample is to this prototype (very). I will now introduce first how the concep-
tual aspect of a language strategy is defined using a procedural semantics system called
IRL and then how the linguistic aspect is defined, using Fluid Construction Grammar.
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11.3.1 Compositional procedural semantics with IRL
Procedural semantics, dating back to research on natural language understanding in the
early seventies by Philip Johnson-Laird, Terry Winograd and Bill Woods, argues that
the meaning of an utterance is equal to a program.10 This approach is very amenable
to grounded language understanding, because programs can be physical actions that
the robot executes or operations over the internal states in memory, such as retrieving
information from the visual data, performing perspective reversal, storing information,
etc. Procedural semantics contrasts with a logic-based approach to semantics which
assumes that facts are available in a fact base and semantics operates bymatching queries
against this database. The problem for a logic-based approach is that there is an infinite
amount of information that can be computed about the world and so it is not possible to
get a complete set of facts. Instead, language actively constrains what facts are collected
about the world. For example, if we say ”the red ball”, the hearer knows that he has
to focus on the shape and colour of the objects in front of him, and so attention and
processing resources can be targeted to those feature dimensions.
To work out the procedural semantics hypothesis, we need to address the question
what the primitives are of these semantic programs, and what computational formalism
is most suited to combine them. Already in 2000, I reported a representation system
for computational semantics, called IRL.11 IRL stands for Incremental Recruitment Lan-
guage, for reasons that will become clear soon. IRL uses a constraint language approach.
Constraint programming languages were pioneered in the seventies by Borning, Steele,
and others. It is a very active field with its own conferences, organisations and journals12
with wide applications in user interfaces, scheduling problems, design, games, etc.
The basic idea of a constraint language is that only data flow is expressed explicitly,
not control flow. There is a set of slots (variables) and a constraint attempts to reduce
the set of possible fillers (bindings) for a slot. Constraints are combined in a constraint
network, based on sharing slots. A solution is found when every slot in the network has
unique bindings. Usually it requires looping several times through the constraints and
often even a rewiring of the constraints to find a solution. A numerical example of a set
of constraints on natural numbers could be:
x = y + z with 2<y<5 and 0<x<5
The constraints expressed here form a network because the same variables x and y
(which are the slots of the network) appear in different constraints (the sum constraint
and two instances of the <-constraint). Given this network, constraint propagation can
compute easily that x = 4, y = 3, and z = 1.
IRL formalises constraints using prefix notation in the following way. Slots are sym-
bols preceded by question marks. Constraints are defined with a list with the first argu-
ment the name of the constraint and the remaining arguments the slots:
(<constraint> <arg1> ... <arg-n>)
10 See for the early research in particular: Winograd (1971), Woods (1981), Johnson-Laird (1977).
11 The earliest paper introducing IRL is: Steels (2000). A more recent description of a new implementation is
reported as: Spranger et al. (2012).
12 see http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/ley/db/journals/constraints/.
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The first argument is called the target of the constraint because it is the most logical
“outcome” of applying a constraint, but as shown in the example above, data may flow
in all directions. The numerical example given earlier translates into the following IRL
program.
(sum ?x ?y ?z)
(between ?y 2 5)
(between ?x 0 5)
How are constraints defined? We need to specify for every possible case how the
constraint can help to constrain the possible values of its slots. Just focusing on the sum
constraint, we have the following cases:
• If ?x and ?y are filled (i.e. bound) we can compute ?z by ?z = ?x - ?y.
• If ?y and ?z are filled we can compute ?x by ?x = ?y + ?z.
• If ?x and ?z are filled we can compute ?y by ?y = ?z - ?x.
• If all three are filled we can test whether the constraint relation holds.
• If only ?x or ?y or ?z is filled, then it is not really possible to compute any of the
others directly, but we can start to enumerate all possibilities if this is a finite set.
The latter is not always possible because any number from the infinite set of numbers
can be a filler and so it is better to wait until perhaps other constraints are able to limit
the set of possibilities further. But for finite domains it might be conceivable to generate
a set of possibilities. Concretely, for the above example the between-constraint could
easily generate the list of possible numbers between the two given values.
IRL is a general language for defining constraints and constraint networks. The IRL
system includes a constraint engine (which propagates constraints) as well as a con-
straint network planner, which finds a possible constraint network, given available in-
formation and a goal. Because a constraint network is a structure, it can also be matched
against other constraint networks, for example, to complete a partial network or to find
a network that is similar to another one.
Constraint networks are an obvious choice for grounded (natural) language process-
ing. For example, to interpret the sentence the ball behind the block, it is possible that
there are many blocks, many balls, but only one ball that is behind a block. So the unique
referent of the ball, the block and of the total noun phrase only become clear when all con-
straints have been applied. Natural languages clearly do not supply control information
but assume that the interpreter is smart enough to interpret constraints based on data
flow. The other properties of constraint programming are also important. The constraint
network planner can be used for conceptualising what to say and the constraint network
matcher is highly useful in parsing an incomplete language fragment or in learning the
meaning of a new grammatical construction.
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11.3.2 Building blocks for natural language semantics
What is the nature of the constraints that we will need for the semantics of natural lan-
guage? Take a phrase like the ball behind the block. It invokes the following constraints,
also called semantic operations:
• the ball evokes a constraint to use a prototype [ball] to find a referent in the
current scene.
• The same holds for the block which uses another prototype [block].
• The preposition behind implies another constraint, namely to use the spatial re-
lation [behind] to filter a set of objects (namely those found by using the [ball]
prototype) and retain only those that satisfy the behind-relation to an object in
another set.
In IRL notation we get the following. There are first variables for the semantic entities
(prototypes and relations) involved:
(bind prototype ?prototype-1 [BALL])
(bind prototype ?prototype-2 [BLOCK])
(bind relation ?relation-1 [BEHIND])
Next there are four constraints: to get the context, come up with the set of blocks (bound
to ?object-set-1), the set of balls (bound to ?object-set-2), and then pick out the object that








Note how the different semantic operations are linked together because they share slots.
?referent is the final result of the network, which would be the topic of the language
game.
It should be possible for the filter-using-prototype operation to either apply a filler
for ?prototype-1 and ?context and then compute ?object-set-1, or provide ?object-set-1
and ?context and obtain a filler for ?prototype-1. The ’normal’ use is the first one, but
the second use is just as important in planning what to say (as speaker) or in guessing
a possible prototype while learning the meaning of some unknown word. Moreover the
“identify-set-using-prototype” operation can be made smart enough that it can actually
come upwith a new prototype, when there isn’t one yet that does the job. Hence learning
can be integrated directly into the constraint network itself.
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So IRL is in fact a way to integrate the broad set of mechanisms used in pattern recog-
nition (including neural networks) and AI (including machine learning). For example,
an operation could implement a radial-basis-function network for doing categorisation
and use the network to identify an object in a set. It could not only use the network
but also adapt the weights in the network. Another operation could implement cate-
gorisation based on discrimination trees (as discussed in Chapter 4) and would not only
do it, but also expand the discrimination trees when necessary. Other operations could
implement set-theoretic operations, for the semantics of connectives like and, or, and
not, by carrying out union, intersection and complement operations over sets. There
is no limit to the possible semantic operations, except that they have to terminate in
finite time, possibly giving up when they cannot reach a valid result. IRL just provides
a framework to define these operations and make them available to be recruited by the
constraint network planner. IRL uses LISP as the host language, which means that all
the computational machinery of LISP is available to implement semantic operations and
associated learning algorithms.
The constraint network planner works on an evolutionary basis, similar to genetic
algorithms. Starting from the goal (for example identifying a particular object in the
environment), it will generate possible networks by recruiting existing primitive opera-
tions, linking them in, and checking whether the computation makes progress towards
reaching the goal. The slots of a constraint are typed to limit what semantic operations
will be tried next. Networks that perform useful functions are “chunked” into higher
order units that then can be used as units in their own right, thus scaling up complexity.
These chunked networks become associated with stereotyped grammatical expression,
so that there is a very fast retrieval and semantic execution.
11.3.3 Strategies for colour
Let us now look at concrete examples from the colour domain as worked out by Joris
Bleys, studying the following strategies:
1. The first strategy is the Basic Colour Strategy which implements a prototype-
based approach to the basic colour categories. This approach is similar to the one used
in the Proper Naming Game, except that only the three colour-dimensions are profiled
(the opponent channels red-green, yellow-blue and the brightness channel). The strategy
is similar to the one shown earlier.
(equal-to-context ?s1)
(profile-colour-dimensions ?s2 ?s1)
(filter-by-colour-lenient ?s3 ?s2 ?cc)
(select-most-activated ?t ?s3)
When the speaker says green, this network is used together with a specific binding of
?cc to the prototype for green (denoted as [green]).
(bind colour-category ?cc [green])
314
11.3 The Colour Description Game
Figure 11.12: Constraint network for the Basic Colour strategy. The colours of each object
in the context are retrieved, their similarity to the prototype computed, and
the one with the highest similarity is chosen.
A graphical representation of this network is shown in Figure 11.12.
2. The second strategy is the Graded Membership Strategy which categorises the
topic first using a basic colour but then qualifies how well its colour fits with the proto-
type. For example, we can say greenish or very green. Some languages (such as Tarahu-
mara spoken in Northern Mexico) obligatory mark graded membership using suffixes.
The core of the constraint network is defined as follows. A graphical representation of
the network is shown in Figure 11.13.
(equal-to-context ?s1)
(profile-colour-dimensions ?s2 ?s1)
(filter-by-colour ?s3 ?s2 ?cc)
(filter-by-membership ?s4 ?s3 ?mc)
(select-most-activated ?t ?s4)
This network grabs the objects in the context and binds them to ?s1 using the equal-to-
context operation. The profile-colour-dimensions operation picks out the colour proper-
ties of the various objects in ?s1 resulting in a new set ?s2. The filter-by-colour operation
computes for each object in the set ?s2 howwell they match with the prototype bound to
?cc, constructing a new set ?s3. The filter-by-membership operation then computes how
well each object in ?s3 satisfies the graded membership qualification bound to ?mc, con-
structing ?s4. And then the select-most-activated operation picks out the best candidate
and binds it to ?t. Other data flows within the same network are possible, for example
to find the bindings of ?mc and ?cc given a context and a referent ?t that needs to be
identified.
The network is entirely general for all expressions that use graded membership and
gets instantiated for a particular case by specifying the semantic entities involved using
the bind operation. For example, Tarahumara has the word sita for a particular colour
prototype and kame for one type of graded membership:
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Figure 11.13: Constraint network implementing the Graded Membership Strategy. It
builds further on the network for Basic Colour Categorisation but adds a
constraint to handle graded membership.
(bind colour-category ?cc [sita])
(bind membership-category ?mc [kame])
3. The third strategy is the Category Combination Strategy which compounds a
category into two new ones, in expressions like greenish blue or red orange. This com-
pounding is not a simple intersection. The set of objects that are greenish blue is not
found by taking all the ones that are green and all the ones that are blue and then the
intersection of the two. Rather, it appears that the discretisation of the colour landscape
is scaled with respect to the colour which appears as head of the phrase and then cate-
gorisation is done. This is achieved with the IRL network shown in Figure 11.14.
4. The next strategy is the Basic Modification Strategy which modifies a colour
along the brightness dimension, as in light green, dull yellow, etc. It is implemented
by projecting the modifying dimension onto the basic colour space whereby the colour
being modified lies on the projecting vector and a new discretisation of the colour space
can be performed. The network for this strategy is shown in Figure 11.15.
Many other strategies for colour can be imagined and some of them are found in
human languages (although not necessarily in English). These strategies always involve
operations over the colour space (such as rescaling, dimensionality reduction, etc.) along-
side additional operations (such as getting the context, picking out a referent, computing
the intersection of two sets, etc.).
11.3.4 Translation to grammar
The Colour Description Game used the Fluid Construction Grammar (FCG) formalism
which was meanwhile being developed by our group with the explicit aim of supporting
experiments in language emergence and evolution. A full exposition of this formalism
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Figure 11.14: Constraint network implementing the Colour Combination strategy leading
to expressions like greenish blue. The filter-by-colour operation now has an
extra argument, namely category-sets, and there is a draw-category-set-to-
category operation that rescales the basic colour category set.
Figure 11.15: Constraint network for the basic modification strategy, for expressions like
light green.
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falls outside the scope of the present book, but there is now a considerable literature for
the interested reader (Steels (2011)). Here we just look briefly at the basic principles by
which IRL expressions are translated into utterances.
FCG represents syntactic and semantic structure in terms of units which have a set
of features and values for these features. The features can be about any layer of linguis-
tic analysis, from phonetics and morphology to various forms of syntactic description
(constituent structure, functional structure, argument structure, information structure),
semantic categorisations or meaning. The syntactic structure to express the basic colour
strategy involves three levels of hierarchy. Units are built and expanded by three types
of constructions (see for example Figure 11.16, left, which is an instantiation of the Basic
Colour strategy in Figure 11.12).
1. There are first lexical constructions that associate a word with the introduc-
tion of a semantic entity such as a colour category or a qualifier for indicating graded
membership. So the meaning for the word yellow introduces a bind-operation, as in:
((bind colour-category ?c [yellow]))
When the word yellow is encountered, a unit for this word is created with this bind-
operation as meaning and the word-string itself as the form. It is the unit called Yellow-
unit in Figure 11.16. The construction also introduces a lexical category (part of speech)
for the word (in this case the lexical category is colour-category) and specifies which
variables in the meaning can be linked with other variables in other units. The variables
are typed. In this case there is one variable ?c which is of type colour-category.
2. Next there are functional constructions that determine in which semantic op-
eration the meaning of a word will play a role. It is necessary to have this layer above
lexical categories because the same word/category can have many different functions.
The choice is determined by the lexical category, and the syntactic and semantic context
as defined in functional and phrasal constructions. For example, an adjective can appear
both in an adjectival function (as in the red block) and as a predicate (as in the block is
red) but it can also be coerced into a nominal function (as in red is a beautiful colour).
The same word can also belong to more than one lexical category, for example, walk can
be a verb (He walks home) as well as a noun (I take a walk).
Functional constructions create a unit on top of the word. For example, in the Basic
Colour Strategy, the colour-category is used in the filter-by-colour-lenient operation (see
Figure 11.12). The new unit is called colour-unit in Figure 11.16, left. Themeaning specifies
the operations to be added to the network, which is in this case:
((filter-by-colour-lenient ?s3 ?s2 ?c))
There are two variables that can be linked to other operations with this meaning: ?s3 and
?s2 both of type object-set. On the syntactic side, the unit is categorised as a constituent
named colour-category.
3. Finally there are phrasal constructions that pull together the functional units in
order to create a phrase. The phrase usually has additional semantic operations as well.
Figure 11.16,left shows an example. The ColourPhrase-Unit is constructed on-top of the
Colour-Unit. It adds three additional operations to the meaning:
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link: (((object-set ?s3) (object-set ?s2)))

















m: ((bind membership-category ?mc [kame]))
Kame-Unit
syn-cat: ((constituent colour-category))
link: (((object-set ?s3) (object-set ?s2)))
m: ((filter-by-colour ?s3 ?s2 ?c))
Colour-Unit
syn-cat: ((constituent membership-category))
link: (((object-set ?s4) (object-set ?s3)))






m: ((bind colour-category ?c [sita]))
Sita-Unit
syn-cat: ((constituent colour-category))
form: colour-unit < membership-unit
link: (((object-set ?s4) (object-set ?s2)))
ColourMembership-Unit
Figure 11.16: Left: Example of structure for the Basic Colour strategy. It involves three
levels of hierarchy: for theword itself, the function of theword, and the com-
bination of the different functions into a Colour-Phrase. Each box shows the
name of the unit, and some of the key features of the syntactic and semantic
pole. Right: Example of structure for the graded colour strategy.
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It links to the variables supplied by Colour-unit (namely ?s3 and ?s2) and the unit itself
has a variable that can be linked further, namely ?t, which is the topic of the whole
utterance. The constituent is called Colour-Phrase.
Figure 11.16, right shows another example, namely the structure for an instantiation
of the graded-membership strategy for the Tarahumara utterance sita kame. It is again a
Colour-Phrase. We see that there are now 4 levels of hierarchy. The ColourMembership-
Unit pulls together a colour-category and a membership-category to form a new colour-
category which then becomes a ColourPhrase-Unit again.
11.3.5 Influence of embodiment
Bleys conducted two types of experiments for each of these strategies, both in computer
simulations and on real robots. The first type of experiment demonstrated that an agent
could learn the colour vocabulary of another agent, given a language strategy. One agent
was provided with an existing human colour system (for example the basic colours of
English, the graded-membership terms of Tarahumara, etc.) and the other agent had to
learn this colour system through situated interactions. The second type of experiment
demonstrated that a population of agents could form a new vocabulary from scratch,
according to the templates provided by a language strategywhichwas given to all agents.
The details of these experiments are published in the Ph.D dissertation of Joris Bleys
(Bleys (2015)).
I report here just briefly one additional experiment, relevant for understanding the
impact of embodiment on language. The experiment compares three conditions (see Fig-
ure 11.17): (i) simulated perception (left column), (ii) shared grounded perception (middle
column), meaning that both robots are given the same perception, and (iii) individual
grounded perception (right column). The latter is the normal case when two robots are
looking at the scene. It furthermore compares results for the Basic Naming Strategy
(implemented with the IRL constraint network in Figure 11.15) for four experimental
conditions:
1. There is a baseline experiment which starts out with the basic English colour
categories provided by design to the agents.
2. An acqisition experiment, where one agent (the tutor) is initialised with a set
of basic colour categories and the other agent (the learning) has to acquire them.
3. A formation experiment which involves a population of ten agents which de-
velop a colour ontology and lexicon from scratch.
4. And an adaptation experiment that starts with agents that are initialisedwith the
English categories but then are allowed to further adapt their lexicons depending






















shared simulated perception (I)
shared grounded perception (II)
individual grounded perception (III)
Figure 11.17: Comparison of three different environmental set-ups (left, right, and middle
columns) and four different learning conditions. Communicative success is
shown on the y-axis.
Interestingly, the best results in terms of communicative success are obtained when
the agents are allowed to evolve their own colour language, partly because there was no
limit on the number of prototypes they could introduce. This was better than using the
set of basic colour prototypes for English, simply because English would turn to more
complex expressions (such as bluish green) when the basic colour categories are not effec-
tive. Moreover, agents still achieve better results compared to the English colour system
when they do not need to stick dogmatically to it. Indeed this shows why alignment,
which is widely observed in human dialogues,13 is a good strategy for achieving more
successful communication.
11.4 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced two major advances with respect to the original Talking
Heads experiment: the use of semiotic networks to build a more sophisticated mapping
between sensory experiences and words, and the introduction of language strategies.
Each language strategy pairs a particular way of conceptualising reality with a particular
method to express it using lexicon or grammar. These developments were illustrated
13 See: Garrod & Anderson (1987) and Galantucci (2005).
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through several experiments with humanoid robots. Each of these experiments was a
major step forward in terms of the use of highly sophisticated humanoid robots with
many degrees of freedom and sophisticated visual processing, grounded compositional
semantics for the meaning of utterances, and a full-fledged formalism for grammar.
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The previous chapters have shown that huge advances have been made in the decade
after the original Talking Heads experiment. It is now realistic to do experiments with
physical humanoid robots, which was unthinkable in the late nineties. Whereas categori-
sation using basic perceptually grounded categories was a big achievement at the end of
the nineties, experiments now routinely use complex compositional semantics. Another
big boost has come from the development of a grammar formalism (Fluid Construction
Grammar) that is adequate from the viewpoint of linguistic complexity and allows at
the same time sophisticated experiments in grammar emergence. We now have several
in-depth studies of language strategies for several domains although much more work
obviously needs to be done to map out the vast landscape of language strategies found
in human languages. This work is difficult and time consuming because each semantic
domain generates its own set of fundamental problems in perception and action, concep-
tual representation, grammar, and language game interaction.
But the sceptical observer will argue that most of these experiments are about lan-
guage emergence rather than language evolution per se. Agents are given a certain set
of strategies, which thus constitutes their innate Language Acquisition Device, and it is
then demonstrated by computer simulations or robotic experiments (i) how these strate-
gies are effective to acqire an existing language system in a population, (ii) how they
are effective to extend a language system so that it remains adaptive to the needs and
environments of its user, and (iii) how a population can invent and coordinate a new
language system from scratch by using the strategy.
Although long-term change is possible given a particular language strategy (for ex-
ample, new colour categories and colour terms might emerge when needed to cope with
new situations in the environment), this change does not alter the set of language strate-
gies available to the agent. Therefore - the critical observer would say - all this does still
not address the question yet where the strategies come from.
12.1 Culture-driven language evolution
To clarify these issues, let us first define a distinction between emergence, language
change, and evolution:
• Language emergence is the phenomenon whereby a language system, i.e. a set of
conventions and conceptualisations for a particular semantic domain, for example
tense-aspect, colour, space or determination, arises in a population and becomes
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shared, based on a particular strategy (or a set of strategies) that is shared by all
agents.
• Language change happens when the components of a language system and its
conceptualisations shift, but the change remains within the bounds of a particular
strategy. For example, the boundaries how different cases are used may shift (as
is happening with the dative and genitive at the moment in German) or a new
basic colour category and colour word may arise and claim a region within the
colour space (as happened with the word ‘orange’ which started to be used as a
basic colour word in 16th century Middle English to occupy a distinctive region
between yellow and red).
• Language evolution occurs when new strategies arise. There is plenty of evi-
dence from creole languages and from historical linguistics that this happens at a
cultural time scale. Here are three examples:
1. Phrase structure (in the sense of strict word order based on abstract hier-
archical patterns) emerged gradually in proto-Indo European, from a stage
with largely free word order but a strong inflectional system (Van de Velde
2011).
2. Word order and prepositions became the dominant strategy instead of mor-
phological cases for expressing argument structure in the late Old English
period (Van Kemenade 1987).
3. There is currently an evolution going on in Spanish clitics (‘le’, ‘la’, ‘lo’)
whereby the etymological system of Standard Spanish, which uses clitics to
express different cases (nominative, dative, accusative), is shifting to a ref-
erential system (expressing gender and number). Case differentiation is lost,
but existing forms are recruited for the new functions implied by a referential
strategy (Fernandez-Ordonez 1999).
It is not always obvious from the observation of language facts whether we are deal-
ing with change (within the boundaries of a strategy) or with a new strategy. However,
this becomes entirely clear when we try to computationally model the processes of ac-
quisition, expansion or invention of the language strategy involved. We always try to
understand change first using existing strategies until we are forced to introduce a new
strategy because the differences at the conceptual or linguistic level are too profound to
computationally handle them.
The distinctions made here map to similar ones in biology. Biological strategies en-
coded in the genome govern the construction of phenotypeswhich include the form of or-
ganisms and their behaviours ensuring survival issues such as predator avoidance, food
gathering, navigation, mate finding, nest building, etc. When we see a swarm of birds
in the sky, or a path formed by ants, or a beaver dam, we see an example of emergence:
A large-scale macroscopic structure emerges from the individual activities of the agents
(i.e. animals) without central control, similar to the way a language system emerges as
a macroscopic shared structure through the individual activities of the linguistic agents.
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The activities of the ants or the beavers are all governed by the same innate strategy. For
example, to achieve path formation, ants put down pheromone when returning from the
nest and they follow pheromone gradients to find a path.
Living organisms are adaptive to their environment and so even within the bounds
of a given set of innate strategies there may still be significant changes observed in ap-
pearance, behaviour or internal functioning. For example, beavers may start using rocks
for dams when mud and branches are not available, birds use plastics or other waste
products, a goat may start to walk on two hind legs when it did not grow the forelegs
(Jablonka & Lamb 2013). Nevertheless true evolution is only said to happen if there
are new innate strategies, i.e. genetically coded strategies, that arise, for example if a
fish species genetically speciates into subspecies where one continues to bread eggs de-
posited on the bottom of the sea whereas the new variant does mouthbrooding, meaning
that eggs are bred within the mouth of a parent. Also in biology it is not always clear
whether we are dealing with adaptive change (without genomic change) or evolution
(with genomic change). Some variants that were thought to be a different species at one
point of time turned out to be ecotypes of the same species, i.e. variants that have the
same genetics but a different appearance or behaviour due to adaptation to the environ-
ment. However today these debates can be entirely settled when a genetic analysis is
performed.
For biological organisms, the standard approach to find out how (innate) strategies
evolved is through the framework of genetic evolution by natural selection and it is
logically possible that language strategies are also innate, in which case we should be
able to figure out how they are genetically coded and evolved. There are indeed several
researchers who strongly favour this hypothesis and they group their work under the
banner of biolinguistics (Boeckx & Grohmann 2013).
But it is also possible that language strategies are the outcome of cognitive develop-
ment and cultural evolution, just like humans have developed a multitude of non-innate
strategies in a wide range of domains: strategies for finding your way in cities, for build-
ing shelters, for preparing food, for playing Jazz piano, for fixing technical equipment,
for organising trade, composingmusic, negotiating a contract, finding a partner, etc. This
is the idea behind the recruitment theory of language evolution, which postulates that
cognition and cultural evolution are the primary motors for the origins and propagation
of new language strategies, even though of course they require the necessary neurobio-
logical capacities that make each strategy possible. Once a strategy culturally evolved,
it exerts a pull effect on genetic evolution, because genetic variants are favoured that
can carry out a strategy more easily. So this hypothesis implies culture-driven gene
evolution rather than gene-driven cultural evolution (Fisher & Ridley 2013).
It is this recruitment hypothesis that has been driving our experiments in language
evolution and this chapter discusses very briefly some of the experiments that explore
this hypothesis with the same rigor and computational backing as the experiments in
language emergence and change discussed in the previous chapters. Much remains to
be done before an experiment can be set up for evolving new strategies in some domain.
We need to understand fully all the cognitive mechanisms required (both the semantic
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and the syntactic aspects). But since we now have at least a good technical basis and
several concrete case studies, as shown in the previous chapters, the study of language
evolution, in the sense of the emergence and propagation of novel language strategies
and their selectionist competition is within reach.
What could a theory of cultural evolution look like? There is certainly no consensus
on this.1 But the most obvious choice is to view cultural evolution as another instance
of a Darwinian evolutionary dynamics, happening at the cultural and cognitive level
rather than at the genetic level. This idea has been suggested by many researchers, in-
cluding Richard Dawkins in his theory of memes (Dawkins 1976). The basic principle
underlying Darwinian dynamics is to split the process of coming up with a design in
three subprocesses:
1. There is a process of generating possible variants, often by making changes to
existing variants or by information transfer between variants, for example through
cross-over.
2. There is a separate process of testing whether these variants satisfy desired se-
lection criteria. This happens usually in a kind of competition where different
variants compete for available resources.
3. There is a self-enforcing causal loop between the outcome of selection and
the frequency with which a variant is maintained and hence used to generate new
variants.
The last step makes Darwinian dynamics cumulative: Partly working solutions can be
built upon further and lead the way to even better ones.
Today, Darwinian evolutionary dynamics is recognised as a general principle that can
and has been applied to many different types of systems, in chemistry, neurobiology or
economics.2 It has also been used successfully to come upwith new artificial systems, for
example to evolve controllers for robots using genetic algorithms (Nolfi & Floreano 2001).
It is therefore not so surprising that selectionism can also be mapped to the cultural and
more specifically to the linguistic domain in the following way:
1. Speakers generate variants, either accidentally through errors in their speech pro-
duction, or deliberately, for example, when they try to express a novel idea by
inventing new forms or appropriating existing forms for new purposes, for exam-
ple, by coercing a word or grammatical construction into a new usage.
2. Which variants will survive in the communal language depends on selectionist cri-
teria. I will discuss them shortly in more detail. They include for example whether
the speaker is understood by the hearer, or whether it reduces the cognitive com-
plexity of parsing and producing and hence allows larger sentences to be under-
stood.
1 See the debate in: Richerson & Boyd (2005).
2 See Arthur (1996), Edelman (1987) and Luisi & Oberholzer (2001).
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3. The self-enforcing causal loop happens when variants created by one speaker start
to propagate in the population and begin to replace their competitors. For example,
a particular word to express a given meaning gets out of fashion and is taken over
by another one. Some of these developments are simply fashion trends, but the
more profound ones, in particular the ones that involve grammar, are related to
critical selectionist criteria.
This Darwinian dynamic is already active in the operation of language strategies, since
a strategy regulates the creation and selection of variants, determines how feedback has
to be handled, and implies a self-enforcing causal loop through lateral inhibition so that
variants satisfying the selection criteria become dominant in the population.
The key argument of this chapter is that the Darwinian evolutionary dynamics also
applies to the evolution of new strategies, which implies that (i) speakers and hearers
have to be able to come up with new language strategies, (ii) selection operates not only
on the level of choices given a strategy, but also at the level of the strategies themselves,
and (iii) there is competition between strategies and a self-enforcing causal loop based
on the success that language users have with the language system they created with
a particular strategy, so that some strategies survive and become dominant and others
fade away.
Linguists are often reticent to use a selectionist approach because they believe that
language is maladapted (Boeckx & Piattelli-Palmarini 2005). However we have to keep
in mind that: (i) An evolutionary process seldom comes up with the perfect solution,
even though it is remarkable effective given that there is no enlightened intelligent de-
signer. (ii) There are conflicting criteria so that there is no optimal solution. For example,
the speaker may want to minimise the effort needed for producing and pronouncing a
sentence but this may make it harder for the hearer to reconstruct an interpretation of
the meaning. (iii) Some of the selectionist criteria have to do with processing. A lin-
guistic theory that only focuses on competence has nothing to say about processing and
therefore cannot lay bare how processing issues play a role in language evolution. (iv)
It is often possible to maintain communicative success with a simpler system (even a
purely lexical language without any grammar at all) and then gradually optimise seman-
tic interpretation by the progressive introduction of more grammar - as we see indeed in
the emergence of creole languages which regenerate syntactic complexity from a lexical
language (Mufwene 2008).
What kind of selectionist forces are relevant in the case of language? Clearly, the bot-
tom line is that language users want to achieve communicative success. Communica-
tive success means that the speaker achieves his or her non-linguistic goal. For example,
if a speaker wants a hearer to perform some action (such as ‘Can you get me the car
keys?’), there is communicative success if the hearer indeed performs the requested ac-
tion. Speakers and hearers generally do not care whether their sentences are perfectly
grammatical or complete or semantically accurate. Speakers assume that hearers are in-
telligent enough to infer the missing information and that they can fill in the required
details from the context. In normal spoken dialogue, communicative success is immedi-
ately obvious, either from the actions that the hearer performs as a consequence of an
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utterance or by gestural cues whereby the hearer informs the speaker that he or she is
being understood.
Communicative success rests on a number of features of a language which thus act as
key selection criteria:
• Expressive adeqacy: The language systems available to the speaker and the
hearer must have the necessary expressive adequacy to reach communicative suc-
cess. The available conceptual systemsmust include the needed conceptual distinc-
tions and the available linguistic systemsmust be able to express these distinctions.
Expressive adequacy depends not only on the goals of the speaker and the available
embodiment but also on the environment. For example, if only black-and-white
pictures are available, a strategy based on hue is entirely inadequate. On the other
hand, if one of the dialogue partners is colour blind, a hue-based strategy would
not work for coloured pictures.
• Cognitive effort: In order to cope with the incredible speed of normal language
production and comprehension, reducing cognitive effort is of primordial impor-
tance. Cognitive effort is expended at all levels of language: How much time and
memory needs to be spent in coming up with adequate conceptualisations? How
complex is the process of constructing a sentence? How difficult is it to articulate
the speech sounds? How efficiently can the sentence be parsed? How complicated
is the interpretation of the sentence? If sentences are too complex to comprehend,
for example because they trigger a large amount of combinatorial search, then
hearers give up. Or if sentences are too hard to produce, the production process
will be too slow to maintain the hearer’s attention. Optimisations of cognitive ef-
fort are often in conflict for speaker and hearer. What requires less effort for the
speaker might mean more effort for the hearer and vice versa.
• Learnability: Speakers must occasionally expand their language systems to ex-
press novel meanings or better capture the attention of hearers with a “fresh” way
of saying something. But these innovations will lead nowhere if they cannot be ac-
quired by hearers. They will lead to communicative failure and the innovation will
not propagate in the population and therefore it has no chance to survive in the
shared language. Learnability depends on whether speaker and hearer share the
same language strategies, how much additional context is available, and how far
the speaker has stretched established conventions to achieve his communicative
goal.
• Social conformity: Speakers and hearers can greatly optimise their language
production and comprehension by making their language systems as similar as
possible. Moreover, details of language use, such as pronunciation, signal to which
group a speaker belongs, and speakers often seek social conformity with the lan-
guage use of their peers in order to belong to the group. Or they mimic the lan-
guage systems of the most prestigious group in order to show they belong to that.
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The opposite happens as well. Speakers may try to mark themselves as linguisti-
cally different from a group to which they do not want to belong.
Language users certainly cannot consciously construct their language to satisfy these
selectionist criteria, even if they would want to. They can have no foresight about all the
possible distinctions that are going to be relevant in their world because new objects,
new artefacts, new types of interactions always come up. They have no obvious way to
know consciously how much cognitive effort a particular sentence is going to require
from the hearer. They cannot know in advance whether a metaphorical extension will
be understood or whether the coercion of a word into a new grammatical function is
going to be grasped by the hearer. And they cannot know for sure what the norm is in
the group because they have no general overview, but can gain evidence only from local
interactions with others whom they might not even be sure of whether they belong to
the same group. The only thing they know for sure (and not even always or immediately)
is whether a communicative interaction was successful. This is why language evolution
has to be a selectionist process. Language users are able to generate or reuse certain vari-
ants but they can never be absolutely sure whether these variants satisfy the linguistic
selection criteria that would lead to more adapted persistent communicative success.
12.2 Fitness landscapes
Organisms use a variety of strategies for survival and offspring production: bodily shape
and appearance, specific sensors and actuators, metabolism, innate behaviours. Biolo-
gists call the ecological area that a particular organism occupies thanks to its physio-
logical and behavioural strategies its ecological niche. A niche is defined through the
ecological conditions (temperature, altitude, habitat type, food availability, presence of
predators, etc.) for which the organism’s strategies are appropriate and hence within
which the species reaches a sufficiently high fitness to survive and fend off predators.
Organisms may also have strategies to alter their environment so that some of their
strategies become more possible or more optimal, a process called niche construction
(Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003)
Niche analysis is performed by defining a multi-dimensional space, further called the
niche space. Each dimension or niche factor has to be dealt with by the species in
order to remain viable. There is consequently a direct relation between the dimensions
of the niche space and the selectionist pressures on the organisms trying to flourish
within that niche which form a fitness landscape. Niche analysis typically examines
how the different species within a delineated geological area are located within the niche
space. It is then possible to see how species overlap, how they compete, how they are
complementary, or whether some species are beginning to occupy a niche left open by
others. Usually the dimensions of the niche space are not known but have to be inferred
through multi-variate analysis from empirical observations of species occurrence and
detailed descriptions of environmental factors (Elith & Leathwick 2009). But it is also
possible to operate in a top-down manner, based on prior analysis of what might be
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niche factors, and to manipulate the environment to detect under what conditions the
members of a species will thrive or not (Nosil & Sandoval 2008).
By analogy with biology, we can apply the concept of a niche to the evolutionary
study of language systems and language strategies. To investigate linguistic niches in
a systematic way, we need to identify first what factors are relevant. Some of these
factors have to do with external conditions, for example, if the language games require
expressing fine-grained hue distinctions or temporal and aspectual distinctions. Others
relate to internal conditions, for example, how big is the search space during parsing,
how much does a model of the situation need to be consulted. Next we can examine the
performance of different systems and strategies for these factors, and map performance
as points or regions in the niche space. Then we can study whether these points move
towards greater or lesser optimality over time, how different systems or strategies com-
pete when occupying the same niche, or how language systems and language strategies
adapt to changes in the ecological conditions and hence the dimensions or critical val-
ues of the niche space. The factors relevant for a linguistic niche include the selectionist
criteria discussed earlier, and they can be analysed by identifying a fitness landscape,
where each dimension is a selection component. I discuss first examples of this kind of
analysis for language systems and then for language strategies.
12.2.1 Fitness landscapes of language systems
To illustrate this approach let us look at a first example, using a fascinating study con-
ducted by Remi van Trijp of change in the German article system as historically observed
over the past 10 centuries.3 The change is puzzling, because the article system started
from a rather clean design in old High German to retain only a few forms in contem-
porary German. This contemporary system seems to be maladapted because the same
forms are now used for many different purposes (syncretism) causing uncertainty and
hence combinatorial search in parsing. For example, in Old High German there was a
three-way gender distinction between masculine, neuter, and feminine for both nomina-
tive and accusative plurals, but in New High German only one form ‘die’ is left. Many
linguists have argued that these changes are just random, caused by phonological ero-
sion and confusion of closely related word-forms. But van Trijp hypothesised that the
changes were actually Optimisations, whereby speakers optimised their own cognitive
effort at the cost of that of hearers, even though the reduction in system complexity
stopped at a critical point to preserve the disambiguation power of the system. See Fig-
ure 12.1.
Van Trijp initialised three populations of agents: with the Old High German system,
the Middle High German system, or the New High German System. He then defined the
following four dimensions for the fitness landscape:
1. Search effort, which is the amount of search that is needed, scaled between
minimum (when there is one marker for every of the 18 possible configurations
and so no search is needed) and maximum (when there are no markers at all).
3 This section draws on the following publications: van Trijp (2013) and van Trijp (2014a).
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Figure 12.1: The German article system has morphological marking for case (nominative,
accusative, dative, genitive), number (singular, plural) and gender (masculine,
feminine, neuter). The system simplified from a well-structured clear system
in old-high German to a system with more syncretism (the same form used
for multiple purposes.)
2. Disambiguation power, which is based on the number of possible interpretations
left after application of the grammar. The disambiguation power is also scaled with
maximum power for 12 markers and minimum for 0 markers (not counting the
genitive).
3. Articulatory effort, which is calculated in terms of the number of movements
that articulators such as the lips and tongue have to make when pronouncing the
different phonemes that make up each article.
4. Acoustic precision, which is based on the phonological distance between words.
Criteria (1), (2) and (4) pertain to the hearer and (1) and (3) to the speaker. They are calcu-
lated for each utterance in a corpus and the weighted average gives a value for the per-
formance of the language system for each of these dimensions. The global performance
can be assessed by taking a (weighted) average of each of the values for all dimensions.
As expected, Old High German scores the highest for disambiguation power and acous-
tic precision and the lowest for articulatory effort and processing effort, thus being an
advantage for the hearer but not for the speaker (see Figure 12.2).
On the other hand, the NewHighGerman systemmanages to become equally effective
for disambiguation while requiring less search effort and articulatory effort, if other com-
plementary cues are made available to the hearer by additional grammatical strategies,
namely grammatical agreement between the article and the noun within a noun phrase,
so that features of the article can be deduced from the noun, and syntactic valence of
the verb, because that suggests which cases noun-phrases and hence their articles may
have. This demonstrates that we should not always focus on a single strategy alone but
have to take other relevant strategies into account. Moreover some forms, which are not
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very distinctive from an acoustic point of view (such as ‘der’, ‘den’ and ‘dem’), and there-
fore risk being collapsed into a single form, are nevertheless maintained because they
are needed to resolve ambiguities that are not mitigated by other syntactic devices. This
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Figure 12.2: Fitness landscape for the Germanmarker system. When the number ofmark-
ers increases (x-axis), the disambiguation power (y-axis) (which takes into
account not only the markers themselves but also the other cues available
for distinguishing gender and number) goes up. However the total perfor-
mance for all four dimensions (y-axis) (which includes articulatory effort
and search goes down). The optimal performance is reached for 4 markers
(New High German has 5 markers whereas old High German had 9.
This example shows how it is possible to analyse the fitness landscape for stages of a
language system at different points in time. The same analysis can also be done for differ-
ent regional variants that are currently competing to become dominant in the standard
language. An example of the latter is the currently ongoing evolution from the etymo-
logical Spanish pronoun system to the referential pronoun systems, which has three
different possible regional variants: ‘leísmo’, ‘laísmo’ and ‘loísmo’. Van Trijp showed
how each of these variants could equally arise with the same referential strategy and
how it is a matter of historical contingency which one becomes dominant. Indeed we
see that different regions of Spain have chosen different variants (van Trijp 2010).
Here is another example of a fitness landscape from the domain of space, developed
by Michael Spranger.4 It focuses on understanding the role of grammar for optimising
spatial language. The experiment involves qrio humanoids (see Figure 12.3) and uses
a sophisticated vision system developed by Spranger, together with IRL and Fluid Con-
struction Grammar (in the previous chapter). A variety of spatial language strategies
were operationalised, in particular:
4 These results are documented at length in: Spranger (2015).
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1. The use of projective relations such as front/back, above/below, left/right. This
requires imposing a coordinate system on the world model and name areas within
this coordinate system. A common coordinate system is to take an object, such as
the human body of the speaker as reference point and project vectors emanating
from the body.
2. The use of proximal relations such as far/near. This requires that the distances
of objects with respect to the reference point are computed and categorised.
3. The use of absolute relations, such as North/West/East/South, related to global
directions.
4. The use of an allocentric landmark (as opposed to an egocentric one) from
which the situation is conceptualised. For example, in the phrase ‘the block in front
of the box’, the box is acting as a landmark and the projective spatial relations are
computed as emanating from that object. Another example is ‘the block on your
left’ where the landmark is the hearer.
Spranger analysed the fitness landscape for grammatical strategies. He compared one
population of agents that was initialised with a pidgin German, i.e. only a vocabulary
for objects and spatial relations but no grammar, and another population initialised with












Figure 12.3: Set-up for the spatial language game experiments. Two robots are looking
at a scene with a few blocks, a bigger box with tags indicating front, back or
left and right side, and a global landmark in the form of a large tag pasted on
the wall. Top left and right: World as seen through the camera of the robot.




1. Scenes with many objects distributed around a landmark.
2. Scenes with several objects but no landmark that can be used as a spatial vantage
point.
3. Scenes with an allocentric and without an allocentric landmark but more complex












combined (more objects)no allocentric landmarkmany objects
Figure 12.4: Investigation how the two language systems (lexical or grammatical) are per-
forming with respect to the communicative success dimension and for each
of the three ecological conditions. A purely lexical system in itself has al-
ready considerable success, but grammar becomes more and more relevant
when the situation becomes more complex. The bottom images show exam-
ples for the three ecological conditions being examined.
Spranger used the following additional internal factors:
1. Communicative success, includingwhether production failed, interpretation failed,
or the hearer pointed to the wrong object (pragmatic failure). We see (Figure 12.4)
that the more complex a situation becomes, the more grammar becomes relevant.
2. Semantic ambiguity, being the number of semantic structures that remain after
syntactic analysis and have to be mapped onto the perceived world in order to
be disambiguated (See Figure 12.5, left). Without grammar there is a lot more
semantic ambiguity and hence more cognitive effort to consult the world model.
3. Interpretation sharing, which takes place when the semantic structure derived
by the hearer is equal to that originally intended by the speaker (See Figure 12.5,
right). Interpretation sharing is important in cases of displaced communication
when agents do not have access to a shared world. We see that without grammar,






























lexicon only vs grammar -- average number of interpretations
lexicon only grammar






























lexicon only vs grammar -- conceptualization-interpretation-equality
combined (more objects)no allocentric landmarkmany objects
lexicon only grammar
Figure 12.5: Left: performance for semantic ambiguity for the same three ecological con-
ditions. We see that without grammar the worldmodel needs to be consulted
heavily to weed out potential interpretations. And Right: Performance for
interpretation sharing. Only with grammar are agents able to share the same
semantic structure, ensuring a higher degree of communicative success.
12.2.2 The fitness landscape of language strategies
We now move one level up, and show how a fitness landscape can be identified at the
level of strategies as well. Rather than supplying agents with language systems, we ini-
tialise them with specific strategies, let them build language systems, and then examine
the performance of these language systems for the different dimensions of the fitness
landscape, so as to understand which niche the strategy occupies. Here is one example
of this approach from the domain of color (developed by Joris Bleys).5
The previous chapter already showed that there are different strategies for colour lan-
guage: basic colour terms, graded membership (‘very green’), compounds (‘sky blue’),
brightness qualification (‘light green’), etc. All these strategies use a particular colour
space, more specifically the CIE L*u*v* space where the L* dimension represents bright-
ness (ranging from black to white), the u* dimension represents the red-green opponent
channel, and the v* dimension the yellow-blue channel. This space was chosen because
the distance between two colours in the L*u*v* space accurately represents the psycho-
logical distances between these colours as perceived by human subjects.
Let us focus on a family of strategies that all use a prototype-based approach, i.e.
they perform categorisation using a standard nearest neighbour classification algorithm
operating over an inventory of prototypical points, as also used in the Proper Naming
Game and the Basic Colour Naming Game discussed in the previous chapter. Three
variant strategies are imaginable (and can be found in human languages):
1. The brightness-only strategy which uses only the L* dimension (dark, grey,
bright, etc.).
2. The hue-only strategy which uses only the hue dimension (blue, yellow, green,
etc.).
3. And the full-colour strategy which uses all dimensions.
5 These results are documented at length in: Bleys (2015).
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In order to understand the niche of each strategy, Bleys has set up experiments where
the context is controlled with respect to the importance of hue. For example, agents
can be presented with contexts with samples where the hue is the same but brightness
is different on the one hand versus contexts with samples where the brightness is the

























brightness brightness and hue hue
Figure 12.6: Niche analysis for three different colour strategies: brightness-only,
brightness-hue, and hue-only. The properties of the context vary on the x-
axis and the y-axis shows performance of each strategy. Only one niche
dimension is examined, namely communicative success. We see that each
strategy has its own niche for which it is optimal, but the full-colour strat-
egy is globally performing the best across contexts, which may explain why
it has become preferred in most language families.
Bleys initialised the three populations with the three different strategies and let them
first learn an interpretation of the Spanish focal colours (with prototypes in brightness-
only, hue-only, and full-colour spaces). Then he measured performance for communica-
tive success for the varying ecological conditions. Not unexpectedly, he found that de-
pending on the percentage of the importance of hue differences in the context, a differ-
ent strategy is more optimal (see Figure 12.6). Not surprisingly, a hue-only strategy fails
completely when the samples in each context have equal hue but different brightness,
whereas a brightness-only strategy fails when the samples have equal brightness but
different hue.
Another very useful type of experiment investigates in how far a particular strategy
indeed makes a difference with respect to certain factors. Here is an example. It is
again in the domain of spatial language discussed earlier and was conducted by Michael
Spranger.
Recall that three internal factors were used for the fitness landscape in this domain:
communicative success, semantic ambiguity and interpretation sharing. Spranger began
with a populationwithout any grammar but just a lexicon for expressing spatial relations
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and properties of objects. The agents were then initialised with a strategy that would
build a grammar consisting of hierarchical constructions which group all the compo-
nents of a spatial relation, put them in a particular sequential order, and add a marker to
them. For example, a construction could arise that groups a spatial relation (like ‘front’),
a determiner acting as selector (like ‘the’), and a noun introducing an object class (e.g.
‘box’), puts them in the order: spatial relation - determiner - noun, and adds a marker to
them (e.g. ‘-bo’).
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Figure 12.7: Agents have been given a grammatical strategy that introduces construc-
tions to signal which conceptualisation strategy has been used and what its
elements are. We see that communicative success and interpretation sharing
go up to the maximum and semantic ambiguity (number of interpretations)
goes down to 1, as the number of constructions built by the strategy increases.
A series of language games were played using contexts (such as the one shown in Fig-
ure 12.7, left) that contained a wide range of objects and also a landmark stimulating the
need for perspective reversal. As shown in the niche analysis earlier (see Figure 12.5 and
12.4) a languagewithout a grammatical expression supporting how spatial relations need
to be analysed will reach a communicative success rate of only 70 %. So the question is
whether the agents will increase this success rate when they exercise this grammatical
strategy. The same question can be posed for the other two niche factors (disambiguation
and semantic sharing). Experimental results are shown in Figure 12.7. They confirm that
as the language system is getting built up, key factors (communicative success, seman-




12.3 Selection and alignment of language strategies
It is only one step now to achieve the selection and alignment of language strategies.
Basically, two mechanisms needs to be added:
1. Agents need to track the performance of their strategies by tracking the perfor-
mance of the language systems that were built based on their strategies. In other
words, not only lexical or grammatical constructions but also strategies need to
have a score. These strategy scores should be updated using the same lateral
inhibition dynamics that we have been using at the level of word-meaning associ-
ations or more generally constructions.
2. It is also necessary that the conceptualisations and the lexical and grammatical
constructions that are implicated within a particular strategy are tagged with that
strategy, so that if their score is updated, the score of the strategy can be updated as
well (Figure 12.8). This is necessary for implementing a proper credit assignment
mechanism and also for ensuring that a word becomes unambiguously used with
a particular strategy.
The samewordmay be taggedwithmore than one strategy because a learning agent does
not know which strategy has been used by the speaker and so this may lead to different
hypotheses. But in the end, agents strive for convergence so that they all use the same
word with the same meaning. For example, a hearer cannot know whether a particular
word (e.g. ‘yellow’) is to be interpreted using the brightness-based or the full-colour-
based strategy, particularly because both strategies could work in similar circumstances.
For example, yellow colour chips are often themost bright ones and hence both strategies
would work. Consequently it is unavoidable that different strategies compete to recruit
the samewords, and this explains that we see this phenomenon indeed in the historically
attested evolution of language. Indeed, many of today’s hue words like ‘yellow’, ‘brown’
or ‘blue’ were all expressing brightness-based distinctions in Old English before they
became used as part of the Basic Colour Strategy in the late Middle English period (1350–
1500).6
We now look at an experiment, developed by Joris Bleys, which puts this evolutionary
dynamics to work. This is very challenging because language users must reach agree-
ment about a dominant strategy without central coordination and while keeping com-
municative success intact. The application domain is colour.
The Bleys experiment concerns the brightness-based and the full-colour strategy. Both
use a prototype-based nearest neighbour categorisation. We know from earlier experi-
ments with the Proper Naming Game and the Action Naming Game that this strategy
enables a population of agents to self-organise a colour lexicon from scratch. Figure 12.9
illustrates (on the left) how communicative success increases and the lexicon becomes
more coherent, and (on the right) how the prototypes of the different agents gradually
expand and become similar to be almost identical after 1200 games per agent, when the
system has stabilised to 6 basic colours.
6 See MacLaury (1992) and Casson (1997).
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Figure 12.8: Differentwords are taggedwith the strategywithwhich they should be inter-
preted. This allows the operationalisation of a 2-level selectionist dynamics,
operating at the level of strategies and at the level of the language system
built with each strategy.
The Brightness Prototype Strategy is similar to the Basic Colour Strategy, but in-
stead of taking all three dimensions into account, only the L* dimension of both the
stimuli in the context and the prototypes of the colour categories are compared. While
learning, the prototype of the used colour category is shifted on the L* axis towards the
L* value of the topic. During invention, only the L* value of the topic is considered rele-
vant. Figure 12.3 shows that this strategy is also adequate to allow a population of agents
to self-organise and coordinate a colour lexicon from scratch. The resulting colour lex-
icon now consists of different shades of grey. The set of prototypes also expands and
becomes similar across agents.
We now turn to themain issue here: the selectionist dynamics between both strategies.
The following selectionist process has been implemented:
• In speaking, agents handle a communicative problem with the solution that had
most success in the past and this solution implies a particular strategy. When
the problem cannot be handled, the speaker has to expand his set of meanings
and his lexicon and he uses the default strategy, i.e. the strategy that had most
success in the past, which translates into having the highest strategy-score. It is
only when this strategy does not work that other alternative strategies are tried
out in decreasing order of their scores.
• In listening, the hearer first applies his own stored solution to interpret the ut-
terance, which again implies the use of a language strategy associated with this
solution. When the hearer is confronted with an unknown word or with a situa-



































































































































































Figure 12.9: The Basic Colour Strategy allows a population of agents (in this case 10)
to self-organise a colour lexicon from scratch. The graph shows that high
communicative success is reached with a lexicon of about 15 colour words
(top). The evolution of a typical lexicon in a smaller population (5 agents), is
shown after 400 (bottom left) and 1200 (bottom right) games per agent. Each
row represents the lexicon of one agent.
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Figure 12.10: The Brightness Colour Strategy also allows a population of agents (in
this case 10) to evolve an adequate colour lexicon (top). The evolution of a
typical lexicon in a smaller population (5 agents), is shown after 400 (bot-
tom left) and 1600 (bottom right) games per agent. Each row represents the
lexicon of one agent.
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(because apparently the speaker used another strategy for this word), he uses first
his own default strategy to figure out the meaning of the unknown word, and, if
that does not work, he tries out alternative strategies, again in decreasing order of
their scores.
Rich and complex dynamics results from this general system. In the results shown in
Figure 12.11, the set of prototypes is kept fixed, namely equal to the focal colours under-
lying the Spanish colour system, which can be used either for the Full-Colour strategy
or for the Brightness strategy. For example, the word morado (‘purple’) can both be
interpreted in the full-colour space and in the brightness space.
Agents are initialised with a random value for the strategy-score for the Brightness-
based versus Full-colour based strategy. When the dynamics described here takes its
course (which includes the shifting of prototypes by speakers and hearers to be max-
imally adapted to the contexts that are presented), we observe several possibilities. In
one simulation run (see Figure 12.11), the brightness-based strategy becomes and remains
dominant. It could have been the brightness or the full-colour strategy, depending on









































strategy score (full colour)
usage (full colour space)
Figure 12.11: Communicative success stays constant. The Brightness Colour Strategy be-
comes dominant very early due to random fluctuations. It stays dominant
but barely. The strategy coherence (i.e. whether agents agree on the default
strategy) increases gradually. The Full Colour Strategy remains still in use
for cases where it is needed.
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egy becomes dominant first (in this case the brightness strategy) to be overtaken later
by another strategy (i.c. the full-colour strategy), as attested in the history of English
colour terms (see Figure 12.12). The two strategies continue to co-exist. Brightness is still
used in circumstances where this gives a higher chance of communicative success, for
example when colour chips are close in hue but distinct in brightness or when there is a
word which has most of its success in the brightness dimension.
12.4 Generation of new strategies
The previous section showed how there can be competition or cooperation between
strategies, fought out through the performance of the language systems against the
niche factors in which the language strategies operate. But a Darwinian evolutionary
framework requires that there is not only selection and a self-enforcing causal feedback
loop but also that new elements get generated, in this case new strategies, which can
then be subjected to a selectionist dynamics. How can we explain that new strategies
arise? This is the most challenging difficult question of evolutionary linguistics research
and very much an open question. We basically have to move up to a meta-level where




































strategy score (full colour)
usage (full colour space)
Figure 12.12: Initially the brightness strategy is dominant, but then the full-colour strat-
egy gradually takes over and becomes dominant around 400 games/agents.
Strategy coherence within the population progressively increases.
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whether they have to be innately given or whether they are themselves also the result
of developmental processes and a cultural dynamics. There are two aspects to a strategy:
a conceptual side and a linguistic side. For the conceptual side, solid results have been
achieved using IRL, which was from the beginning developed to allow the generation of
new conceptualisation strategies. So far a single meta-strategy has proven to be quite
successful in this case. The linguistic side however is still to a large extent in a stage
of fundamental research, and here there appear to be several different meta-strategies,
used by different language communities. Each of these two aspects is now discussed.
12.4.1 A meta-strategy for generating new conceptualisation
strategies
As explained in the previous chapter, the conceptualisation of grounded meaning takes
the form of programs which perform operations over the world model. For example, for
the spatial domain, this amounts to cognitive operations such as filtering the objects in
the context with a particular prototype, geometric transformations to re-interpret the
scene from a particular perspective, execute set operations, etc. We have seen that these
programs can be formulated in terms of constraint networks. Each cognitive operation
helps to determine or constrain the value of slots and computation terminates success-
fully when all slots could be filled.
We will use the domain of spatial language again as a source of examples, based on
experiments carried out by Michael Spranger. It uses the qrio humanoid robots and
scenes like the one shown in Figure 12.3. An example of a constraint network from this
domain is shown in Figure 12.13. It is the network for the phrase ‘near the box’. ‘Near’ is a
proximal relation which categorises objects in terms of how near they are to a landmark
(in this case the box). In a list form the network looks like this:
1. (get-context ?ctx-1)
2. (construct-region-proximal
?region ?ctx-1 ?landmark ?cat)
3. (bind proximal-category ?cat NEAR)
4. (apply-selection ?landmark ?landmarks ?selector-2)
5. (apply-class ?landmarks ?ctx ?landmark-class)
6. (bind selector ?selector-2 UNIQUE)
7. (get-context ?ctx)
8. (bind object-class ?landmark-class BOX)
The order of these operations does not matter as values propagate and constraints be-
come active until no further progress can be made. Operations in 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 provide
the referent of ‘the box’. The following contributions can be made by each of the cogni-
tive operations: The predicate box gets bound to ?landmark-class in operation 8. Object-
class is the type of ?landmark-class. The context, i.e. all objects in the present situation,
gets bound to ?ctx in operation 7. The selector uniqe gets bound to ?selector-2 in opera-
tion 6. Then the operation apply-class is applied to all the objects in ?ctx (the context) to
find the possible landmarks which get bound to ?landmarks using the ?landmark-class
(box). This set is assumed to be a singleton and so in operation 4 the unique element in
the set of ?landmarks can be selected and bound to ?landmark.
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Near the box  
Figure 12.13: Example of a conceptualisation for the phrase near to the box. Top: Leftmost:
The situation as perceived by the robot. Middle: situation after a geomet-
ric transform where the box is made the central perspective. Right: Area
around the box which reflects (in terms of darkness of the colour) how near
objects are to the box. Bottom: IRL constraint network for this conceptuali-
sation.
The remaining three operations apply the proximal relation. In operation 3 ?cat is
bound to the proximal-category near. In operation 1, ?ctx-1 gets bound to the context.
And finally in operation 2, the region around the landmark, which satisfies the category
?cat (near), can be computed and bound to ?region by “construct-region-proximal”. The
construction-region-proximal constraint has to perform first a geometric transformation
on the scene, constructing a world model from the viewpoint of the landmark, i.e. the
box.
A conceptualisation strategy is an abstraction of such a concrete conceptualisa-
tion network. It consists of a network that acts as a useful chunk and is therefore a
modular unit that can be linked into a larger network. The chunk has a set of open vari-
ables with which the network can be linked to other networks. For example, the network
shown in Figure 12.13 can be made more abstract to handle many instances of proximal
relations, not only near the box, but also far from the box, close to the box, near the boxes,
near the table, very far from the wall, etc. The open variables are ?cat, ?selector-2, and
?landmark-class, which have to be supplied by lexical items or phrases. The network is
then as follows, with operations at 3, 6 and 8 removed:
1. (get-context ?ctx-1)
2. (construct-region-proximal ?region ?ctx-1 ?landmark ?cat)
4. (apply-selection ?landmark ?landmarks ?selector-2)
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5. (apply-class ?landmarks ?ctx ?landmark-class)
7. (get-context ?ctx)
The network has to be completed with bindings for the open variables, but all the other
variables can be computed through the network itself. Network-chunks are expressed
through a grammatical construction, which expresses which chunk is involved and how
the initial values of the slots are to be expressed. In this case it is a noun-phrase con-
struction, syntactically of the form [noun preposition article noun] and semantically
constrained as [proximal-category selector object-class].
Spranger demonstrated how new spatial conceptualisation strategies can be derived.
The process uses the regular way in which the speaker agent finds possible conceptuali-
sations, namely through a search process (Figure 12.14).
Figure 12.14: The meaning of an utterance is found through a search process, starting
from an empty network, progressively more constraints are added until a
solution network is found that, when executed, yields the topic chosen by
the speaker.
As explained in the previous chapter, the speaker starts from a particular commu-
nicative goal (the topic) within a specific context. Each step in the search process adds
progressively more nodes and at each step, the network is tried out to see whether it is
able to compute anything in the present context and whether it brings the speaker closer
to a possible effective conceptualisation. The end-nodes of the search tree contain either
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networks that do not yield a solution or a network that is a possible conceptualisation
offered for translation into an utterance.
Often there is more than one solution. (There are already four solutions in the tree
in Figure 12.14 and more solutions would turn up if some of the nodes are worked out
further.) Solutions are ranked based on various criteria such as their complexity, the
score of the prototypes involved, or how well they can be translated into an utterance.
Once an adequate conceptualisation is found and it leads to a successful game, mod-
ular sections of the network can be abstracted and used as the basis of reusable concep-
tualisation strategies in the future. Each conceptualisation strategy has its own score
which is updated using the lateral inhibition dynamics as used for the lexical or gram-
matical constructions as explained in earlier chapters. The frequency of use and success
of a strategy depends partly on whether the “niche” in which a strategy is most effective
occurs frequently, partly on what is preferred by the rest of the population, and other
criteria such as complexity.
Figure 12.15 shows an example experiment in which all the aspects discussed in this
section are brought together. A population of 10 agents is developing new conceptuali-
sation strategies for a niche that encourages preference for a particular strategy, namely
a projective strategy with possible perspective reversal, as in the box in front of the wall.
We see that communicative success steadily rises and that the number of spatial cate-
gories increases. The bottom graph zooms in on the conceptualisation strategies. We see
that agents reach a consensus about a dominant strategy after a period in which new
strategies are invented and tried out.
12.4.2 Meta-strategies for generating new lexicogrammatical
strategies
Are there general meta-strategies that can be used to generate the kind of lexicogrammat-
ical strategies that can in turn generate all the language systems we observe in today’s
languages? This is a very profound question, related to the ongoing debate in linguistics
on the existence of a universal language acquisition device. A lot of ink has been spilled
but we need to do profound computational modelling of meta-strategies and thorough
experiments to find out.
Generally speaking, a lexico-grammatical strategy has two components: diagnostics
which monitor how language processing is going and repairs which add new construc-
tions to the agent’s inventory.
For lexical strategies, the diagnostics consist in checking whether there is part of
the meaning that is not yet covered by any lexical item. The repair then consists in
introducing a (possibly new) word and introducing a new lexical construction for this
word. This strategy is already used by the Talking Heads. When part of a meaning
cannot be covered, a new word form is randomly generated and used from then on for









































































Figure 12.15: This experiment combines strategy invention, alignment, and category de-
velopment by each strategy. The top figure shows language games on the
x-axis, and communicative success, average number of categories, and in-
terpretation similarity on the y-axis. The bottom figure shows the similarity
between strategies and the average number of strategies in the population.
One strategy becomes dominant.
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A study of ongoing change in the vocabularies of human speakers shows that the
invention of a brand new word form happens seldom. Usually an existing wordform is
recruited to express an uncovered meaning. The meaning of the already existing word
form expresses aspects of the novel meaning to be expressed but there is not an exact
overlap. However, the existing word is sufficiently suggestive so that the hearer can
guess what meaning is intended by the speaker. For example, the word ‘mouse’ becomes
adopted for computer mouse based on its appearance. Often a compound of several
words is used, each of them suggesting other aspects of the meaning, such as bitcoin,
which suggests digital (bit) and currency (coin). There are several other strategies, for
example, an abbreviation of a longword becomes itself a single newword, such asMOOC,
meaning ‘massively open on-line course’ and now standing for a course made available
through the internet. There are also playful variations created with existing words, as
for example wackadoo which means ‘bizarre person’ and probably originally came from
the word wacky.
It is not really possible to capture the enormous creativity of human word creation in
computational simulations because that would involve components for common sense
inference and access to massive cultural knowledge. However we can do experiments
to understand how new words may arise by analogy with existing words and how the
meaning of words can develop further, for example by abandoning some of the aspects
of the original meaning or gaining new meanings. Such experiments have been carried
out in particular by Wellens, Loetzsch & Steels (2008).
In their “adaptive, flexible word meaning strategy”, Wellens and Loetzsch assumed
that the association between a word and the different components of the meaning (called
its features) is flexible. Each component feature has a score and not all features have to
be present in order to use a word. The scores of the features are updated depending on
the success of the word and whether they were relevant in the situation in which the
word was used. As a consequence we get a much more fine-grained dynamics in which
the meanings of words may flexibly shift and a word may come to be used for another
constellation of features that is only partially matching. Figure 12.16 shows examples
of how these features evolve over time. They show the kinds of progressive shifts in
meaning that we also observe in human lexicon evolution and demonstrate how words
can come to be used for quite different meanings than their rigid original sense would
demand.
Grammatical strategies come in two types. There are first of all strategies that express
additional meaning using syntax. The syntax can either take the form of ordering of the
words, as in the distinction between an affirmative sentence and a question, signalled by
the use of the auxiliary do and inversion of the main verb and the subject (as in Does he
come? versus he comes), or by the use of syntactic structure and function words, as in the
verb phrase. For example, a phrase likewill have been coming involves a future perfective
using the auxiliarywill, the infinitive auxiliary (have), the past participle auxiliary (been),
and the present participle main verb (coming).
There are also strategies that focus on minimising the cognitive effort of the listener
by signalling how words in the sentence need to be semantically grouped together. This






















































Figure 12.16: Two examples of the meaning of words in terms of a set of component
features whose weight can change over time.
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• Language-dependent markers for various syntactico-semantic features, such as
number, gender, case, are introduced and the different words which need to be
grouped are all marked for the same features. An example of this kind of gram-
matical agreement is ‘la belle fille’ (French: the beautiful girl) where the article ‘la’
and the adjective ‘belle’ are both marked as singular feminine.
• The second strategy is phrase structure. Words are grouped together that are about
the same object, a sequential order is imposed on these words, and patterns of
orderings based on syntactic and semantic categories are introduced.
Extensive empirical work on grammaticalisation has given us a wealth of data how these
strategies play out in the history of human languages.7 And the key challenge for evo-
lutionary linguistics is to model these processes, the same way evolutionary biologists
model speciation or species evolution.
I here just point to one series of experiments, I conducted with Katrien Beuls, on the
origins of agreement systems, which follow the latter strategy Beuls & Steels (2013). The
challenge was to discover by what kind of language strategies an agreement system
could arise and to identify the basic building blocks with which evolutionary experi-
ments could be set up.
Historical linguists have researched many concrete examples of how agreement sys-
tems arise.8 There are invariably the following phases:
1. Agreement markers derive from reusing existing words, such as pronouns or clas-
sifiers.
2. The markers derived from independent words become shorter, they lose part of
their form, then become clitics and later affixes. For example, the Dyirbal (Aus-
tralian aboriginal) agreement marker m- evolved from the classifier mayi, which
means ‘non-flesh food’.
3. The features that agreement markers express, which are initially semantically
grounded, invariably become more abstract and get to be used in a purely con-
ventional manner. For example, the masculine/feminine gender distinction has its
basis in male/female sex, but is then arbitrarily applied to inanimate objects, so
that table might be masculine in one language (German: der Tisch) but feminine
in another (French: la table).
Starting from a game of reference, similar to the Talking Heads experiment, populations
of agents were programmed first to build a “formal” agreement system, i.e. a system
based on formal markers without any meaning, and then a meaningful grammatical
system, with grammatical markers that express semantic features. The experiment was
then extended with further strategies that optimise three niche factors:
7 See for example: Heine & Kuteva (2007), Hopper & Traugott (1993), Lehmann (1982), Traugott & Trousdale
(2013).
8 See for example: Lehmann (1988), Luraghi (2011).
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1. The recruitment of existing words as markers makes the acquisition of new mark-
ers more accurate because it is based on existing words and so the meaning can be
guessed more easily. This helps to propagate the markers faster in the population.
2. The phonological reduction of word forms leads to less articulatory effort, as we
have already seen with the German article system.
3. Conventionalisation leads to a smaller inventory, and hence less memory require-
ments and better preservation of the language system.
Here I just show results for one example, the phonological reduction strategy. Al-
though sophisticated models of speech articulation exist and they predict the kind of
errors and variations that speakers tend to introduce and how they influence sound
change, we have used a simpler model that nevertheless brings out the language dynam-
ics clearly. Speakers optimise articulation by leaving out the last consonant or vowel of
a marker with a certain probability ϵ = 0.1. Hearers are flexible enough in their parsing
of markers to recognise that a truncated form is a variant of an existing marker, as long
as it deviates for only one consonant or vowel. When an agent produces or encounters
a truncated marker, he stores it in his inventory as a new variant of the original marker,
and later uses the original or the truncated form with equal chance. However, as soon
as an agent encounters the truncated marker for a second time, he adopts it as the new
norm and the old form is discarded. It is possible that the agent encounters again the
previous older form which may then be re-adopted and reused if it is encountered more
than once. However, at some point, there are enough agents using the new variant so
that the whole population shifts in a phase transition.
Figure 12.17 shows the outcome of a computer simulation of this phonological reduc-
tion strategy. An agreement system based on meaningful markers is emerging using
the meaningful marker strategy. But after agents reach a stable level of performance (in
the experiment this is typically after 200 games per agent), they occasionally introduce
phonological reductions with probability ϵ = 0.1 and this leads to the erosion of the
original markers. Figure 12.17 top) shows that the average marker length is decreasing
from an average of 7 to 4 consonants and vowels, without affecting performance. There
is greater variation Vg in the population because there are always different variants of
the same marker in use, but this generally does not have an impact on communicative
success because agents are able to recognise them as a variant of their own norm. Fig-
ure 12.17 bottom) shows a typical example how a marker (in this case -uinbui) erodes.
At the beginning there is still competition for two meanings for this marker but soon
the second meaning dominates. The form gets phonologically reduced in the sequence
-uinbui → -uinbu → -uinb → -uin → -ui → -u. At this point reduction stops because
speakers are able to detect that otherwise the function of the marker would get lost.
These results are significant from a language dynamics point of view because they
show, for the first time, how phonological reduction carried out by individual agents
can lead to marker erosion, without destroying the functioning of the agreement system
as a whole and even though there is no central control to ensure that shared norms are
maintained.
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Figure 12.17: Performance of the phonological reduction strategy. i) Average perfor-
mance values for 50 game series for a total of 50,000 games (average of
10,000 per agent). We see that the length of themarkers progressively dimin-
ishes, thus reducing articulatory effort, but variation Vg does not increase,
implying that the system is stable. The marker inventory size remains con-
stant as well. ii) Trace of the changes to a marker in a single experiment.
The marker -uinbui erodes progressively to -u. A truncated variant is typi-
cally present for a while in the population until a phase transition happens




This section reported on experiments in the 2010–2015 time period that have tried to
scale up language dynamics from a single strategy (as in the Talking Heads) to multi-
ple strategies. This led to the discovery that we need a dual dynamics: on the level of
language systems governed by one ormore strategies, and on the level of language strate-
gies. We have applied a cultural Darwinian dynamics on both levels. How that works
for language systems is quite clear now, but many questions remain and much more
work needs to be done to see how it would work on the level of language strategies. This
chapter reported some of the progress made recently. It introduced three steps: niche
analysis as a way to understand the evolutionary landscape, selection and alignment of
language strategies, and the generation of new language strategies.
It is now time to come to a general conclusion of this book. The intellectual adventure
that has been described here is not over yet. Here are some of the many lines for further
research remaining.
First we needmuchmore work along the paths of which we have seenmany examples:
1. The study of more language systems, based on firm empirical data. For example,
the study of the verbal system of Italian or the determiner system of Dutch.
2. A study of the language strategies that underly these systems. A language strategy
should define how a particular type of language system operates, how it is learned,
and how it is expanded and aligned.
3. A study of the niche occupied by the language systems governed by a particular
language strategy.
4. Evolutionary experiments to show how new strategies may arise.
Then there are also several deep open questions which have not been addressed exten-
sively so far. Here are a few examples:
1. What are implications of the models presented here for the neurobiology of lan-
guage? Right now it remains largely a mystery how the human brain is processing
language and current neural network models are entirely insufficient from a repre-
sentational and computational point of view to handle the structures and processes
that we have been using in the various experiments reported in this book.
2. How to orchestrate long-term evolution, both within the individual and in a popu-
lation? Some suggestions have been made based on the autotelic principle which
allows agents to control the communicative challenges in relation to their level
of skill (Steels & Wellens 2007). But these suggestions need to be tested more
seriously in large-scale long term experiments.
3. What is the interaction between cultural evolution and genetic evolution? I have
argued in favour of culture-driven genetic evolution but what kind of genetic
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change is necessary to support the processes that we have been found to be op-
erating at the cultural level? Clearly, flexible recruitment and huge amounts of
memory are key demands on the human brain, but there are undoubtedly others.
4. What is the interaction between social evolution, cultural evolution and biological
evolution? The language games which we have studied all required honest com-
munication. Agents do their best to play the game as well as they can and agents
are fully cooperative. This is not the default condition in the natural world and
it is not so easy to explain how human sociality arose, and how human language
may have fostered it (Dor, Knight & Lewis 2014).
These questions can only be properly addressed by bringing up and working out hy-
potheses and doing detailed computational analysis and computational experiments. The
field of evolutionary linguistics is still in its infancy and so far too few researchers are
contributing through the kind of computational simulations that were discussed in this
book. This is not surprising given the technical complexity and the breadth of knowledge
needed to work in this area. It takes Ph.D students on average 5 years of training and
experimentation to carry a research thread to fruition, assuming that the student starts
with considerable background in computational linguistics or Artificial Intelligence. Let
us hope that in the future the resources will be available so that younger generations
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